Landscaping in Kaesong

Not everything is missiles or major projects, sometimes small but interesting things occur in North Korea, and I would like to share one of those interesting things going on in the border city of Kaesong. 

Kaesong is one of the historic capitals of Korea and it's located in a hilly region at the foot of the Ahobiryong Mountains. This means that there's very little flat ground for agriculture, and cultivated land often has to extend up the slopes of hillsides. 

Hilly agricultural area on the outskirts of Kaesong, March 2021.

Near the banks of the Sachon River at 37.986871° 126.607192°, a semi-circular set of low hills and a valley have been filled in and leveled to create a flat platform approximately 16.7 hectares (41 acres) in size. The hills rise from around the central valley between 7 and 13 meters, and so a mix of leveling and backfilling of material was needed to create the platform.

The work began in late 2023 and the leveling process was largely done by April 2024, and by August 2024 (the latest Google Earth image) seven buildings had been constructed. This is enough to determine that the site was created for agricultural purposes. About 85% of the land is available for cultivation with the remainder being part of the processing facilities.

New agricultural complex after construction, August 2024.

A similar thing happens inadvertently when small reservoirs (usually for local irrigation) silt up - self levelling in the process - and are no longer able to hold water. The site is then converted into small fields and makes use of all of the soil that washed into the area. But these aren't made purposefully and are usually only a few hectares in size. 

Current imagery doesn't show a stable retaining wall around the site, and some small areas have already been eroded by rainfall. Without a retaining wall to support the platform, its edges will continue to be attacked by erosion and the usable portion will decrease in size, with soil runoff washing into nearby fields.

Outside of coastal land reclamation projects, this is one of the largest such landscaping projects in recent years. Although this process technically reduces the overall land area available (as three-dimensional hills provide more surface area than a flat plain), filling in the area enables broader use and control of the land, and it will likely provide greater benefit than the original use of the site. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Dylan D., David Malik, Raymond Ha, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, January 18, 2025

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Farming on the Frontier

North Korea shares 1,369.3 km of border with China and Russia. Predominately demarcated by the Yalu and Tumen rivers, the border regions are mountainous, with the available farmland often squeezed into thin strips or even onto islands that completely flood every few years.

With a few exceptions, such as the plains around Taehongdan and Onsong, farming in this region doesn't contribute significant amounts to the national food supply. However, they are important locally as are the forests which harbor herbs, mushrooms, and other plants used for food and in traditional medicines, and access to these lands provides additional income to local farmers and foragers. 

But, the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has placed that access at risk.

Through the construction of two layers of border fence, the land in between has become subjected to additional checkpoints, and many of the forests have become completely off limits. 

Farmer and ox cart at the Migok Collective Farm (2008). Image source: Stephan (Flickr), CC BY-SA 2.0.

North Korea has attempted to secure the full border in the past but never succeeded in doing so until COVID-19. Using the pandemic as justification, even the most impassable parts of the border are now fenced off with over 1,000 km of new fencing and thousands of additional guard posts having been constructed.

Even in this mountainous region of North Pyongan Province, where the Yalu swells to over two kilometers wide in some spots, electrified fencing has been erected to prevent anyone from fleeing the country.

As seen in the next image, the double row of fencing cuts through not only mountainous regions but also through farmland, disrupting the typical flow of human activity in those areas.

Detail of the border fence. Location: 42.967323° 129.999220°

Sometimes those fences are separated by only a few meters but in other areas it can be as much as a kilometer. In total, over 260 sq. km. of farmland and forest lies between the two fences, cut off from easy access. 

In this area, 17 sq. km. of land (highlighted in green) have been cut off by the two rows of fencing. 

In other areas, the fences run much closer together. At the narrowest point in this image, they are only 60 meters apart.

The land that has always belonged to official farms continues to be cultivated, even in places where the fences are close together, but the secondary fence prevents farmers from easily accessing that land, placing an additional hardship on them. Furthermore, parts of the border are alleged to hold landmines and the placement of those mines could further complicate the farmers' relationship with the lands they're required to work.

