Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Slowdown at the Pakchon Uranium Plant?

In the course of researching my article on the toxic leaks at the Pyongsan uranium mine and milling plant, I started observing North Korea's second such facility at Pakchon, North Pyongyan.

Reviewing historical satellite imagery for Pyongsan shows an ever-growing pile of tailings (waste material) and sludge from the mine and factory at its waste reservoir, indicating continual operations. The same cannot be said upon review of the reservoir at Pakchon. A lack of obvious changes to the reservoir recently could mean a few things, which I'll discuss later.

Like Pyongsan, Pakchon was constructed in the 1980s under the leadership of Kim Il Sung (with various degrees of Soviet assistance), and is the second of North Korea's two declared uranium milling plants (where uranium ore is processed into yellowcake). The other plant being Pyongsan, as mentioned earlier. A review of satellite imagery shows the evolution of the Pakchon facility's operations.

Google Earth imagery from 2005 shows that the original tailings dam had been closed and turned into farmland, while a second tailings dam had been established during the intervening years.

By 2014, activity at the dam can still be seen, as new materials are dumped into it via truck (unlike the reservoir at Pyongsan, which has waste material moved via pipe).

The addition of new waste to the dam appears to have slowed down by 2016.

The small sections of the reservoir that were active in 2014 no longer seem to be undergoing change, and there isn't much (if any) additional activity as evidenced by the lack of surface disturbances.

The general lack of new waste deposits has continued into 2019. Any changes to the reservoir from 2016 and 2019 are very minimal, indicating a lack of production. By comparison, the growth of the "sludge pile" within the Pyongsan tailings reservoir grew substantially.

The Pyongsan plant is much larger than Pakchon and processes coal with a uranium concentration of 0.26%, compared to Pakchon's 0.086%. Both are considerably low quality concentrations by most definitions but seem to be among the best ore the country has domestic access to.

The sludge pile within the Pyongsan reservoir occupied some 69,000 square meters of space by May 2017.

The pile had grown to approximately 87,000 square meters by March 2019, an apparent increase of 26%. An exact figure can be difficult to ascertain because water levels may have changed slightly over time.

The only area of Pakchon that seems to have maintained activity is the associated mine, 1.3 km south of the main factory building.

Aside from monitoring tailings, the physical state of the factory complex gives us more information.

The main building is roughly 120x100 meters, but there are several other buildings involved in the process of concentrating and milling the uranium. The administration section of the complex seems perfectly fine, but two industrial buildings are falling apart, and one of those is in the process of being demolished.

Google Earth imagery from March 19, 2012 gives a clear view of the two buildings of interest. They are in good order and appear functional.

By March 2019, the roof of building #1 has several holes in it and building #2 has been torn down.

What does all of this mean?

It would make sense that Pyongsan would be the country's primary facility, as the ore used is of much greater quality than the ore at Pakchon. Indeed, Pyongsan underwent a refurbishment in 2014-2015, with additional improvements being seen even more recently. But is Pakchon slowing down?

A lack of obvious waste deposits and the fact that some of the buildings have been neglected or demolished points to problems. Mining operations have continued, but there doesn't seem to be a new tailings dam that would explain the lack of activity at the current one. The mine has settling/separation ponds but doesn't appear to have a dedicated spot to hold waste from the processed material. This could indicate that the country is stockpiling material for processing but has cut back on the overall amount of milled uranium it can produce at Pakchon. This may be backed up by the fact that, at least for 2019, even work conducted at Yongbyon has been scaled back.

Another possibility is that there are problems with the factory itself. North Korea's industrial sector has long been crippled for its lack of spare parts and their generally inability to repair and replace complex equipment in a timely fashion. Additionally, uranium processing is expensive and energy intensive. During the early days of North Korea's nuclear program, the Soviet Union told them that it wasn't economically feasible to extract the low-quality uranium sources within the country. Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung persisted. The energy intensive and expensive nature of the process may have finally caught up with them, leading to scaling back Pakchon.

Pakchon has never operated every single day, but this prolonged period with little to no activity is a change from the time under Kim Jong Il. It will take more observations to know exactly what is happening, but for now, Pakchon certainly doesn't seem to be operating at its full capacity.

--Jacob Bogle, 8/21/2019

Saturday, August 17, 2019

Support AccessDPRK Using Patreon

I began mapping North Korea in 2012 as a hobby. Since then, it has turned into an enormous project that has resulted in several important outcomes. Phase II of the national map became the most comprehensive map of North Korea freely available to the public. I was the first to report on a new missile test site at Tonghae, showed that the country has multiple stealth ships, released a data set of over 300 ancient sites in the country, and information from the project has been used to support RAND Corp. reports and others. And most recently, my post showing leaks of polluted material into the Ryesong river from the Pyongsan uranium plant is being discussed by Radio Free Asia, UPI, and others.

Unlike the bulk of North Korea analysts, I'm not part of a think tank with million-dollar grants or part of major news organizations. Everything I produce was created by my own efforts, drawing on years of experience and my library of over 21,000 pages worth of material. However, it does take a lot of time and energy. Getting new research material, accessing subscription-based sources, needing the occasional updated satellite image from companies like Planet all takes money.

If you appreciate the work I do and would like to help support me in this endeavor, I'd like to ask for your patronage via Patreon.

Currently there are three levels of support, $3, $5, and $15. Each level comes with additional benefits, like receiving copies of articles 24 hours before the general public and being listed as a supporter on those articles (as well as "thank you" tweets).
I am also working on additional tiers ($20+) and rewards, such as granting access to exclusive data sets, which will be made available in the future.

Please consider helping AccessDPRK keep producing unique and relevant content that opens up the Hermit Kingdom to the world. I will greatly appreciate every drop of support.

The direct link is

--Jacob Bogle, 8/17/2019

Sunday, August 11, 2019

In Defense of North Korea Travel

In September 2017, the US prohibited American citizens from traveling to North Korea (except under special circumstances). This move was ostensibly in retaliation for the horrific and mysterious circumstances surrounding the death of Otto Warmbier. Then in August 2019, the US State Department announced that foreigners who visited North Korea at any time since March 1, 2011 would no longer be able to qualify for visa-free travel to the United States. This newest restriction applies to several other countries as well, but it will make visiting North Korea an even more difficult decision for foreigners who also have family or business in the US.

The argument against visiting North Korea (or any dictatorial country like, Cuba, China, Russia during the days of the USSR, etc.) is that a person is giving money to these repressive regimes and that travel may even be a tacit sign of support. That the money raised by tourism isn't used to bolster their economies or help employees, but goes towards things like weapons programs. The other argument is that it's just too dangerous, especially for Americans.

