Sunday, March 23, 2025

Pyongyang: Air Defense by the Hectare

I have written about different forms of land use in North Korea before; how the new border fence system affects local farming, the development of land reclamation projects, and even highlighted some of North Korea's green energy projects.

S-75 (SA-2) surface-to-air missile system. Image: KCNA.

While making broad classifications of land use (forest, rice crops, urban environments) can be straightforward and can also be assessed using multispectral imagery, getting a more granular understanding, however, is often something that requires substantial human judgement. 

Understanding land division in North Korea requires a lot of observation. Field boundaries are often based around tree lines, roads, rivers or irrigation canals, and are rarely neatly delineated with fencing or walls. And even when fences are used, being able to identify and trace them can be difficult.

A great example of that can be found at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. 

When discussing Yongbyon, attention is rightly focused on the various nuclear-related facilities that are all clearly identifiable behind their perimeter walls. But Yongbyon is more than just the nuclear reactors and research facilities. Like many examples in the former Soviet Union, Yongbyon is a closed city. It is made up of the town of Dong-an and has several small villages within a much wider perimeter fence that encloses nearly 25 sq. km. of territory.

Even with part of Yongbyon's perimeter fence highlighted, can you easily spot any difference between what's inside and what's outside of the special district? (Click on image for a larger view.)

Indeed, even places like the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the adjacent Hwasong political prison camp (kwan-li-so No. 16) rely on their remote location as much as any fence system or guard posts to secure their territories. If kilometers of fence exist around the mountain that nuclear devices are tested beneath, I certainly haven't found it.


But, back to the title of this post, Pyongyang: Air Defense by the Hectare. This will be the first of what will become a series of articles detailing how much land in North Korea is being used by the military. It's one thing to know how many individual military bases there are, it's another to understand how they fit into the larger landscape of North Korea's territory and how much land is being used for purposes other than food production or economic and industrial activity, and even its impact on the natural environment.

All countries, of course, have the right to national defense. And that right obviously requires that land be used for military purposes. In the United States, 8.8 million acres of land are owned by the Department of Defense for the purposes of training and housing troops, testing weapons, and other directly related military uses. (This excludes land controlled by the Army Corps of Engineers which administers over 5,000 individual sites for public benefit like hydroelectric dams and recreational areas).

But that's only 0.39% of the total landmass of the US. Unlike the US, however, North Korea doesn't have vast deserts that it can use for testing nuclear weapons nor does it have an abundance of available farmland. So, I think it's worth exploring how being such a militarized country impacts North Korea's land use.


To start off the topic of military land use in North Korea, I'd like to examine the air defense sites within Pyongyang.

The full network of Pyongyang's air defense. The innermost ring is the Ryongsong Residence.

In 2022 I wrote about North Korea's expansive air defense network. With over 1,500 fixed-position installations made up of surface-to-air missile batteries and short-range anti-aircraft artillery sites, North Korea has the densest such network in the world that is currently operational. 

As the capital, Pyongyang naturally has the most protected air space. Eighteen surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites positioned within 60 km of Kim Il Sung Square provide overlapping coverage of the city. And over 400 short-range anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites form concentric rings of protection, with the Kim family palace having the most well-defended airspace of them all. 

But directly inside of the Pyongyang capital administrative region, there are six SAMs and 243 independent AAAs (some SAM sites have their own AAA batteries to aid in their defense). 

Both kinds of air defense systems are made up of permanent gun emplacements, barracks, munitions storage, fire control & communication, and maintenance facilities. Some also have their own radar installations. 


A Note on Methodology

Determining the exact amount of land that is under the direct control of each unit isn't straightforward. Some air defense installations are compact and others sprawl out across the landscape. Some are located on mountaintops and others are in the middle of farmland. Some have clearly defined boundaries with perimeter fences and others require closer examination to assess their extent.

In cases where a SAM or AAA site, with all of its constituent structures, are nicely bound by fencing, measuring its total area is simple. For those sites without fencing, I tried to create area polygons that enclose the artillery/missile location, headquarters, and storage sites. Sometimes those sites can be 100-200 meters apart and may even be separated by irrigation canals or other topographic features. In such cases, I have endeavored to draw the areas conservatively, and to use trench networks, field boundaries, waterways, tree lines, roads, and other bounding features to help constrain the area into reasonable and contiguous plots that don't include large amounts of extra land.

