Pyongyang's Unknown Secret City

Hwasong-11D transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) in their factory in the center of a restricted region north of Pyongyang. KCTV video still, 2024.

North Korea is well-known for its restrictions on movement around the country. Cities, counties, and provinces all have check points, and movement between them requires government permits. 

But then there are also the sprawling palaces and sensitive military areas that are blocked off from the rest of the country. Perhaps the most well-known are the 28.4 square kilometer Soviet-style closed city of Yongbyon and the 17-km-long Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. 

However, there are even more restricted districts that are unknown to the general public.

One such restricted district lies over 20 km to the northeast of Pyongyang's own walled government quarter. 

Location of the Ryongsong-Pyongsong Restricted District.

Straddling the Ryongsong District in Pyongyang and southern Pyongsong, this secure area takes up nearly the whole Hapjang River valley, an area of 32.4 sq. km. - making it larger than the closed city of Yongbyon and 23 times larger than Pyongyang's government quarter. 

Although the exact nature and history of this district isn't publicly known, I'd like to provide a rundown of the various sites within it to give those interested greater insight into how North Korea segregates large swathes of its territory and population from the rest and why.

Locations of some of the main sites within the district.

The district includes at least ten military bases, a military academy, and a large factory complex. The area also holds the KPA Navy headquarters, a horse riding center, 17 villas and two state guest houses for members of the country's elite, and two livestock facilities. 

The restricted district also includes numerous regular housing units for locals approved to live and work in the area and may have a population as high as 10,000.

The location of ten probable KPA installations within the district.

The district isn't fully fenced but its boundaries can be defined by the mountains that surround the Hapjang River valley and the eight checkpoints/gates that control the road network into the district. These control points are supplemented by another five that exist within the district, plus multiple others that control entry into each point of interest (bases, livestock centers, etc.).

Locations of the movement control points within the restricted district.

KPA Navy Headquarters.

The Korean People's Army Navy Headquarters is located within the district (39.190109° 125.819614°). Although the headquarters is its own complex, its internal road network leads directly into the rest of the district and controls the primary north-south axis road in the district, inextricably connecting the sites.

The headquarters covers approximately 174 hectares (430 acres). Renovations were carried out in 2013 and 2017. 

The main road leads north to two large guesthouses and the equestrian center.

The restricted district also includes a set of villas and guesthouses around the Rimwon Reservoir.

The Hapjang River feeds the Rimwon Reservoir next to the KPA Navy HQ. Nestled within the hills surrounding the reservoir are seventeen villas in two clusters as well as two guesthouses (or possibly banqueting facilities) on the western side. 

Unattributed sources allege that the villas are for use by members of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly, but I haven't been able to confirm that. However, multiple clusters of villas exist around Pyongyang, and some are known to be used according to government branches, such as the Party and military, as well as exclusive villas for members of the Kim family. So their use by SPA members is certainly possible.

The villas are not connected via road to either the guest houses or to the rest of the restricted district, and they are serviced by their own security. The two guesthouses or banqueting facilities, however, are connected directly to the district's wider road network.

(As an aside, in the northwestern corner of the district lies the grounds of the former Hapjang Villa [39.255694° 125.797615°]. Belonging to Kim Jong Un’s late step-grandmother Kim Song-ae, he had it demolished in 2024.)

Equestrian center and riding trails.

An interesting addition to the district is the equestrian facility (39.214684° 125.835387°) that was constructed in 2020. One of over a dozen that now dot the DPRK landscape, this riding center is one of the few that also have riding trails to compliment the main riding track and stables with 5.3 km of trails through the forested hills.

North Korea began adding horse training and riding facilities at corps-level military installations in 2023 and even opened up civilian tracks in selected cities as well. Although equestrian activities have long been part of Kim family life and are used occasionally in propaganda displays, it remains unclear why the regime thought it necessary to expand the number of trained riders within the KPA (importing valuable horses along the way). 

Hwasong-11 TEL factory complex.

The details of this part of the district remain somewhat muddied as it involves around a century of history and industrial facilities with very little public information about them.

On the eastern edge of the district is a former Japanese colonial-era prison (39.221627° 125.849484°). At some point after the Korean War the prison was converted into an industrial site, with additional factory buildings built directly north of the tell-tale Ʞ-shaped prison building.

