Friday, December 20, 2024

Where Did They Come From, Where Did They Go?

The prospect of North Korean soldiers being sent to Russia (and eventually into Ukraine) is one that most probably didn't see coming. Although Pyongyang and Moscow have been renewing ties since the start of Russia's illegal invasion, the idea that North Korean soldiers could be deployed nearly 7,000 km away in support of the former superpower wasn't on too many BINGO cards for 2024. 

North Korean soldiers being kitted out at a Russian base in October 2024. Screen capture of a video provided by the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security.

North Korea's Korean Peoples' Army (KPA) doesn't have any dedicated expeditionary units and the last time KPA personnel were sent overseas en mass was back during the Angolan Civil War in the 1970s and 1980s, when upwards of 3,000 were deployed as advisors and in very limited combat roles. 

So, this deployment to Russia is the first international deployment of North Korean troops in a generation and it is likely the first time most of them have ever even left their home country. Indeed, I doubt any member of the KPA would have envisioned being sent anywhere more exotic than Seoul when they enlisted as part of their required national service. 


And as Russia's "special military operation" has drawn on for nearly three years instead of the anticipated few days or weeks, Russia's military has been severely stretched. It has struggled to maintain adequate numbers of troops, has begun to run out of its most advanced missiles, and it even seems to have problems providing its frontline soldiers with enough food and warm clothing. 

Russia's illegal war has also meant that it can't rely on its traditional trade networks to provide all of the necessary war materiel and specialized technology. 

Fellow pariah state North Korea is one of the only countries to have openly approved of Russia's invasion since the start in February 2022, and the two countries began to grow closer as a result. North Korea, of course, is likewise shut out from most global trade and cooperation, and it has its own set of national priorities such as developing satellite and nuclear technology. And, North Korea happens to have one of the largest armaments industries in the world still capable of manufacturing many of the Soviet-era munitions that Russia still uses.

And so, the countries have complimentary needs and resources. Russia can provide North Korea with technology transfers and raw materials for its industries, and North Korea can provide Russia with large numbers of short-range ballistic missiles and millions of artillery shells. 

This arrangement seemed natural given their mutual desperation, but Russian (and Soviet and Tsarist) doctrines of war have always relied on mass concentrations of troops and a willingness to tolerate a high body count. Estimates vary but the United States has assessed that Russia has suffered 600,000 casualties over the last three years. For a country experiencing a birthrate crisis and shrinking population, that's an unacceptable rate of loss and Russia has struggled to fill its recruitment needs in the absence of resorting to politically fraught national mobilization. 


In September 2023, Putin claimed that Russia had all the manpower it needed and dismissed the idea that North Korea was planning to send military personnel to assist Moscow's war efforts. Then in October 2024, following Ukraine's occupation of Russian territory earlier in the year, reports appeared confirming that North Korea had sent soldiers to Russia for training and then to be deployed in Kursk, to help with Russia's attempts to retake their lost territory. 

From these public reports, videos, and published information from the governments of South Korea, Ukraine, and the United States, we can piece together what units were sent to Russia, where they were trained inside of Russia, and their approximate positions now in Kursk. 


Where Did They Come From?

North Korea has one of the largest standing armies in the world. The Korean People's Army consists of five branches and has 1.3 million men and women in active service. North Korea also has paramilitary and reserve forces, which means that nearly 30% of the country's population is, in some way, part of its armed forces and civil defense.

The Korean People's Army Ground Forces (from here on KPA) is presently organized into approximately seventeen corps-level units, the best equipped and trained being North Korea's special operations forces which belong to XI Corps. And it is from the XI Corps that Kim Jong Un has drawn from to provide Putin with more men.

Headquarters of XI Corps in Tokchon.

Popularly referred to as the "Storm Corps", XI Corps is garrisoned in the city of Tokchon, about 90 km north of Pyongyang. Organized into its current form in 1991, XI Corps has a long and infamous history. Its members took part in the 1968 Blue House raid during which they tried to assassinate South Korea's president. And members were sent to the border with China in 2020 to crack down on smugglers and defectors while North Korea rebuilt their border fence, leading to a massive decline in annual defections. 

Of the four brigades (10,000-12,000 men) that Kim Jong Un is reportedly willing to send, the majority appear to be pulled from XI Corps.

From their home bases, "recruits" are then sent off to Russia's Far East for mission-specific training. 

