Reprocessing Activity at the Pakchon Uranium Concentration Pilot Plant

The Pakchon Uranium Concentration Pilot Plant is North Korea's first uranium concentration plant. Converted from a graphite processing facility, Pakchon began to process uranium ore into "yellowcake" in 1982. Based on open-source information and satellite observations, it has likely been in caretaker status since 2002. But, as previously reported by AccessDPRK, low-level activities have continued at the plant.

The Pakchon Uranium Concentration Pilot Plant as of February 2024.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, such low-level activities may involve "small processing runs of iron-bearing ore of some type, caretaker maintenance work, or decommissioning of equipment within the plant." 

However, recent satellite imagery suggests additional kinds of activity are now taking place.

A series of chemical or slurry tanks were constructed at the waste material reservoir between September 2021 and February 2024, along with small support structures and a new ~240 sq. meter holding or settling pond. 

By Sept. 2021, some of the structures needed to reprocess the waste material had been constructed, including a dry materials storage site and some unidentified support structures. Some material from the old waste reservoir was also already being removed.

Then, by Feb. 2024, we see a number of other additions that include seven chemical tanks and a holding or settling pond, as well as other support structures. 

This opens up two main possible explanations for the activity. 1) that the waste material is being reprocessed to extract rare earth elements (REEs) or even residual uranium; 2) that the plant is actually undertaking an environmental remediation program to clean up the industrial waste.

Frank V. Pabian, former IAEA Nuclear Chief Inspector for Iraq, told AccessDPRK that it is most probable that they "are setting up to process the old waste tailings pile" in search of rare earth elements in a process that, considering North Korea's command economy, "does not have to be cost effective in the normal sense of things."

Rare earth elements such as gadolinium, neodymium, and yttrium can be used for a wide range of purposes, but they have become critical for modern military and electronic technologies. With international sanctions preventing North Korea from legally importing such material, the country needs to find domestic sources.

At Pakchon, as at Pyongsan, the uranium came from coal which was then processed to concentrate the uranium into yellowcake (a low-radiation powder of concentrated U-238, mostly in the form of triuranium octoxide) before it was shipped off to Yongbyon. The waste material was then deposited in a series of reservoirs.

Although it is unlikely that Pakchon has been engaged in uranium concentration activities since 2002, it seems that North Korea has found another use for the facility.

Tailings from uranium processing can contain concentrations of other valuable minerals like REEs, but their recovery still relies on expensive and complex chemical, physical, or electrical processes. 

China is the world's leading supplier (90%) of processed REEs, creating a dangerous bottleneck that could be cut off in the event of economic or military confrontation. That risk to the world's supply has seen countries scramble for alternative sources. 

Investing in technologies to make REE extraction economically viable from coal waste from power plants, other industrial sources, and even municipal waste is something multiple countries, including the United States, are engaged in. However, extracting the elements out of the waste requires a combination of physical and chemical processes.

As Pabian noted, North Korea isn't always bound by traditional economic considerations. Its drive for nuclear weapons has resulted in a crippled economy for decades and numerous sanctions, and so it has sought ways to evade and break sanctions by developing synthetic fuels from its own coal supplies to funding its activities through cryptocurrency theft. 

Reprocessing material from Pakchon may be yet another attempt to get the raw materials the country needs for its weapons and technology projects. It's worth noting that regardless of whatever policy directives are specific to the activities at Pakchon, North Korea has been going back to tailings and gangue piles at mining sites around the country to reprocess that material as well.

Besides the new reprocessing site, other changes at Pakchon should also be noted.

The main industrial center of Pakchon, 2021.

The main industrial center of Pakchon, 2024.

As is shown, two of the plant's support buildings had their roofs replaced between 2021 and 2024. These follow similar changes in previous years to other buildings, and reenforces the assessment that Pakchon is still being used for various activities, just not large-scale uranium processing. 

With the reprocessing of waste material in search of REEs or residual uranium, however, the use of these buildings as part of that reprocessing activity can't be ruled out. 