Then, in 1987-88, a larger factory was constructed 1.4 km to the west (39.226460° 125.834949°), with the two factories separated by a range of steep hills. But the two factories were connected to each other by a road tunnel and share a perimeter wall, indicating that the newer factory is likely an outgrowth of the older 'prison' factory. However, until recently, no one in the public sphere knew what was being produced at the new factory site.

The "new" factory's two main assembly halls have a combined 25,700 sq. meters (276,632 sq. ft.) of primary floor space, and thanks to work by NK News in cooperation with the New Tools Team at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation at the Middlebury Institute, the factory's purpose has been revealed. 

Based on satellite imagery and state media reports going back to 2024, it has been shown that the factory is a production center for the Hwasong-11D three-axle TELs, with 45 chassis visible at the factory on January 10, 2024.  

A large part of the factory's workforce would appear to come from the adjacent Hacha-dong neighborhood, which is located entirely within the restricted district and only has a single, winding dirt road connecting the neighborhood to the rest of Pyongsong.

Probable military academy in the north of the district.

Two kilometers north of the TEL factory is an unidentified military academy (39.244390° 125.830239°).

There are a lot of academy/university-looking complexes throughout North Korea, most of which have no identification. But this particular one can be confidently categorized as "non-civilian" thanks to a few visual signatures.

Landsat imagery shows that this location has had buildings and activity since at least 1984, but the current set of buildings was constructed in 2004-2006. Constructed at the same time was a small target range (39.245652° 125.840589°) - something a typical civilian university wouldn't have.

Following a 2018-2019 renovation of the main campus and nearby housing, the target range was greatly expanded in 2020 and now includes larger shooting ranges, an obstacle course, and possible barracks. 

The exact nature of the academy doesn't appear to be public but, it could be used by KPA Army officers, the Navy, special operations forces, or even by the Supreme Guard Command given its proximity to multiple Kim family palaces.

Training base.

On of the ten KPA bases within the district is this training base (39.223113° 125.817883°) located almost in the center of the restricted area. Although the above image only shows the area used for various military exercises, the full base covers at least 43 hectares (107 acres) and is comprised of dozens of buildings. 

But within the area used for exercises one can find a row 9 fake tanks used as targets, two large pools that can be used both for swimming and fording exercises to replicate driving vehicles through water, there are two building facades that are used to facilitate urban combat (aka MOUT), there is a small arms firing range, and several other points of interest used to train military personnel.

A large livestock facility within the district.

Most facilities, of every sort, in North Korea have secondary roles in rearing or growing food either for domestic consumption or for export. Grade schools often raise rabbits, factory grounds get turned into cultivated plots, and even places like Punggye-ri have large tracts of land dedicated to growing food.

This district is no different and much of the flat land that isn't covered by a building or road is being cultivated. But there are also sites set aside for livestock such as poultry or swine. The largest is seen in the image above and covers over 100 hectares, although the actual area used for the longhouses and production is much smaller.

Whether this protein is produced for use by those in the district, for the general military, for the country's elite, or for export isn't known, but it is nonetheless a prime example of the wide range of industries that occur within KPA-controlled areas and shows how the nation's food supply issues touch every sphere of activity.

Restricted districts such as this one aren’t publicized and don’t even appear on domestic maps (which are already notoriously limited). Together with all of the other restrictions on movement between cities, near the coasts and borders, etc. North Korea might – for the average citizen – be more accurately viewed as an archipelago of countless islands rather than a unified territory one can move through.

While, in the end, I don’t believe these hidden districts play a major role in the overall national story, the paucity of information about them and their role in the national economy nonetheless places further limits on the usefulness of third-party reports on the status, growth, or decline of DPRK economic activity, resource distribution, and land use patterns. And it requires us to dig deeper into how North Korea organizes itself so that future reporting can be all the more accurate.

Uncovering this particularly large, restricted area was a byproduct of an ongoing AccessDPRK project aimed at determining the scope of land use by the Korean People’s Army. This is only one of several such districts, and I am happy to be able to shed some light on their existence.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Sarah Cowan, Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, Yong H, and 덕형이. 

