I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, Yong H, and 덕형이.
AccessDPRK
The AccessDPRK blog is dedicated to exposing North Korea via satellite imagery. Discussing domestic, economic and military locations and helping to uncover this hermit kingdom.
Thursday, July 23, 2026
Traditional Burial Grounds Emptied in Wake of DPRK Policies
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
New Bunker Complex Built Near Kumgang
A new unidentified bunker complex has been constructed in the village of Sangsedong-ni (상세동리) 38.696186° 127.846879°, about 14 km northwest of Kumgang and within 45 km of the DMZ.
The site covers approximately 329 hectares (814 acres) and consists of eleven covered bunkers, a headquarters/administrative area, and ten apartment blocks. However, the bunkers don't conform to typical weapons storage structures seen in the rest of North Korea, and so the complex may have other uses such as equipment storage or even a military-industrial purpose like manufacturing/handling explosive materials.
Based on AccessDPRK mapping, North Korea has over 1,500 known individual military storage locations, from simple weapons storage bunkers found at front-line units to the suspected underground nuclear warhead facility at Yongdoktong, with hundreds of other likely storage sites hidden away in lesser-known tunnels. Around 200 storage sites are large facilities covering multiple hectares.
While sites are periodically renovated or gain expanded capacity with new bunkers being constructed, the vast majority of North Korea's storage areas are decades old. The Sangsedong-ni complex is the newest large-scale potential storage facility to be constructed.
Prior to the construction of the bunkers, what is now the administrative area was a small, compact Korean People's Army facility with ten barracks across from a central parade ground, and little change can be noted at the base or surrounding valley on high resolution imagery from Google Earth which goes back to May 2, 2005.
The first signs of change began in May 2024 but work on the hardened structures didn't really take shape until April through July 2025.
As seen in the image below, the probable barracks structures were removed during the site's reconstruction, but the original three administrative buildings remain in their original condition. Five unidentified new structures were also constructed to the south of the administrative site.
Before the site was converted to its present use, there was a collection of twenty duplex houses north of the administrative section totaling forty housing units, just inside of the base's guarded entrance. By 2025, the entrance was moved 260 meters further north and the original homes were demolished.
To replace the duplexes, ten three-story apartment buildings were built, providing 156 individual units. The apartments are in the same 'peculiar' style as the new apartment buildings being constructed throughout the country.
This increase in living space (up from 40 units) may also be to replace the lost barracks space that existed in the administrative section of the base.
Additionally, in an adjacent valley (38.695107° 127.841137°) just outside of the base, the foundations for seven more apartment buildings were prepared. However, as of April 2026 no further construction has taken place. Whether or not these were intended to be part of the base or to provide more housing for associated personnel isn't known, but small construction projects are routinely abandoned in North Korea and I'm only mentioning this one due to its proximity to this complex.
To the south of the residential and administrative area are eleven bunkers and support buildings.
The bunkers are standard rectangular concrete box forms (~30 x 7 meters) that are then covered by earth, and each have an entry structure wide enough to allow a vehicle through.
The entry structures appear to have an accessible upper floor with either windows or openings in the outer wall. The purpose of this floor is unknown but may also be part of a "camouflage, concealment, decoy" (CCD) deception scheme to misled foreign observers/analysts.
There are no protective berms at the facility, which are often seen in locations where explosive materials or weapons are stored (or manufactured), however each of the bunkers are positioned a minimum of 70 meters apart from each other and none of the bunker openings face the opening of another bunker, which adds to the bunker's protection.
The purpose of this complex is speculative but although storage may be the easiest conclusion, military-industrial purposes can't be ruled out.
At the same time, using the structures to protect TELs or mobile artillery, particularly in light of the Ukraine and Iran wars, would make very little sense as the bunkers are in static positions, highly visible, and aren't buried deep enough to offer protection from even common missile systems like the American Tomahawk cruise missiles or the South Korean Hyunmoo-3.
Construction around the complex is still not complete as of May 2026 but there doesn't appear to be spaces under preparation for any additional bunkers.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H.
Wednesday, April 22, 2026
Kwangtanchon Land Reclamation Project
Kim Jong Un continues to expand the number of coastal areas undergoing land reclamation, with a new 3,266-hectare project at the Kwangtan River (광탄천) estuary in Taedong Bay, west of the town of Taetan, South Hwanghae Province.