If you couldn't tell from the title, I reject the idea that the risks of tourism outweigh the benefits. For one, on a purely philosophical level, I believe that every human being has an inherent right to travel anywhere they want to. (Even if the target country doesn't care about human rights.)
As far as safety risks, anyone visiting any country has to be aware of local laws, especially if they have laws surrounding culture, religion, or the leadership. Plenty of other countries have laws that would seem completely insane through the eyes of an American (like going to prison for insulting a king or dancing with a woman you're not married to), so North Korea isn't unique in having absurd laws. What's unique about North Korea is the extreme and severe consequences of breaking those laws. But in terms of the actual risk level, there have only been 16 Americans arrested in North Korea since 1999. I doubt the same could be said of any nationality visiting the United States.

Tour groups often give lengthy warnings about what not to do, and it should be common sense by now to avoid political and religious discussions, to listen to your minders, and to be as respectful as possible. North Korea is a serious place with serious consequences if you screw up, but statistically, an average tourist doesn't seem to be at much greater risk of being arrested than any other average tourist visiting a place like Saudi Arabia, Thailand, or Iran. In fact, the only group at a higher-than-average risk is ethnic Korean-Americans, particularly those who are Christian.

Getting to terms of economics, only a few hundred Americans visited North Korea each year prior to the ban. The total economic impact on the country from American tourists was likely less than $5 million a year.
If Kim Jong Un is anything like his father in his love for alcohol and parties, that money wouldn't even pay his annual bar tab, let alone be directly responsible for propping up a billion-dollar weapons program nor would it significantly boost spending on luxury items like cars and yachts. Indeed, under Kim Jong Il, the regime spent over $600 million a year just on luxury goods.
North Korea's sources of outside income is vast and includes countless illicit programs. Their cyber theft activity is estimated to have brought in some $2 billion over the years. So I don't buy the argument that the extremely limited American tourism industry to the country was having any significant impact on allowing the country to continue doing what it does.

On the other hand, tourism to the country offers many opportunities that further the goals of democracy and benefits the work of North Korea analysts.

The impacts of cross-cultural engagement can't be underestimated. A couple years ago I had the opportunity to travel to Cuba during the brief window created under the Obama administration (which has since been cut off under the current administration). It was a government approved tour to be sure, but I also got to see a decent amount of reality - not just propaganda. I saw trash in the streets, houses without electricity, and suburban neighborhoods in bad need of repair. I also saw a more managed Cuba with an immaculate downtown, loyal soldiers of the Revolution marching around, and people just trying to live their lives. What I didn't see was goosestepping civilians calling for the death of all Americans. In fact, after everyone got comfortable with each other, the message was pretty clear. Cubans recognize that problems exist and they don't necessarily mind overlooking complicated historical matters if it means having a less antagonistic relationship with the US, so long as both sides can open up and allow the Cubans to finally start moving out of the 1960s thanks to tourism and trade.

Actually getting a change to see the "evil" communist Cubans, Soviets, and North Koreans reveals that they are actually people, just like everyone else. They have their own individual desires no matter how hard the regime tries to subdue them and enforce the "collective-first" ideology. That individuality and their realization that North Korea isn't a paradise on earth, is part of a long and inexorable process that will result in the collapse of the Kim family. It is something that was only made possible by North Koreans seeing other parts of the world like, China and Russia, and from outsiders coming in with their fat bellies, modern fashion, and new technology. Being envious of Levi jeans helped fuel discontent among the Soviet youth and the same thing has been happening in North Korea.

The results of trading, especially with China, has been a flood of outside information flowing into the country. This information (largely in the form of foreign movies and TV shows) is seen as a major threat to the regime. It has broken the spell of the "socialist paradise" while also raising the expectations and dreams of the people. And each time the government fails at meeting those expectations and addressing the people's concerns, even more cracks form between government and citizen. And tourism allows each side to realize that the other is human, too. That Westerners aren't bloodthirsty devils and North Koreans aren't as brainwashed as mass media may lead us to believe.

While I have never been to North Korea, I have read countless accounts, watched a ton of video, and looked at loads of pictures of tourists from multiple countries and during different periods of time. No matter how tightly controlled the visit is, human behavior is universal. Once a level of comfort sets in, people start talking. Sometimes it's just a small amount chatting, but others results in a relative flood of information being quietly exchanged between people. This adds even more fuel to the fire that has severely damaged Pyongyang's ability to blackout information and to squash growing aspirations.

And all of those stories, pictures, and videos help shed light on scores of interesting areas, often inadvertently. They can show new buildings, verify the location of a factory or other place of interest, they show propaganda posters, which allows analysts to get a better grasp of what the government is telling their people (verses what they're telling the world) and where their current interests lie. They can also give us a close look at infrastructure, car and cell phone use, and even more mundane things like current fashions. All of this augments and helps verify what we can learn from defectors and satellite imagery - both of which come with their own problems. If you take away tourism, you take away thousands of new pictures and thousands of hours of video each year. To me, that seems to be the exact opposite of what the West has been trying to do: reveal as much as possible about a country run by dangerous people with nuclear weapons.

--Jacob Bogle, 8/11/2019

Saturday, August 3, 2019

Radioactive River

North Korea is a signatory to the Paris Accords, has made plans to reforest the country, and uses propaganda to show off how clean and beautiful the country is. While it is true that the North Korean countryside can be lovely and that there are densely forested mountains, North Korea is also an impoverished industrial country with a fascination with nuclear weapons. In such regimes, industrial and military progress always takes precedent over nature and the well-being of people. One such example of this is the Ryesong River, which is heavily polluted with waste material from the Pyongsan uranium mine and concentration plant.

One of North Korea's two known uranium processing plants, Pyongsan lies at the confluence of two rivers, the largest being Ryesong, which flows south for approx. 80 km, through the city of Kumchon and into the Han River estuary, which is shared by both Koreas, before emptying into the Yellow Sea.

The plant concentrates uranium from coal which is mined north of the plant. Uranium can be mined out of natural ores containing higher levels of the radioactive element or it can be found in lower quality coal - which North Korea has in abundance. Getting uranium from the coal involves a lot of steps and results in literally tons of toxic water and sludge being produced.
Normal international precautions for dealing with toxic materials include limiting the amount of polluted exhaust and aerosols, treating waste water, and storing waste materials in reservoirs that are lined with multiple layers of thick sheeting to prevent the contamination of ground water.

North Korea began constructing these uranium milling facilities in the 1980s. While there's only satellite evidence of leakage dating to 2003, it is highly likely that this has been ongoing for decades. The facility itself sits near the confluence of a smaller tributary river the larger Ryesong River, meaning that anything dumped into the tributary will quickly enter the Ryesong.