--Jacob Bogle, October 25, 2026

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Nungwol-li Missile Facility

Hwasong-5 short-range ballistic missile mounted on a converted MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launcher vehicle. Image: screenshot from an undated parade in Pyongyang. Original URL. 

The coastal missile defense complex in Nungwol-li, off the coast of Kangwon Province, is probably something you've never heard of.

If you Google the village name Nungwol-li (능월리), you might get some information about the existence of a "populated place" by that name, but little else. But if you're looking for military facilities at Nungwol-li, you may just end up getting this result:

However, there does in fact appear to be a small coastal missile facility located near the village of Nungwol-li. 

But before I get more into that, I want to add for the sake of clarity that Nungwol-li is the largest of the nearby populated places to the facility. The military site in question is located at 38.824053° 127.952862°, about 1.5 km west of the village which is at 38.819997° 127.969462°.

A closer but smaller populated place is Myeongmunam-ni (명문암리), and the facility is located in the Pŏmjaebi-gol valley and near the banks of the Yongdongcheon River, so using the name Nungwol-li is a preferential choice and may not have any relevance to North Korea's official designation of the facility. (This reflects a long-standing practice to name publicly unidentified sites by the nearest village or major geographic feature.)

With that bit of housekeeping out of the way, let's take a look at this enigmatic site.

Nungwol-li is located in eastern Kangwon Province.

Since I can't find any published information about Nungwol-li, I have to rely on what's available in the form of commercial satellite imagery.

Low-resolution Landsat imagery shows that the Nungwol-li missile site was constructed in the late 1980s, and Google Earth has high resolution imagery of the facility going back to 2004. 

Landsat imagery showing the Nungwol-li area in 1985 and 1987. The 1987 image shows a bright spot indicating land clearance and excavation.

Although the Pŏmjaebi-gol valley it's positioned in extends for over 2 km, the facility's structures and road network is confined to the valley's eastern opening and only takes up an area of approximately 20.3 hectares (50 acres).

The area of Nungwol-li with its approximate perimeter.

The facility is currently comprised of a main administrative building with three smaller buildings around courtyard, a gatehouse at the entrance, a 50-meter-long launch pad, a bermed revetment with a bunker/hardened structure next to it, and a possible underground entrance about 180 meters west of the launch pad.

There is a perimeter wall the runs along the front of the facility, but there is no obvious fencing or other barrier that encloses the whole area.

Detail look at Nungwol-li as of January 12, 2004.

Google Earth has 16 images of the site dating from January 12, 2004 to November 8, 2025. The biggest change to Nungwol-li in that time was the construction of a ~24-meter-long support building in 2017.

Detail look at Nungwol-li as of February 12, 2017.

Regarding the potential underground entrance, with the available images, I am not certain if the facility does have an actual underground component or if this site is really just a small, paved siding. 

Detail look at Nungwol-li as of March 10, 2013.

Additionally, no apparent TELs or mobile or towed artillery systems have been captured by the available imagery. Only small trucks such as in this example on February 10, 2020 have been seen within the facility grounds. 

February 10, 2020 image showing a small truck or other vehicle sitting within the bermed revetment.

Given the facility's relatively small size and the timeframe it was constructed in (1980s), it's probable that it was built to provide a test site for North Korea's various SCUD missile iterations such as the Hwasong-5 or Soviet-sourced artillery rocket systems like the Luna family of short-range rockets (2K6 Luna, 9K52 Luna).

To support this idea, it should be noted that the concrete launch pad is aimed toward the East Sea and is angled along 52-53° which would allow even long-range missiles (depending on just how accurate the guidance is) to fly through the La Pérouse Strait, threading the needle between Japan's Hokkaido Island and Russia's Sakhalin Island, thus avoiding an international incident or risking populated places in the event of an accident. 

Although I suspect that the facility was built to test missiles and not as an operational missile base, it's worth noting that there is no public evidence of it ever being used for a missile test. Based on the database complied by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, nearby tests occurred instead at Kittaeryong Operational Missile Base and around Tongchan, but none have been noted in the vicinity of Nungwol-li during its lifetime.