That is particularly important because nearly all military facilities in North Korea also engage in agricultural activities. So a particular military unit may have control over multiple hectares of farmland, but that land may extend for hundreds of meters away from the core air defense structures. It's also less obvious what bit of farmland belongs to the artillery unit as part of farming compared to the land that is part of the direct operation of that unit's military purpose. Thus, only land that is either bounded directly by a clear perimeter or is immediately adjacent to the various military structures have been included in this survey.


Surface-to-Air Missile Sites

Locations of the SAM sites within Pyongyang.

Given their limited number, SAMs don't take much land overall. Together, the six SAMs within Pyongyang occupy a total of 52.6 ha (130 acres). Two of them are also located on top of hills or mountains, with one being positioned on the top of Mt. Taebo (38.988250° 125.583587°) at an elevation of nearly 372 m (1,232 ft), making their impact on available farmland even more limited.

The SAM site at Kumdae-ri covers 9.36 hectares (23.1 acres).

However, the other four are in areas that would otherwise be used for more productive purposes, including the SAM located amongst the village of Kumdae-ri (38.937404° 125.628269°), south of the Taedong River. 

The six SAMs are SA-3 (S-125) systems dating to the 1970s and are of questionable serviceability. Nonetheless, the sites continue to be manned.


Anti-Aircraft Artillery Sites

Areas of the various air defense sites in Pyongyang. Anti-aircraft artillery sites are in yellow.

Pyongyang's 243 AAAs take up a total of 716.2 ha (1,770 acres) and are located on every kind of terrain around the city. 

As I discussed in 2022, each AAA has between one and twelve artillery pieces (such as the M-1983 Quad 14.5 mm gun and ZU-23-2 twin barrel autocannon), with most having 6-8 guns.

An example of an AAA battery with a clearly defined boundary.

The smallest sites are single gun emplacements along the rim of a large water settlement basin in eastern Pyongyang and each occupy around 500 sq. meters of space. The largest is a dual set of AAAs that share 12.2 ha (30.3 acres). On average, however, each AAA location covers 2.94 ha (7.28 acres).

Some are on mountain tops and others defend palaces or are part of larger military areas. Most are located in the low hills and plains that stretch out before Pyongyang, disrupting the networks of farms that help feed the capital.

An example of an AAA battery that lacks a clear boundary around the entire unit.

The aforementioned village of Kumdae-ri is surrounded by seven AAAs within 1.3 km along with the SAM battery. 

Most are also denuded of any tree cover. A portion of the land within each AAA site is still used for agriculture, but that is because of long-standing orders requiring military units to become as "self-reliant" as possible. Official rations are barely sufficient and so soldiers spend much of their time as farmers, working to feed themselves since the state cannot provide enough calories on its own, reflecting the severity of North Korea's food crisis. 

The number of AAA sites varies more often over time than do SAM batteries. AccessDPRK has located over 100 former AAA sites within Pyongyang. And eight active AAAs have been built since 2016.

Of the former sites, some have been completely demolished and leveled, making way for crops, houses, and factories. But many others retain their revetments and abandoned bunkers, making their complete reclamation for productive, civilian uses more difficult.


Pollution

Military "brownfield" sites, developed land that has been abandoned or underused, come with numerous special environmental considerations when converting them to other uses - especially for agriculture.

After decades of use, the artillery installations can be contaminated by accumulated heavy metal toxins, scrap metal, lead, diesel, oil and other petro-based chemicals used in the maintenance of equipment and vehicles, as well as untreated human waste (given the historically poor state of sewage transportation, treatment, and disposal in North Korea). 

There is little satellite evidence and no eyewitness testimony to suggest that detailed contamination remediation efforts occur prior to these sites being reused for farming or home construction. Indeed, many of the sites that have been fully removed appear to have simply been leveled and plowed under, with crops planted on the site soon after. 

This assessment is supported by observing the six AAAs that were removed in 2016 on the grounds of the Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm. 

One of the Taedonggang AAAs in March 2016, before it was decommissioned and razed. (Coordinates: 39.136522° 125.966291°)

The grounds of the Taedonggang AAA after it was razed were turned into an orchard.