South Korea's National Intelligence Service identified three embarkation ports (Hamhung, Chongjin, and Musudan) where North Korean soldiers were loaded onto Russian ships.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) image of the Port of Chongjin on Oct. 12, 2024, showing a Russian transport vessel moored in the harbor. Image provided by the ROK National Intelligence Service.


Where Did They Go?

Map of the general journey taken by North Korean soldiers to Russian training camps and then to Kursk. Image: AccessDPRK.

From North Korea's ports (and possibly by rail through the Tumangang border crossing), the soldiers are first sent to Vladivostok and then onto one of several bases in the region where they can receive additional training.

Although these special forces are among the best trained, that must be understood as "best trained in North Korea", not the world. The effectiveness of North Korea's military is hard to assess because, until now, they've rarely been seen in action and eschews engaging in joint military exercises with other countries. 

But from what is known about their equipment, training standards, and military doctrine it can be deduced that North Korean soldiers will not be at parity with their Russian counterparts and may need additional training before being deployed to the front lines depending on what exactly they'll be used for. 

Identified Russian bases at which North Korean troops are being trained. A) 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade, B) 127th Motor Rifle Division, C) 240th Tank Training Division. 
(Click on image for larger view.)

At least five primary Russian bases have been identified as hosting North Korean soldiers. As part of my collaboration with Radio Free Asia, I identified three of the bases and their units as the 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade in Ussuriysk, 127th Motor Rifle Division in Sergeevka, and the 240th Tank Training Division farther north in Khabarovsk.

South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence have also said that North Korean troops were sent to Blagoveshchensk and Ulan-Ude but the specific bases they were sent to haven't been confirmed.  

We can glean what the likely tasks of the North Koreans will be from the bases they've received training at. The 83rd Air Assault Brigade is a Russian special operations force that traces its roots back to a Soviet-era Guards reconnaissance battalion. Given that the North Koreans are part of the XI Corps, it makes sense to utilize them in similar operations for which they're already trained like reconnaissance, infiltration of rear areas, sabotage, etc.

And the 127th and 240th are both units which rely heavily on artillery. North Korea is known to be sending Russia millions of artillery shells, so it also seems logical to send along additional support troops who are already versed in using artillery such as 152 mm howitzers.

After their training, the soldiers are then sent to the west where they are embedded with Russian units pushing back against Ukrainian forces in Kursk.

Approximate extent of Russian territory still controlled by Ukraine around the town of Sudzha as of Dec. 17, 2024 (data from ISW). And the general position of the Russian forces within which North Koreans are embedded. (Click for larger view.)

For several reasons, including the risk of defections, North Korean soldiers are not deployed as fully independent units but have been mixed in with at least four Russian units that surround the Sudzha pocket that Ukraine still holds. 

These units include the 106th Guards Airborne Division, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 11th Air Assault Brigade, and the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Division. 

Since October, Russian attempts to retake the area around Sudzha has been fairly slow. Based on satellite imagery, some villages such as Zelenyi Shlyakh (51.312974°  35.083803°) have been completely destroyed while the prison at Malaya Loknya (51.329091°  35.237051°) was damaged in autumn fighting, but the push to retake the Sudzha has rarely involved moves greater than 1-2 km a day.

The destruction of civilian areas has been an integral part of Russian military doctrine for a century, but the limited speed of their offensive to retake the area could indicate a desire to not destroy the larger town of Sudzha or it could indicate that Russia genuinely lacks the manpower and artillery necessary, and will have to wait until all of the North Korean soldiers have been brought to the front.

Although the United States has confirmed that up to 11,000 North Koreas are in the Kursk Oblast, they are not all believed to be actively engaged in fighting. Based on mapping information from the Institute for the Study of War, Ukraine presently still occupies some 459 sq. km. around the town. Pyongyang's reinforcements may end up being key to retaking it.


What Next?

While I do not expect Ukraine will be able to hold on to Sudzha in the long term, they have been able to use this time to fortify key positions, and their incursion has tied down considerable Russian resources. 

Over the next several weeks and months, the next question will be "where will the North Koreans be sent next?" If President Zelenskyy's claim that Kim Jong Un is willing to send up to 100,000 troops is correct, then the post-Kursk action could be to open up a new Russian axis of attack in an attempt to take the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, which has been under almost daily aerial attack since the war began. Or they could be used to help Russia consolidate its gains in the four Ukrainian territories it is trying to annex.  