Beginning in 2025, this previously unreported-on project will connect with smaller existing land reclamation sites in the area and will eliminate nearly the whole Kwangtanchon estuary, creating a combined area of artificial land almost 14 km wide from east to west.
Land reclamation on the Korean Peninsula has been extensive, with the earliest projects predating the division of Korea. Following the establishment of the DPRK, the government of North Korea has embarked on numerous reclamation projects, with the Sixth Central Committee meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea in 1981 ultimately envisioning 3,000 square kilometers of reclaimed land, primarily on the country's west coast; a goal that Kim Jong Un has taken claim to as well.
An AccessDPRK examination of ongoing and completed land reclamation in North Korea shows that by 2023, approximately 1,049 square kilometers of land had either been reclaimed or was subject to ongoing projects. By 2026, that figure grew to over 1,100 sq. km.
The Kwangtanchon project is comprised of six new basins that have been enclosed by nearly 34 km of seawalls (approximately 5 meters high), that are being built in and around 10 smaller plots that were constructed in previous decades. The new seawalls enclose an area of 32.6 square kilometers. And when including the existing reclamation basins, the total reclaimed area within the estuary will reach 42 square kilometers
The scale of Kwangtanchon suggests that each new basin will be reclaimed by slowly draining the area and then allowing sediment to gradually fill in the basins, while local laborers subdivide and level the ground systematically over a period of years.
This will produce plots of land that still remain below or very near sea level even after reclamation (instead of infilling and raising the land by adding large amounts of rock and soil), and so the new agricultural land that is made available will continue to rely on the seawalls for protection against flooding.
The seawalls for each area are constructed from rocks quarried nearby (usually by leveling small hills), and they are being fitted with tidal dams/gates to allow the flow of water in and out of each new basin. This will maintain the tideland ecosystem (and the food it provides) over the period of the project's life, until the basins have been reclaimed.
In the end, however, North Korea is making the choice to lose tidal and riverine food sources in exchange for new rice growing land; a trade that causes tremendous ecological disturbances and may be wholly unnecessary to improve the food supply. As Bernhard Seliger of the Hanns Seidel Foundation told NK Pro, "it would be much easier and more feasible and better to allocate resources and labor in a different way" to increase food production. However, Kim Il Sung's legacy of mega reclamation projects looms large.
As a result, with the addition of the Kwangtanchon project and others currently under construction, the majority of North Korea's west coast tidal flats and marshes are under critical threat. And the only way to achieve the goal of reclaiming 3,000 square kilometers would be through the eventual destruction of nearly the entire west coast intertidal zone.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H.
Wednesday, March 25, 2026
Kim Chaek Iron & Steel Complex: An Aging Hulk
North Korea has placed heavy industry and steel production at the center of its economic policies ever since the country was established. And one heavy industrial key to those plans has always been the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex in the city of Chongjin.
Originally built by the Japanese between 1938 and 1942 and rebuilt following the Korean War, the factory was long touted as one of the crown jewels of North Korea's "socialist construction". But following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, famine in the 1990s, and perennial fuel and electricity shortages, the steel complex has been in a multi-decade era of gradual decline.
Despite partial renovations and occasional additions to the complex, large portions of the factory have been abandoned or torn down, and now one of its largest production centers appears to be heading for the scrap pile as Kim Jong Un places more emphasis on military production and light- to- medium industry through the 20x10 Regional Development Plan.
Of note, even though Kim Jong Un has visited locations in and around Chongjin, he isn't known to have personally visited the iron and steel complex since coming to power - perhaps as a nod to its obsolescence.
At the time of its construction, the Kim Chaek Iron & Steel Complex (then known as the Chongjin Iron and Steel Company) was one of the largest steel plants in Asia and would become the largest such plant in North Korea with an annual capacity of 5.2 million tons of pig iron, rolled steel, and other steel products by the mid-1960s.
The plant is comprised of two primary sections and a dedicated port facility, covering a combined 766 hectares. The longest hall within the factory is 0.88 kilometers long and Kim Chaek has additional nearby facilities including a 2-km-long elevated conveyor system. In other words, the factory is big.
Over time, Kim Chaek has undergone substantial changes, which mirror North Korea's economic decline from the 1970s onward, with sporadic reprieves from state investment and new facilities.
But despite occasional reports of the factory's struggle to maintain operations, activity nonetheless continued in both the northern and southern sections throughout the 2010s, with bulk carriers regularly bringing raw materials and coal visible at the port.
