Market Growth Post-COVID 2020-2025

Upwards of 90% of North Koreans supplement their official incomes through market activity, and in the years leading up to Pyongyang's closure of North Korea's border in response to COVID-19, the growth of market space around the country had been at a fever pitch. But what about in the years since 2020?

Un-dated Naenara image of a marketplace in Pyongyang.

Black and grey market activity has been a key driver of the North Korean economy for decades, and they are often the only way citizens can meet their daily needs or earn money for necessary expenses.

As such, market activity has long been used as a proxy for the state of the country's economy as official state data is often lacking in detail and credibility; and the health of marketplaces reflect the ups and downs of DPRK trade with China, and the central government's ever-changing attitudes toward market activity. 

AccessDPRK has monitored the annual expansion of market infrastructure and vendor space, and has used commercial satellite imagery to detect changes to the overall available market area dating back to 2011. 

Prior to the pandemic, the overall trend under Kim Jong Un had been one of intensifying market area growth, and in 2019, a record 23,260 square meters of additional vendor space was built nationwide. (This is only new construction and doesn't take into account markets that may have declined for various reasons. However, prior to COVID, market infrastructure rarely dropped in any particular county.)

However, in the following year, as COVID policies took hold, the amount of gross new space (vendor stalls and open-air spaces) constructed nationwide dropped 68% to just 7,450 square meters in 2020 and then to a mere 630 square meters of identifiable growth in 2021.

2011-2021 chart showing the total amount of new market area (gross) added annually. 

For this post-pandemic 2020-2025 survey, I have focused on the amount of covered vendor stall space (buildings) only, and not enlargements of open-air spaces that don't host vendor stalls on a permanent basis. Stall space more accurately reflects the health of each individual market as the building or demolition of vendor structures strongly indicates the level of local demand. 

Locations of the 138 market towns reviewed for this report.

At the time of writing, 69 market towns are covered by Google Earth imagery from the year 2025. A further 69 towns have imagery from 2024. These locations represent 222 total markets from every part of the country, equating to 48% of the 477 known permanent markets in North Korea.

Reviewing these towns shows that market growth remains limited compared to pre-COVID, despite improvements in trade with China and Russia; but growth is nonetheless occurring. 

In total, combined for the years 2020-2025, net market growth for the 222 markets reviewed showed only a gain of 9,905 square meters worth of vendor stalls, averaging out to 1,981 sq. m./year - the lowest average annual rate since 2011 and an annual growth rate decline of 91% compared to the high point of 2019.

However, most of that modest growth can be found due to only four markets: Sariwon Market #2 (38.510007° 125.766451°), Sariwon Market #4 (38.508158° 125.742289°), and the Pyongyang-Hadang Markets #2 and #3 (39.054520° 125.721985°) totaled 5,140 square meters of growth, accounting for over 50% of the total net growth in North Korea's market space for the time. 

This concentrated distribution of market growth may reflect difficulties in improving goods availability through the whole country, but that can't be determined solely through satellite imagery.

Sariwon Market #4 was constructed entirely in mid-2020.

Of the 222 markets reviewed, twenty-six markets showed an increase in vendor space and fifteen markets declined in space, with four of those markets either fully demolished or had their vendor buildings removed. The other 181 markets showed no meaningful change in their physical structures over the five years, which would not unusual for any give five-year period.

The four markets that closed are: Haksan (39.430997° 126.021379°), Nampo-Waudo (38.723984° 125.348461°), Tokryong* Market #2 (40.219230° 124.694337°), and Yomjon (37.766101° 126.127783°).

Haksan Market comparison for 2020 and 2024. Haksan originally had 400 sq. m. of vendor stalls.

Nampo-Wadu Market comparison for 2022 and 2024. The walled space remains but the vendor stalls have been removed. The market held 650 sq. m. of stalls.

Tokryong Market #2 comparison for 2020 and 2022. The market had 350 sq. m. of stalls.

Yomjon Market comparison for 2022 and 2025. Yomjon's stall space fluctuated but had a total area of 1,270 sq. m.

