Largest Hydroelectric Project in DPRK Heads Toward Completion

North Korea is no stranger to mega projects. The May Day Stadium (largest seating capacity in the world), Ryugyong Hotel (the abandoned "hotel of doom" that would have been the tallest in the world back in 1992), and the West Sea Barrage (an 8-km long dam across the mouth of the Taedong River) all bear witness to North Korea's willingness to expend enormous resources on enormous projects, even if they don't always work out as planned.

One such current mega project is the Tanchon Hydroelectric Power Station.

Despite being named for the coastal city of Tanchon, the project centers around the border area between Ryanggang and South Hamgyong provinces, specifically around the worker's district of Sinhung, 53 km away from Tanchon as the crow flies. However, this isn't a run-of-the-mill hydroelectric dam. It is a massive complex that starts at a new water intake point at the Samsu Reservoir (near Hyesan) and then carries water through a roughly 60 km-long tunnel to the electricity generating stations in Sinhung. The tunnel is the longest such tunnel in the country and makes this the largest hydroelectric project currently underway by North Korea.

The next longest water tunnel for hydroelectricity that I am aware of is the Songwon Dam tunnel. Constructed in 1987, it runs a mere 42 km.

The Tanchon project is actually part of a larger attempt to take advantage of the rivers and steep valleys of this region. The northerly-flowing Hochon River is the primary source of water. The northern extreme is the Samsu Dam and reservoir, which lie less than 10 km from Hyesan and the Yalu River border with China (into which the Hochon empties).

In this complicated image you can see the path of the Hochon River (blue), flowing south to north. That water fills the Samsu Reservoir where the water intake site is located for the Tanchon project. That water is then diverted through a tunnel (white) where it travels north to south (against the natural gradient of the area). It will then enter the dual Tanchon generating stations in the small town of Sinhung. From there, it empties into the Namdeachon River (yellow) which flows north to south and empties into the sea at the city of Tanchon.

Moving south (aka upriver), lies the Sachophonyg Reservoir which feeds the Hochongang Power Station in Sinhung (11.8 km away and is adjacent to the new Tanchon generating stations). Both the Hochongang Power Station and the new Tanchon stations empties the waters of the Hochon River into the Namdaechon River, across a sort of continental divide thanks to the tunnels, as the Namdaechon then runs south and empties into the Sea of Japan, whereas the headwaters of the Hochon arise in the Hamgyong Mountains (also known as Gangbaekjeonggan) which create a natural border between Ryanggang and South Hamgyong provinces.

Being built at the same time as Tanchon is a smaller hydroelectric dam on the Hochon at Saphyong-ri (pictured above) and a hydroelectric dam at Sinhung (also called Power Station No. 5) on the Namdaechon River that is less than 2 km from the new Tanchon generating station.

Exploiting this riverine resource goes back nearly a century. During the Japanese occupation era, Yutaka Kubota (founder of the Japanese engineering firm Nippon Koei) was a consultant for the Hochongang River Overall Project from 1925-45, and the project was expected to eventually generate 338 MW of electricity.

Samsu Dam ca. 2011. The large propaganda sign in the background reads "Long live Songun Korea's General Kim Jong Un!" and is over half a kilometer long. Image source: Wikimapia.

In terms of North Korean efforts, the Samsu Hydroelectric Dam alone was supposed to produce 50 MW of electricity to provide for Ryanggang Province and the important Hyesan Youth Copper Mine. Built from 2004-2007, the dam was beset with problems and still fails to live up to expectations.

Kim Il Sung introduced the modern idea of exploiting the rivers in the area in the years soon before his death and wanted the project to generate 400-500 MW. But it wasn't until 2016 when Kim Jong Un announced the construction of the Tanchon Power Station that work finally began. According to a May 2017 Pyongyang Times report, the project is supposed to generate "several hundred thousand of kilowatts" and would indeed be the largest hydroelectric project in the country's history.

During Kim Jong Un's 2016 New Years' address he said, "The problem of electricity should be resolved as an undertaking involving the whole Party and the whole state." Giving little detail about the project he went on to say, "The construction of the Tanchon Power Station and other projects for boosting the country’s power-generating capacity should be promoted along with the efforts to ease the strain on electricity supply by making proactive use of natural energy." 

Such an undertaking would indeed require the effort of the "whole state".

As discussed in the Songwon article, one reason to not locate the electric generating station at the site of a dam or to excavate miles of tunnels to divert water elsewhere, is to take advantage of a substantial change in elevation. The greater the difference between the elevation of where the water is stored (in this case the Samsu Reservoir) and where it runs through the turbines at the generating station, the greater the power generated.

The approximate elevation of the water intake site at Samsu is 2,500 ft above sea level. The tunnel cuts through mountains and valleys on a downhill gradient to deliver the water to a point roughly 1,800 feet above sea level. This represents a 700-foot drop, something no existing traditional hydroelectric dam in the country could provide. For some perspective, to otherwise maintain a hydraulic head of 700 feet would require a traditional dam on the scale of the Glen Canyon Dam in the United States.

The elevation drop also allows a relatively small amount of water to pick up momentum and hit the generating turbines with more energy, producing more electricity. Both the Songwon and Samsu water intake sites are placed at shallow ends of their respective reservoirs, meaning limited amounts of water can transit the tunnel system. This may seem counter intuitive, to only have a little water flowing through, but considering the number of droughts North Korea has, it could also allow for a more constant supply of electricity (albeit limited) but without draining the reservoirs or damaging the tunnels over time.