As for the possibility that the activity is related to environmental remediation efforts, I do not think that it is likely. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated its low regard for environmental and health safety, including by allowing industrial waste to flow into the Ryesong River and by polluting the Taedong River (Pyongyang's main water source). So, it would be a rare instance of remediation and the only instance known of such efforts at a nuclear facility, if that is what is taking place at Pakchon. 

I believe that these developments at Pakchon, as well as the recently discovered construction activity at the suspected Kangson Uranium Enrichment Facility, should spur a review of all known nuclear facilities as well as key mining sites to see if there are other similar changes happening.

Regardless of if the developments at Pakchon are occurring in isolation or in tandem with other sites, it serves as a reminder that North Korea will use any and all sources of raw materials to further its technology programs and to earn foreign currency regardless of its international obligations. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Jonathan J, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, April 1, 2024

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Building North Korea's Bomb

If you've ever looked at a diagram of a nuclear bomb (whether of Little Boy or of a modern miniaturized warhead like the W-87), you might be forgiven for thinking constructing such devices looks fairly straightforward.

For a gun-type fission weapon (like Little Boy), you simply fire a hollow chunk of uranium at a solid cylinder slug of uranium, setting off a chain reaction. For a simple implosion-type weapon, you just wrap a core of plutonium in a shell of conventional explosives and detonate it. That will create an implosion shockwave, compacting the plutonium until it reaches criticality and explodes with the force of thousands of tons of TNT. 

Even today's advanced two-stage thermonuclear weapons can be rendered in handy graphics. But the simplicity of popular descriptions of how nuclear bombs work belies their devilish complexity.

Diagram of the W-87 two-stage thermonuclear warhead used by the United States. Image: US News & World Report.

All of these descriptions and diagrams are simply distillations of feats of physics and engineering that took thousands of people and billions of dollars to produce in each of the countries that have developed their own weapons.

The world's nuclear weapons programs rely on physicists, engineers, often some of the most powerful supercomputers in history, and networks of manufacturing centers that are responsible for safely producing the uranium and plutonium needed as well as the scores of individual components that make up a working nuclear device.

In the United States, the primary assembly of nuclear warheads takes place at a single location in Texas. But that's just the final step in a long chain of research and production that involves facilities across the country, from the mountains of Tennessee to the deserts of New Mexico.

Likewise, North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a decentralized affair that includes mining sites surprisingly close to the DMZ to top secret underground storage facilities just a couple hours away from the border with China. 

In this article, I will attempt (with a caveat) to layout North Korea's nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

That caveat is: no country makes its nuclear secrets easy to uncover. Building a nuclear weapon takes the combined efforts of thousands of people, and uncovering the exact design components and in which factory which part is made is typically highly classified information. Because of that, this can't be a comprehensive exposé. There is still plenty about Pyongyang's nuclear program that isn't publicly known, and plenty that isn't even known to government intelligence agencies.

However, there is enough known information to provide a solid outline of many of the facilities North Korea uses to produce their nuclear arsenal.

With that in mind, let's get to it.

Kim Jong-un National Defense University.

The first steps to building a bomb are in research and development. For North Korea, this takes place at several institutions including the Atomic Energy Department of Kim Il-sung University (39.059259° 125.767729°), the Physics Department of Kim Jong-un National Defense University (39.169623° 125.776838°), as well as three departments within the Pyongsong College of Science (the Chemical Department, Physics Research Institute, and Atomic Energy Research Center). Additional research also takes place at some of the locations I'll discuss in greater detail below.

Once you have the theories and designs worked out, you need some raw materials.

North Korea has modest uranium deposits and has mined it from locations across the country including at the Wolbisan Mine and at mines near Sonbong. However, North Korea's primary uranium mine is located in Pyongsan (38.323984° 126.436512°).

Pyongsan uranium mine and concentration plant. 

The Pyongsan uranium mine (also called the January Industrial Mine) is an anthracite coal mine that contains usable concentrations of uranium as an impurity. The mine has five mining shafts with one, possibly two, currently active. 