For additional detail about the plant itself, check out 38North's article.

Thanks to Google Earth, we can identify (unfortunately) that the pipe taking waste materials to the open reservoir has leaks and has been spilling toxic water into the Ryesong's tributary, which is then carried downriver until it finally empties into the Han River estuary and adds to the contamination of the Yellow Sea.

In this image from 2006, a clearly identifiable layer of black sludge has accumulated beneath the waste pipe as it leaves the factory. An apparent algal bloom is also visible. Small blooms naturally happen all over the world, but they can also be the result of certain kinds of pollution. The blooms release toxins of their own and can be very harmful to fish and people.

Fast forward to 2011 and you can see that the sludge has actually piled up on the riverbed, that it is coming from both ends of the pipe, and that the polluted water is flowing downstream as it hugs the north bank of the river heading to Ryesong.

In May 2017, a leak of an unidentified white-colored material can be spotted. Like the leak from 2011, this lighter material can clearly be seen being carried downstream.

The continual spilling of material can also be clearly seen during winter. The otherwise frozen tributary river is melted at each end of the pipe, where hot waste water is being dumped directly into the river.

The waste water reservoir occupies 338,000 square meters (33.7 hectares) and doesn't appear to be lined at all. This places any groundwater and wells at great risk as well as offers more opportunities for toxic materials to seep into the river.
Around 200,000 people live near the factory and downstream along the Ryesong River. Aside from the two main cities of Pyongsan and Kumchon, there are multiple small villages that line the riverbanks. The river is the only above-ground source of water for drinking, washing, and farming. Plants grown using polluted water often concentrate those pollutants and those are then passed on to the animals and people that eat them.
The various pollutants from the factory are then added to the other runoff received by the Yellow Sea, which is home to roughly 600 million people.

River pollution is a major problem in North Korea and even affects Pyongyang's main source of drinking water.

--Jacob Bogle, 8/3/2019

Thursday, June 13, 2019

Being Gay in North Korea

(Image source: Equaldex)

Like many authoritarian regimes around the world, North Korea doesn’t recognize even the existence of LGBT people. In 2014, state media declared, "This practice can never be found in the DPRK boasting of the sound mentality and good morals..." Likewise, Chechnya and many central African and Asian states claim that homosexuality is a moral aberration brought about by capitalism or as a remnant of decadent imperialism. Of course, reality is rather different. There is no debate that homosexuality has existed in all parts of the world for all of human history. It is just as normal as any other form of humanity, be it blue eyes, dark skin, or being right-handed.

While former colonial nations take great pains to erase obvious signs of their national subjugation, many of those now independent countries opt to keep their anti-LGBT laws on the books and go to great lengths to defend them, despite the bad intentions behind the original implementation of those laws. Various colonial laws, from India to Kenya, remain on the books and many of these laws were put in place to suppress indigenous cultures and religions, and to force the inhabitants to behave the way their morally superior overlords demanded. Unfortunately, 70 countries still outlaw same-sex relationships, with many threatening extended jail times or even death. But what happens when a country doesn’t even recognize the existence of those with same-sex attraction?

The North Korean government has spent decades trying to reverse the effects of the Japanese occupation, trying to show the deficiencies of former Korean kingdoms, and attempting to strike a balance between socialist ethics and Confucian morality. North Korean propaganda would tell us that the country is a socialist paradise, free from all of the impurities of capitalism, class division, and imperialism. Among those impurities, of course, is not just homosexuality, but free democratic processes, the ability to decide what to do with your own life, and the right to dissent. There are no known laws specifically aimed at homosexuals, but there are laws pertaining to the security and unity of the state and society. The government’s outlook on LGBT people is likely similar to their outlook on religion. You’re free to believe what you want, so long as it doesn’t threaten or question the supremacy of the state in any way. In practice, this means there is no religion and those caught sharing religious ideas, or even ancient mysticism, can be executed.

Like religion, homosexuality brings up "dangerous" questions surrounding individuality. North Korea prides itself on unitary thought and actions. The Mass Games are a key piece of that propaganda for it demonstrates the unity of spirit that socialism brings by showing 100,000 people putting on a show. Threatening unity threatens the very existence of the state, and little else highlights the beautiful diversity of humanity than a group of people that not only don’t conform to traditional sexual roles but can also bend gender lines to the point that, for many, such artificial social constructs no longer exist. So, while a specific law may not exist, the appearance of threatening society is itself a crime.

There are no international gay travel groups that visit Wonsan’s white beaches and there are no known gay clubs in Pyongyang (at least, none that openly operate). But gay North Koreans exist surely as right-handed North Koreans do. Various estimates show that anywhere from 2 to 5 percent of a population will be gay or lesbian (the numbers tick up even higher when you include bisexuality). That means that statistically there are between 500,000 and 1,250,000 LGBT North Koreans.

Very little direct information from inside the country has reached the western world regarding matters of sex and sexuality. And, out of over 100,000 known defectors, only one, Jang Yeong-jin, is known to be openly gay. It would be fair to assume that the vast majority of LGBT people do not live open lives. North Korean’s general knowledge about sex and sexuality is primitive at best, with many women not even knowing what sex entails until the time comes. The rise of markets has helped in this regard, with rooms being rented out by the hour and young couples engaging in more open dating behaviors (like holding hands), but many North Koreans remain naïve. North Korea has many social anachronisms and is often described as a place lost in time.

Despite a clear history of homosexuality in ancient Rome, Greece, and China, the words “heterosexual” and “homosexual” weren’t even coined until 1869. This, plus what little information has leaked out of the country on the topic of homosexuality, leads me to believe that those million LGBT people probably couldn’t even describe themselves as gay or lesbian because they don't have the words. (Something Jang Yeong-jin has said as well.)
They know they have different desires and they know that living their lives being open with those desires would be dangerous. Undoubtedly, most end up marrying members of the opposite sex and do the things expected of them by family and society, as we know countless others do around the world.

In certain situations, like within military and university settings, same-sex behaviors appear to be an open secret. Older officers or students will take a younger man for his lover until such time as they get married to an approved female spouse. Whatever emotional relationships formed will either come to an end or are forced to be transformed into a platonic friendship or professional relationship. Even in cases where this is only "situational sexuality", where the participants aren't gay but engage in same-sex sex when women aren't available or when celibacy is required, the consensual behavior itself can get you into trouble as it is viewed as part of anti-socialist moral weakness and a threat to the state.