This dramatic slump in growth also matches reports of declines in on-the-ground activity within the markets and the struggling economic recovery in North Korea post-pandemic. 

Following the country's lockdown, agricultural imports and food stores plummeted, and daily goods like toothpaste and cooking oil were in short supply, even in Pyongyang's modern supermarkets. In street markets, the availability of any commodities that had been sourced overseas quickly ran out. That drop in supply of imported items didn't return to normal for some product classes until 2024.

Visible declines in market crowd sizes have also been reported, and as Professor Lim Eul Chul of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University told Radio Free Asia in 2022, "mobility must be guaranteed for a market to a certain extent, but since mobility is not guaranteed, the market inevitably shrinks. Second, raw materials, fuel, and various subsidiary materials must be smoothly supplied from China;" with new national policies to bring market forces back under state control, they aim "for marketization that is managed and led by the state. As a result, the market is bound to contract." (emphasis added)

Those declines, over time, would eventually necessitate the physical removal of market structures as supplies persistently waned.

Dedicated market days and hours vary across municipalities and can be arbitrarily changed by authorities, so it's difficult to get a complete picture of human activity within the markets using sources like Google Earth, however, following roughly three years of very few visible examples of crowds at markets, large crowds were visible at fairly widespread locations again in February 2024. 

And so, although the markets have clearly struggled in the last five years, there are finally signs pointing to a return to normal in many parts of the country.

Crowds visible at the Ryonggang Market on February 29, 2024

The conclusion is that for the 2020-2025 period, the market's resiliency and the ingenuity of North Korean citizens helped to keep market activities alive in the face of a global pandemic and the worst government crackdowns on economic activity in a generation.

Market growth slowed considerably, but despite the reduction in some market spaces and the elimination of others, net growth continued to occur; albeit at a limited pace compared to earlier years.

With that in mind, for some rural areas, recovery may not be fully possible in the short-term, as logistics chains and supply and demand pressures shift within provinces and nationally. So while the national economy continues to recover, the local effects may be felt for years to come.

*Note: The Tokryong market does not have recent imagery in Google Earth, but the market closed in 2021 and was reviewed in Planet for a series of articles I wrote with Radio Free Asia, and its closure status has been verified in 2024 and 2025.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., NO ONE, Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, Timberwolf, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, January 7, 2026

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COVID Isolation Buildings Begin to Come Down

During the COVID pandemic, North Korea closed its borders, expelled all foreign citizens (including diplomatic staff), and engaged in the strictest national lockdown of any country. To further control the pandemic, the country would also lockdown and isolate whole cities whenever cases of unspecified "fever" hit. However, Pyongyang refused to admit to any actual cases of the COVID-19 viral illness until mid-2022, more than two years after the global pandemic began.

AccessDPRK, along with additional information gathered by NK Pro, used satellite imagery to directly counter that claim by showing that authorities had begun building COVID isolation facilities in most counties as early as the Winter of 2020/Spring of 2021. They continued to construct new satellite facilities and extensions as late as 2023. 

AccessDPRK has continued to monitor these sites and at the time of this writing, has identified 126 locations. 

Locations of the COVID facilities that are known to have been closed.

However, 2025 imagery from Google Earth of several of the isolation facilities shows that at least eight of them have likely been closed with seven of them reverted back to their original use and one of the closed sites has been completely demolished. 

For the sites in Changpung (38.093365° 126.678362°), Chongjin (41.844432° 129.724593°), Chongnam (39.494703° 125.450490°), Kimhyonggwon (40.825335° 128.133432°), Kimhyonjik (41.499954° 127.277062°), Koksan (38.795817° 126.688550°), and Orang (41.441129° 129.675561°), the COVID facilities have been closed and the facility in Samsu (41.285784° 128.028118°) has been razed. 

The Changpung COVID facility in 2022, showing the telltale double fence/wall and central building.

Changpung facility in 2024. The fence and wall have been removed. 