From the mine, the ore is taken via a conveyor system about 500-meters-long to the uranium concentration plant and mill.

The people over at Arms Control Wonk and the Center for Strategic and International Studies have written in-depth reports on the history and workings of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant. But here's a brief rundown.

Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant.

Construction on the plant began in 1985 and it was operational by 1990, albeit on a limited scale. Full-scale production wasn't reached until ca. 1995.

The ore is brought to Pyongsan where it is processed to separate out the uranium from the rest of the minerals found in the coal source material.

The uranium is found in reported concentrations of between 0.26% and 0.8%, and at least 10,000 tonnes of ore are mined each year; although, this estimate varies widely and annual production levels also vary year-to-year. This is then processed and concentrated into what's commonly known as yellowcake, which is 80% pure uranium. 

The uranium extraction process involves (simplistically): crushing the coal, sampling, grinding it down into a powder, adding sulfuric acid and sodium chlorate to leech out the uranium, washing it, running it through an extraction circuit and salt solution, and passing it through precipitation tanks where the concentrated uranium can be gathered, and dried. The yellowcake is then packed and shipped off for enrichment.

After processing, as much as 272 tonnes of yellowcake uranium leaves the plant annually in the form of triuranium octoxide (U₃O₈) and uranium dioxide (UO₂). 

North Korea does have a second uranium concentration plant at Pakchon (39.710533° 125.568319°). It began operations in 1979 as a pilot plant, but has been in caretaker status since at least 2002, with only low-level activities noted from time to time, leaving Pyongsan as the only active uranium mill.  

From Pyongsan, the uranium needs to be enriched. There is only one verified enrichment facility, at Yongbyon. There is a suspected site near Pyongyang at Kangson (38.957195° 125.612159°), but there is considerable debate within published sources about Kangson's purpose.

Other raw materials besides uranium are needed to support the country's nuclear program (from graphite to tungsten), but which mines exactly are used isn't known. However, there are several identified mines that could provide North Korea with some of the needed materials. 

There are several specialty materials and components associated with uranium enrichment and modern warhead manufacturing that North Korea is not known to have the capabilities to produce domestically, but the country clearly has enough legacy technology and skill to overcome those shortcomings and to produce these deadly weapons. 

The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center (39.796977° 125.755110°) is North Korea's key nuclear facility. With a history dating back to 1963-64, Yongbyon plays a central role the country's development of nuclear weapons.

Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.

Located some 85 km north of Pyongyang, the complex covers a 24.8 sq. km. area that's surrounded by fences and guard posts. Within Yongbyon lies the town of Dong-an (formerly Sang-dong) which serves as the civilian quarter and houses all the scientists, researchers, technicians, their families, and everyone else needed to run the town and research centers. 

Southeast of the town is a walled compound containing the research center's administration, laboratories, and various other facilities. South of that, is an adjacent walled compound that houses the 5MWe nuclear reactor and the Experimental Light Water Reactor, as well as the spent fuel storage building. 

Elsewhere in Yongbyon is the Radiochemistry Laboratory (39.781174° 125.753286°) where plutonium is produced as well as radionuclides used in nuclear medicine. And then there is the uranium fuel fabrication facility (39.770255° 125.749224°) where the uranium brought in from Pyongsan is further processed and enriched into weapons-grade material. The fuel fabrication facility is also used to manufacture the fuel rods needed for the nuclear reactors.

The uranium complex at Yongbyon, including the enrichment halls.

Estimates place Yongbyon's annual capacity to be 100 kg of highly enriched uranium and 6 kg of plutonium. The enrichment hall at the uranium fuel facility was enlarged in 2013 and again in 2021, indicating an increase in North Korea's enrichment activities.

According to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, North Korea has enough fissile material to build a further 45-55 nuclear warheads. 