"Jang says he could cope with limited food or clothing in North Korea but having nothing to dream for left him miserable." - CNN

Socialist governments pride themselves on “granting” equality for women, agency for children, and being the voice of the oppressed, but when it comes to sexuality, they are often more illiberal than conservative capitalist states. While criminalization of same-sex activity became de facto legal within Soviet Russia due to the abrogation of the Tsarist legal code, other soviet republics who never had such laws before (like Abkhazia, Georgia, and Turkman) ended up making it illegal. Among all communist countries, this push back against minorities of all kind, sexual and ethnic, was greatly increased during the Stalinist era. North Korea was no exception. The DPRK is both a highly homophobic regime and deeply racist one.
What little exposure people in North Korea may receive to the idea of homosexuality is negative. Placing homosexuality in terms of it being unnatural, only behaviors animals engage in, part of the moral corruption of their enemies, etc., adds to the difficulties of living life for gay people, particularly youths.

As noted earlier, there may be as many as 1 million LGBT people living in North Korea. One million people who may not even know the word for what they are or that their difference is shared by hundreds of millions of others around the world. The one thing they do know, is that having pride in themselves isn’t an option. There is no option to be recognized as existing. No option for marrying the person they love. No option for living free of fear.

June is traditionally “pride month”. It’s the month LGBT people and their allies around the globe celebrate who they are, remember the sacrifices and work of previous generations (like the Stonewall Riots in New York City fifty years ago), and when countless people make their most visible demand for equality; the right to be treated the same by the law, and the right to not be arrested, beaten, or killed. In short, the right to live and love as the human beings they are.

This June there will be no parades down the streets of North Korea’s major cities. There will be no public advocacy groups fighting for their legal protections or recognition. There won't even be a rainbow flag flying on some distant embassy. This June, let us not forget one of the most overlooked populations within one of the most overlooked countries in the world. They are all our brothers and sisters and deserve every happiness in the world.

--Jacob Bogle, 6/13/2019

Saturday, June 1, 2019

Runways into Plowshares

Each year North Korea sounds the alarm on its food supply. Droughts, floods, bad harvests, sanctions, there's always some reason used to appeal for food aid. However, various reports for 2018-2019 show that recently they have indeed had lower than average cereal production, and childhood malnutrition has been ongoing for over a generation. The typical western response is to send limited aid, followed by the admonition to stop wasting billions on nukes and luxury goods and then maybe the regime could feed its people.

Despite military spending and market crackdowns, the government doesn't seem entirely blind to the need. In 2018 Kim Jong Un visited sites around Kyongsong County in North Hamgyong Province and declared that the air force regiment at Jungphyong-ri (aka, Kyongsong-Chuul) was to be removed. In its place, a large-scale vegetable greenhouse facility was to be built. Kim's orders are being carried out at "lightning speed". The northern provinces routinely face food shortages, so as long as the food grown here isn't redirected to Pyongyang or into the hands of the military, it should help alleviate some of the local problem.

Kyongsong-Chuul had been part of the Sixth Transport Division and included an officers training school (which lies slightly to the north). 

Satellite imagery from October 2018 clearly showed a massive amount of work happening at the airbase. However, Jungphyong-ri technically lies about 8 km north, and there is another base 6 km to the north of the village, so I wasn't 100% certain what going on at Kyongsong-Chuul.

The most recent freely available imagery is from May 2, 2019 and it leaves no doubt that this is the airbase in question and that the farm's construction is well underway.

I was able to count 198 foundations for greenhouses. There is apparent room for at least 39 more.
The area covered by this new agricultural center covers approx. 203 hectares (501 acres). This figure excludes the space occupied by the temporary worker's housing, which will be torn down once construction is completed.

I counted 54 apartment blocks under construction with a new school in the lower right-hand corner of the district.

Only two greenhouses have been finished by the time of this image. In the administration quarter, the required Juche Study Hall is under construction and there's a spot for the Tower of Immortality monument as well.

It is unclear what will become of the training school. There hasn't yet been any construction (or deconstruction) of the facility.

I have written a lot over the years about North Korea's military activities, especially the growth and modernization of their bases. It seems that this time they have finally turned swords (or at least a runway) into plowshares.

--Jacob Bogle, 6/1/2019

Monday, May 20, 2019

Why Has There Not Been a North Korean Stauffenberg?

The short answer is, there may have been. Maybe even more than one during the seven decades of the Kim family regime. Word of the event(s) simply may have never made it to the outside world, as little does. It’s also possible that the Korean Stauffenberg(s) never made it as far as the real Stauffenberg and were cut down before they could make a serious attempt on the lives Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, or Kim Jong Un. But all signs point to there never having been a coup attempt with any realistic chance of success.

For those who may be unaware, Colonel (German: Oberst) Clause von Stauffenberg was a German military officer and minor noble who was a leading figure in the July 20 plot of 1944 to assassinate Adolf Hitler by blowing him up in a conference room. July 20 was the last known attempt to kill Hitler. Despite the murder of 6 million Jews, the deaths of millions of rank and file German soldiers and tens of millions of European civilians, and despite the creation of an authoritarian regime that eliminated nearly every freedom one can think of, no mass uprisings occurred in Germany. Even during the final year of the war, when it was obvious to everyone that the war was lost and that Germany would be destroyed, after July 20, 1944, not one stray bullet or bomb found Hitler, and certainly not a nationwide coup as July 20 had attempted.

So what does World War II history have to do with North Korea? (Besides a lot) North Korea has created a state every bit as brutal and oppressive as Nazi Germany or Stalin-era Soviet Union. Nazi Germany was only destroyed from the outside after nearly six years of war. The Soviet Union managed to survive for a staggering 69 years. However, even the USSR wasn’t immune to challenge and revolt. The countries behind Iron Curtain chaffed at Moscow’s reigns and occasionally this spilled out onto the streets, such as during the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Within Soviet Russia itself, you had the Kronstadt Rebellion and anti-Bolshevik peasant revolts. But North Korea appears to lack this kind of internal strife, at least, to a very large degree. It has certainly managed to hold off mass violence and protesters marching in the streets longer than any country I’m aware of, communist or otherwise.

Andrew Scobell’s 2006 monograph “Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System” mentions the fact that totalitarianism demands tremendous resources, both human and material. By necessity it creates systems for coercion and surveillance. And after a while, resources start to dry up and wear down. The economy suffers, infrastructure breaks down, and people grow weary of constant “ideological struggles”, mass mobilizations, as well as the more immediate and constant struggle of feeding one’s family. This leads to a burnout of faith in the regime and a burnout at a more fundamental level – the people themselves simply become tired of it all. North Korea has managed to hold on for 71 years and counting, longer than any communist country in history. The Nazi’s fell because of outside forces and the Soviets fell because of unstoppable economic forces. And both countries had to deal with internal dissent and the burnout of their people. The question I’d like to answer is, why has North Korea not only been able to survive, but why hasn’t it even had a Stauffenberg figure?