Although this renewed Russo-DPRK alliance will be one forged in blood, it doesn't come without risks. 

Due to its isolation, North Korea doesn't have a tradition of how to welcome home wounded and deceased service members. The grief of mothers and widows can be a particularly powerful force in society and it led to public protests in the United States and Russia multiple times over the decades. 

Should North Korea begin experiencing hundreds or thousands of casualties, it is unclear how the state might react. Although mass protest isn't something that happens in the country, and the state's internal security apparatus does a substantial job at limiting communication and domestic travel, the risk to the regime from heartbroken mothers asking why their sons were sent to Europe to die can't be ignored. 

It is already believed that Russia has been providing Kim Jong Un with technical assistance regarding its nuclear weapons and satellite programs. Grain, fuel, and other commodities have also begun to flow into North Korea. And, most recently, it has been alleged that Russia is going to send North Korea MiG-29 fighter jets for their assistance in the war.

For a country facing an economic crisis and a military running out of parts to repair its aging air fleet, for Kim, these rewards may justify any risk of disquiet at home. 

And both countries will have to deal with the ever-present risk of defections. Kim could lose members of this elite corps to the West, and Russia will be the one ultimately tasked with their "security" while they're deployed together. 

Additionally, Russia risks a high rate of failure when it comes to any weapons built by North Korea, and this could impact battlefield performance. And should the North Koreans manage to not adapt to real-world combat, they may become a drag on Russia's movements and efficacy, placing even more Russian soldiers at risk of being injured or killed. 

Russia's direct assistance of North Korea's illegal nuclear and ballistic weapons programs, as well as their aide to the country's conventional forces and cyberwarfare units could also make Moscow liable for belligerent actions taken by Pyongyang in the future, further entangling the two countries and risking even more sanctions and international action against them. 


The war against Ukraine is a global war of logistics. Ukrainian men and women are doing the fighting, but it's with arms and supplies provided by dozens of countries. Now with North Korea on the playing field, will they turn out to be a successful Hail Mary for a challenged Vladimir Putin? Or will they be just another batch of men to be ground down as so many others have been?

How does this impact South Korea's willingness to assist Ukraine? And what happens when North Korean troops make it onto sovereign Ukrainian territory?

We're learning more and more about where they came from and where they have gone thus far, but as the war progresses, the real question is where is all of this going?


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Dylan D., David Malik, Raymond Ha, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, December 20, 2024

Sunday, October 27, 2024

Nuclear Infrastructure: Yongdeok High Explosives Test Site

Deep in the western hills and mountains of North Korea lies a large fenced-off complex that occupies an entire valley. Just 7.4 km from the ancient city gate of Kusong is the Yongdeok High Explosives Test Site. (Note: it is alternatively spelled Yongdoktong.)

This facility was constructed in the 1980s and conducted numerous conventional explosive tests as part of North Korea's nuclear weapons program in the 1990s. The testing of these high explosives relates to the conventional explosive materials that make up the "lenses" within nuclear devices that compresses the fissionable core, initiating criticality and the nuclear explosion.

Kim Jong Un standing beside what has been humorously called the "disco ball", the primary stage of a nuclear device. The small circles are the locations of each polygonal, high explosive lens.

Explosive lens design and testing used to occur at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center but was later moved to Yongdeok once the complex became operational. As a dedicated testing and production center, Yongdeok is spread out over an area of approx. 6.3 square kilometers, with discreet facilities for the various research, design, testing, and production centers. 

It is suspected by senior US intelligence officials that Yongdeok's purpose has expanded over time, particularly since North Korea's early nuclear tests, to also become the country's primary nuclear warhead storage facility as well as its nuclear warhead assembly center.

Overview of Kusong and Yongdeok. 

There are different kinds of high explosive lens testing that can be done. These tests consist of more than just setting off a shell of explosives but involve creating an analogue core (to replicate the effects of the explosion on a real nuclear core) and recording the results in minute detail to ensure proper design and physical affects.

The simulated cores can be made up of inert, depleted uranium or even titanium. The cores are then surrounded by an explosive shell (made up of between 2 and 96 individual lenses) and the shell detonated. This compresses the metal core at temperatures so high that the core melts and reacts similarly like the real thing - just without the ensuing blast and destruction.