However, while production has continued, production levels are unlikely to have ever recovered to pre-1990 levels, and the factory's age and disrepair are quite noticeable both through satellite imagery and through the thinly worded mentions of the complex in state media.
In light of problems maintaining and repairing equipment (much of which likely hasn't even been commercially manufactured in decades and may no longer be available), beginning in 2017 and lasting through 2024, large portions of the northern section of Kim Chaek began to be demolished.
By 2024, roughly half of the structures in the northern section of the complex had been demolished or were in a derelict state. At the same time, however, North Korea constructed a new oxygen separator in 2020, and an accompanying oxygen blast furnace was built where the older furnaces used to be. This new furnace was officially completed on December 20, 2023.
The new oxygen blast furnace occupies an area approximately two-thirds smaller than the original industrial facilities (area excludes changes made to rail and conveyor infrastructure).
Nearby surviving structures were also renovated during this time.
For the southern section, the situation may be drawing toward a similar outcome: demolition and reconstruction at a smaller scale.
The southern section of Kim Chaek contains its rolling and finishing facilities (which includes the aforementioned 0.88-km-long hall).
Split into two main complexes, the western buildings are the plant's rolling mills, and the eastern complex of buildings are where finishing processes have historically occurred.
Kim Chaek's rolling mills are the most active part of the southern section of the complex, with very little activity noticeable at the larger, finishing mill complex.
The mills had been served by eleven main rail spurs bringing raw steel from elsewhere at Kim Chaek and shipping off finished products.
After reviewing 67 high resolution images on Google Earth dating between February 14, 2012 and August 18, 2025, active rolling stock is only noted on the lines going to the rolling mill (west side complex), while no active rail traffic is noted on the east complex (finishing mills).
While the primary connections to the national Pyongra Line are still maintained, and the complex's main internal transport rail circuit is also used, numerous rail sidings and spur lines have been disconnected, and some have been completely dismantled throughout Kim Chaek. Among the disconnected lines are five of the six spurs leading to the finishing mills.
Other vehicle traffic is also practically non-existent for the finishing mills. Vehicles are only visible at the finishing mill complex on two dates. On October 23, 2016, one dump truck and three other objects (possibly cars) are visible and on October 25, 2016, five dump trucks and a flatbed cargo truck are visible
The roof of the finishing complex has also undergone sustained deterioration, with corrosion appearing on progressively larger portions of the roof.
An additional line of visual evidence that this part of the complex is either defunct or only operating at a low level is winter imagery.
Imagery from Google Earth dated March 13, 2020 shows snow covering most of the roof of the finishing mill building, while internal heat has melted the snow off large parts of the rolling mill building roof.
Thermal imagery from 2014 and 2015 was reported on by 38 North that showed elevated heat signatures across the complex, including at the finishing mill. But additional winter imagery from Planet Labs spanning 2020-2025 shows sustained snow cover on the finishing mill and little or no snow on the rolling mill.
In conjunction with the lack of vehicle traffic and the dismantling of rail lines, this snow cover suggests that by 2020 (at least) activity at the finishing mill had indeed fallen substantially.
Despite superficial one-sentence mentions in state media praising how the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex "further perfect[ed] the Korean-style iron- and steel-making methods", it's very clear that the complex has declined considerably, and that the last remaining Korean War reconstruction-era production halls are in dire need of total renovation or may soon face demolition.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Jacob C., Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H.
Tuesday, February 10, 2026
Sino-DPRK Smuggling Sites Suggest Kim's Approval
North Korea's economy largely functions because of smuggling, not in spite of it, and the luxury goods that keep Pyongyang's elites supporting the Kim regime are almost exclusively acquired by the state through illicit means.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., NO ONE, Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H.
Thursday, January 8, 2026
Market Growth Post-COVID 2020-2025
Upwards of 90% of North Koreans supplement their official incomes through market activity, and in the years leading up to Pyongyang's closure of North Korea's border in response to COVID-19, the growth of market space around the country had been at a fever pitch. But what about in the years since 2020?
Black and grey market activity has been a key driver of the North Korean economy for decades, and they are often the only way citizens can meet their daily needs or earn money for necessary expenses.
As such, market activity has long been used as a proxy for the state of the country's economy as official state data is often lacking in detail and credibility; and the health of marketplaces reflect the ups and downs of DPRK trade with China, and the central government's ever-changing attitudes toward market activity.