I suspect that a full answer and explanation would end up being many, many pages long, too long for the purposes of this blog. So, I will attempt to give a satisfactory but abridged answer here as told through a history of the country.

Kim Il Sung

After the July 20 plot, Stauffenberg was viewed by his contemporary citizens as a traitor. This wasn’t necessarily because he tried to kill Hitler the person, but because he tried to kill the leader of the nation during a time of crisis and war. The people of Germany saw this as dishonorable and as an act that, if successful, would have hurt Germany – after all, the average German still saw Hitler as the reason for the economic improvements of the 1930s and directly responsible for the amazing military successes earlier on in the war. Hitler was still viewed as the only one who could bring about ultimate victory. The world may have been collapsing, but the Führer was the personification of their ultimate hope.

Likewise, Kim Il Sung became the embodiment of the hopes and dreams of the North Korean people.

The Kingdom of Korea, it would be fair to say, was one of the last feudal-esque kingdoms in the world by the time it was annexed by Japan in 1910; slavery wasn’t even officially banned until 1930. Millions of people lived in abject poverty and few had access to education. Japan’s annexation brought with it rapid modernization. The northern half of Korea was industrialized, while the southern half became the breadbasket of the peninsula. But all of this “good” also brought tremendous, continued suffering on the part of the native Korean people. Korean language and culture was banned in favor of Japanization. Japanese citizens were moved into Korea and countless Koreans were forcibly moved out to the far reaches of Japan’s growing empire.

The treatment of the Korean people continued to be abysmal. Then came along a shining example of Korean nationalism and the greatest general of all time, Kim Il Sung. (So says the official myth, anyway.) Japan was defeated in 1945 and a Soviet-backed state created in 1948, with Kim Il Sung at its head. He instituted broad reforms, imprisoned the landlords and gave the farms to the people. He attacked the Christian minority (seen as a stain of imperialism) and replaced such superstitions that repressed the people with faith in him; a god they could see. Education, healthcare, housing, no sector was left untouched by his brand of Korean-Marxism. Then, a short two years later, he launched his country into the most devastating war it had ever seen.

Millions of Koreans died and nearly every building in Pyongyang (and everywhere else) was destroyed. The truth is that North Korea only survived because of Chinese intervention, but the official regime story is that it was the iron-willed leader, Kim Il Sung, who saved the northern half of Korea from American imperialism – while the southern half was forced to languish under the American whip until a new war of unification could be waged. The end of Japanese occupation and the Korean War created a situation that gave Kim Il Sung the opportunity to lay claim to the titles “creator” and “savior” of North Korea. The people, naturally, had been given a front row seat to the horrific abuses of the Japanese and the devastation of modern warfare. North Korea would now forever be at risk. It would always be in the sights of much larger powers just waiting to destroy them.

However, while the peasantry was happy enough to take their anger out on abusive landlords, the apparatus of state was far from settled. Kim Il Sung was only one of many would-be national heroes. In fact, by the end of WWII, he had spent more time outside of Korea than living inside the country. Multiple factions existed and it wasn’t until 1961 before he could really lay claim to being an absolute dictator. But this struggle was largely limited to political machinations on the part of those that opposed him, or at least against his desire to be a dictator. Unfortunately for them, Kim & Co. wasn’t afraid of violence. He and his guerrilla warrior faction were largely uneducated and cared little for the rules of war (or law) and they didn’t mind purging those who opposed his will – either by exile or outright murder. By the 1960s, his Manchu-based guerrilla faction was the only one that had any real power.

Afterwards, the dictatorship he created was constructed to help ensure his continued rule. Some dictatorships are “cooperative”. Those in the military, the bureaucracies, and economic bosses tend to work together within their respective sectors to create a stable state. Lots of other dictatorships lean on a more competitive design. They pit people against each other, and agencies try to usurp one another in the grab for resources and political favor. This creates an inefficient and unstable state, but it also breaks up possible alternate bases of power and limits the risks to the dictator from anyone within government or the military. Kim chose the latter design.

As the country recovered from war and Kim rebuilt the nation, the average person genuinely respected him and had faith in “socialist construction”. It’s important to recall that most Koreans were poor, uneducated farmers and laborers prior to the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The only education they received after that was education that promoted the state and made Kim Il Sung the center of the universe. And the country’s elite and military leaders knew to respect and fear him. They were also well aware of the threats facing their country and that they would not have their positions without Kim, thus loyalty was required.

Kim Jong Il

Kim Jong Il on the other hand was disliked by basically everyone by the time he died in 2011. When Kim Il Sung died in 1994, many outside observers thought the country would soon collapse. What Kim Jong Il had going for him and the first hereditary succession of a communist state was that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, he had been maneuvering himself into being the only viable successor to his father. He built up the personality cult surrounding his father beyond anything Stalin received. He placed himself at the center of every powerful agency, and most importantly, he ingratiated himself with the military. He played up Kim Il Sung’s “divine” bloodline, which he, too, shared.  And he slowly cut the elder Kim out of active politics and control.

Kim Jong Il didn’t escape unscathed in his transition to power. But, once again, the opposition was limited to palace intrigue, with the requisite purges that followed. There wasn’t visible public out crying against this most un-socialist of transitions and there weren’t any overt attempts on his life by the elite. Once again, their own survival depended on his, much like the survival of the Nazi elite depended on the continued patronage of Hitler, even in the last weeks of World War II.

The great famine of the 1990s proved to be his greatest threat and it became the greatest example of the regime’s durability. Around a million people died and the state failed in many of its obligations. This is one of a few periods when consistent, but limited, stories pop up of dissent; however, they’re largely limited to factory strikes and such. But this dissent wasn’t necessarily aimed at Kim Jong Il himself (although any dissatisfaction or grumble is viewed by the state as going against the Leader and is treasonous). The people simply wanted food. Luckily for Kim Jong Il, there were plenty of plausible things to blame the famine on that deflected attention away from him and the inherent flaws within socialism: droughts and floods, corrupt officials stealing, and the perennial favorite, Western hostility.

The closest example of a Stauffenberg-like revolt is rumored to have happened in 1997, while the famine was still ongoing. Elements of the Korean People’s Army Sixth Corps, based in North Hamgyong Province, conspired to begin a general uprising. This is where the regime’s insistence on extreme political surveillance and “centralized decentralization”, where Kim is the only one with an overall view of the nation, while the military and state apparatuses are fragmented – particularly when it comes to communication – came into play. The plotters were unable to reliably contact others to arrange a mass uprising. They also failed to overcome the fact that every high-ranking official has their own (one or more) state security officer watching their every move. The commander of the corps refused to take part and the Sixth Corps was disbanded. The conspirators and their families were never heard from again.