Another change of note within Yongbyon has been the construction over the last decade of enough housing for ~3,200 new residents. The increase in Yongbyon personnel, the enlargement of the uranium fuel fabrication facility, and other changes in recent years (at Yongbyon and elsewhere) have enabled Kim Jong-un to ramp up the production of nuclear warheads.

This increase in capacity was reflected in a 2022 speech by Kim Jong-un in which he vowed to "exponentially increase" the size of the country's nuclear arsenal. 

However, simply having a pile of enriched uranium and plutonium doesn't a nuclear bomb make.

Yongdoktong nuclear complex.

Nuclear weapons use shaped charges made of conventional explosives as an "explosive lens" to collapse the inner shells within the device and lastly to compress the core of fissile material, initiating the chain reaction.

Yongdoktong (40.004320° 125.339377°), just east of Kusong, is where these lenses are developed, tested, and manufactured. 

A review of Landsat images reveals that construction of the complex began ca. 1987 with most of the work completed by 1992. In more recent years, several changes have been noted including at least 18 new buildings or building renovations since 2016, the addition of greenhouse and garden facilities in 2019, and ~47 new housing units, most of which were built since 2020. On top of that, in late 2020, a new building was constructed to cover the entrance to an underground facility near the main production center.

Explosive lenses are often produced at or near the same facility that conducts the final assembly of warheads. The size of Yongdoktong, its several distinct sections and underground sites - to me - makes it a candidate location for where North Korea builds their completed nuclear warheads.

Additionally, it is where intelligence sources suggest that North Korea stores its warheads in underground facilities within the complex. 

Regardless, warheads may then be taken from Yongdoktong to Punggye-ri for underground nuclear testing or they could be sent to one of a dozen or so ballistic missile bases.

Punggye-ri nuclear testing complex.

Punggye-ri (41.279084° 129.087133°) is North Korea's only nuclear test site. The facility runs south from Mount Mantap and down a valley for ~17 km. At the foot of Mount Mantap, four tunnels for underground nuclear testing were dug. From there, a series of administrative, support, and guard buildings are situated along the valley.

The exact year that Punggye-ri was established is difficult to ascertain but excavation work on the testing tunnels began in the early 2000s, and the site was being monitored by South Korean intelligence agencies as early as the 1990s.

To-date, six underground nuclear tests have been conducted, but only three of the four tunnels have ever been used. The first test took place in 2006 and the most recent (and most powerful) nuclear test occurred on Sept. 3, 2017. After that, North Korea announced that they had successfully completed the tests required to prove the validity of their nuclear weapons designs, and that Punggye-ri would be shuttered. 

On May 24, 2018, in front of foreign media who were especially invited to attend, the tunnel entrances were ceremonially blown up. However, doubts of Punggye-ri's closure were raised almost immediately. In the coming months and years, satellite evidence revealed that the facility had only been placed in caretaker status and remained suitable for future tests.

In 2022, new construction activity at the site was identified and U.S. officials later announced that the facility had been repaired and that further nuclear tests could take place at any time.

Validating the design of new warheads through testing is an important step in developing a credible nuclear force, particularly as North Korea advanced from testing crude nuclear devices (as in 2006) to developing miniaturized thermonuclear devices that could be mounted onto missiles. 

It is likely that further testing will be required as North Korea refines its designs and develops new variants. Currently, it is generally accepted that North Korea now possess ~30 operational nuclear warheads and is actively building more.

Map of known operational ballistic missile bases.

Ballistic missiles require adequate device miniaturization and heat shielding to deliver a functional warhead to the target. U.S. intelligence assessments concluded that North Korea had developed the capability to miniaturize a nuclear device and mount it onto a ballistic missile by 2017.

However, there is still debate whether or not Pyongyang has yet developed the capability to manufacture the necessary heat shielding for the reentry vehicles that are used in hypersonic missiles and MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) that North Korea's seeking to acquire.