Despite all the work visible via satellite images, by March 2020 the project was only fifty-percent completed. On April 17 the regime announced that the number of "national projects" would be cut from 15 to 5 projects. One such project is the new Pyongyang General Hospital and it is consuming substantial resources from across the country.

However, according to the Pyongyang Times, by June construction was being "pushed dramatically" and key parts of the project are now nearing their "final stage". This jump in activity is a common theme among North Korean projects and suggests that Tanchon is one of those five main national projects still being given priority as their economy struggles due to COVID-19 measures and ongoing sanctions.

Once completed, Tanchon would be the culmination of generations of planning and levels of backbreaking work rarely seen in today's modern world.

The 60-kilometer tunnel was built by cutting dozens (over 50) of individual access tunnels into solid rock to slowly expand and lengthen the main water tunnel. North Korea lacks tunnel boring machines, so the work is being done with small excavation equipment and by hand.
The construction of the generating station will consume thousands of tons of concrete and steel, and its power distribution lines will run for untold miles connecting the site to the national energy grid.

Unfortunately, any projections that Tanchon will substantively ease regional energy needs should be taken with a grain of salt. As mentioned, Samsu Dam has failed to generate electricity at its designed capacity and other dams have likewise suffered from setbacks. Even the backbone of North Korea's energy grid like the Pyongyang and Pukchang thermal power plants are constantly plagued by generation and efficiency problems, and blackouts in Pyongyang itself are still a common occurrence.

However, if Tanchon does live up to the majority of expectations, it and the other hydroelectric stations along Hochon's 220 kilometers will finally surpass the planned generating capacity by the Japanese all those many years ago.


Additional reading:
38 North has been covering the construction progress of the Tanchon project. You can read their detailed work here and here. Also, see AccessDPRK's November 2020 update.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., Anders O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 7/2/2020
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Powering Up North Korea

As anyone who has ever visited the country can attest, North Korea's electrical supply is limited and unreliable. Compared to its highly wired northern and southern neighbors, North Korea looks like a black hole, as this well-known NASA image shows.

North Korea has several rivers and an abundance of coal that it can exploit for electricity generation, but a lack of equipment, spare parts, technical know-how, and an inefficient electric grid has meant that providing stable power to the country (or even the capital) has been a never ending problem for decades.

To try and address the electricity problem, North Korea has been trying to mine ever larger amounts of coal (since building entirely new coal plants appears to be beyond their current capabilities due to cost and sanctions), constructing new hydroelectric dams, and making attempts to fix inefficiencies within the system.

The country uses three main types of hydroelectric generation: traditional hydroelectric dams, low-head hydroelectric generators which don't require large amounts of water, and gravity pumped hydroelectric generators which can be used to supplement the energy supply. One major problem with hydroelectricity production is the region's weather which leaves the country in drought conditions fairly often. Since the water is most needed for crop irrigation, a stable nationwide supply of electricity from this source has yet to be achieved.

To help mitigate this problem, North Korea has begun to move away from building giant hydroelectric dams and is switching to building smaller dams that run along the course of a river as a set. Their combined electrical generating capacity can be large but without the constant problems the country has encountered while building larger dams. 38 North has published two articles disusing this trend. (Part I, Part II)

The country's energy portfolio does include wind power, but the current generating capacity is only enough to power a few thousand homes. However, experiments in wind continue, especially on the small scale of individual farms or small factories. I have noted that a site near Cholsan could be interpreted as the foundations for several large turbines but as of Feb. 2020, any additional construction has yet to occur.

Tweet link: https://twitter.com/JacobBogle/status/1050871826652516352

Finally, there's solar. North Korea only has a few "large" solar farms (by international standards, they're fairly small), but there are multiple reports that solar panels are being installed all around the country, mostly by individuals trying to power their home appliances. While many of these solar sites are too small to be seen via satellite, there are plenty of buildings with sets of solar panels that give evidence to the reports.

Building in west Pyongyang with solar panels covering the roof. Source: Google Earth, Jan. 16, 2017.

Obviously nuclear power could greatly help North Korea's problems. North Korea received a research reactor from the Soviet Union in 1963 and in 1979 it began to build its own indigenous reactor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and a lack of domestic nuclear fuel greatly hindered further research into nuclear energy production, but the country didn't give up. Pyongyang began construction on a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon; however, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to halt construction of that reactor in exchange for two 1000 MWe light-water reactors (which can't be used in weapon's programs). As so often happens, the deal fell through after several years and the final oil shipments and other associated programs as part the agreement ended in 2006.

Since then North Korea seems to be far more interested in developing weapons than building a peaceful nuclear energy capacity. Thus, the country must continue to rely on outdated coal plants and try to squeeze every kilowatt of power out any available river. One can hope that they will continue to develop wind and solar energy.

According to most sources, North Korea's energy production breaks down to 76% from hydroelectricity and 24% from coal. However, as noted, there has been real investment (both private and state) into wind and solar. I think it is possible that up to 5% of North Korea's energy portfolio now comes from these two sources, as many homes produce and use electricity that isn't connected to the official grid and can't be methodically measured through standard means.