Over time, Nungwol-li has become degraded. The launch pad is partially covered by eroded soil, and the road network is not as well maintained as it has been in the past. But the main buildings and courtyard have been maintained, and so the facility could still be used to test short-range missiles or even be used to deploy surface-to-ship antiship missiles to help defend this portion of the coast in the event of a conflict.

Nungwol-li is little known and doesn't appear to play a particularly active role in the country's missile program or its defenses, but it is yet another facility that we must nonetheless continue to monitor. Some missile and artillery facilities go dormant, others will have years go by in between tests, while others still end up being demolished. The fact Nungwol-li still exists is a sign that the KPA continues to consider the facility worth investing in.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, Yong H, and 덕형이. 

--Jacob Bogle, August 21, 2026

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Traditional Burial Grounds Emptied in Wake of DPRK Policies

North Korea's hillsides host countless burial mounds in clusters ranging from just a few burials to many thousands. 

These irregular cemeteries have been a common feature of mourning and remembrance for generations. But due to government orders in 2024 to help promote reforestation efforts, thousands of burials have been exhumed around the country and numerous mounds have been flattened by authorities.

This report reviews nine burial locations across five provinces and Pyongyang that help illustrate the extent of the policy's effect at present.

Uncredited image of traditional burial mounds on a hillside North Korea. Source: North Korea Economy Watch.

Hillsides have always been a preferred location for burials, and a casual glance at hills in both North and South Korea can reveal countless small mounds of the dead. But in North Korea, this practice took on a whole new importance during the 1994 famine that killed upwards of a million people as space in sanctioned burial grounds grew sparce and cremations remained unaffordable for many.

The famine itself was exacerbated by widespread deforestation caused by the need for firewood and in attempts to expand crop growing areas, but that only resulted in the topsoil being rapidly washed away, enabling floods to be stronger and causing crop yields to drop.

The resulting deaths and burials on the hillsides mean that on top of nearly every denuded hill near cities and villages are countless burial mounds. Some are dutifully tended to by living decedents and others have been forgotten as family lines die out, memories fade, and populations move.

The orders from Pyongyang allow for relatives to dig up and re-inter their loved ones, but for those graves that can't be emptied, local governments simply bulldoze them into oblivion. 

This process can be seen across the country, from the starting point of tomb's being opened to the end result of the mounds being flattened and the land repurposed.

The first example I'll show is from a small hill on the outskirts of Pyongyang.

Numerous open tombs are visible; their remains having been exhumed.

On this hill in Pyongyang's Sadong District, you can see a mix of intact tombs and many others that have been opened (next to each yellow line). Although the government's orders to clear irregular cemeteries don't dictate what families must do with the remains, we can presume that they are either cremated or reburied at an approved cemetery.

Despite my searches, there are only limited examples of burial mound removals in Pyongyang. Perhaps I simply didn't look thoroughly enough or perhaps such a move - to demand the removal of burials of members of the country's elite families - would have been politically fraught.

The next example is at Chungsan.

Google Earth images of hillside burial removals in Chungsan, comparing the site in November 2019 and in June 2025.

In Nov. 2019 the town's burial mounds were all clearly visible and intact but by June 2025 a large swathe of them had been totally removed, and many others emptied. This site represents the largest clearance of burials in Chungsan.

A June 2024 story by DailyNK reported that authorities had intended on the cemeteries to be emptied by the end of 2024. However, while the process of exhumation has spread, most of these hillside cemeteries still remain at least partially intact. 

Opened burial mounds in Songnim, 2025.

This hillside burial ground in Songnim is another representative of this clearance activity in a major city.

What isn't known is how long family members are given to enact the removals. Due to freezing winters, exhumations can only be carried out during certain times of the year, and they are most often done using manual labor. 

Nor is it known how families are notified that a certain area is slated to be reforested or converted into farmland. Comprehensive, centralized records are not known to be kept of these sites, so if a family is unaware, can't be contacted, or can't reach the site quickly enough, it's probable that many burials become forcibly lost forever.

Bongsan burial mound removals. 

In this example at Bongsan, east of Sariwon, you can see dozens of mounds were levelled at some point between 2022 and 2026, but quite a few still appear intact. 

