The prospect of North Korean soldiers being sent to Russia (and eventually into Ukraine) is one that most probably didn't see coming. Although Pyongyang and Moscow have been renewing ties since the start of Russia's illegal invasion, the idea that North Korean soldiers could be deployed nearly 7,000 km away in support of the former superpower wasn't on too many BINGO cards for 2024.
North Korean soldiers being kitted out at a Russian base in October 2024. Screen capture of a video provided by the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security.
North Korea's Korean Peoples' Army (KPA) doesn't have any dedicated expeditionary units and the last time KPA personnel were sent overseas en mass was back during the Angolan Civil War in the 1970s and 1980s, when upwards of 3,000 were deployed as advisors and in very limited combat roles.
So, this deployment to Russia is the first international deployment of North Korean troops in a generation and it is likely the first time most of them have ever even left their home country. Indeed, I doubt any member of the KPA would have envisioned being sent anywhere more exotic than Seoul when they enlisted as part of their required national service.
And as Russia's "special military operation" has drawn on for nearly three years instead of the anticipated few days or weeks, Russia's military has been severely stretched. It has struggled to maintain adequate numbers of troops, has begun to run out of its most advanced missiles, and it even seems to have problems providing its frontline soldiers with enough food and warm clothing.
Russia's illegal war has also meant that it can't rely on its traditional trade networks to provide all of the necessary war materiel and specialized technology.
Fellow pariah state North Korea is one of the only countries to have openly approved of Russia's invasion since the start in February 2022, and the two countries began to grow closer as a result. North Korea, of course, is likewise shut out from most global trade and cooperation, and it has its own set of national priorities such as developing satellite and nuclear technology. And, North Korea happens to have one of the largest armaments industries in the world still capable of manufacturing many of the Soviet-era munitions that Russia still uses.
And so, the countries have complimentary needs and resources. Russia can provide North Korea with technology transfers and raw materials for its industries, and North Korea can provide Russia with large numbers of short-range ballistic missiles and millions of artillery shells.
This arrangement seemed natural given their mutual desperation, but Russian (and Soviet and Tsarist) doctrines of war have always relied on mass concentrations of troops and a willingness to tolerate a high body count. Estimates vary but the United States has assessed that Russia has suffered 600,000 casualties over the last three years. For a country experiencing a birthrate crisis and shrinking population, that's an unacceptable rate of loss and Russia has struggled to fill its recruitment needs in the absence of resorting to politically fraught national mobilization.
In September 2023, Putin claimed that Russia had all the manpower it needed and dismissed the idea that North Korea was planning to send military personnel to assist Moscow's war efforts. Then in October 2024, following Ukraine's occupation of Russian territory earlier in the year, reports appeared confirming that North Korea had sent soldiers to Russia for training and then to be deployed in Kursk, to help with Russia's attempts to retake their lost territory.
From these public reports, videos, and published information from the governments of South Korea, Ukraine, and the United States, we can piece together what units were sent to Russia, where they were trained inside of Russia, and their approximate positions now in Kursk.
Where Did They Come From?
North Korea has one of the largest standing armies in the world. The Korean People's Army consists of five branches and has 1.3 million men and women in active service. North Korea also has paramilitary and reserve forces, which means that nearly 30% of the country's population is, in some way, part of its armed forces and civil defense.
The Korean People's Army Ground Forces (from here on KPA) is presently organized into approximately seventeen corps-level units, the best equipped and trained being North Korea's special operations forces which belong to XI Corps. And it is from the XI Corps that Kim Jong Un has drawn from to provide Putin with more men.
Headquarters of XI Corps in Tokchon.
Popularly referred to as the "Storm Corps", XI Corps is garrisoned in the city of Tokchon, about 90 km north of Pyongyang. Organized into its current form in 1991, XI Corps has a long and infamous history. Its members took part in the 1968 Blue House raid during which they tried to assassinate South Korea's president. And members were sent to the border with China in 2020 to crack down on smugglers and defectors while North Korea rebuilt their border fence, leading to a massive decline in annual defections.
Of the four brigades (10,000-12,000 men) that Kim Jong Un is reportedly willing to send, the majority appear to be pulled from XI Corps.
From their home bases, "recruits" are then sent off to Russia's Far East for mission-specific training.
South Korea's National Intelligence Service identified three embarkation ports (Hamhung, Chongjin, and Musudan) where North Korean soldiers were loaded onto Russian ships.
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) image of the Port of Chongjin on Oct. 12, 2024, showing a Russian transport vessel moored in the harbor. Image provided by the ROK National Intelligence Service.
Where Did They Go?
Map of the general journey taken by North Korean soldiers to Russian training camps and then to Kursk. Image: AccessDPRK.
From North Korea's ports (and possibly by rail through the Tumangang border crossing), the soldiers are first sent to Vladivostok and then onto one of several bases in the region where they can receive additional training.
Although these special forces are among the best trained, that must be understood as "best trained in North Korea", not the world. The effectiveness of North Korea's military is hard to assess because, until now, they've rarely been seen in action and eschews engaging in joint military exercises with other countries.
But from what is known about their equipment, training standards, and military doctrine it can be deduced that North Korean soldiers will not be at parity with their Russian counterparts and may need additional training before being deployed to the front lines depending on what exactly they'll be used for.
Identified Russian bases at which North Korean troops are being trained. A) 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade, B) 127th Motor Rifle Division, C) 240th Tank Training Division.
(Click on image for larger view.)