The backbone of North Korea's energy grid (2012). Source: Geni.org

Based on #AccessDPRK mapping for Phase III, North Korea has eleven coal and oil-fueled thermal electric generating plants. Of those, one is inactive and another is under construction (which has been stalled since 2014). There are at least 475 hydroelectric generating stations and associated dams (the dams and generators can sometimes be miles apart, but both are counted as they are part of the overall hydroelectric system). Many of these sites only run during periods of high water or seasonally for irrigation purposes, while lying inactive the rest of the year. Many of the smallest sites (that produce only a few kilowatts) might actually be completely inactive due to flood damage over the years. It's impossible to tell via satellite for each and every site.

Those sources of energy, along with the new solar and wind locations, distribute their electricity through a network of at least 1,322 electrical substations.

The following set of images show the locations of the country's fossil fuel power plants, its hydroelectric plants, main wind and solar farms, and all of the substations.

The country continues to try to improve its energy production through all means available. A kilometer-long solar farm was constructed in Sinuiju in 2019 and the country is in the middle of finishing up construction of its largest hydroelectric project that's currently underway. The Samsu-Sinhung hydroelectric station (also called Tanchon) will rely on a 60 km tunnel to deliver water from the Samsu reservoir in Ryanggang Province to a generating station in Sinhung, S. Hamgyong Province.

Additionally, they have been taking steps to decrease the energy demand on the main grid by installing solar panels at most cell phone towers. With the country's 1,150 or so cell towers, this step alone contributes anywhere from 1 to 3 megawatt hours of power to the system during peak hours. (Cell tower energy production levels depends on several variables which aren't easily discoverable with North Korea.)

Powering North Korea relies on a complex network of generating sites, distribution points, and other infrastructure that is often many decades old. Inefficiencies within the system continue to pose a major obstacle to achieving energy sufficiency as upwards of 30% of electricity is lost through transmission and distribution by the time you get to rural areas, with a 2014 national loss average of 16% - five times the loss rate of South Korea.

Reviving the entire system would cost billions the country doesn't have. In the meantime, the regime seems to be dealing with this perennial problem by investing more in hydroelectricity to ensure energy levels are sufficient to meet core industrial and agricultural needs, and has been letting individual families fend for themselves by buying solar panels, solar water heaters, and installing micro-wind turbines on their homes and apartments. This approach will not solve the energy problem, but it does give the state some extra options until more systemic and economical solutions are discovered.


Patreon Special Access
Patreon supporters at the $20 tier are entitled to exclusive data sets. The Google Earth file for this post is one of those exclusive offers. The file contains every identified thermal power plant, hydroelectric dam, wind turbine, every major solar site, the country's network of electrical substations, and dozens of examples of small-scale solar installations. In all, it has over 1,800 places marked and with additional information where available. Please consider supporting the #AccessDPRK Project on Patreon and get access to this and other exclusive information.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., Anders Omholt, GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.


--Jacob Bogle, 6/13/2020
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Old School Fortifications Still Part of DPRK Military Plans

In this day of guided bombs, stealth fighters, and rail guns, North Korea is holding fast to World War II-style "practical" fortifications to keep their country from being quickly overrun in the event of an invasion.

After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung ordered that the country be made into an impregnable fortress. To that end, anti-tank walls, dragon's teeth, and concrete "fall barriers" (tank traps) were constructed all over the country, especially along the coast and DMZ to defend against invading forces.

The country's road system was also intentionally left in a poorly developed state to hamper the movement of heavy vehicles and tanks which would instead get stuck in the mud or squeezed into choke points to be picked off by North Korean forces.

Anti-tank "fall barrier" (German: fallsperre) located along the Pyongyang-Kaesong Highway in North Korea. Image source: Commons.

Some of these anti-tank fall barriers, which consist of concrete blocks stacked precariously on top of each other waiting to be toppled into the road to prevent tanks and other equipment from moving forward, are even placed at key points within the interior to protect mountain passes and other key transit sites.

While dragon's teeth and anti-tank ditches have largely been left to decay over the decades (with many sites being completely useless today), Kim Jong Un has continued to construct tank traps.

Another common fall barrier design. Image taken near the DMZ.

In 2017 with the publication of the #AccessDPRK Phase II Map, I had identified over 500 tank traps around the country - 198 were located near the Demilitarized Zone. Since then, I have located several others that I missed but I have also found a number of them that have been installed in just the last few years (while most others have been around for decades).

Map of all identified tank traps as of June 2020.

As the map shows, tank traps have been positioned along the DMZ and coastal regions to stall any invasion. Pyongyang is also protected by groups of them to the east and west (as the southern approaches are already protected by the DMZ).

Below are four new examples of these barriers that have been installed since 2015.

Near Kwaksan, a tank trap was added in 2015. It also includes a section of an anti-tank wall that runs for approx. 460 feet and blocks a small depression that tanks could have driven through to bypass the tank trap along the road.  Coords: 39°39'21.60"N 125° 0'3.08"E

Anti-tank wall and tank trap under construction on March 18, 2015.

The completed system as seen on April 1, 2017.

This one was built in Onchon in 2017 and reinforces another older road block 4 km away to prevent travel through the Cholhyon Pass of Mt. Sindok. Coords: 38°50'46.76"N 125°20'2.57"E

Four sets of blocks as seen on Feb. 27, 2019.

Two have been constructed near Myongchon. One in 2015 and the other in 2018. They block two points along AH 6 and is part of the main system of tank traps in North Hamgyong Province that defends the main transportation routes.

North trap (installed in 2015) - 41° 7'2.21"N 129°22'31.56"E

South trap (installed in 2018) - 41° 4'31.58"N 129°22'41.03"E

These are all similar to most other examples in the country and are meant to be able to block the width of regular country roads (which are predominantly unpaved). There are some examples of much larger road blocks, however.