This kind of testing is called hydrodynamic because the core liquifies, and it has been the most common way to test this part of a nuclear device without needing to set off an actual bomb. Monitoring the implosion millisecond-by-millisecond is also energy intensive, and the entire process requires advanced technical skills.

With that said, the production sector does have a large electrical substation in the area to provide electricity and that could support modern testing (which can't be detected by outside parties). But the exact building this might occur in hasn't been publicly identified. It's also possible the tests happen in an underground test chamber.

The Yongdeok High Explosives Test Site with its main sectors highlighted.

Yongdeok can be generally divided into two main sectors, an administrative sector and a production sector which also has a residential district and is likely where testing takes place.

Yongdeok's administrative sector (2003).

Within the administrative sector are two main compounds, the administrative compound and the main security compound for Yongdeok. The administrative center will, undoubtedly, not only have offices dedicated to overseeing operations at Yongdeok but also to liaise with the multiple other nuclear research facilities throughout the country, and to develop new lenses (components, geometry, etc. to fit newer warhead designs). 


Yongdeok's production and testing area (2003).

In the production sector are the main industrial and testing areas as well as the largest housing district within Yongdeok.

There are multiple storage and handling facilities for explosive materials, assembly buildings, a large electrical substation, and other support buildings.

Yongdeok housing district (2003).

In 2003, this housing district included twelve single-story houses, eleven three-story apartment blocks, and a single-story multifamily home. These would provide space for approximately 148 families of scientists, engineers, technicians and other personnel.

Yongdeok housing district (2012).

By 2012, four additional houses were built next to the original cluster of eight homes, and a further 26 single-family houses were constructed across from the main district, bringing the total to 178 housing units in this area.

Explosives handling area (2003).

In this part of the production sector, eleven structures were protected by berms in 2003. Some are simply storage for raw materials, others for mixing and creating the final explosive mix, and still others for additional purposes.

However, the buildings within the "area of interest" box will undergo a change in the years ahead.

Explosives handling area (2012).

By 2012, the two long buildings within the area of interest had been replaced by five smaller storage structures protected by a berm. However, the activities within the long buildings may have simply been transferred to a new, single long building that was built a few meters away from the originals.

The reasons for this development likely had to do with safety or a change in the materials being handled at this site. 

Area that will eventually host an underground facility. (2003)

Yongdeok has multiple underground and hardened structures, but the most interesting and possibly largest is located at 40.030719° 125.307414°.

Two entrances are clearly visible in this 2017 image.

Sometime between 2003 and 2012, North Korea constructed this underground facility across from an unidentified set of industrial buildings. 

Normally, reviewing low-resolution LANDSAT imagery can help pinpoint a construction year as tunneling work results in large amounts of spoil (debris), which is typically dumped nearby. However, I can't find any clear signs of construction work, which means North Korea took specific care to limit what could be seen via remote observation. This probably included the use of netting to obscure the area and the removal of debris by trucks - leaving directly from the excavation site and not allowing any of it to pile up.

Underground entrance in 2021. Note, a building now covers the entrances.

The entrances are spaced ~13 meters apart and are large enough to accommodate motor vehicles. But, in 2020, the entrance was obscured by a new building. Reported on by CNN and Arms Control Wonk, the 35-meter-wide building covers the entrances but doesn't block them, and the building actually extends back into the hillside with the two entrances still very much visible. 

The purpose of the underground facility isn't publicly known. Whether it's testing, assembly, storage, or something else, the UGF continues to play an apparent central role in activities at Yongdeok.

Agricultural area (2017).

Large parts of Yongdeok are actually cultivated fields and small greenhouses, as very little cleared land in North Korea is allowed to lay fallow. The grounds next to the administrative compound are no exception. In 2017, the area held a small park but most of the land were fields. 

Agricultural area in 2023.

By 2023, a segmented garden area covering 1.2 hectares was established and three larger greenhouses were built along with two additional buildings. At the park, swimming pools were installed.

Gardens similar to this have been popping up around North Korea for the last decade or so. The food can either be grown to supplement the diets of those living in the area or grown as crops for sale (domestically or even for export), but it's most likely in this case that they're being grown to supply Yongdeok.

Probable COVID quarantine facilities (2021).

As I first hypothesized on AccessDPRK and then confirmed with NK News, North Korea built scores of COVID quarantine centers around the country. They all share the same visual signatures: external guard posts, an outer fence, and an inner wall. Sometimes they converted existing structures and other times purpose-built facilities were constructed. 