Other small burial grounds exist in Bongsan and all have had at least some of the mounds removed, but none have been completely razed. 

Hillside burials in Chaeryong. A partial clearance of the mounds is visible. 

This Chaeryong burial ground shows a mix of intact tombs, emptied ones, and shows an area on the eastern flank of the hill that has been cleared entirely. 

North Koreans maintain traditional beliefs when it comes to death practices and consider family burial grounds to be sacred sites that should be honored. 

Throughout the year family members will check on the grave sites and clear them of debris, and there are specific holiday observances, such as Chongmyong on April 5.

During Chongmyong, families visit the graves of their ancestors, make offerings, and share in their remembrances. In atheistic North Korea, this is one of the few traditional events that still carries spiritual weight and is widely practiced. 

However, the burial clearances have begun to destroy those ancestral ties and diminish the ancient rites.

Before and after of tomb removals in Sampo-dong. 

At this single burial ground in Sampo-dong at least 160 graves have been removed between 2022 and 2025. Several hundred others have been removed in the immediate area.

Although one of the driving forces for removing these burial mounds is ostensibly to help reforest the nation's hills, low hills such as these are often cleared to expand farmland. And while gaining farmland is obviously a national need, one has to question if the price of a few extra hectares is worth the destruction of local sites of multi-generational remembrance?

Former burial ground in Munchon, Kangwon Province.

One of the more curious outcomes of the clearance process can be seen in Munchon.

After graves were emptied and the mounds removed, the area has seen deep cuts into the ground. There is a small site used as a quarry at the foot of the hill, so one wonders if what we were seeing at this site is the expansion of quarrying activity to now include the former burial ground.

Illicit farm in Munchon being reforested between 2020-2026.

It should be noted, however, that reforestation efforts extend to more than just burial grounds, and have impacted illicit hilltop farms known as sotoji. 

Further up the mountain from this burial ground, a ~1.3-hectare sotoji plot was planted over with trees in 2021-22. 

Cleared burial grounds in Kumya, South Hamgyong Province.

The destruction of burial grounds around the town of Kumya is among the most widespread and striking.

Just within the area shown, some 250 graves have been completely destroyed. Another 500 or so burials in several other plots within half a kilometer of this site have also been removed. 

Cleared burial ground in Hamju, South Hamgyong Province.

North, in Hamju, a further 200 burial mounds were removed. 

Despite the public account of when the burial removal orders were issued, some large-scale removals were already underway in 2023, and so local pilot programs may have preceded the establishment of a national policy.

Most countries have regulations for burials. Where, when, what kind, are all questions that are not only important to the family but are also important for things like public health.  

The proliferation of irregular burial grounds may have caused difficulty for North Korean authorities, especially on the local level, regarding things like land usage and trying to regulate the further erosion of hillsides. 

However, forcing the great mass of the population to not only exhume ancestors but to then give up grave sites that have played an important role in the sense of family continuity that such places engender seems particularly harsh. 

North Korea is already a place where family fealty must take a backseat to the state, and where even love for one's parents is supposed to be less than one's love for the Great Leader. Eliminating scores of burial grounds that have long served as communal focus points comes across as yet another attempt to further limit any sense of identity that may exist outside of the state.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, Yong H, and 덕형이. 

--Jacob Bogle, July 23, 2026

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New Bunker Complex Built Near Kumgang

A new unidentified bunker complex has been constructed in the village of Sangsedong-ni (상세동리) 38.696186° 127.846879°, about 14 km northwest of Kumgang and within 45 km of the DMZ. 

The site covers approximately 329 hectares (814 acres) and consists of eleven covered bunkers, a headquarters/administrative area, and ten apartment blocks. However, the bunkers don't conform to typical weapons storage structures seen in the rest of North Korea, and so the complex may have other uses such as equipment storage or even a military-industrial purpose like manufacturing/handling explosive materials.

Overview of the new Sangsedong-ni bunker complex. Google Earth, Nov. 8, 2025.

Based on AccessDPRK mapping, North Korea has over 1,500 known individual military storage locations, from simple weapons storage bunkers found at front-line units to the suspected underground nuclear warhead facility at Yongdoktong, with hundreds of other likely storage sites hidden away in lesser-known tunnels. Around 200 storage sites are large facilities covering multiple hectares. 