This is a set of four blocks on the eastern approach to Pyongyang along the Pyongyang-Wonsan Highway. Since the road is wider than most, the blocks are taller; approx. 30 feet in height (compared to ~15 for most others).

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 6/3/2020
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North Korea's Underground Navy: A Review

Many countries have underground facilities for their navies. Places to protect submarines, places to defend against surprise or nuclear attacks, underground storage, places that have all kinds of purposes.

One large example was the Soviet base in Balaklava, Crimea. China currently maintains at least six underground submarine bases. The United States has an enormous underground fuel storage site in Hawaii.

North Korea is no different.

North Korea has a tremendous amount of experience digging tunnels. I have found hundreds of tunnels across the country, hundreds of artillery sites that pop out of tunnels, scores of underground factories, and quite a few underground naval sites.

Bounded on two sides by the ocean and with 2,495 km of coastline, the Korean People's Navy has a strength of 60,000 men and over 800 vessels, making it one of the largest navies in the world in terms of vessel numbers. And while most of their naval technologies are decades behind the West, Kim Jong Un has been focusing on modernizing the fleet. Furthermore, what they lack in technology they can make up (some of that gap) by sheer numbers.

North Korea has 70-80 submarines, which places them on par with the United States (based on numbers) and far outpaces South Korea. Their navy has been able to inflict substantial damage in attacks like the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002.

And so, it makes sense to marry navy and tunnel together. Underground naval bases provide safety in the event of attack and secrecy to develop, arm, refuel, and launch attacks. Having multiple sites also makes it more difficult for an attacking country to quickly knock out North Korea's navy.

The country has 13 identified underground naval sites. Some can accommodate submarines but most currently serve various types of surface ships. Interestingly, North Korea's main submarine base for the Sea of Japan (East Sea), which is based on Mayang Island, lacks any apparent underground facilities.

(Click on images for larger view)

The facilities range from simple tunnels to more complex facilities that are accessed from the sea and cover a large footprint.

Starting with the Yellow Sea (West Sea) bases:

Taewha-do Underground Base: 39°25'59.69"N 124°37'2.39"E

Taewha-do is on an island (the -do suffix means island) and consists of a small underground facility and a turntable to enable vessels to be moved around the base on a short rail system. There is only a single dual entrance/exit point to the underground facility (UGF) but the island's size could theoretically accommodate an enormous UGF inside. However, it only appears to house small patrol boats and the island garrison is no larger than battalion sized.

Very little information about the base is publicly available and most of the information that does exist relates to a series of small military actions during the Korean War, before the UGF was construction. The island rises steeply out of the ocean and can provide up to 600 feet of solid rock on top of the UGF, giving it excellent protection.

Sok-do is not necessarily an underground base but rather it is a set of four hardened pens that allow craft to be protected. Located at 38°38'7.33"N 125° 0'26.27"E, it doesn't appear to be in use. It lies just 5 km from Pip'a-got, which is a primary naval base.

Pip'a-got is the largest naval base immediately outside of the West Sea Barrage, which cuts off direct access to the Taedong River and Pyongyang.

Pip'a-got naval base.

The base consists of a large protected harbor (created by a set of breakwaters), hundreds of buildings, and seven distinct ship handling sites (dry docks, main harbor, UGF, etc). It covers approx. 5 square kilometers.

The underground component consists of a 600-meter long tunnel that connects a turntable (that can take ships from a slip and bring them to the tunnel entrance) to an exit that enters directly into the sea, bypassing the large seawalls.

The tunnel could include other facilities like fueling, loading weapons, and repair, but the interior layout is not known. The hill it cuts beneath rises from ~90 feet at the turntable to a maximum height of ~250 feet along the path of the tunnel.

Sunwi-do & Sagot (Ryongho) Bases
Sunwi-do has a small base at the far northeast end of the island. It is across from the larger Sagot base on Ryongho Island 4 km to the north. Both bases are in South Hwanghae Province are the southernmost underground naval facilities on the west coast. The base at Sunwi-do lies a 31 km from the South Korean island of Yeongpyeong.

The base on Sunwi Island, 37°46'11.59"N 125°20'21.45"E

At its height, the island provides ~180 feet of rock over the Sunwi tunnel which runs for 250 meters.
North Korea has several classes of patrol boats and Sunwi seems to be a base for them. In the imagery provided by Google Earth, at no time has there been more than 13 ships and none over ~28 meters in length.

In this image of Ryongho, four classes of ship can be seen. Upwards of 36 ships have been seen at Ryongho but some may have actually been small fishing vessels along with the military craft.

Sagot base is split between two main facilities. One is at the town of Sagot, on the mainland 1.8 km to the north, and the second is the UGF on Ryongho Island (37°48'17.24"N 125°21'9.58"E).
A direct line from the Ryongho entrance to the exit runs 290 meters but the full tunnel path isn't a straight line. It is likely at least 365 meters in total length. Between 150 and 250 feet of rock sits above the site, depending on location.

The exit has apparently silted up and cannot be used as a direct exit point for sailing into the sea. Any vessel must be towed down the "hump" from the UGF exit point to the water. Why this hasn't been corrected would only be speculation, but it has been the case since at least 2004.

NK-01 antiship cruise missiles (a local variant of the Soviet P-15 Termit (aka Styx) are believed to be deployed at the base.

Along the northeast edge of the island is a series of small tunnels for terrestrial vehicles and other equipment. This is a common feature found at many bases across the country.