However, other facilities that also have imagery from 2025 (such as in Chungsan and Hagap) still remain intact, so a wider trend of dismantlement can't yet be assumed. 

The Samsu COVID facility in 2022. 

The Samsu facility in 2025 with the building having been demolished in late 2024, and the outer fence/wall has also been removed.

These facilities were likely never meant to be permanent structures and were only created in response to a rapidly evolving health crisis. Most of the sites were repurposed existing buildings that were converted to this use, and most of the buildings are quite small at only 100-200 square meters; although, some larger complexes do exist such as in Sinmak and Unsan. 

With the exception of the Samsu building, which was demolished, the other known closed sites have likely been restored back to their original purposes.

There is very limited direct information about what happened inside of these COVID facilities or the level of care patients received. But given their limited size and tight security (with gates and guard towers as well as the double fence), it's doubtful that critical medical care was being provided, and they likely served only to isolate suspected cases. 

These are the first of the purpose-built COVID facilities known to have been closed down, perhaps representing a shift in the government's focus and the perception that the virus no longer poses as much of a threat to the population (despite relatively low vaccination levels) and may as well reflect ongoing improvements made to regional hospitals.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, 10/19/2025

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Temporary Border Fence Demolished

During the COVID pandemic, North Korea began to seal off its entire norther border with China and Russia - marking the first time the full northern border has been physically sealed in North Korea's history. 

AccessDPRK has closely monitored the development of the border fence which has undergone several phases of construction since 2020. 

As a quick reminder, to increase security of the border while the primary border fence was being constructed, authorities built at least 950 kilometers of a secondary fence to the rear of the primary fence. Photographs from the Chinese side of the border show that this secondary fence was largely made up of reeds and wood, and it was obvious from its construction quality that it was never intended to be a permanent fixture. 

The secondary fence helped to delineate a "no go" zone and even cut off thousands of hectares of farmland and forest from use in order to allow military construction units the time and space needed to build the far more substantial primary border fence - which is made up of two rows of electrified fencing, uses concrete fence posts, and is secured by thousands of guard posts and numerous patrol paths.

Annotated photo of the DPRK border at Namyang showing the main border fence and the secondary fence made out of reeds. Annotations by AccessDPRK. Photograph comes from Weibo, March 2023. (Click for larger view.)

Google Earth has slowly been updating the available imagery of the border and in the most recent images, the secondary fence has been removed from those sites.

Only a portion of the border has imagery for 2024 and 2025, but locations include (from west to east) the area around the Yalu River estuary at Ryongampo and Sindo (Pidansom) Island, a 10 km section west of Manpo, a 20 km section around the town of Chunggang, and a 29 km section south of Musan. 

Map showing the four areas of interest reviewed for this article.

The imagery around Chunggang and Manpo is from April and October 2024 and shows that the fence was in the process of being removed, but that some segments still remain in place. 

Satellite image from September 2022 showing the secondary border fence near the town of Chunggang (41.788063° 126.933754°). 

Satellite image from April 2024 showing that the secondary fence around Chunggang has been removed, and only the foot path used for border guard patrols remains visible.

Likewise, at the village of Ha-dong (41.094134° 126.172053°) near Manpo, the secondary border fence was removed between 2022 and 2024. 

Satellite image from October 2022 showing the secondary border fence at the village of Ha-dong. In this image you can clearly see the fence crossing across fields and a local stream.

By October 2024, the reed fence had been removed in this area.

Elsewhere along the border, imagery from June 2025 shows that the fence had been almost completely removed at Ryongampo and south of Musan by the middle of 2025, with only a few disconnected segments still being visible. 

October 2022 image of the secondary border fence at the village of Hasimdae, near Musan (42.139535° 129.099791°).

The June 2025 image shows that the fence has been completely removed. 

At Ryongampo, the secondary fence was less complex and was even missing in some areas as late as 2022, likely due to the fact the town is further away from the Chinese mainland. But in the areas where the fence was present, those segments have also been demolished.