The popular perception of organizations like the Nazi SS or Soviet KGB is that they had absolute control over the people. That they knew everything, saw everything, and heard everything. But that isn’t reality. The reality is that Colonel Stauffenberg was recruited by others and that they had far reaching support (even if that support wasn’t exactly based on mass support). An entire apparatus including military officers and political leaders was able to be assembled for the purposes of the July 20 coup attempt. (Some 7,000 people were eventually arrested in connection to the plot.)

What little we know about the 1997 plot paints a much different picture. The conspirators weren’t even able to reach outside of their own units, and they didn’t seem to have had any political supporters. North Korea’s multilayered approach to state security and the security of the supreme dignity (another term for Kim) far surpasses the capabilities of the SS or KGB.

One very plausible reason for the military’s opposition to revolt, even though their own families were suffering during the famine, is that Kim Jong Il switched the center of national power away from the Worker’s Party (WPK) and state bureaucracies and moved it to the military. Kim promoted the military by instituting the Songun policy (military first). By securing his power base among the largest and most powerful (literally) organization in the country, he ensured his continued survival. He also managed to build up a base of support early on, before his succession, by taking over the ideological and propaganda departments. With these behind him, there was little chance of a sustained or deeply rooted challenge to his authority.

A rare example of popular dissent comes from 2009. The people were protesting unpopular currency reforms which wiped out what little people had managed to save. It was viewed as an attempt by the government to steal wealth and crack down on market activities. However, Kim Jong Il, unlike many dictators, learned to listen to the opinions of others and made limited changes to the reforms in response. He also had the “mastermind” behind the reforms executed. The ability to know when to bend to pressure while also maintaining the appearance of personal infallibility served Kim Jong Il well. For the second time in a row, a dictator was able to die of natural causes, as he did in 2011.

Kim Jong Un

Successful dynastic succession is completely unheard of among communist and totalitarian regimes. Within communism, such a thing as hereditary leadership cuts against every aspect of the ideology. And totalitarian systems are largely created by a single strongman and then fall apart as soon as he dies. Kim Jong Un is the grandson of Kim Il Sung. Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il, he didn’t have decades of grooming. In fact, he didn’t have a single decade. To outside observers none of this bode well for the young man. However, Kim the Third seems to have taken rapid actions to secure his reign. A series of purges and executions allowed him to consolidate his power. He took steps to reaffirm the authority of the Party while emphasizing a parallel track that allowed the military to hold on to its power.

Kim Jong Un has managed to accomplish what his father and grandfather couldn’t: the completion of the nuclear program, the successful test of a missile that could hit any part of the US, and face-to-face meetings with the leader of their greatest enemy, President Donald Trump. Furthermore, whatever problems arise from sanctions, Kim Jong Un has still managed to oversee a billion-dollar construction boom. He has also learned the lessons of his forefathers and struck against those who could harm him (his uncle Jang Song-thaek and his half-brother Kim Jong Nam), and he has begun to reach out and rebuild relationships with old allies. His personal characteristics play in his favor, too. Like his grandfather, he is outgoing and more charismatic than his father. Not to mention his striking physical resemblance to Kim Il Sung.

From the outside, it seems like he is in a very good position to maintain power.


Kim Il Sung was the father of the nation. Kim Jong Il led the country out of famine and protected it while it was weakest. Kim Jong Un has managed to accomplish multiple regime promises. And all were able to maintain ruthless control, even if absolute power has waned slightly generation-to-generation. North Korea’s take on Confucianism, filial piety, ultra-nationalism, and severe coercive and security systems has meant that at any given time, the people were either unwilling or unable to reject the Kim’s. Kim Il Sung is viewed as the father of each of the 25 million North Koreans alive today and the Kim dynasty is the personification of the people’s will and of the state. A lyric to a North Korean song goes, “without you, there is no motherland. Without you there is no us.” The leadership has built for itself a system in which the people are inherently opposed to the very idea of dissent or overthrowing the Kim’s, and one in which open dissent or revolt is all but impossible.

The regime’s ability to react positively, but only just, to popular demands and its ability to navigate and command the numerous group interests within the “competitive dictatorship”, has enabled the Kim family to rule for 71 years. In 2019, there is no real outward sign of imminent collapse. Going back to Andrew Scobell, perhaps instead of collapsing the way Libya or the Soviet Union did, North Korea will take the path of China (albeit more slowly) and manage a gradual transition toward a post-totalitarian system. Pyongyang’s total control over the flow of information and economic activity has been greatly reduced over the years. The average citizen no longer relies solely on the state for their needs, but instead relies on their own ingenuity to get what they want. And, the system has become highly corrupt. These weaknesses may enable the transition to a post-totalitarian state, or they may simply be the first visible cracks before the entire edifice comes crashing down. Either way, a Korean Stauffenberg seems as unlikely today as yesterday.

Tuesday, May 14, 2019

The Evolution of Kim's Underground Airbase

There are 20 air bases and one heliport with underground facilities within North Korea, however, one of those air bases stands out from the rest. While the others simply have maintenance taxiways that take aircraft away from the main runway and to underground facilities for their maintenance, resupply, and general protection, the air base at Kangda-ri (near Anbyon) actually has a runway that goes completely through a mountain. It is one of only two of its kind in the country (the other being Onchon, S. Pyongyang).

Kangda-ri has existed since at least 1984 based on Landsat images. At the time, it was just a simple dirt runway with the mountain some 500 meters off to the east. Basic work on the secondary runway which goes through the mountain appears to have began around 1997-98. Work soon stalled but was restarted in 2000. Additional work occurred in 2009-2010 and since then, almost nothing. However, imagery from late 2018 shows that new work has commenced.

1984 satellite image of Kangda-ri. The small dirt runway is barely identifiable as a thin line running parallel to the river.

By 1998, clear evidence of tunneling work under the mountain can be seen.

By 2001, the main tunnel through the mountain has been cut and the runway is beginning to extend out both sides of the mountain.

Imagery from 2002 is of high enough resolution to show detailed construction work.

This image shows two main features. First, that blast doors were installed. These will, theoretically, protect the tunnel from attack. The second is that the tunnel employs a very clever but simple design: having two ceilings. The first ceiling is simply the exposed stone of the tunnel, the second is a separate concrete arch. This "tunnel within a tunnel" acts as a shield and protects whatever is inside the tunnel from debris and small collapses of the outer stone tunnel should the mountain be bombed. This type of design was employed by the Nazis to protect key naval and missile facilities and has been used by other nations, like the US in the construction of Cheyenne Mountain.