East Sea (Sea of Japan) Bases

Puam-dong is the first base on the east coast. (Going north to south, as I did for the Yellow Sea bases.) Located at 41°19'17.15"N 129°46'4.71"E it is a primary navy base and has a large harbor protected by ~470 meters of breakwaters.

The base has been called a submarine base (and some of its features support that conclusion) but no submarines are visible in the available imagery. Other vessels stationed at the base include the Sohung-class PTG (guided missile patrol boat). This has been a key base for them since at least the 1980s.

Puam-dong is divided into two sections because of a hill in the middle of the base. The main section has headquarter facilities, barracks, and other buildings. The second section (to the south) is for maintenance.

The tunnel runs for at least 425 meters and the hill provides ~270 feet of rock above. The base also has a small underground storage facility higher in the hills at 41°20'12.02"N 129°45'24.94"E.

Cha'ho is a major submarine base located at 40°12'18.28"N 128°38'59.31"E in S. Hamgyong province. Including the harbor, it covers approx. 7.7 square kilometers.

Development of Cha-ho began in 1961 and it was transformed from a small base for patrol craft to a major submarine facility. By 1968 the underground portion was under construction. Unlike many other bases, it has rail access.

Unlike land-based underground facilities, where large piles of debris can be seen and analyzed to yield the approximate volume of the UGF, sea-based sites tend to lack any visible debris (since it can just be dumped under water) making it almost impossible to determine its size or layout using traditional methods. (Technology does exist that can shed light on the internal nature of the site using special techniques, but those are beyond the reach of most.)

However, at least a portion of the quay positioned between the entrances of the UGF may be made up of excavated debris based on a review of declassified images.

Taking the curved shape into account, the tunnel runs at least 330 meters and is protected by upwards of 200 feet of rock. I suspect that the main tunnel is placed farther back than I have it drawn, but that's why things are labeled "approximate".

Throughout the base Sang-O class (mini subs) and Romeo-class submarines can be seen. Romeo's are Chinese built, Soviet originated submarines that North Korea first acquired in 1973.

Ryoho-ri (Toejo-dong) Base is the location of the East Sea Fleet Command. It goes by several designations, Ryoho-ri, Yŏho-ri (an alternate spelling), and Toejo-dong (the name of the bay and also commonly used). Its location is 39°52'33.92"N 127°46'43.45"E.

As if signifying the base's importance, one of North Korea's many leadership residences is adjacent to the base. Ryoho is also serviced by rail.

The base doesn't appear to have any shipbuilding capabilities, but it does have a small repair facility for patrol boats. As mentioned, it is the headquarters for the East Sea Fleet and commands all of the bases and associated facilities along the east coast. One of the subordinate units at the base is KPA Unit 158.

The underground facility follows the same basic design as all the others. Its tunnel is ~315 meters long and is covered by roughly 200 feet of rock.

Samil-ri is a small UGF that consists of a single entry point. Located at 39°22'18.03"N 127°26'18.43"E it is on a small peninsula that's part of the much larger Munchon Naval Base.

Across from it on the other side of the peninsula (over 900 meters away) is a turntable but it doesn't appear to have been used in years and the images available on Google Earth make it difficult to confidently assert that there's a tunnel connecting the two points.

It's hard to gauge how active this site is, particularly since the turntable doesn't appear to be in use, but the wider Munchon area has been the focus of a large modernization and expansion program which has been ongoing since 2014. The Munchon-Wonsan region is an important military and industrial area, and various improvement projects have occurred there including the Kalma International Airport, Wonsan-Kalma tourist zone, and the nearby Hodo missile test facility.

Of note, various materials can be seen at the entrance site in recent images that could be used in a restoration project.

Sindo & Yodo island bases

Sindo is a small, narrow island in Yonghung Bay, off of Wonsan. It has a small underground site but unlike Samil-ri it definitely doesn't have an exit point. It is located at 39°13'18.11"N 127°31'10.04"E and would have a maximum length of 85 meters (based on the particulars of the island). The island's garrison seems to be geared toward operating coastal defense artillery and is located nearly a kilometer to the east.

The Yodo island site is located 8.7 km east of the Sindo site. Like Sindo, it doesn't have a second entry/exit point, but it does have a turntable. This allows approx. 8 vessels to sit on the beach and then individually brought into the tunnel for servicing and then moved back out and onto the "holding yard".

If you look closely at the image, you can see a vessel halfway in (or out) of the tunnel entrance.

Yodo has a much larger garrison and even has a small grass runway that extends for 660 meters (although a dirt path cuts across it near the southern end). The naval tunnel may run for 180 meters into the hill to reach 140-150 feet of rock depth. Directly across is a hardened coastal artillery battery and those tend to have small tunnels connecting them to the outside. If we assume the tunnel comes close to the battery, then the tunnel may run as much as 200-230 meters.

Namae Navy Base

Located at 38°48'9.76"N 128° 8'18.58"E Namae is a large navy base with a breakwater that creates 38 hectares of protected harbor. The northern end of the base contains the underground facility. Namae has the facilities available to service all of North Korea's surface fleet and may be able to dock submarines.

The entrance is approx. 20 meters in width and could be covered by as much as 200 feet of rock. There does appear to have been an exit point built, but the tunneling work was either never finished or there was some other problem. An exit structure was built but is in a state of disrepair.