Most of these isolation centers are civilian, but some can be found at military bases. And for Yongdeok, a total of three exist, with two being built next to each other in 2021.

Detail of Site 2. 

Usually, a whole town might only have one of these secured quarantine facilities, but Yongdeok has three (the third is located at 39.993325° 125.341502°). This could be because of the national security risk posed by having a pandemic decimate the skilled population that lives and works at the site that they wanted to ensure enough treatment space was available. 

It could suggest that COVID not only hit Yongdeok but did so particularly badly, necessitating additional sites. Or maybe there's three because each one provides a larger space to patient ratio (individual rooms perhaps instead of the rows of beds at civilian facilities), so they simply needed to build more to have the required space. 

In any case, the placement of quarantine facilities at Yongdeok underscores the importance the regime places on it. Such facilities haven't been located at ballistic missile bases or even at most other military sites (including Punggye-ri). But Yongdeok has three.


In all, Yongdeok is comprised of hundreds of buildings, its own security infrastructure, and has facilities for storing and manufacturing explosive material, testing the lenses, research and development, and assembly and storage of nuclear devices. There are also enough residential units to house approximately 1,100 individuals on-site (including family members).

Yongdeok plays a critical role in North Korea's nuclear program and will for the foreseeable future. Although details of the activities at the site are unknown, satellite imagery offers us a window into one of the most secret locations in the country.

And, who knows, after Kim showed off the Kangson Uranium Enrichment Plant for the first time, maybe we'll get an official look at Yongdeok one day. 


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, October 26, 2024


Monday, September 23, 2024

Paraglider Training Facilities Uncovered

North Korea has nine active airborne training facilities that use jump towers to qualify paratroopers. This has been a topic covered by AccessDPRK and others in the past. However, there are also at least two dedicated paraglider training sites.

Members of KPA Unit 525, a North Korean special operations force conducting exercises in 2016 at a mock-up of the Blue House. For illustrative purposes. (KCNA)

As far as I’m aware, there hasn’t been any public reporting on the locations of these paraglider facilities. Information about the topic is scarce, and there is still a question of whether or not these two sites are part of special military operations forces or if they are training sites purely for exhibitions that take place during air shows at the Kamla and Mirim airports. 

North Korea has also disclosed the existence of civilian "parachuting clubs", but it isn't clear if the facilities described below are part of those clubs.

In any case, these two sites are part of a little understood subject within the OSINT community. Unlike an area with continual human activity, these sites were difficult to identify. After looking through imagery from dozens of different dates going back to 2010, clear paragliding activity was only noted four times at one location and three times at the second.

Because of the amount of observation it took to identify the sites due to their sporadic activity and unassuming nature, they were not included in the AccessDPRK map until the 2023 updated pro version.


Site A (Sunan-Pyongyang)

Area around the Sunan paraglider launch site.

The first site is located on a hilltop at 39.188701° 125.759280° in the Sunan District of Pyongyang, 1.4 km northeast of the Kim Jong Il Peoples’ Security University and 400 meters east of the Ministry of Social Security’s K-9 training center.

Paraglider launch point and associated facility.

The jump facility consists of a slope cleared of trees 30-35 meters wide and nearly 200 meters long at an approximate elevation of 122 meters (400 ft). There are no paved roads leading from this site, but a foot path appears to connect it to a series of buildings at 39.183573° 125.761520°, suggesting that the building complex is associated with the paragliding program.

Based on commercial satellite imagery, this site was established ca. 2015-2016 as a much smaller cleared strip which was later widened to its present dimensions in early 2021. 

Before and after image of the launch point. Images from March 2020 and February 2021.

Imagery from April 9, 2021 shows training activities taking place with six and possibly a seventh wing (canopies) visible. Four wings appear to be in the air and two or three are on the ground. Using the measuring tool in Google Earth, the wings have a span of 8-9 meters, which is on the lower end of what’s commonly used in recreational paragliding.

Paraglider activities, April 9, 2021.

Three other exercises are visible on commercial imagery from other sources between Nov. 10, 2020 and April 9, 2021.


Site B (Chwayong-Taedong)

Overview of the Taedong paraglider facility. 

Site B, located at 39.087029° 125.439573°, is the largest of the two sites. Situated south of the Chwayong Reservoir in Taedong County, it consists of a small, cleared spot on top of a hill (coordinate center) and landing fields 450 meters northeast at 39.089528° 125.443737°. This is in turn part of an even larger military complex.