The country has around a dozen operational ballistic missile bases and a further dozen or so support facilities (for equipment storage, training, etc.). These bases are roughly divided into three "belts" around the country, with medium-to-intermediate range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles being deployed at bases in the "operational" and "strategic" belts (in the center and northern parts of the country respectively), and short-range missiles deployed in the "tactical" belt close to the DMZ. 

There are questions whether or not any warheads are actually stored at these missile bases, ready to be launched, or if they are all held at Yongdoktong and would only be moved to missile bases following a direct order from Kim Jong-un. 

Keeping them at Yongdoktong would introduce a serious delay in North Korea's ability to rapidly launch a nuclear-armed missile as the warheads would have to be transported from there to the bases. (The nearest operational base to Yongdoktong is over 50 km away by road.)

But for now, any discussions about deployed warheads or North Korea's nuclear command and control remains largely speculative.

What isn't speculative is that North Korea has worked for decades to develop the technology and infrastructure needed to build a nuclear arsenal, despite international condemnation and despite the tremendous hardships the nuclear program has caused the people of North Korea. 

And although I was able to highlight several publicly known nuclear facilities in this article, North Korea is known to have other undeclared research and industrial centers that play a role in the country's nuclear weapons program. Having a detailed accounting of these sites will be imperative to any successful denuclearization or arms limitations agreement in the future.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Jonathan J, Joel Parish, John Pike, JuneBug, Kbechs87, Nate Odenkirk, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 8/26/2023

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Pyongsan Uranium Plant Reservoir Expansion

On New Year's Eve, following the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Party's 8th Central Committee, Kim Jong Un laid out his plan to "exponentially increase" the number of nuclear warheads North Korea has. Current estimates are that North Korea has enough fissile material for up to 55 warheads, has assembled ~20 weapons, and has a production capacity of one bomb every two months. 

Publicly announced plans are rarely made prior to any foundation work being done. Whether its massive new farms, high-rises in Pyongyang or new weapons, by the time an announcement is made the plans are often already in the process of being carried out.

To dramatically increase the number of warheads, the country would need to ramp up uranium and plutonium production. On the uranium front, the Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant is North Korea's primary facility for the production of yellowcake uranium (80% uranium oxide). From there it is sent to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center for enrichment to weapons-grade uranium. The number of centrifuges at Yongbyon is a major bottleneck in their ability to increase the manufacturing rate of warheads, but there are signs that North Korea has been trying to resolve this as well.

At Pyongsan, the waste material from the plant is sent to a reservoir about 300 meters away, across the Namch'on River. I have written about the deficiencies of this reservoir and the risk of river pollution from the complex, but it seems like North Korea has been planning for its continued use through ongoing uranium production for some time.

Depending on the exact height of the dam, the current reservoir has 35 hectares (86 acres) of usable space. In 2006, the visible area of precipitated waste sediment was roughly two hectares (4.9 acres). That had increased to 6.1 hectares (15 acres) by 2017. 

There is some variability in what can be seen and measured due to seasonally changing water levels within the reservoir, but the area of visible waste now covers at least 13.2 hectares (32.6 acres); however, the solid pile has nearly reached the same level as the top of the embankment dam and has blocked off one of the reservoir's main lobes, limiting the reservoir's lifespan and risking flooding/overtopping events each time there's heavy rain fall. 

Historic extent of visible waste material for 2007, 2017, and 2022.

If Kim Jong Un is serious about adding dozens or hundreds of new warheads to his arsenal within the next decade or so, Pyongsan is going to need more space to hold its toxic waste, and it looks like that is exactly what's happening now.

Google Earth now shows a reservoir expansion that's in the early days of construction. The current reservoir sits within a series of low hills and shallow valleys. The valley immediately east of the reservoir is being prepared to serve as a future storage site. 

In early 2022, a mere 120 meters away, a trench was constructed leading from the current reservoir into the new valley. And at the end of the valley, nearly a kilometer away, the foundations for a new dam were being excavated. 

This 175-meter-long trench will carry a pipe from the old reservoir and into the valley along the path of a small stream, allowing it to fill using gravity.