By 2013 a hole had appeared in the roof of the possible exit structure and by 2019 the roof had collapsed entirely. Had the entire facility been completed, the tunnel would have run 515 meters and would make it the second longest confirmed tunnel after Pip'a-got.

Possible exit structure with collapsed roof.

The last of North Korea's underground navy sites is at Changjon, 38°43'59.96"N 128°12'45.45"E.

It's the southernmost naval facility on the east coast and lies a mere 18 km from the military demarcation line.

Changjon is divided into two sections. The northern section contains a large active navy base, the southern section (~1.8 km away) has the underground facility but it appears to have been abandoned. No military vessels can be seen in Google Earth images (which go back to 2005), and there is a civilian dock with a floating restaurant just a kilometer away. It's part of the Kumgang tourism system.

At the same time, a small naval unit is still directly connected to it and the base did serve as a "frontline base for North Korean submarines" before being suspended as part of the creation of the aforementioned tourist zone. However, Kim Jong Un has recently expressed a desire to enlarge the base, so this portion of it may become active again in the future.


Additional reading:
Work on Major Hovercraft Base Advances, AccessDPRK, 1/17/2020


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 5/9/2020
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Kim Jong Un: Wanted, Dead or Alive

Kim Jong Un hasn't been seen in public since April 11. While the occasional absence isn't unusual, he missed the April 15 "Day of the Sun" holiday for the first time ever. The Day of the Sun celebrates the birth of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, who founded the state. It's a very important holiday in North Korea and his lack of attendance sent the worldwide rumor mill into motion. Each day since has only added confusion and intensified the mystery.

Does he have coronavirus? Did he have a heart attack? Is being held hostage as his sister or uncle orchestrate a coup with the help of powerful generals? Maybe he's just tired of being in the spotlight all the time and needs a break? Or perhaps he was injured by flying shrapnel during an artillery exercise?

The speculation surrounding his health began in earnest when the DailyNK published a report based on a single unnamed source that claimed Kim had undergone a heart procedure at a special hospital based in Hyangsan and is recuperating.

Within about 48 hours, even reputable media descended into saying he was gravely ill or brain dead, and that a crisis was about to unfold. None of that, absolutely none of it, was supported by the initial report. Since then, some have even gone so far as to claim he's actually dead. And the usual suspects like Gordon Chang have jumped at the opportunity to stir the pot.

North Korea is already a very opaque state and they are not in the habit of publicly discussing the health of their supreme leader. Why should they? It would only invite internal dissent, discredit the idea that the Kim's are somehow special humans, and could court disaster from both within and without. So there has been no direct reference to either his health or whereabouts by state media.

With some notable exceptions, the international press has generally not made things any clearer. Their instance on speculation and running with the most sensationalist headlines has only served to make the waters more murky and caused many people a lot of unnecessary stress, as they add concerns over "lose nukes" to the already considerable stress caused by the global pandemic.

So what, exactly, are the facts? What do we know or at least what is most probable given the evidence?

Two weeks after his disappearance from public view, both the United States and South Korea have made claims that Kim is indeed alive and that he is staying at his seaside palace in Wonsan.

The general consensus of more rational media sources, unnamed officials, and official statements paints this picture: sometime in April Kim had a medical procedure and has since been resting in Wonsan.

Even the unverified claim that a Chinese medical delegation was sent in to help isn't unusual. From Muammar Gadaffi to Kim Jong Il, dictators with limited access to advanced medical equipment and expertise often seek the aid of foreign doctors. Indeed, Kim Jong Un was seen by a French doctor in 2014.

When it comes to what we know (or is most probable), that's basically it.

Lending support to that picture is the fact that commercial satellite imagery has shown one of Kim's armored trains parked at Wonsan since at least April 21. This also makes sense because in the original report from DailyNK, they said he had been recovering at a villa near Pyongyang immediately after surgery. After spending a week or so at that villa, he may be feeling well enough to venture to his favorite home.

Wonsan is not just the best equipped seaside residence in North Korea, it happens to be the place where Kim spent much of his youth outside of Pyongyang and Switzerland.

However, that alone is not conclusive evidence of anything as Kim is said to have at least three trains. His movements are always tightly guarded, and a second train will be used as decoy to help obfuscate his real movements (something he learned from his father). However, lending more credibility to the idea that he's in Wonsan comes from a report which cites an unnamed US official who said that Kim was spotted (via US reconnaissance aircraft) walking outside between April 15 and 20.

Additionally, Moon Chung-in, adviser to the South Korean president, has said that the official position of the ROK government is that Kim is "alive and well". As recently as April 27, President Trump has said that he knows the status of Kim and did not give any indication that he was dead or no longer able to govern the country.

It's important to remember that this is not the first time Kim has gone missing. He disappeared for about six weeks in 2014 after having an apparent procedure done on his ankle.

Kim Jong Un isn't the best example of health. Although he is only 36 years old, he is morbidly obese and is a heavy smoker. Adding to that is a family history of cardiovascular disease and stroke. So it's perfectly understandable for people to wonder about his health. What isn't normal is for journalists to gleefully speculate about his current condition as though it were fact.

There is nothing in any valid public source that would indicate anything more than he is in recovery.

And while I am personally content to read the tea leaves and wait until he shows back up (his dad went missing for nearly two months after his stroke), I am also getting tired of seeing extravagant speculation and rumor spreading. It may have made April slightly more exciting as I (like many of us) sit at home, forbidden to visit favorite restaurants or friends, but it has also consumed an inordinate amount of time to tamp down wild theories.