A hillside segment of the fence in Ryongampo in April 2022. This segment cut through a small area of traditional burial mounds (unrelated to COVID); they can be more clearly seen in the next image.

The fence is gone by February 2025.

North Korea's largest island, Pidansom (commonly referred to as Sindo) was ringed by over 25 km of secondary fence. 

This particular section of fence was constructed on top of a levee. The multiple, evenly spaced guard posts are also clearly visible.

By February 2025 the fence and guard posts were removed throughout the island.

A partial reed fence was also constructed along parts of the coastline while authorities strengthened the country's coastal barrier as well. This secondary fence was even less substantial than along the northern border, and it passed through marshland foot tracks and along river banks making its path somewhat more difficult to identify, but imagery of more than 60 km of coastline south of Ryongampo, passed Tonchang-ri and the Sohae Satellite Launch Center to the small island of Nabi-do appears to show that the secondary coastal fence in that area has also been removed. 

Although the removal of this fence may sound like a positive development, it signifies that the government has finished construction of the primary border fence and all of the new guard posts, garrisons, and other infrastructure built in the last five years to seal off the country from the outside world.

At the height of construction activity ca. 2021-2022, I estimated that a total of 15,000 guard posts were established. Most were temporary wooden structures, and thousands had already been removed by 2024. But around 5,000 of them were part of the secondary fence system. With those guard posts now gone, border guards can be redirected to the permanent facilities that exist. Additionally, any military personnel that were assigned to the construction and defense of the fence while it was being built can also be sent back to their home units, improving the overall manpower readiness of the KPA.

Based on my research of North Korea's border security and twelve years of observations, this will likely be the last major change to the border fence system for several years.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, September 19, 2025

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The Development of North Korea's Northern Border Wall

Ever since the mass defections and rise in illegal trade caused by the 1990s famine, North Korea has tightened its grip on border security with increasing severity, but its northern border was still far from impenetrable. 

Despite fences and guard patrols, along with inhospitable terrain and weather on both sides of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, plus China's repatriation policies, total defections could reach several thousand each year. While most defectors remain in China in hiding, between 1,000 and 2,000 would make it to South Korea annually since about 2001.

But as the COVID pandemic spread, North Korea was not only faced with a possible existential threat due to the poor state of the country's healthcare system, but it was also faced with an opportunity - to use the pandemic as an excuse to finally (and completely) close down the border.

In the intervening four years, the physical barriers associated with the "border wall" were built, altered, and now appear to be undergoing a final series of changes.

In this article, I will lay out the development and current state of North Korea's anti-pandemic border measures now that the threat of the pandemic has waned, and as Pyongyang seeks to at least partially reopen its borders. 

3D render of a section of renovated border fence. This section features a levee, a double-row of fencing, guard posts, and a border guard garrison is in the background (right). Created by Nathan J. Hunt for AccessDPRK.

As far as I'm aware, I was the first person to note (with the aid of satellite imagery) that North Korea was increasing its border security with a Spotlight Report published by AllSource Analysis back in April 2021.

The report highlighted changes around the border town of Hoeryong, particularly noting an increase in the number of guard posts and the now ubiquitous primary and secondary lines of fencing.

Chronologically, however, one of the earliest examples of improved security following the border's closure in January 2020, was the addition of guard posts in Ryongchon County (south of Sinuiju) in September 2020.

Location of new guard posts built in 2020 along a section of older border fence in Ryongchon.

However, according to DailyNK reporting, the order to build a new border fence across the entire border wasn't issued by Kim Jong Un until February 2021. 

The addition of new guard posts may have been a separate order followed by a new (Feb. 2021) order to build the border fence, or perhaps the earliest order may not yet have come to light. Regardless, the timeline of increased border security was not uniform, with some areas undergoing construction sooner and others delayed. But by 2021, work was underway along the full North Korean border with China and Russia.

As mentioned, the first activity seen was the installation of thousands of small guard posts. Most were along the existing border fences, but some were placed in the middle of fields or atop river levees. In total, I have estimated that up to 15,000 guard posts dotted the landscape at the height of the pandemic.