AccessDPRK has monitored the annual expansion of market infrastructure and vendor space, and has used commercial satellite imagery to detect changes to the overall available market area dating back to 2011.
Prior to the pandemic, the overall trend under Kim Jong Un had been one of intensifying market area growth, and in 2019, a record 23,260 square meters of additional vendor space was built nationwide. (This is only new construction and doesn't take into account markets that may have declined for various reasons. However, prior to COVID, market infrastructure rarely dropped in any particular county.)
However, in the following year, as COVID policies took hold, the amount of gross new space (vendor stalls and open-air spaces) constructed nationwide dropped 68% to just 7,450 square meters in 2020 and then to a mere 630 square meters of identifiable growth in 2021.
For this post-pandemic 2020-2025 survey, I have focused on the amount of covered vendor stall space (buildings) only, and not enlargements of open-air spaces that don't host vendor stalls on a permanent basis. Stall space more accurately reflects the health of each individual market as the building or demolition of vendor structures strongly indicates the level of local demand.
At the time of writing, 69 market towns are covered by Google Earth imagery from the year 2025. A further 69 towns have imagery from 2024. These locations represent 222 total markets from every part of the country, equating to 48% of the 477 known permanent markets in North Korea.
Reviewing these towns shows that market growth remains limited compared to pre-COVID, despite improvements in trade with China and Russia; but growth is nonetheless occurring.
In total, combined for the years 2020-2025, net market growth for the 222 markets reviewed showed only a gain of 9,905 square meters worth of vendor stalls, averaging out to 1,981 sq. m./year - the lowest average annual rate since 2011 and an annual growth rate decline of 91% compared to the high point of 2019.
However, most of that modest growth can be found due to only four markets: Sariwon Market #2 (38.510007° 125.766451°), Sariwon Market #4 (38.508158° 125.742289°), and the Pyongyang-Hadang Markets #2 and #3 (39.054520° 125.721985°) totaled 5,140 square meters of growth, accounting for over 50% of the total net growth in North Korea's market space for the time.
This concentrated distribution of market growth may reflect difficulties in improving goods availability through the whole country, but that can't be determined solely through satellite imagery.
Of the 222 markets reviewed, twenty-six markets showed an increase in vendor space and fifteen markets declined in space, with four of those markets either fully demolished or had their vendor buildings removed. The other 181 markets showed no meaningful change in their physical structures over the five years, which would not unusual for any give five-year period.
The four markets that closed are: Haksan (39.430997° 126.021379°), Nampo-Waudo (38.723984° 125.348461°), Tokryong* Market #2 (40.219230° 124.694337°), and Yomjon (37.766101° 126.127783°).
This dramatic slump in growth also matches reports of declines in on-the-ground activity within the markets and the struggling economic recovery in North Korea post-pandemic.
Following the country's lockdown, agricultural imports and food stores plummeted, and daily goods like toothpaste and cooking oil were in short supply, even in Pyongyang's modern supermarkets. In street markets, the availability of any commodities that had been sourced overseas quickly ran out. That drop in supply of imported items didn't return to normal for some product classes until 2024.
Visible declines in market crowd sizes have also been reported, and as Professor Lim Eul Chul of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University told Radio Free Asia in 2022, "mobility must be guaranteed for a market to a certain extent, but since mobility is not guaranteed, the market inevitably shrinks. Second, raw materials, fuel, and various subsidiary materials must be smoothly supplied from China;" with new national policies to bring market forces back under state control, they aim "for marketization that is managed and led by the state. As a result, the market is bound to contract." (emphasis added)
Those declines, over time, would eventually necessitate the physical removal of market structures as supplies persistently waned.
Dedicated market days and hours vary across municipalities and can be arbitrarily changed by authorities, so it's difficult to get a complete picture of human activity within the markets using sources like Google Earth, however, following roughly three years of very few visible examples of crowds at markets, large crowds were visible at fairly widespread locations again in February 2024.
And so, although the markets have clearly struggled in the last five years, there are finally signs pointing to a return to normal in many parts of the country.
The conclusion is that for the 2020-2025 period, the market's resiliency and the ingenuity of North Korean citizens helped to keep market activities alive in the face of a global pandemic and the worst government crackdowns on economic activity in a generation.
Market growth slowed considerably, but despite the reduction in some market spaces and the elimination of others, net growth continued to occur; albeit at a limited pace compared to earlier years.