Without physically examining the sites it's impossible to determine the extent of the contamination and whether or not it impacts the quality of food grown over the land or if it affects ground water. But North Korean authorities have allowed far greater levels of pollution at others sites, and so it's doubtful that they place a high importance on former air defense units.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, March 22, 2025

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

Military Operations in Urban Terrain: Redux

In the earlier days of AccessDPRK, I wrote a short brief on urban warfare training centers around North Korea, otherwise known as military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). This was before the first full version of the AccessDPRK map was completed and after nine years, new discoveries have been made, and new facilities have also been constructed. 

With North Korean soldiers now in Russia, likely facing new urban combat situations in the weeks to come, I wanted to take the opportunity to revisit the topic and provide some updates to the earlier article.

KPA soldiers at an unidentified urban training center. Image: KCNA, Oct. 2024.

To review, the United States Marine Corps defines MOUT as "all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where manmade construction is the dominant feature. It includes combat in cities, which is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-by-street fighting in towns and cities".

It is believed that North Korea's primary goal during a renewed invasion of South Korea will be the capture and holding of Seoul, a city with a core population of over 9 million and a metropolitan population of 26 million. To achieve that objective, North Korean special operations forces will need to infiltrate behind the South's defensive lines at the DMZ and begin to isolate Seoul and its surrounding population centers from the rest of ROK and US forces, enabling the main body of the Korean People's Army to move in and take the city.

Indeed, according to the United States Army, the first moves of the KPA Ground Forces "will likely isolate the bypassed cities to prevent assistance from the outside or a breakout from inside the urban area."

Naturally, one needs to know how to engage in combat within populated areas to accomplish that.

Urban warfare is one of limited movement; fighting not just street-to-street but within buildings floor-to-floor, and it can require a multi-domain battle approach (land, air, and even sea) that, all too often, results in very high casualty rates. And so, getting proper training for the urban environment is essential.

North Korea's KPA MOUT centers.

In total, I've been able to identify fourteen MOUT facilities across North Korea. 

Four of them are much larger than any of the others and three are dedicated to training against specific, real-world targets: the Panmunjom "Truce Village", the ROK Armed Forces headquarters at Gyeryongdae, and there is also a mockup of the Blue House - the South Korean presidential residence until 2022. 

The other sites are smaller and fairly non-descript, but they often retain hints of the 1960s and 1970s South Korean architectural style that the larger MOUT facilities were constructed to simulate back when they were first established. 

There is also an alleged underground facility in Pyongyang that contains a scale model of a 'typical' district in Seoul complete with functional buildings and even "employees" who help the special forces personnel engage in conversation, use South Korean won, and otherwise help them become acclimatized to South Korean culture so that they can better infiltrate the South. However, its existence and location haven't been independently verified.


Main Facilities

Unsan MOUT facility divided by sections.

The largest MOUT facility (40.014045° 125.885854°) in North Korea is located in Unsan County near the village of Majang-ri. The army-level base, with all of its associated facilities, covers more than one square kilometer and includes an airborne drop tower that was built in 2014. But the MOUT part of the base covers 62 hectares and it is divided into three main sections. 

Close-up of the Unsan mock urban area.

The first section includes the base's headquarters, barracks, and associated buildings. The second section is the "urban terrain" which is 25 hectares and includes around 80 mock structures between one and six floors high. And the third section is a smaller MOUT complex that was added ca. 2014-16 and has mock satellite dishes and communication facilities.


Soe-gol MOUT facility.

The second largest MOUT facility in the country is Soe-gol in Pyongyang (39.080629° 126.092776°). Soe-gol is a large training complex with a MOUT facility, tank training areas, and other facilities. I wrote about the overall complex in 2019, following a major expansion of the base.

The MOUT facility has also undergone expansion over time. In 2005 there were twelve structures and by 2011 there were 47. There have been some small changes to the structures since 2011, but the total number remains about the same.


Pakkoryong MOUT complex.

On the outskirts of Pyongyang is another MOUT facility (38.967371° 126.105667°), about 4 km east of the village of Pakkoryong. Positioned within a small valley on the banks of the Nam River, it's fairly isolated and doesn't even have a paved road leading to it. But the Kim Jong Suk Military Academy is in Pakkoryong, and so the MOUT facility could be operated by that institution.

Established in the late 1980s, it occupies about 22 hectares and is aligned on an east-west axis. The easternmost section contains the base's headquarters and barracks. Then there's a 200-meter-long "road" with mock buildings on either side. At the west end there are eleven greenhouses that were built in 2019.