Nearly a kilometer southeast of the trench, this future dam will block the valley to create the reservoir. It will be around 165 meters in length.

Depending on the finished height of the dam (as constrained by the abutting hills), the usable size for this new waste reservoir could be between 16 and 19 hectares (39-47 acres). The current reservoir was constructed in 1990, but activity at Pyongsan has historically not been constant, with several periods of little-to-no production. But if the last ten or so years of production levels are any guide, this new reservoir could hold another 15-20 years' worth of waste material on top of what can still be added to the existing reservoir, which could still be operational for the next ten years depending on the depth of its western lobe.

Since the current reservoir still has life, there may not be a need to rush the construction of this new site. But the fact it has been planned and initial work carried out speaks to the long-term plans of Kim Jong Un, and that is to keep uranium production going for as long as possible. 

One thing that I will be interested in watching for is whether or not the new reservoir will be lined with protective sheets (the current reservoir isn't) or if any mitigation efforts will be undertaken to prevent leaks into the ground water and into the larger Ryesong River which is just 2 km away and flows toward South Korea. 

All of this is happening as 2022 became a record year for the number of missile tests carried out, far surpassing any other. And it is happening following announcements in 2021 surrounding the development of tactical nuclear warheads, hypersonic glid vehicles, and continued work on submarine launched ballistic missiles. Kim Jong Un has made it very clear he wants to develop a dizzying array of new weapon systems, and the expansion of this reservoir is a practical infrastructure step toward enabling North Korea to engage in the types of industrial activity needed to eventually produce them in the long-term.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, JuneBug, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/5/2023

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Mining and National Defense

North Korea has always struggled to supply its armed forces with modern weapons and technology. Major reasons for this can be traced to the flaws inherent to a command economy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more recently, multiple layers of international sanctions as a response to North Korea's nuclear program.

However, what North Korea lacks in advanced technology or from their lack of access to international markets, the country endeavors to make up for by using an ever-growing military-industrial complex fueled by indigenous designs and manufacturing processes (with the help of occasionally stolen/illicitly acquired foreign research). 

To facilitate this, as every country strives for, North Korea seeks to extract domestic supplies of strategic raw materials for their tanks, planes, and missiles.

For the United States, the National Mining Association noted that there are 46 metals and minerals that are critical to national security and yet accessing adequate supplies requires overseas imports. If a country as mineral rich as the US needs to import so many raw materials, the situation can only be worse for much smaller North Korea.

Geology and distribution map of major mineral deposits in North Korea. 

Image source: Koh, Sang-Mo & Lee, Gill & Yoon, Edward. (2013). Status of Mineral Resources and Mining Development in North Korea. Economic and Environmental Geology. 46. 10.9719/EEG.2013.46.4.291.

Through the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet and Eastern European geologists conducted several surveys of North Korean territory to find what mineral deposits existed and which ones could be extracted. Later surveys by Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, and other firms have since refined those earlier efforts.

This enabled the country to expand its access to things like iron, copper, and coal. And recent estimates suggest that North Korea could be sitting on $7-10 trillion in mineral wealth, opening up greater opportunities to provide the raw materials necessary to fuel its defense needs, even if the country still lacks some the materials used in the most advanced technologies (such as beryllium).

Complicating matters, however, is that its mining industry remains underdeveloped and North Korea's technical ability to cast, forge, alloy, and otherwise fully exploit the properties of a number of these materials remains limited.

From copper to zinc, the capacity to mine (or produce synthetically in the case of certain nuclear elements) these materials on North Korean soil would give the country a buffer against sanctions and enable them to continue work on more and more advanced technologies including a modernized nuclear arsenal. To this end, new rounds of investment in the mining industry has occurred from both domestic and international sources, and the country has been able to open new mines, reopen others shuttered years ago, and maintain operations at their key facilities.