At least five primary Russian bases have been identified as hosting North Korean soldiers. As part of my collaboration with Radio Free Asia, I identified three of the bases and their units as the 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade in Ussuriysk, 127th Motor Rifle Division in Sergeevka, and the 240th Tank Training Division farther north in Khabarovsk.
South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence have also said that North Korean troops were sent to Blagoveshchensk and Ulan-Ude but the specific bases they were sent to haven't been confirmed.
We can glean what the likely tasks of the North Koreans will be from the bases they've received training at. The 83rd Air Assault Brigade is a Russian special operations force that traces its roots back to a Soviet-era Guards reconnaissance battalion. Given that the North Koreans are part of the XI Corps, it makes sense to utilize them in similar operations for which they're already trained like reconnaissance, infiltration of rear areas, sabotage, etc.
And the 127th and 240th are both units which rely heavily on artillery. North Korea is known to be sending Russia millions of artillery shells, so it also seems logical to send along additional support troops who are already versed in using artillery such as 152 mm howitzers.
After their training, the soldiers are then sent to the west where they are embedded with Russian units pushing back against Ukrainian forces in Kursk.
Approximate extent of Russian territory still controlled by Ukraine around the town of Sudzha as of Dec. 17, 2024 (data from ISW). And the general position of the Russian forces within which North Koreans are embedded. (Click for larger view.)
For several reasons, including the risk of defections, North Korean soldiers are not deployed as fully independent units but have been mixed in with at least four Russian units that surround the Sudzha pocket that Ukraine still holds.
These units include the 106th Guards Airborne Division, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 11th Air Assault Brigade, and the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Division.
Since October, Russian attempts to retake the area around Sudzha has been fairly slow. Based on satellite imagery, some villages such as Zelenyi Shlyakh (51.312974° 35.083803°) have been completely destroyed while the prison at Malaya Loknya (51.329091° 35.237051°) was damaged in autumn fighting, but the push to retake the Sudzha has rarely involved moves greater than 1-2 km a day.
The destruction of civilian areas has been an integral part of Russian military doctrine for a century, but the limited speed of their offensive to retake the area could indicate a desire to not destroy the larger town of Sudzha or it could indicate that Russia genuinely lacks the manpower and artillery necessary, and will have to wait until all of the North Korean soldiers have been brought to the front.
Although the United States has confirmed that up to 11,000 North Koreas are in the Kursk Oblast, they are not all believed to be actively engaged in fighting. Based on mapping information from the Institute for the Study of War, Ukraine presently still occupies some 459 sq. km. around the town. Pyongyang's reinforcements may end up being key to retaking it.
What Next?
While I do not expect Ukraine will be able to hold on to Sudzha in the long term, they have been able to use this time to fortify key positions, and their incursion has tied down considerable Russian resources.
Over the next several weeks and months, the next question will be "where will the North Koreans be sent next?" If President Zelenskyy's claim that Kim Jong Un is willing to send up to 100,000 troops is correct, then the post-Kursk action could be to open up a new Russian axis of attack in an attempt to take the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, which has been under almost daily aerial attack since the war began. Or they could be used to help Russia consolidate its gains in the four Ukrainian territories it is trying to annex.
Although this renewed Russo-DPRK alliance will be one forged in blood, it doesn't come without risks.
Due to its isolation, North Korea doesn't have a tradition of how to welcome home wounded and deceased service members. The grief of mothers and widows can be a particularly powerful force in society and it led to public protests in the United States and Russia multiple times over the decades.
Should North Korea begin experiencing hundreds or thousands of casualties, it is unclear how the state might react. Although mass protest isn't something that happens in the country, and the state's internal security apparatus does a substantial job at limiting communication and domestic travel, the risk to the regime from heartbroken mothers asking why their sons were sent to Europe to die can't be ignored.
It is already believed that Russia has been providing Kim Jong Un with technical assistance regarding its nuclear weapons and satellite programs. Grain, fuel, and other commodities have also begun to flow into North Korea. And, most recently, it has been alleged that Russia is going to send North Korea MiG-29 fighter jets for their assistance in the war.
For a country facing an economic crisis and a military running out of parts to repair its aging air fleet, for Kim, these rewards may justify any risk of disquiet at home.
And both countries will have to deal with the ever-present risk of defections. Kim could lose members of this elite corps to the West, and Russia will be the one ultimately tasked with their "security" while they're deployed together.
Additionally, Russia risks a high rate of failure when it comes to any weapons built by North Korea, and this could impact battlefield performance. And should the North Koreans manage to not adapt to real-world combat, they may become a drag on Russia's movements and efficacy, placing even more Russian soldiers at risk of being injured or killed.
Russia's direct assistance of North Korea's illegal nuclear and ballistic weapons programs, as well as their aide to the country's conventional forces and cyberwarfare units could also make Moscow liable for belligerent actions taken by Pyongyang in the future, further entangling the two countries and risking even more sanctions and international action against them.
The war against Ukraine is a global war of logistics. Ukrainian men and women are doing the fighting, but it's with arms and supplies provided by dozens of countries. Now with North Korea on the playing field, will they turn out to be a successful Hail Mary for a challenged Vladimir Putin? Or will they be just another batch of men to be ground down as so many others have been?
How does this impact South Korea's willingness to assist Ukraine? And what happens when North Korean troops make it onto sovereign Ukrainian territory?
We're learning more and more about where they came from and where they have gone thus far, but as the war progresses, the real question is where is all of this going?
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Dylan D., David Malik, Raymond Ha, and Yong H.
--Jacob Bogle, December 20, 2024