Following the installation of numerous guard posts, secondary fence was then constructed behind the main border fence. The secondary fence was located anywhere from just a few meters behind the main fence to several hundred meters behind, and it cut through agricultural fields, forests, spanned rivers, and even incorporated the boundaries of factories and houses.

This secondary fence, based on a range of tourist photographs taken from the Chinese side of the border, was built out of either wood or reeds, depending on the raw materials available in each locality. 

Annotated photo of the DPRK border at Namyang showing the main border fence and the secondary fence made out of reeds. Annotations by AccessDPRK. Photograph comes from Weibo, March 2023.

To accomplish the work, construction units logged local forests and built temporary work camps in multiple locations along the border. 

Area of interest near Chang-ni in 2020, prior to logging.

Area of interest showing logging activities in 2022.

Timber piles for fence construction in Chunggang County, 2022.

Elsewhere, logs being staged for use in fence construction can be seen. In the above example, that area had simply been empty previously. No logging or storage activity existed prior to this event.

The work camps, as seen below, are standard for any large-scale construction project such as at the major residential projects underway in Pyongyang. 

One of multiple temporary, small worker's camps along the Taehongdan section of the Sino-DPRK border.

One of the temporary worker's camps in Musan.

Given the logistics of building a border fence across more than 1,000 km of highly variable terrain, instead of having a single centralized worker's camp, the camps (with their housing, workshops, and other facilities) are dispersed; with dozens of them along the border, each housing only few dozen to a few hundred workers. 

Worker's camp near Onsong. Numerous small buildings can be seen in October 2022.

The Onsong camp had been removed by May 2023 and the meandering secondary fence completed.

Following the addition of guard posts to tighten security and the wooden secondary fence that served to cut off access to the areas under construction, any original border fencing was then demolished section by section.

The next steps taken were to reenforce, rebuild, or newly construct flood barriers in places prone to flooding, and then building the new fence on top of those levees - with each province (and likely each county) responsible for providing most of the manpower and materials needed within their jurisdiction.

On a bend of the Tumen River, 2 km away from the Onsong worker's camp, a new levee was under construction in 2022.

By May 2023, the levee was largely completed, and the new electrified fence was placed on top. However, some soil grading activity was still ongoing. 

In at least one area, in Rason, a new quarry was opened to provide the materials needed for local levees. 

Rason quarry, with both the new main fence and secondary fence visible.

New fences were also constructed on hills and mountainsides, areas that were often left poorly controlled prior to COVID and that served as routes of defection.

The previous border fence was just a single row of barbed-wire fencing with guard posts that were only concentrated near populated areas and areas where defections were less physically difficult (open fields, narrow parts of rivers, etc.) Guard posts were often 1 km apart or even farther, and the wide reservoirs along the Yalu lacked fencing in general. 

The main border fence now comprises two rows of tall fence, allegedly electrified, with a patrol road along it. And the secondary fence appears to have become a permanent part of the system as well. 

Guard posts are considerably closer together and can be found along the entire length of the border - even in remote areas. Guard posts are positioned on both the main and secondary fences. Fencing was also added to the previously unprotected reservoirs (such as the Sup'ung Reservoir) and electronic surveillance infrastructure was improved.

Construction of the new fence was carried out by border guards, local labor brigades and, due to the immense manpower requirements, military units from XI Corps (Storm Corps) were also used. However, the same manpower requirements that necessitated the use of the military to help construct the border fence also temporarily drained the readiness of the corps.

After first being fortified with additional guard posts, the fence path in this area was moved further inland to follow an existing road. 

Between 2021-2023, fence paths were adjusted to improve local security and as better paths were identified during construction. 

Along with the fences and guard posts, over 400 border guard garrisons now dot the landscape. Most of the garrisons existed before COVID and many had already been renovated ca. 2016, but new ones were still constructed, and other changes were made to existing sites.

Example of a border guard garrison.