Checkpoint example #1 at 42.540183° 130.443553°.

Checkpoint example #2 at 42.544376° 130.477298°.

Positioned along roads that pass through the secondary fence are small checkpoints to verify the identification of everyone that tries to enter the border region. Not all of the existing road network remains open, however, with the fence just cutting across the road, and closing it. By limiting the number of access points, North Korea can funnel activity through a more manageable number of fence crossings, increasing overall security.

However, the fence doesn't only impact official farms. Illegal plots of farmland (sotoji) have been an integral part of North Korea's black market economy for decades, and they play an important role in supporting local economies and supplementing local food supplies, with corn, cabbage, potatoes, and soybeans being common crops.

Although the land in between the fences (and the illegal farms it holds) no longer appear to be openly accessible, entry to the sotoji could still be possible by bribing checkpoint officers as bribery and corruption is already rife in North Korea. If bribes are required, however, that is yet one more slice of income taken away from farmers (who, in the case of sotoji, could be anyone from professional farmers, teachers, and miners, to retired persons). 

If, however, access to the land has been permanently blocked and many or most of the fields are no longer cultivated, then that will have a direct impact on the many small villages and hamlets that can be found along the border region.

Examples of sotoji found within the fenced area. Location: 40.622524° 125.280157° 

In this area (imaged above) northeast of Pyoktong, North Pyongan Province, sotoji comprise roughly half of the land with forests occupying the other half.

Nationwide, an estimated 550,000 hectares are suspected of being sotoji, and DailyNK estimated that some 20% of all grain grown in the country in 2007 came from these irregular farms. Of course, land use patterns evolve over time, but as Andrei Lankov wrote in 2011, "the percentage of land under the cultivation of sotoji owners roughly equals that under cultivation by state-run farms" in some counties that border China. And, indeed, numerous of these illegal plots can be found within the new border fence area.

Crop yields nationwide have struggled in the last few years, but there haven't been any studies yet that focus on the border area that might tell us how the sotoji have fared with the construction of the border fence.

Whether it's a border blockade cutting off cross-border trade and impacting the lives of thousands living in the villages and hamlets of the area, or whether it's the construction of scores of additional checkpoints between towns and counties, and even surrounding Pyongyang, the government has used the pandemic as an excuse to crack down on human movement in ways greater than ever before.

Unfortunately, the difficulties imposed by the dual-layer border fence system on local populations aren't likely to lessen as authorities continue to extend the state's power over the economy and the freedom of movement. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Jonathan J, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 12/22/2023

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Review of KPA Farm No. 1116

The Korean People's Army (KPA) Farm No. 1116 is a large, military-controlled collective farm on the southern outskirts of Pyongyang and adjacent to the Ryokpo winter palace.

The whole complex includes the main farm, a mushroom farm, and encloses the palace. Its perimeter length is approx. 16.5 km and the amount of cultivated land is around 368 hectares or 909 acres (including greenhouses). The primary farm is overseen by KPA Unit 810, while the mushroom farm is operated by KPA Unit 534. Based on their location, both units would be subordinate to the Pyongyang Defense Command.

(As usual, click on any image for a larger view.)

Perimeter of KPA Farm No. 1116 with Ryokpo Winter Residence also outlined.

Map of farm with the 368 hectares of cultivated land highlighted. Excludes small plots of land each resident is allocated for personal use but includes greenhouses.

Based on a review of satellite imagery, the collective farm was established sometime between 2000 and 2006 with the construction of dozens of housing units and an administration building.

In 2011, this section was enlarged with the addition of another building by the agriculture-related complex.

Beginning in 2017, the administrative building was demolished, and a new headquarters was constructed, complete with research facilities, a farm museum, enlarged greenhouses, and a small solar farm. Large, new greenhouses were also added nearby.

Korean Central News Agency photo of the new HQ building from 2019.