While sites are periodically renovated or gain expanded capacity with new bunkers being constructed, the vast majority of North Korea's storage areas are decades old. The Sangsedong-ni complex is the newest large-scale potential storage facility to be constructed. 

Residential and administrative area of the base prior to renovation. Google Earth, Sept. 29, 2022.

Prior to the construction of the bunkers, what is now the administrative area was a small, compact Korean People's Army facility with ten barracks across from a central parade ground, and little change can be noted at the base or surrounding valley on high resolution imagery from Google Earth which goes back to May 2, 2005.

The first signs of change began in May 2024 but work on the hardened structures didn't really take shape until April through July 2025. 

As seen in the image below, the probable barracks structures were removed during the site's reconstruction, but the original three administrative buildings remain in their original condition. Five unidentified new structures were also constructed to the south of the administrative site.

Residential and administrative area of the base after renovation. Google Earth, Nov. 9, 2025.

Before the site was converted to its present use, there was a collection of twenty duplex houses north of the administrative section totaling forty housing units, just inside of the base's guarded entrance. By 2025, the entrance was moved 260 meters further north and the original homes were demolished. 

To replace the duplexes, ten three-story apartment buildings were built, providing 156 individual units. The apartments are in the same 'peculiar' style as the new apartment buildings being constructed throughout the country.

This increase in living space (up from 40 units) may also be to replace the lost barracks space that existed in the administrative section of the base.

Additionally, in an adjacent valley (38.695107° 127.841137°) just outside of the base, the foundations for seven more apartment buildings were prepared. However, as of April 2026 no further construction has taken place. Whether or not these were intended to be part of the base or to provide more housing for associated personnel isn't known, but small construction projects are routinely abandoned in North Korea and I'm only mentioning this one due to its proximity to this complex. 

To the south of the residential and administrative area are eleven bunkers and support buildings. 

Map highlighting the locations of each bunker. Google Earth, Nov. 9, 2025.

The bunkers are standard rectangular concrete box forms (~30 x 7 meters) that are then covered by earth, and each have an entry structure wide enough to allow a vehicle through.

The entry structures appear to have an accessible upper floor with either windows or openings in the outer wall. The purpose of this floor is unknown but may also be part of a "camouflage, concealment, decoy" (CCD) deception scheme to misled foreign observers/analysts. 

Detail image showing a close-up of individual bunkers. Google Earth, Nov. 9, 2025.

There are no protective berms at the facility, which are often seen in locations where explosive materials or weapons are stored (or manufactured), however each of the bunkers are positioned a minimum of 70 meters apart from each other and none of the bunker openings face the opening of another bunker, which adds to the bunker's protection.

The purpose of this complex is speculative but although storage may be the easiest conclusion, military-industrial purposes can't be ruled out.

At the same time, using the structures to protect TELs or mobile artillery, particularly in light of the Ukraine and Iran wars, would make very little sense as the bunkers are in static positions, highly visible, and aren't buried deep enough to offer protection from even common missile systems like the American Tomahawk cruise missiles or the South Korean Hyunmoo-3. 

Construction around the complex is still not complete as of May 2026 but there doesn't appear to be spaces under preparation for any additional bunkers. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, May 20, 2026

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Kwangtanchon Land Reclamation Project

Kim Jong Un continues to expand the number of coastal areas undergoing land reclamation, with a new 3,266-hectare project at the Kwangtan River (광탄천) estuary in Taedong Bay, west of the town of Taetan, South Hwanghae Province.

Seawall construction at the Honggongdo Tidelands Project. Image via KCNA, 2017.

Beginning in 2025, this previously unreported-on project will connect with smaller existing land reclamation sites in the area and will eliminate nearly the whole Kwangtanchon estuary, creating a combined area of artificial land almost 14 km wide from east to west.

The latest six reclamation project sites are outlined in blue, with earlier sites in green.

Land reclamation on the Korean Peninsula has been extensive, with the earliest projects predating the division of Korea. Following the establishment of the DPRK, the government of North Korea has embarked on numerous reclamation projects, with the Sixth Central Committee meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea in 1981 ultimately envisioning 3,000 square kilometers of reclaimed land, primarily on the country's west coast; a goal that Kim Jong Un has taken claim to as well.