This is a view I believe I share with many other analysts. Yes, we're all very curious, but one can only say for certain what one knows. And the only ones who know much of anything right now are Kim Jong Un and his associates.

Dead or alive, it's only a matter of time before we know the facts. Turning what could be a simple heart procedure into a sordid dynastic succession struggle between Kim, his sister, and his uncle may make people click on links, but it does little to advance the cause of truth and violates the trust media, analysts, and other experts are supposed to engender.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 4/27/2020
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UN Report Shows Continued Illicit Oil Imports

Illegal ship-to-ship transfer of petroleum product between the Vifine and New Konk on June 19, 2019. (UN POE report, page 20.)

The 2020 United Nations' Panel of Experts (POE) report on North Korea's illicit trading activities has added further understanding to how North Korea has been able to continue building gas stations across the country.

Back in 2019 I did the first-ever survey (that I'm aware of) of DPRK gas station construction and it showed that at least 74 fueling sites had been built under the rule of Kim Jong Un. I have most recently been able to identify a total of 122 gas stations in the country (built before and since Kim Jong Un).

By examining the fueling tanks at a gas station in Wonsan, we can derive a rough estimate for how much gas would be required to keep all 122 stations operational if they were only required to be refueled once a month.

The tanks, located at 39° 8'32.42"N 127°23'8.17"E, are clearly visible on the Google Earth image dated Jan. 30, 2014. They are each approx. 32 ft long and 7 ft wide. That yields a volume of 1,231.5 cubic feet. For the sake of being conservative and to take into consideration the unknown thickness of the tank's walls, I am going to deduct 10% from that figure (giving us 1,108.3 cubic feet).

The weight of a cubic foot of gasoline is 46.75 pounds, giving each tank the capacity of 51,813 pounds of fuel (or 7,733 gallons at 6.7 pounds per gallon).

Gas stations have a variable number of storage tanks, some only have one and others have four or more. Simply assuming an average of two tanks for each 122 identified station, the country has the need for 1,886,852 gallons of fuel each month. If we use the 42 gallon per barrel measurement, then that's 44,925 barrels of gasoline needed each month, or 539,100 barrels annually just for vehicle fueling. There's still the need for aviation fuel and other petroleum products needed in transportation and industry.

North Korea is limited to importing 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products each year.

The POE report says that the "aggregate amount of 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products was exceeded many times over." (page 4). As part of the report, estimates from the United States suggest that North Korea imported anywhere from 3 to 8 times the legal cap (or 1.5 million to 4 million barrels of illegal petroleum).

The amount of petroleum being brought into the country would more than justify the continued construction of gas stations. Looking at fuel prices over time also suggests that the country is able to import (through whatever means) enough product to meet demand.

In Dec. 2018, fuel prices were around 15,000 won ($1.86) per kilogram. According to the most recent market trend report from DailyNK, gas prices had dropped to 11,500 won per kg. ($1.34) in April 2020. This also implies that trade in the most crucial supplies has not been severely affected by the coronavirus measures North Korea has put into place. Most trade has been stopped, but it was never fully ended and illicit activities continue regardless of the reported decline in legal oil imports from China.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 4/24/2020
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City Planning in the DPRK

Downtown area of the reconstructed Samjiyon. Off in the distance is a bronze statue of Kim Il Sung and "revolutionary history" museums at the base of the hill. (KCNA, 2019)

Plenty of people are familiar with Pyongyang and even other major cities in North Korea, but most of the population lives outside of the capital, Wonsan, and Sinuiju. Car ownership is still rare in North Korea, so even in Pyongyang, it doesn't take very long to find yourself on winding, narrow dirt paths. But the layout of streets is only one part to city planning.

The majority of the housing, stores, and schools in my hometown is in an area roughly 5 x 5 miles. That's a city with about 150,000 people. There are 14 North Korean cities with a population of 150,000 or greater. Excluding Pyongyang, the urban areas of those other 13 cities all fit within an area smaller than 5 x 5 miles.

And even Pyongyang, with 2 million people living in the main urban area, only occupies about 67 square miles. That is almost the same area as the federal district of Washington DC, which has a third of Pyongyang's population. This underscores the realities of how densely cities develop when cars aren't the "driving force" vs. how cities grow when vehicle ownership is viewed as a personal imperative. The result of that is North Korea lacks a lot of the urban sprawl that plagues many other countries.

Main urban area of Pyongyang.

Where you place important buildings, markets, or stadiums, it all matters, and it all says something about what the people and government find most important. This is all the more important when you're dealing with a walking and biking population.

City plans place what is important to the regime in the center and then from there follows places that would be important to the people (like small business districts that may have stores, a restaurant or two, and maybe a small hotel). To help us understand the overall city planning fundamentals in North Korea, I am going to detail two county seats, a smaller town, and then an even smaller village.

County seats follow two general layouts. A compact core of civic buildings and monuments around central plaza or a more spread out design where citizens encounter reminders of the state at multiple points throughout the city. The main difference between county seats and provincial capitals is that each provincial capital will also host large, bronze statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Otherwise they tend to simply be enlarged versions of county seats with more industrial sites, more local businesses, and the occasional university.

Kophung, Chaggang Province is an example of the "compact" design.

As you can see, the main roads of Kophung channel people passed important reminders of regime power like the Juche Study Hall and the Tower of Immortality. The town hall is, of course, centrally located as well. Another thing to note is how far away the marketplace is.