There are other structures dotted around the hillsides for a total of approximately 30 mock buildings.


Pyongsan MOUT facility.

The last of the large MOUT facilities is in Pyongsan (38.400285° 126.370334°). It's part of the KPA Army II Corps headquarters, which is nearest to the village of Wahyeon-ri (와현리) and is 57 km from the DMZ. 

The MOUT section and associated support buildings only take up 3.3 hectares and extends for 190 meters. Unlike other MOUT facilities, the Pyongsan location has actually shrunk in size over time. In 2011 it spanned over 6 hectares and was 340 meters in length. Some of the smaller structures were razed ca. 2012 and it was further reduced in size when an airborne training drop tower was constructed nearby in 2015-17.

Currently, 15+ different facades and mock buildings make up the MOUT facility.


Replica Facilities

Panmunjom is the village that used to straddle the border between North and South Korea, and it is where the 1953 Armistice Agreement was signed. It plays a highly symbolic role on the Korean Peninsula and is now where the Joint Security Area is located, which hosts inter-Korean talks, is a tourist hotspot, and has even witnessed several defections over the years as North Koreans dash across the Military Demarcation Line into the South.

Image of the real Panmunjom area.

In late 2017, a replica of Panmunjom was constructed 17 km east-northeast of the real Panmunjom, just on the other side of Kaesong. Coincidently, on Nov. 13, 2017, just a few months after the completion of the replica, a North Korean soldier defected by crossing the DMZ at the real Panmunjom.

Mock Panmunjom.

The replica facility was built on the site of a pre-existing military base and includes a fairly accurate (though, not precise) replica of the major Panmunjom buildings: the large Freedom House, the seven "blue huts" of the Armistice Commission buildings, and facades of the Peace House and Panmun-gak Administrative Headquarters. 

Security hut models and a replica DMZ post were also constructed on the site. 

The exact reason for its construction isn't known, but apart from its usefulness in training special operations forces to infiltrate or seize the site, it may have been used to help familiarize DPRK personnel with Panmunjom prior to the 2018 meetings between Kim Jong Un and South Korean president Moon Jae-in, as well as for the 2019 meeting between Kim and US President Donald Trump. 


Comparison of the real Gyeryongdae (left) and the scale model (right).

Gyeryongdae is the Republic of Korea Armed Forces Headquarters located at 36.308581° 127.218556°, about 136 km south of Seoul. The octagonal, tri-service building was constructed from 1985-89.

Given its location in the interior of the country, it's doubtful that any DPRK soldiers could make it that far before being stopped by ROK and US allied forces. Nonetheless, in 2017-18, North Korea built a 1/4th scale model of the building at a training base (39.849323° 125.681858°) just 8 km northwest of the Yongbyon Scientific Nuclear Research Center in the village of Gusan-ri.

Each of the building's eight sides are 15 meters long and the building is 40 meters in diameter. Imagery is limited, but it does look like they tried to replicate (in quarter scale) Gyeryongdae's height as well.

Unlike the Blue House replica (discussed below), I'm not aware of any military exercises at the Gusan-ri site that have been made public.


Blue House replica in 2016.

In April 2016, North Korea built a replica of the Blue House, which was the official residence of the president of South Korea between 1948 and 2022. North Korea launched a raid on the real Blue House in 1968 in an attempt to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung Hee. The attack failed but not before 59 people died (29 North Koreans, 26 South Koreans, and 4 US servicemembers). 

In preparation for the 1968 raid, members of the KPA special forces Unit 124 trained at their own replica of the building. Forty-eight years later, a new mockup was constructed on the outskirts of Pyongyang at 38.928852° 125.924206°. 

The range of hills where the replica is constructed has been used for military exercises for many years, and there is even an executive observation facility 3 km north (38.947974° 125.915933°) that was built in 1996, where the Kims and military leaders can watch the exercises when they want.

Paratroopers landing at the Blue House replica during the Dec. 12, 2016 military drill. Image: KCNA.

Since the replica's construction, North Korea has conducted at least two "raids" on the structure and publicized them through official state media. Following these drills, the structure has been left in a nearly totally destroyed state.


Additional MOUT Facilities

There are at least seven additional MOUT facilities around the country of various sizes. 

1. Haeju-Sinchang (38.134321° 125.751458°) is a set of four, multi-floor structures built in 2011 that are part of a much larger training base. It is located in the mountains 10 km north of Haeju.