The monument site has been enlarged over the years. A monument first appears in 2011 (although it could have been erected any time between 2006 and 2011). The site was enlarged with the addition of a small building in 2013. The building was doubled in size in 2016, and the plaza was enlarged in 2019.

These changes are indicative of visits by leadership. These monuments and museums are dedicated to "On the Spot Guidance" given by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, or Kim Jong Un and can be found across the country. In the case of this farm, the monument and museum are for Kim Jong Un's multiple "field guidance" trips. Kim has visited at least once a year from 2013 onward. Since a monument was in place by 2011, it is likely that Kim Jong Il also paid the farm a visit at least once before his death.

Kim Jong Un inspecting the mushroom farm in 2013. Photo: Rodong Sinmun

One other major addition to the farm was the construction of a mushroom farm ca. 2010.
The first satellite imagery of it is from 2011 but the site appears relatively new, so I am inclined to believe that it was built soon before. The farm was expanded in 2013 and is capable of year-round production. It has dedicated housing for its staff of all-female soldiers.

The sub-farm is within Farm No. 1116 but it is operated by KPA Unit #534 instead of Unit #810.

Military farms do more than just provide food for the army, they are a major source of foreign currency earnings. Everything from fish to mushrooms are farmed and then sold (or smuggled) to international markets, namely China. Pyongyang imports hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of luxury goods each year and legal trade doesn't provide the amount of cash needed. So, the government turns to the military to operate a secondary economy to bring in much needed funds.

The military also works with the "household staff" and leadership security units to provide enough supplies to furnish the food needed to supply multiple palaces and countless lavish parties each year. Evidence of this can also be found at this farm.

There is an animal farm (probably poultry, but it could be other animals) that has a direct road into the Ryokpo palace grounds. It was tripled in size in 2011.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

--Jacob Bogle, 2/20/2020
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Runways into Plowshares

Each year North Korea sounds the alarm on its food supply. Droughts, floods, bad harvests, sanctions, there's always some reason used to appeal for food aid. However, various reports for 2018-2019 show that recently they have indeed had lower than average cereal production, and childhood malnutrition has been ongoing for over a generation. The typical western response is to send limited aid, followed by the admonition to stop wasting billions on nukes and luxury goods and then maybe the regime could feed its people.

Despite military spending and market crackdowns, the government doesn't seem entirely blind to the need. In 2018 Kim Jong Un visited sites around Kyongsong County in North Hamgyong Province and declared that the air force regiment at Jungphyong-ri (aka, Kyongsong-Chuul) was to be removed. In its place, a large-scale vegetable greenhouse facility was to be built. Kim's orders are being carried out at "lightning speed". The northern provinces routinely face food shortages, so as long as the food grown here isn't redirected to Pyongyang or into the hands of the military, it should help alleviate some of the local problem.

Kyongsong-Chuul had been part of the Sixth Transport Division and included an officers training school (which lies slightly to the north). 

Satellite imagery from October 2018 clearly showed a massive amount of work happening at the airbase. However, Jungphyong-ri technically lies about 8 km north, and there is another base 6 km to the north of the village, so I wasn't 100% certain what going on at Kyongsong-Chuul.

The most recent freely available imagery is from May 2, 2019 and it leaves no doubt that this is the airbase in question and that the farm's construction is well underway.

I was able to count 198 foundations for greenhouses. There is apparent room for at least 39 more.
The area covered by this new agricultural center covers approx. 203 hectares (501 acres). This figure excludes the space occupied by the temporary worker's housing, which will be torn down once construction is completed.

I counted 54 apartment blocks under construction with a new school in the lower right-hand corner of the district.

Only two greenhouses have been finished by the time of this image. In the administration quarter, the required Juche Study Hall is under construction and there's a spot for the Tower of Immortality monument as well.

It is unclear what will become of the training school. There hasn't yet been any construction (or deconstruction) of the facility.

I have written a lot over the years about North Korea's military activities, especially the growth and modernization of their bases. It seems that this time they have finally turned swords (or at least a runway) into plowshares.


--Jacob Bogle, 6/1/2019
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