Canopy seen at the launch point in 2010.

An image from Sept. 11, 2010 shows a single wing at the hilltop jump site and two more in the fields below, with a small crowd watching nearby. There is also an image on June 20, 2012 that appears to show another exercise with one wing but it is obscured by cloud cover. One further exercise may have taken place on Aug. 21, 2021 but the image quality isn’t optimal.

Canopies landing in 2010 with an onlooking crowd.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, Sept. 20, 2024

Wednesday, August 21, 2024

Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 - Tongrim Reeducation Camp

North Korea operates hundreds of prisons and detention centers of various types, but only a couple dozen current and former sites have been properly identified through the use of satellite imagery and witness testimony. 

Map of known kwan-li-so (yellow text) and kyo-hwa-so (white text) prisons that remain open, with Tongrim marked out.

In this article, I want to review the Tongrim reeducation camp (properly known as Kyo-hwa-so No. 2, Tongrim). Although there is little public information available (as with the Sunchon kyo-hwa-so), I want to provide a baseline of information about its history and development (as observed by satellite imagery) to help facilitate future research.

The reeducation camp (which are known as a kyo-hwa-so) at Tongrim is one such facility that has been mentioned by defectors - although not in detail - and listed in human rights reports going back to at least 2011 (by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights). While its exact location has not been verified by prison survivors, former guards or former local residents, through the use of commercial satellite imagery a clear candidate stands out.

Located at (39.877265° 124.727696°) 2.6 km northeast of the Tongrim train station is this complex of buildings and walled compounds. 

Tongrim and Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 locations.

North Korean authorities began arresting political opponents as early as 1947 (before the actual founding of the North Korean state), and the number of prisons proliferated through the 1950s and 1960s.

When Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 was established isn't known, but declassified low-resolution (2-4 ft) imagery from the KH-9 satellite shows the site going back to at least 1973, meaning the prison was established some time before then. Earlier images from the USGA's EarthExplorer program exist but their resolutions are too low to make any clear determination.

Kyo-hwa-so reeducation camps are typically used to house "redeemable" prisoners. Following a period of hard labor and ideological “training”, prisoners may be released. The larger kwan-li-so political prison camps house more serious offenders and prisoners are held for a longer period of time or even for the rest of their lives.

All known kyo-hwa-so and kwan-li-so prison camps use forced labor. From mining coal to making uniforms and even fake eyelashes, proceeds from prison labor provides millions of dollars in revenue to the state each year. 

Having said that, the exact forms of forced labor used at Tongrim aren't known. However, the prison sits at the base of a stone quarry, so it's logical to assume that the prisoners are used to extract stone (among other activities). 

The earliest high-resolution commercial imagery of Tongrim comes from 2005. 

Kyo-who-so No. 2, Tongrim. Image of prison and quarry from May 2005.

The prison complex can be separated into three main sections: administrative, prisoner barracks, and the quarry.

Unlike the larger kwan-li-so political prison camps, the area around Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 isn't surrounded by a perimeter fence. The prison and quarry extend about 1 km along a small mountain valley, with three sides flanked by rocky terrain. But only the prisoner barracks have any sort of fence or wall around them.

Detailed view of the main prison area from 2005.

The main administrative and support area has a number of different buildings. What the purpose of each building is can't currently be known with certainty, but it will likely have a main administrative building, a dining hall, a building for ideological and political training, as well as a guard barracks and a vehicle storage and repair facility. 

The administrative area also has a ~270 sq. m. building that is surrounded by a wall. This building is similar to one described at the former Kwan-li-so No. 22 in Hoeryong as being an interrogation center. I will discuss this in more detail near the end of the article.

The prisoner section consists of a walled compound that occupies 1.56 hectares and has nine buildings inside it. The main gate is protected by a guard building and a security tower. There are also prisoner barracks and workshops within the walled perimeter.

The guard building is approximately 180 square meters in size. The prisoner barracks is a large, single-story L-shaped building with approximately 950 sq. m. of floor space.

Based on witness testimony from other prisons, the prisoner barracks will have a number of rooms that hold prisoners and other rooms such as a latrine and guard room. It may also have a dining room, interrogation room, a medical room, and other offices or closets; although, those could also be housed in other buildings within the compound.