2. Fifteen km northwest of the Haeju base is the Kyenam MOUT facility (38.207401° 125.604108°). The area was just a rural agricultural area until 2017-18 when various military buildings were constructed. A compact MOUT facility covering 3 hectares was also built. It had 19 small structures inside the fenced perimeter in 2018. But by 2021, the fence appears to have been removed, three of the structures were converted into real houses, and the other MOUT structures have been left to decay.

3. Near Changdo, Kangwon Province is a large training complex. An apparent MOUT section (38.641828° 127.753018°) was built in 2018-19 consisting of ten, single-story structures. A large number of barracks were also constructed at the same time, some 430 meters away, as part of renovations to the wider base.

4. A possible MOUT facility (38.553567° 124.994947°) was constructed in 2018 at a base 4 km south of the Pip'a-got submarine base. It doesn't look like the traditional mock buildings but may be collection of facades (single walls) used for targets.

5. In Pyongyang, 4.5 km northeast from Kim Jong-un's house, a set of 4 MOUT structures were built between 2009 and 2011. The coordinates are 39.148852° 125.851172°

6 and 7. The area around the Chik-tong Airfield in Koksan has two MOUT facilities. The northern one (38.723600° 126.693819°) is a modest site built in 2019. The southern facility (38.709796° 126.670334°) is larger with at least 27 structures and was constructed in 2020. Koksan has been reported to be one at which KPA soldiers bound for Ukraine have trained.


Similar MOUT training centers in countries like the United States are known to change every few years and present different urban environments that national forces may confront. After all, a city in Iraq is going to have different requirements than one in Siberia or in eastern Europe. But North Korean MOUT "villages" rarely change and are largely stuck in their design and reflect a doctrine that developed in the 1970s. 

And although the KPA's presence in Russia and Ukraine is giving North Korean soldiers the first experience of combat almost any of them will have ever seen, fighting among the towns of the vast Central Russian Plateau is only partially instructive for fighting in a dense urban environment with skyscrapers and a complex underground transit system - a city vastly changed from the Seoul of the 1970s.

Nonetheless, particularly as it pertains to small unit tactics, North Korea's MOUT facilities still offer a fertile environment for the introduction to urban combat and to the skills needed to minimize the risks associated with fighting in a populated area. 


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, February 26, 2025

Saturday, January 18, 2025

Landscaping in Kaesong

Not everything is missiles or major projects, sometimes small but interesting things occur in North Korea, and I would like to share one of those interesting things going on in the border city of Kaesong. 

Kaesong is one of the historic capitals of Korea and it's located in a hilly region at the foot of the Ahobiryong Mountains. This means that there's very little flat ground for agriculture, and cultivated land often has to extend up the slopes of hillsides. 

Hilly agricultural area on the outskirts of Kaesong, March 2021.


Near the banks of the Sachon River at 37.986871° 126.607192°, a semi-circular set of low hills and a valley have been filled in and leveled to create a flat platform approximately 16.7 hectares (41 acres) in size. The hills rise from around the central valley between 7 and 13 meters, and so a mix of leveling and backfilling of material was needed to create the platform.

The work began in late 2023 and the leveling process was largely done by April 2024, and by August 2024 (the latest Google Earth image) seven buildings had been constructed. This is enough to determine that the site was created for agricultural purposes. About 85% of the land is available for cultivation with the remainder being part of the processing facilities.

New agricultural complex after construction, August 2024.


A similar thing happens inadvertently when small reservoirs (usually for local irrigation) silt up - self levelling in the process - and are no longer able to hold water. The site is then converted into small fields and makes use of all of the soil that washed into the area. But these aren't made purposefully and are usually only a few hectares in size. 

Current imagery doesn't show a stable retaining wall around the site, and some small areas have already been eroded by rainfall. Without a retaining wall to support the platform, its edges will continue to be attacked by erosion and the usable portion will decrease in size, with soil runoff washing into nearby fields.

Outside of coastal land reclamation projects, this is one of the largest such landscaping projects in recent years. Although this process technically reduces the overall land area available (as three-dimensional hills provide more surface area than a flat plain), filling in the area enables broader use and control of the land, and it will likely provide greater benefit than the original use of the site. 


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Dylan D., David Malik, Raymond Ha, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, January 18, 2025