The AccessDPRK Map 2021 Version located 2,001 mining locations. A plurality of these mines are coal mines, but coal mines offer more than a fossil fuel and can be a source of numerous other minerals. And although many individual mines in North Korea are unidentified, the minerals extracted can be determined visually for some, and others are indeed publicly known. This gives me the opportunity to list a number of specific mines that likely play key roles in providing raw materials for North Korea's national defense.

Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant (38°19'28.46"N 126°26'12.29"E)

According to researchers Sherzod R. Kurbanbekov, Seung Min Woo, and Sunil S. Chirayath "North Korea has at least 4 million tons of natural uranium ore reserve for industrial development, and hence total natural uranium feed available is 4,000,000kg (assuming 1000ppm ore quality). This means that the DPRK program is not constrained by the availability of natural uranium." 

That's enough for around 700 highly enriched uranium-based nuclear warheads and would supply their nuclear program for years to come.

North Korea has several large uranium deposits in Pyongsan, Pakchon, Aoji (Undok), Kumchon, and other areas. This supply comes largely from coal mines as lower quality forms of coal contain a wide range of other minerals that can include uranium.

Currently, the coal mine at Pyongsan is North Korea's primary source of uranium. The Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant was constructed ca. 1990 and is the only declared site that still produces "yellowcake" uranium - ore that has been concentrated to 80% uranium oxide.

The ore is transported via pipeline from the mine to the concentrate plant half a kilometer away. At the plant the ore is processed and the uranium is concentrated into yellowcake before being taken to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center where it is further refined into highly enriched uranium and becomes suitable for nuclear warheads.

Jongchon Graphite Mine (37°55'8.52"N 126° 6'49.64"E)

This graphite mine was established in 2003 as a joint venture with the South Korean company KORES and had an initial investment of $5.5 million. The plan envisioned an annual production of 3,000 tons and allowed each side to keep half of the graphite. The mine opened in 2006 after a total investment of $10.2 million.

The graphite at Jongchong is mined from mineral-bearing soil and gravel that is then processed to separate the graphite. The waste material is then dumped as a slurry into a holding pond.

Naturally occurring graphite can be used for vehicle lubricants, batteries, crucibles/foundries, and numerous other purposes. Graphite used in nuclear reactors is synthetic and Jongchon would not be a source for the materials needed to produce it.

At the time the mine opened, it was estimated that the annual 1,500 tons South Korea was able to acquire would be enough to provide for 20% of South Korea's domestic graphite consumption. Given North Korea's considerably smaller economy, it's possible that this one mine is capable of providing for all or nearly all of the country's needs (graphite is mined in smaller quantities at other sites).

The deal with South Korea eventually collapsed and production at the mine fell further following new rounds of sanctions. This decline can be seen in satellite images of the last few years that show water building up in the open pit mine and the surface of the waste pond drying and showing signs of agricultural activity within.

At least six other major deposits are known to exist in North Korea and in 2011 the National Defense Commission's Resources Development Corporation agreed to explore graphite deposits in three locations within South Hwanghae Province in cooperation with Chinese firms. 

Hyesan Youth Copper Mine (41°21'51.84"N 128° 9'31.68"E)

Copper is one of the most useful and indispensable elements there is. From shell casings to ships, a military can't exist without copper. 

North Korea has several copper deposits, but its largest copper mine is in Hyesan, near the border with China. Copper's utility also makes its export a prime source of foreign currency. To that end, operations at Hyesan have occasionally been carried out jointly with Chinese companies such as Wanxiang Resources Limited Company in 2007.

First explored in the 1960s, today the mining complex spans several kilometers and is estimated to have an annual capacity of 50,000-70,000 tonnes of copper concentrate. However, flooding, electricity shortages, sanctions, and COVID-19 have caused substantial problems with the mine over the years, and it has never operated at full capacity.

The construction of the nearby Samsu Hydroelectric Dam resulted in the mine being flooded in 2007 as water forced its way through fissures in the surrounding geology. The government spent $8.2 million in the first year after the flood draining and repairing the mine. 