In terms of the prisoner population, in 2005 it is unlikely that Tongrim held more than 2,500 individuals.


Tongrim quarry, 2005.

Attached to the prison complex is a rock quarry. The primary quarry is roughly 400 meters long. A rail spur coming from the main Pyongui Line (2.7 km south of the quarry) enables loading and transport of the quarried materials. 

In 2005, the rail line, an explosives storage area with two storage buildings, and a cluster of six nearby support buildings and two greenhouses existed. 

Additional support structures and material transport infrastructure existed within the quarry site itself.

Tongrim prison in 2010.

By 2010, the workshop area by the prison's administration, noted in the 2005 image, had conclusively been converted into a barracks, and a perimeter wall was erected around the site. The new building within the perimeter wall has approximately 600 sq. m. of floor space and the wall enclosed an area of nearly 3,800 sq. m. This addition may have provided space for up to 500 new prisoners or to create an area to segregate a new class of prisoners among the existing population (segregated by sex, severity of the crimes, or perhaps by songbun class).

An entrance gate and guard tower were added, as well as a smaller tower in the northernmost corner of the new compound.

At the main prisoner compound, a new 26-meter-long building was constructed.

Between 2005 and 2010, little changed at the quarry.

Tongrim prison in 2012.

The main change at the prison between 2010 and 2012 is that the perimeter wall of the newer compound was extended northward to enclose two 30-meter-long greenhouses and a connected support building which the prisoners operate. Whether the food is grown for the prisoners, for the guards, or to sell can't be determined.

Based on the imagery available, the foundations for the greenhouses were laid in April 2010 and so they were likely completed in that year.

Tongrim prison in 2014.

By 2014, a new ~120 sq. m. building had been constructed within the main prison compound. 

In the administrative area, an unidentified building had its roof replaced (now covered in blue tiles). The removal of the old roof is actually visible in the 2012 image, but it's not annotated.

Tongrim quarry, 2014.

At the quarry, by May 2014 the number of support buildings fell from six in 2005 to just three. An area of active quarrying is also clearly visible at the southern end of the quarry. This location has been the main site of activity since 2005.


Tongrim prison in 2019.

In the main prison compound, between 2014 and 2017, the 26-meter-long building that was constructed ca. 2010 had been razed. And between 2017 and 2019, the ~120 sq. m. building that was built ca. 2014 was also razed.

Additionally, the greenhouses in the small walled compound were also removed between 2018 and 2019.

The 2014 to 2019 timeframe represents the first period of major demolition at Tongrim. 

Tongrim prison in 2021.

By 2021, the extended perimeter wall at the smaller compound had been removed, reducing the walled area back to its original size.

In the main prisoner compound, the grounds have become overgrown with vegetation, possibly a crop.
This would not be unusual as North Korea attempts to cultivate every potential area it can from prisons to military bases. And, yet another building has been razed (occurring between Nov. 2019 and February 2020).

The workshop buildings, however, have started to show signs of disrepair, with fairly extensive roof damage visible in 2021. (More limited roof damage can be seen as far back as 2019.) Buildings at other prisons and industrial areas routinely show damaged roofs, but it can often serve as an indicator of the level of activity at and importance of a particular structure or facility. 

Regardless of the damage at the workshops, the rest of the prison complex appears to be well maintained. 

Tongrim quarry in 2021.

At the quarry, activity levels have declined, and more buildings have been demolished since 2014.

The storage buildings that held the explosives used at the quarry have been removed. And a total of three support structures within the quarry were also razed. 

The area of active quarrying also appears to have moved to a small area near the loading facility, with no new changes since ca. 2019 to the southern site mentioned previously.


Tongrim prison in 2024.

The biggest change in 2023-24 was the total demolition of the workshop buildings within the main prison compound. Whether this is a permanent situation or if they will rebuild a new one, only time will tell. But it follows a multi-year trend of demolitions.

Tongrim quarry in 2024.

The demolition trend extends to the quarry site as well, with the railway building being razed in 2023-24. At this part of the quarry, only two of the eleven or so nearby support buildings that existed in 2005 still stand today, and the explosives storage site also remains closed.

Importantly, the prison's rail connection to the main Pyongui Line (2.7 km south of the quarry) was removed ca. 2020-21, and the last section of rails were removed from the quarry in either 2023 or early 2024.

A comparison of images from 2010 and 2024 (below) paints a fairly clear picture that quarry operations are being wound down if they haven't yet been stopped entirely.