While it's certainly within walking, it has been placed on the outskirts of town, something that is repeated in many of other locations. This is because most markets began as unofficial, even illegal, gatherings of people trading, bartering, buying, and selling. Some would be little more than an open area of ground where people would bring their goods, while others had small tents or other temporary structures placed at the site during the day or two the market was open.

As markets were slowly incorporated into the daily lives of most citizens, they became tolerated and then eventually regulated by the state. This allowed permanent structures to be built and they tended to be built where the informal market was already located - in the outskirts or other less desirable places.

Generally speaking, markets are also located some distance away from any key state symbols (like monuments), as they are somewhat regarded as an ideological stain (albeit one to accept). You can't have a blazing example of capitalism and individual freedom next to a monument to the communist "Sun of Mankind", Kim Il Sung.

In this close-up image, you can see that the line-of-sight from any direction you come, lands on the Tower of Immortality. These were first erected following the death of Kim Il Sung as monuments to his life and to reflect that his spirit will always remain. Indeed, Kim Il Sung is legally the "Eternal President" of the DPRK. The inscriptions on the towers were changed to include Kim Jong Il after he died. He is the "eternal" General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party.

Additionally, every county seat (and provincial capital) have joint murals of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. During my 2018 survey of the country's monuments, I was able to identify 5,175 Towers and 265 joint murals.

Like elsewhere in the world, cities will usually keep their small industrial sites away from the city center. Many county seats also lack a stadium or dedicated sports field, but they will use the fields at schools. For those that do have a stadium, they are likewise set out away from the urban core.

Sepo, Kangwon Province is an example of the "spread out" design.

With the city of Sepo, the regime-focused structures are spread throughout the city, instead of in a single cluster. From the image's perspective, moving north from the train station (which is how most people arrive into town), there is a direct line of sight to the Tower of Immortality, and from there, to the town hall.

If someone travels down either of the main left-to-right roads, the joint murals will be visible at one end and the Juche Study Hall at the other (which happens to be surrounded by two grade schools. One is marked in the above image and the second is marked on the image below).

Every town has at least one "Juche Study Hall", they go by a number of different names including, palace of culture and Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism study hall. These basically play the equivalent role of churches in Europe and the Americas in centuries past. Centrally located, this is where people are required to go multiple times a month (at least) to be indoctrinated in the latest Party orders, to learn about the exploits of the leadership, and to hold "self-criticism" sessions.

Instead of struggling through alcoholism and freely talking about your journey in a safe environment, as in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, self-criticism sessions could be described as meetings holding each other accountable for "wrong thought". But it goes much further than that. Everyone fails Kim Jong Un. Everyone holds thoughts incompatible with Juche. Everyone didn't try hard enough to study their best or to meet their quotas during work. Everyone fails and everyone is expected to come up with something to confess, whether or not they really did it.

And instead of being supported by their community, they are shouted down or accused by everyone in the group. These sessions can last hours, and defectors have spoken about the emotional trauma they cause.

Hwanggang-ri, N. Hwanghae Province is an example of a smaller town (38°20'16.79"N 126°47'8.90"E)

Hwanggang-ri is a small town with fewer than 2,000 people in the immediate area. It has a single, combined school where the elementary school and high school are within the same complex. From the perspective of this image, to the north of the Tower is the town hall and below the Tower label is a row of four buildings.

Each North Korean town has a medical clinic. Unlike schools or Juche buildings, these clinics don't always have a uniform style that is easily identifiable from satellite images. (Large hospitals are more easily discernible, but they're only in large cities anyway.)

In some places, the clinic is located inside the town hall and in others, a stand-alone building exists for the clinic. These clinics only offer basic health care functions, similar to a walk-in clinic that a pharmacy might have in western countries. They can diagnose a cold, give you something for a fever, stitch up a cut finger, or pop a shoulder back into place. They are not for MRIs or open-heart surgery. And given the state of North Korean healthcare overall, you probably won't find any antibiotics readily available, either.

A town this size is large enough to have a clinic, but whether it's in the town hall or in one of those four buildings, I can't say.

Unphyong-ri, Chaggang Province, is an example of a small village (40°52'51.36"N 125°46'20.17"E)

Even in small villages with only a couple hundred people, where having a separate building for Juche studies doesn't make sense, there is still a Tower, a town hall, and a school nearby. That simple organizational style is repeated in almost every populated place in the country. Only the smallest hamlets lack these things.

In the most rural parts of the country, schools are simple and may require a long walk, but it underscores the importance of basic education. Most students may only receive a limited education, but reading and basic math are fundamental to any functional society. 


As we have seen recently with the city of Samjyon, cities can be completely redesigned, demolished, and then rebuilt in the new design on the whim of the country's leadership. And many larger cities have had parts of their cores rebuilt or modernized at the direction of Kim Jong Un and through the national Korean Workers' Party. But local additions must be requested, approved by higher authorities, materials assigned, and then finally the buildings can be constructed. This means that a village might not see a single new home or even a repaired home for many years. Indeed, no new homes are visible in Unphyong-ri since 2009 and only two new homes were built in Hwanggang-ri since 2002.

And as we have seen here, no matter the size of the locale, there will always be a recognizable pattern in the plans of each city and village. They will place regime buildings and monuments in high visibility areas, schools will (often) be nearby, and signs of capitalism will be pushed to the side if possible.

Additional reading
A brief urban history of Pyongyang, North Korea - and how it might develop under capitalism, The Architect's Newspaper, by Dongwoo Yim, Aug. 24, 2017

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 4/14/2020
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