An AccessDPRK examination of ongoing and completed land reclamation in North Korea shows that by 2023, approximately 1,049 square kilometers of land had either been reclaimed or was subject to ongoing projects. By 2026, that figure grew to over 1,100 sq. km. 

Areas of reclaimed land and ongoing projects along North Korea's west coast, with Kwangtanchon in blue.

The Kwangtanchon project is comprised of six new basins that have been enclosed by nearly 34 km of seawalls (approximately 5 meters high), that are being built in and around 10 smaller plots that were constructed in previous decades. The new seawalls enclose an area of 32.6 square kilometers. And when including the existing reclamation basins, the total reclaimed area within the estuary will reach 42 square kilometers

The scale of Kwangtanchon suggests that each new basin will be reclaimed by slowly draining the area and then allowing sediment to gradually fill in the basins, while local laborers subdivide and level the ground systematically over a period of years. 

This will produce plots of land that still remain below or very near sea level even after reclamation (instead of infilling and raising the land by adding large amounts of rock and soil), and so the new agricultural land that is made available will continue to rely on the seawalls for protection against flooding.

Close up of some of the newly built seawalls. 

The seawalls for each area are constructed from rocks quarried nearby (usually by leveling small hills), and they are being fitted with tidal dams/gates to allow the flow of water in and out of each new basin. This will maintain the tideland ecosystem (and the food it provides) over the period of the project's life, until the basins have been reclaimed.

A map of the seawalls built in 2025-2026. 

In the end, however, North Korea is making the choice to lose tidal and riverine food sources in exchange for new rice growing land; a trade that causes tremendous ecological disturbances and may be wholly unnecessary to improve the food supply. As Bernhard Seliger of the Hanns Seidel Foundation told NK Pro, "it would be much easier and more feasible and better to allocate resources and labor in a different way" to increase food production. However, Kim Il Sung's legacy of mega reclamation projects looms large.

As a result, with the addition of the Kwangtanchon project and others currently under construction, the  majority of North Korea's west coast tidal flats and marshes are under critical threat. And the only way to achieve the goal of reclaiming 3,000 square kilometers would be through the eventual destruction of nearly the entire west coast intertidal zone.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, April 22, 2026

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Kim Chaek Iron & Steel Complex: An Aging Hulk

North Korea has placed heavy industry and steel production at the center of its economic policies ever since the country was established. And one heavy industrial key to those plans has always been the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex in the city of Chongjin.

December 2023 photograph of the newly completed oxygen blast furnace at the Kim Chaek Iron & Steel Complex. Image: Rodong Sinmun.

Originally built by the Japanese between 1938 and 1942 and rebuilt following the Korean War, the factory was long touted as one of the crown jewels of North Korea's "socialist construction". But following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, famine in the 1990s, and perennial fuel and electricity shortages, the steel complex has been in a multi-decade era of gradual decline.

Despite partial renovations and occasional additions to the complex, large portions of the factory have been abandoned or torn down, and now one of its largest production centers appears to be heading for the scrap pile as Kim Jong Un places more emphasis on military production and light- to- medium industry through the 20x10 Regional Development Plan.

Of note, even though Kim Jong Un has visited locations in and around Chongjin, he isn't known to have personally visited the iron and steel complex since coming to power - perhaps as a nod to its obsolescence. 

At the time of its construction, the Kim Chaek Iron & Steel Complex (then known as the Chongjin Iron and Steel Company) was one of the largest steel plants in Asia and would become the largest such plant in North Korea with an annual capacity of 5.2 million tons of pig iron, rolled steel, and other steel products by the mid-1960s.

The plant is comprised of two primary sections and a dedicated port facility, covering a combined 766 hectares. The longest hall within the factory is 0.88 kilometers long and Kim Chaek has additional nearby facilities including a 2-km-long elevated conveyor system. In other words, the factory is big.

General layout of the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex.

Over time, Kim Chaek has undergone substantial changes, which mirror North Korea's economic decline from the 1970s onward, with sporadic reprieves from state investment and new facilities.