With that in mind, for some rural areas, recovery may not be fully possible in the short-term, as logistics chains and supply and demand pressures shift within provinces and nationally. So while the national economy continues to recover, the local effects may be felt for years to come.
*Note: The Tokryong market does not have recent imagery in Google Earth, but the market closed in 2021 and was reviewed in Planet for a series of articles I wrote with Radio Free Asia, and its closure status has been verified in 2024 and 2025.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., NO ONE, Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H.
Thursday, November 20, 2025
Gone But Not Forgotten: The Kangdong Power Plant
With little fanfare, Pyongyang began work on a new coal-fired power plant located in the village of Samdung, Kangdong (39.002934° 126.159251°) in early 2011. However, despite some initial progress, work shuddered to a halt and the plant became one of many of North Korea's abandoned projects that litter the landscape.
In this article I will examine the history of the site and its eventual fate, hopefully serving as a modest ode to this nearly forgotten chapter in Pyongyang's attempt to solve its energy woes.
The plant, with an estimated capacity of 300 MW, would go a long way toward relieving Pyongyang's energy shortages and help to power industrial sites around the region. It would have also been the first new grid-scale thermal power plant constructed in North Korea since the East Pyongyang Thermal Power Plant came online in 1994.
However, despite the possible rewards of building a new power plant, there wasn't much public reporting on the project or its progress, and none within official DPRK media.
Satellite imagery shows that by March 31, 2011, initial preparatory work had begun on the 25.4-hectare (62.2 acres) site and that foundations for the future switchyard were being built. Construction progressed quickly at first and by October 29, 2011, foundation work for the boilers, cooling tower, and worker's housing was all underway.
Work was also underway to provide a dedicated rail link to the plant to bring coal from nearby coal mines, but the tracks were never laid.
There is then a gap in the imagery but by October 1, 2013, four worker's apartment buildings were externally completed (with foundations for a further six being created), the cooling tower structure had begun to rise, the main smokestack was completed, the switchyard was largely finished, and work on at least 17 other core structures had been carried out.
Unfortunately, the 2012-13 window appears to be where North Korea began encountering major problems with the Kangdong power plant.
Following the collapse of the Communist Bloc, North Korea has struggled to import complex industrial equipment and hasn't been able to purchase things ranging from fuel oil to rice at the 'friendship prices' it had been accustomed to. Even as late as the early 2010s, North Korea's economy was still largely stagnant in the wake of famine and economic isolation. And the country's industrial base was not known to have the ability to domestically manufacture things like large turbines for electricity generation. Indeed, even in 2015-2017, the country had to rely on Chinese assistance for the successful expansion of the Bukchang Thermal Power Plant.
Building a completely new power plant would come with an even greater level of complexity and need.
Work came to halt by the end of 2013 and imagery from Oct. 5, 2015 showed little additional progress. Imagery from the following years show small changes, such as construction materials being occasionally moved around the site, but progress was stagnant until 2020.
Then, on Nov. 9, 2020, imagery appeared showed that work was resuming, with new progress being made on the two boiler buildings (still sans boilers, but progress nonetheless). The next image isn't until a year later, on Dec. 2, 2021, but that showed that work on the boiler buildings had advanced.
Despite that brief flash of activity, Kangdong would never be completed.
The reason for this isn't known. Maybe it was COVID, maybe it was turning out to be too technically difficult, or maybe authorities decided to abandon the Kangdong project in favor of expanding the East Pyongyang Thermal Plant and relying on a series of hydroelectric projects that have been completed in the years since 2011.
Regardless of reason, no more construction would be carried out and in April-June 2024, the site was demolished. The demolition process was caught by NK watcher @NobodyGerman who operates an anonymous account on Twitter. (Go follow the account, they find a lot of interesting things.)
The four apartment blocks still stand and may or may not be occupied, and the facility's switchyard also remains (likely serving as a substation for lines from Bukchang into Pyongyang). But the rest of the site has been covered over and is now being used as farmland.
And so, with even less fanfare than when it began, Kangdong vanished. In fact, @NobodyGerman's post about its demolition is the only mention of its fate that I'm aware of. But hopefully, though it may be gone, this article can help serve as the memory of the little power plant that coulda, woulda, couldn't.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., NO ONE, Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H.


















