A wide view of the quarry area in 2010.

In 2010, operations at the quarry were ongoing and numerous support buildings existed. The brightness of the quarry and rock faces is indicative of activity levels; the brighter the more recent.

A wide view of the quarry area in 2024.

As mentioned, by March 2024 most of the buildings have been removed, the rail line is gone, and much of the quarry itself has become covered in dirt and vegetation, indicating little to no recent activity.


I want to take the opportunity to also talk about some other features and changes to the prison that deal more directly with people's lives.

As mentioned near the beginning, Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 has a separate walled building in the administrative area. The building is ~26 meters long and is surrounded by a wall that is positioned quite close to the building itself. It has its own entry gate to the south and there is a guard tower on the northeast corner of the wall.

Walled building in 2024.

The building is similar in its size and location within the prison complex as another building that was located in Kwan-li-so No. 22 in Hoeryong. Before the prison was closed in 2012, a former guard attested that the building was used to interrogate prisoners and even torture them.

Based on the available visual and contextual evidence, I believe that this building may be where prisoners are interrogated at Tongrim. 

According to the UN's Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, "torture is an established feature of the interrogation process", with many prisoners dying during the process or suffering from permanent injury. 


Also of note, despite the demolition of other buildings around the prison, security has been tightened around the main prisoner barracks.

In December 2022, the barracks was surrounded by a tall wall as the primary physical barrier.

Main prison compound in 2022.

But between 2023 and 2024, a fence was erected around the barracks, making freedom of movement even more limited, and effectively reducing the overall size of the compound in which prisoners could walk around in by more than half (to 0.6 ha, down from 1.56 ha).

Main prison compound in 2024 with new fence outlined.

The last activity at Tongrim I want to discuss is the visibility of a large number of prisoners on the March 8, 2024 image. Catching individuals on satellite is uncommon and one of the most cited examples, at Chongjin in 2018, showed but a handful of individuals. 

But in the below image, over 100 individuals are visible and more can be seen walking along the main road nearer the quarry. And this is just the most recent example, as prisoners can be seen in several previous images on Google Earth.

It can perhaps be easy when viewing sites through satellite to forget that the places we look at are connected to human beings living real lives. Whether it's a school, factory, prison, or any other place, the pixels we're seeing are comprised of the lives, struggles, work, and happiness of other people.

Unfortunately, the one's we're seeing below are made up from a regime that commits among the worst human rights abuses in history and does so through the torment of countless individuals, many of whom committed no crime that would be recognized anywhere else in the world.

Prisoners can be seen on satellite in multiple locations, 2024.

North Korea has hundreds of penal facilities of numerous types and sizes with Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 making up one small part of a system that imprisons over 150,000 at any given moment. And through this review, we can see that North Korea's detention system continues to be dynamic, with new buildings constructed, old buildings removed, and people marched from place to place engaged in forced labor throughout all seasons.

Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 also provides some insight into changes within the overall system.

Although none of the prisoner barracks or security installations of Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 have been removed, the removal of multiple workshops and other support buildings throughout the complex suggests that the prison is undergoing a reorganization and may be preparing to be downsized, as occurred at Kyo-hwa-so No. 88 in Wonsan, and its human "resources" reengaged in other types of labor. 

Indeed, DailyNK reported in 2017 that Tongrim was actually converted into an orphanage. However, that use is hard to reconcile with the visible security features at the site such as the new fence erected around the barracks, and the fact that dedicated orphanages already exist. If there was such a change at Tongrim, then it is an orphanage in name only. In practice, it would serve more as a juvenile detention facility where the children are treated little better than adult prisoners (and also used for forced labor).

These changes highlight the need for continued observation of Tongrim but in the end, witness testimony will be required to answer some of these questions. Ultimately, it is up to the North Korean government to begin to uphold its obligations under domestic and international law, to cease the operation of its vast constellation of prisons, to allow independent international observers to visit all prisons to document any human rights abuses, and to place those responsible for crimes against humanity at the hands of justice.


Other prison reviews by AccessDPRK:

1. Review of the Sunchon Kyo-hwa-so (2024)

2. Is Wonsan Prison No. 88 Closing? (2021)

3. Chongjin Prison Camp Update (2019)

4. Prison Camp No. 22 Today (2018)

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, Aug. 21, 2024 (edited Aug. 22)