The original runway was then upgraded in 2009-10 to a larger paved runway.

The original runway was approx. 5,400 feet long and 70 feet wide. The upgraded runway that was completed in 2010 is substantially larger at approx. 8,200 feet long and 145 feet wide.

Construction work on a bridge and road to connect the two runways actually began sometime before 2007 but was never completed. Additionally, it seems that this larger runway was abandoned as it has been overgrown and repeatedly flooded. Minor activity of various kinds can be seen between 2010 and 2017 at the underground site, but no further substantial work happened until 2018.

By 2018 several changes could be seen. 1) the pile of spoils (debris) from tunneling work has grown; 2) the southern section of runway has been resurfaced; and 3) there is an extension protruding to the west off of the northern section of runway.

The current dimensions of the extension is approx. 455 feet long and between 75 and 105 feet wide (depending on the section measured). There's no way to know what it's for at this point and based on the mind-numbing slow pace of work here, we may not know for a very long time, if the place is ever even finished. However, the fact the regime has continued to expend resources here across two generations of leadership shows that the site retains some level of importance.

The exact purpose of Kangda-ri is unknown, although we do know that it is part of the 2nd Air Combat Division (HQ at Toksan).
According to Joshua Stanton over at Free Korea, the underground runway is both too short and not wide enough for fighter jets. But, the Anbyon region is suspected to hold a major chemical weapons storage facility, so perhaps the smaller runway is supposed to be part of loading and transport. Smaller aircraft can then be lined up and taxi to the main runway (should the bridge ever be completed) where they can take the weapons to any other part of the country when needed. At this point, it's all conjecture.

--Jacob Bogle, 5/14/2019

Tuesday, April 2, 2019

Target Panmunjom

North Korea's asymmetric and urban warfare training capabilities have been the center of intense focus by Kim Jong Un. Nearly every MOUT (military on urban terrain) facility in the country has been enlarged or upgraded and multiple new sites have been constructed since his rule began.

The post-training ruins of the replica Blue House, constructed near Pyongyang in 2016. 

The country already has a history of constructing mock ups of important buildings like, South Korea's Blue House and defense headquarters. North Korean special forces blew up the mock Blue House during a training exercise in 2016, and in 2017 a replica of South Korea's Gyeryong military services headquarters was spotted at another MOUT facility near the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Now, a third famous site can be added to the list: Panmunjom.

Gyeryong replica building as seen in September 2018.

Panmunjom (aka Truce Village, aka Joint Security Area) is a small collection of buildings that straddle the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and is the only place where soldiers from both sides stand face-to-face. If you've ever visited the DMZ, you were undoubtedly taken here. The site was the location of the 1953 Armistice signing and has hosted many diplomatic and military negotiations over the years. While Panmunjom was the site of the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit, which marked the first time a North Korean leader stepped foot into South Korea since the Korea War.

The real Panmunjom is located less than 11 km from the North Korean city of Kaesong. The copy is also near Kaesong, a mere 7 km to the northwest, close to the village of Haeson. The copy is built at a small military training base that was constructed around 2006 and has had incremental changes over the years.

Locations of the two Panmunjom's in relation to Kaesong. 2019 Google Earth image, annotated by Jacob Bogle.

The first satellite evidence of the site is dated Nov. 29, 2017. Well before the Inter-Korean Summit which happened in April 2018. Curiously, on Nov. 13, 2017, a North Korean soldier defected the country and fled to South Korea via Panmunjom. The layout of the site doesn't perfectly match the real place, but there are plenty of similarities - most notably the design of Freedom House and the facade of the Phanmun Pavilion.

The purpose of this mock facility can only be guessed at, but it's possible it was a rushed construction to give border guards more accurate training to deal with any possible future defections. It could also serve diplomatic causes by giving dignitaries a place to do trial runs and walk through's prior to visiting the real place. However, the fact remains that it was constructed at a military base and during a time when the Kim regime was enjoying blowing up other important locations. This leads me to believe that there is likely a military purpose for it as well as any theoretical peaceful mission.

--Jacob Bogle, 4/2/2019

Wednesday, February 27, 2019

The Monuments of North Korea

Murals of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at Jangdae Hill, Pyongyang. (Image source: Commons/Nicor/CC 3.0)

Monuments usually mark the place of an important event or memorialize important historical figures. But they can also be used to to enforce the ruling regime. Through murals of the gentle leader playing with children (subtly suggesting the regime controls all ages) to massive monuments declaring the absolute power of the party and state, North Korea uses monuments physically stamp its control across the country.

However, they're more than just symbols of authority with little part in people's everyday lives. Monuments play a central role in ordering society and maintaining control. Wedding photos are taken next to them, locals are required to pay homage to the Kim's at the monuments on holidays and at other times, and their display and proper upkeep (which is required by law) helps to demonstrate loyalty - which in turn can assist in a town or factory in receiving favors from the government.

Various estimates place the number of monuments at up to 34,000. However, the 2017 AccessDPRK Mapping Project, using Google Earth, has established that there is only a fraction of that total in reality. It located 9,896 individual monuments. In 2018 I resurveyed all of those monuments (spending roughly 150 hours on the project). As part of the survey, I classified them by type and was able to located additional monuments. Despite that, I still cannot substantiate the 34,000 estimate and I feel the 2018 survey places restrictions on the maximum number of monuments (it is greater than 10,000, but will not be higher than 15,000, even considering any others I may have possibly missed). With this in consideration, the only realistic interpretation of the 34,000 figure is that it represents the total number of monuments ever constructed, which would include those that have since been demolished, includes memorial plaques (such as on a chair Kim Il Sung may have sat on), or was simply largely based on anecdotal evidence that led to an incorrect figure.

The 2018 review found 11,170 monuments (an increase of  1,274). This increase in number over the original 2017 map can largely be attributed to the erection of new monuments and updated satellite imagery which made seeing them more easy. Regarding new statues in the context of Kim Jong Un, all joint statues and murals of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are "new" in that they were constructed under the rule of Kim Jong Un. In the new file, I have also pointed out selected other monuments that have been erected since he came to power. In total, there have been at least 410 monuments constructed since 2011.

For this article, I am only focusing on permanent monuments that are made out of stone or metal. There may be upwards of 1,000 propaganda signs, but many are often transient and may be left to deteriorate. Additionally, there are countless wooden signs placed in fields, at construction sites, and other places which promote whatever propaganda theme is being pushed at the time. These signs are likewise often temporary.

To directly download the Google Earth KMZ file, click here. (You must have GE to access the data.)