However, there have been changes to the level of security seen earlier on in the fence's development. What I would describe as being overkill in the number of guard posts (and thus guards needed) has been relaxed, with many redundant positions removed. 

Nonetheless, the northern North Korean border has become one of the most well-secured civilian borders in the world. Presently along the northern border are over 400 guard posts, 10,000-13,000 guard posts, and approximately 2,100 km of primary and secondary fencing has been identified by AccessDPRK.

Combined with increased security on the Chinese side of the border and enhancements to the DPRK coastal fence as well, it is unlikely that defection rates will return to previously seen levels anytime soon. (Only 196 made it to South Korea in 2023.)

Animation showing the development of a section of border fence from July 2020 to October 2023.

3D render of the same section of fence with the border guard garrison building shown on the left. Created by Nathan J. Hunt for AccessDPRK.

Note: if you'd like to learn more about how North Korea's border closure has impacted the lives of average North Koreans, check out this in-depth report from Human Rights Watch which I assisted with.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pearce, Douglas Martin, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, 7/23/2024

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Pyongyang: COVID Fortress

AccessDPRK has been at the forefront of using satellite imagery to uncover North Korea's anti-pandemic measures. It was the first to use satellite imagery to verify reports of the "border blockade", it was the first to offer a nationwide look at those border changes via the AccessDPRK map, and it was the first to expose a network of covert COVID isolation facilities that was built across the country.

Screenshot of KCTV program (July 27, 2020) showing a COVID disinfection checkpoint along the Pyongyang-Kaesong Highway. Image source: NK News.

North Korea has used the pandemic to clamp down on human movement and trade in the most extreme ways, and it has relied on myths and pseudoscience to back up its policies. From claiming that COVID could pass into the country from Chinese dust to putting people in quarantine for coming into contact with objects from South Korea - despite there being very little evidence that one can contract the virus by simply touching an object - North Korea's anti-pandemic measures have caused an inordinate amount of harm.

Of course, given the state of the country's healthcare system, any pandemic could pose an existential threat to the state (to say nothing of the people living there). That is why it's little surprise to discover that authorities embarked on building not just border and coastal fences but have tried to erect an anti-COVID barrier around Pyongyang itself. 

First, however, I want to review the other infrastructure changes that North Korea has instituted in its fight against COVID.

North Korea was the first country to completely close their borders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. To accomplish this, not only were all border crossings closed and trade & tourism suspended, but authorities erected hundreds of kilometers of new border fence (often in two layers) as well as repaired and modernized the existing border fences.

Map showing all border and coastal fencing as well as fences along the DMZ.

As part of the border closure, they added over 15,000 additional guard posts and garrisons along the border with China and Russia. They also improved security along both coastlines. AccessDPRK has verified the existence of 2,008 km of northern border fence and 1,567 km of coastal fence that now ring the country (plus hundreds of kilometers of DMZ fences). 

Within the country, numerous checkpoints were set up to further limit human movement and the spread of the disease. Some of these are simple tent-like structures where a person's temperature can be taken, and others are existing vehicle inspection points that have been expanded to allow for decontamination processes.

At the border crossings, most have simply remained shuttered. But at Sinuiju (the main crossing with China) and Tumanggang (the only crossing with Russia), new facilities to quarantine and disinfect goods and people were set up to handle what little trade has occurred since 2020, and to prepare for when trade is normalized again. There is also evidence of disinfection infrastructure being built at the ports of Nampo and Tanchon.

Location of all identified COVID isolation facilities. 

And as part of actually providing a level of medical care, albeit a questionable level, dozens of suspected COVID isolation facilities (95 at last count) have been constructed throughout the provinces. These highly secured compounds can isolate patients who test positive with COVID or have a severe "unidentified" fever, while not taking up additional room in the country's poorly staffed and supplied hospitals. Within Pyongyang, the city's hospitals have all had dedicated COVID wards set up.

It is within this context that I want to detail the latest apparent COVID infrastructure project: fencing off Pyongyang itself.