But despite occasional reports of the factory's struggle to maintain operations, activity nonetheless continued in both the northern and southern sections throughout the 2010s, with bulk carriers regularly bringing raw materials and coal visible at the port.

However, while production has continued, production levels are unlikely to have ever recovered to pre-1990 levels, and the factory's age and disrepair are quite noticeable both through satellite imagery and through the thinly worded mentions of the complex in state media.

In light of problems maintaining and repairing equipment (much of which likely hasn't even been commercially manufactured in decades and may no longer be available), beginning in 2017 and lasting through 2024, large portions of the northern section of Kim Chaek began to be demolished.

By 2024, roughly half of the structures in the northern section of the complex had been demolished or were in a derelict state. At the same time, however, North Korea constructed a new oxygen separator in 2020, and an accompanying oxygen blast furnace was built where the older furnaces used to be. This new furnace was officially completed on December 20, 2023. 

Area of the original furnaces vs. the new, smaller-sized oxygen blast furnace. (Click for larger view.)

The new oxygen blast furnace occupies an area approximately two-thirds smaller than the original industrial facilities (area excludes changes made to rail and conveyor infrastructure).

Nearby surviving structures were also renovated during this time.

Southern section of the complex with the rolling and finishing mills highlighted.

For the southern section, the situation may be drawing toward a similar outcome: demolition and reconstruction at a smaller scale.

The southern section of Kim Chaek contains its rolling and finishing facilities (which includes the aforementioned 0.88-km-long hall). 

Split into two main complexes, the western buildings are the plant's rolling mills, and the eastern complex of buildings are where finishing processes have historically occurred.  

Kim Chaek's rolling mills are the most active part of the southern section of the complex, with very little activity noticeable at the larger, finishing mill complex. 

The mills had been served by eleven main rail spurs bringing raw steel from elsewhere at Kim Chaek and shipping off finished products. 

After reviewing 67 high resolution images on Google Earth dating between February 14, 2012 and August 18, 2025, active rolling stock is only noted on the lines going to the rolling mill (west side complex), while no active rail traffic is noted on the east complex (finishing mills).

Status of rail spurs leading to the rolling and finishing mills in 2012 and 2025.

While the primary connections to the national Pyongra Line are still maintained, and the complex's main internal transport rail circuit is also used, numerous rail sidings and spur lines have been disconnected, and some have been completely dismantled throughout Kim Chaek. Among the disconnected lines are five of the six spurs leading to the finishing mills.

Other vehicle traffic is also practically non-existent for the finishing mills. Vehicles are only visible at the finishing mill complex on two dates. On October 23, 2016, one dump truck and three other objects (possibly cars) are visible and on October 25, 2016, five dump trucks and a flatbed cargo truck are visible

Six vehicles are visible on October 25, 2016.

The roof of the finishing complex has also undergone sustained deterioration, with corrosion appearing on progressively larger portions of the roof.

Expanding areas of roof corrosion is noticeable in these images from 2006, 2015, and 2025. (Click for larger view.)

An additional line of visual evidence that this part of the complex is either defunct or only operating at a low level is winter imagery.

Imagery from Google Earth dated March 13, 2020 shows snow covering most of the roof of the finishing mill building, while internal heat has melted the snow off large parts of the rolling mill building roof.

Varying degrees of snow cover on the roofs of the rolling and finishing mills (outlined in blue) on March 13, 2020.

Thermal imagery from 2014 and 2015 was reported on by 38 North that showed elevated heat signatures across the complex, including at the finishing mill. But additional winter imagery from Planet Labs spanning 2020-2025 shows sustained snow cover on the finishing mill and little or no snow on the rolling mill. 

In conjunction with the lack of vehicle traffic and the dismantling of rail lines, this snow cover suggests that by 2020 (at least) activity at the finishing mill had indeed fallen substantially.

Despite superficial one-sentence mentions in state media praising how the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex "further perfect[ed] the Korean-style iron- and steel-making methods", it's very clear that the complex has declined considerably, and that the last remaining Korean War reconstruction-era production halls are in dire need of total renovation or may soon face demolition.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D., HG, Jacob C., Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, March 25, 2026

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