Monument Types and Identification

North Korea's monuments can be broken down into six main categories: Towers of Immortality, statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, murals of the two Kims, general murals (may feature the Kims, images of daily life, nature, etc.), general monuments and statues (monuments to an event, ones carrying slogans or sayings, non-Kim statues), and large monuments (such as the Juche Tower).
Slogan signs, general murals, and other such monuments all fall within a broader system of generalized monuments and so I haven't given each general monument its own classification label. A key reason for this is the fact that many are small and any detailed identification via satellite is basically impossible. So I have focused on breaking down the monuments into the following major categories: Towers, Kim statues, Kim murals, large monuments, and "others" (which encompasses everything else).

Tower of Immortality on Sungri Street, Pyongyang. (Image source: Commons/Nicor/CC 3.0)

From satellite imagery, Towers look like this

This is the primary Tower of Immortality and is located in Pyongyang.

Towers located in towns and elsewhere, such as in this example, will have a more simple appearance and will be smaller.

This is the Mansudae Grand Monument which features giant bronze statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. While these are the largest statues in the country, smaller statues of the Kim's exist in each provincial capital and at some major institutions.

This is the site as seen on Google Earth.

Murals of Kim Il Sun and Kim Jong Il at Jangdae, Pyongyang. (Image Source: Commons/Nicor/3.0).

From satellite, the murals look like this

Many murals are placed at schools, universities, and factories, and because they are relatively thin (as seen from above), it can be hard to locate them as they may blend in with trees or building facades.

Joint KIS-KJI murals are all labeled within the KMZ file "Others". However it also includes all additional murals, which can have a wide range of images painted on them, as well as slogan monuments, which are typically the smallest kind and has various quotes from the leadership and Party, and larger monuments like the monument to the foundation of Korean Worker's Party and Juche Tower.

This is an example of an institution that has multiple types of monuments around the grounds.

Air Defense and Combat Command, Pyongyang. Base image by Google Earth with annotations by


As a general rule, there's one joint statue of the deceased Kim's in each provincial capital and one joint mural in each county seat. Towers of Immortality are placed in every city, town, and village of note, as well as universities and major factories. In most cases, military bases will not have a monument, but some key military schools, headquarter facilities, and other important bases will have at least one monument.

Final Numbers

North Korea has at least 11,170 monuments, a 13% increase from the 2017 file. Of those, 5,175 are Towers, 29 are joint statues of Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il (KIS-KJI), 265 are KIS-KJI joint murals, and 5,701 are various other monuments. While I did not attempt to date every monument erected since Kim Jong Un came into power, I did determine that there are at least 145 of them (representing 1.3% of the total number of monuments in the country). This doesn't include the joint murals, all of which were erected after the death of Kim Jong Il (usually in the place of the single murals of Kim Il Sung that existed prior). If you take those into consideration, then at least 410 monuments are new.

Breakdown by Province

Chagang has 657 total monuments. Of those, there are 346 Towers, 1 is a KIS-KJI statue, and 16 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 294 monuments of various types.

N. Hamgyong has 864 total monuments. Of those, 463 are Towers, 1 is a KIS-KJI statue, and 19 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 381 monuments of various types. There is also an example of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 7 other examples of new monuments (built in 2009 or later)

S. Hamgyong has 1,295 total monuments. Of those, 690 are Towers, 1 is a KIS-KJI statue, and 26 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 578 monuments of various types. There are also 7 example of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 12 other examples of new monuments (built in 2009 or later)

N. Hwanghae has 1,265 total monuments. Of those, 568 are Towers, 3 are KIS-KJI statues, and 25 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 669 monuments of various types. There are also 6 examples of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 16 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

S. Hwanghae has 1,254 total monuments. Of those, 667 are Towers, 2 are KIS-KJI statues, and 24 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 561 monuments of various types. There are also 9 examples of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 22 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

Kangwon has a total of 1,073 total monuments. Of those, 444 are Towers, 2 are KIS-KJI statues, and 16 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 611 monuments of various types. There are also 3 examples of demolished monuments (not included in the overall counts).
There are 23 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

N. Pyongan has 1,252 total monuments. Of those, 637 are Towers, 2 are KIS-KJI statues, and 39 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 574 monuments of various types. There is also an example of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 9 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

S. Pyongan has 1,497 total monuments. Of those, 673 are Towers, 4 are KIS-KJI statues, and 54 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 766 monuments of various types. There are also 10 examples of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 32 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

Pyongyang has 1,473 total monuments. Of those, 449 are Towers, 11 are KIS-KJI statues, and 21 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 992 monuments of various types. There is also an example of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).
There are 20 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

Rason has 109 total monuments. Of those, there are 33 Towers, 1 is a KIS-KJI statue, and 2 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 73 monuments of various types. There are also 3 examples of a demolished monument (not included in the overall counts).

Ryanggang has 431 total monuments. Of those, 205 are Towers, 1 is a KIS-KJI statue, and 23 are KIS-KJI murals. There are an additional 226 monuments of various types.
There are 4 other examples of new monuments (built in 2011 or later)

Below shows the ratios of monuments to population.
The population figures are based on the 2008 national census. The annual population growth rate between 1993 and 2008 was 0.84%. That period included a major famine and economic collapse. To estimate current populations, I am going to use growth rate of 10% for the 2008-2018 period, as the economy and food supply situation has improved.

Chagang - 1,429,813 / 657 monuments = 1:2180
N. Hamgyong - 2,560,098 / 864 monuments = 1:2963
S. Hamgyong - 3,372,614 / 1,295 monuments = 1:2604
N. Hwanghae - 2,325,039 /  1,265 monuments = 1:1837
S. Hwanghae - 2,541,533 / 1,254 monuments = 1:2026
Kangwon - 1,625,340 / 1,073 monuments = 1:1514
N. Pyongan - 3,001,528 / 1,252 monuments = 1:2397
S. Pyongan - 4,456,865 / 1,491 monuments = 1:2989
Pyongyang - 3,580,816 / 1,473 monuments = 1:2431
Rason - 216,649  /  108 monuments = 1:2006
Ryanggang - 791,195 / 431 monuments = 1:1835
National population - 25,901,490 / 11,170 monuments = 1:2318

To directly download the Google Earth KML file, click here. (You must have Google Earth to access the information.)
Remember, this file has over 11,000 places marked. The file is broken down by province, so in order to not slow down your computer, click on the province you're interested in, or to view the full file, click on each province one at a time.

Additional Reading
1. The Price of the Cult of Kim, by Jacob Bogle, AccessDPRK (2017)
2. North Korean Cult of Personality, Wikipedia

--Jacob Bogle. 2/27/2019