Map showing the location of the capital COVID fence. The yellow lines represent confirmed fence paths. The white lines represent rows of guard posts that may or may not be connected by fencing.

Because there are gaps in the available image data from Google Earth, I haven't been able to map out the full system as it exists today, but I have been able to locate enough of it to provide this review.

Beginning no earlier than March 2020, the construction of a series of fences, guard posts, garrisons, and checkpoints began. In parts of the city, the first iteration of the system was already built by October 2020, while in other areas construction extended until at least June 2022. 

Detailed look at the fence with a garrison building and guard posts visible.

Another detailed view of the fence. The fence's path is clear as are the guard posts and foot patrol path.

Based upon the available imagery, there are at least 63.2 km of clearly identifiable fencing with a further 22.9 km of rows of guard posts that may or may not also be connected by fencing. The guard posts are typically spaced every 75-100 meters. With 86.1 km of fenced and unfenced guard post lines, that means that roughly 1,000 guard posts (between 861 and 1,148) have been constructed around the city. 

Locations of garrison (barracks) buildings.

Just like with the country's border fence, these posts are supported by a network of at least 28 purpose-built garrisons (barracks) - six of which were actively under construction in June 2022. There are several other sites that I believe are now being used as garrisons, but they were previously used for other purposes. I haven't included them on the map because of a level of uncertainty. 

Locations of identified checkpoints, both pre-existing ones and newly constructed.

The fence system is also interconnected with the capital's checkpoint network and consists of 35 checkpoints of various types. Of those, twenty were built since 2020 and several of the preexisting sites have had visible upgrades. 

Explanation of gaps in the fence system. "Image gaps" refers to a lack of more recent imagery available on Google Earth.

There are parts of the terrain around Pyongyang where I have not been able to identify any new fencing. However, some of these areas are already "protected" by existing fences from factories or agricultural places, and those fences have been incorporated into the new system. Additionally, large sections of eastern Pyongyang are afforded security by the wide Taedong River (which serves a natural physical barrier), and northern sections of the city are mountainous and filled with military bases - effectively creating large swathes of inherently restricted territory. 

Thus, Pyongyang now sits at the center of a multilayered security network; a city that already required permits to visit, can now shut itself off from the rest of the country at-will. This doesn't only include restricting traffic from the main roads (an ability that has always existed), but even prevents Pyongyang farmers from coming too close to the city core by merely crossing a field on foot. 

The Central Quarantine Command oversees Pyongyang's anti-pandemic measures, instituting lockdowns, and enforcing the various government orders relating to the pandemic. However, whether or not this capital fence system is subordinate to the CQD, is part of the capital police force, or is part of a multi-agency force isn't yet known. 

I reached out to several North Korea experts including those with access to information from within the country, and only hints of information about this fence have begun to make it to outside researchers - and there had been no independent verification of it until now. It seems that North Korean authorities have been keen on keeping it a secret. 

However, as defector and former Pyongyang resident Hyun Seung Lee told me, it is "highly possible [that such a fence was constructed] since the country's top priority is Kim Jong Un's health. If anything COVID-19 related happened inside North Korea, none of the authorities will be free from responsibilities to protect the leader."

Considering the large number of checkpoints that already restricted access to Pyongyang, it may seem redundant to build dozens of kilometers of fences and a thousand guard posts to further cut off the city. Yet, North Korea not only built over 15,000 additional guard posts to seal off their northern border they also built fences all along the coastline. And so, North Korea seems to fight viruses with the same tactics as they would an invading army - block the enemy from being able to move. In this case, the general population plays the role of "enemy".

Although North Korea appears to be preparing to reopen its borders, it's clear that they have invested in the physical infrastructure needed to reenter lockdown at any time, and to continue to further restrict human movement within the country. This latest discovery underscores the paranoid nature of the state and demonstrates how Kim Jong Un would rather resort to force (sealing off the capital and placing thousands of guards on patrol) than take helpful steps like granting general access to vaccines or allowing adequate humanitarian aid into the country. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Jonathan J, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Nate Odenkirk, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 9/15/2023

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