More recently, the border closures due to COVID-19 cut off nearly all internal trade, and production at the mine plummeted. While this obviously harms North Korea's economy, limited activity at the mine continues and the extracted copper can still be used for domestic and military requirements. 

Susan Titanium Mine (38°57'52.03"N 125°21'42.77"E) 

Titanium is a lightweight and durable metal that is used in jet engines, submarines, armor plating, missile components, abrasives, and has many other uses. 

The Susan Titanium Mine in Kangso, Nampo is estimated to hold at least 20 million tons of titanium dioxide in reserves. As North Korea seeks to modernize its military and manufacture more advanced vehicles and weapon systems, having domestic titanium supplies and further developing the metallurgical technologies needed to properly exploit titanium's properties will become increasingly important.

A small mine has existed on the site since at least the 1980s, but it was enlarged and modernized in the early 2010s. As North Korea rarely releases official figure of its mining operations, activity at the mine can be tracked through monitoring the growth of its tailings reservoir. In 2011 it covered 12.2 hectares and by 2021 it had more than doubled to 25 hectares in area and was several meters deeper. 

Onjinsan Gold Region (38°49'47.48"N 126°26'49.85"E)

This is a name I've given the area surrounding Mount Onjin in North Hwanghae Province that has several gold mines within 10 km of the mountain's summit. Taken together, this is one the largest gold producing regions in North Korea, and it has some of the largest gold reserves in the world.

The two primary mines are the Holdong mining complex (38°52'8.88"N 126°27'31.21"E) and the Namjong mine (38°48'17.46"N 126°21'48.00"E). The area, Holdong in particular, has been a gold mining center since 1893 and has a capacity of at least 2 tons of pure gold a year. 

Through imagery we can tell that the mines use the cyanidation process whereby ore is soaked is cyanide which then concentrates the microscopic gold particles into a more easily recoverable form.

Although gold is used in electronics, its main value is in its ability to bring in foreign currency, enabling North Korea to fund its activities. Gold can also be very hard to trace once melted and sold into the global gold market, making it an important vehicle for illicit economic activity. 

Unlike some other minerals, gold mining falls under tighter government regulation and the military plays a role in its extraction and export. The secretive Office 39, which helps to finance everything from luxury cars to missiles, is also alleged to play a role in gold production and illegal exports.

Iron Mining

Like copper, iron is indispensable. Tanks, ships, artillery, and everything in between relies on iron and two of the largest iron mines in the country are at Musan and Unryul.

The Musan Iron Mine holds one of the largest iron reserves in east Asia with 1.5 billion tons of ore that is currently economically recoverable and least 7 billion tons in proven reserves. 

Like the rest of North Korea's mining sector, Musan has experienced the ups and downs related to economic downturns, famine, and poor economic policies, but it has remained a keystone in the country's industrial capacity and continues to provide around a million tonnes of ore each year.

Unryul Iron Mine (38°35'21.59"N 125° 8'46.47"E), also spelled Ullul, is another large iron mine. This one is located on the country's west coast 40 km northwest of the city of Sinchon. 

The large open-pit mine is 2.7 km long and overburden is taken via a 4-km long conveyor belt to the sea where, over many years, it has helped to build up sea walls for a large land reclamation project.

A port was constructed at the conveyor terminus in 2013-2014 for fishing vessels and as part of local aquaculture development. The port and associated facilities are powered by 15,700 sq. m. of solar panels and a wind turbine, making it one of the largest renewable energy sites in the country.

Tungsten

Tungsten's hardness and temperature-resistant properties give it many uses from armor-piercing rounds to use in rockets and airplanes. It can also be used in the protective shells around nuclear warheads.

Both the Man-nyon Mine (38°55'38.29"N 126°57'47.92"E) and Mandok Mine (40°36'55.88"N 128°33'45.41"E) extract wolframite, the main ore-bearing mineral for tungsten. 

Man-nyon is an underground mine with a series of mine faces that are interconnected and accessed through a tunnel system. The full area of mining activity extends across approximately 10 sq. km., with small exploratory mines spread further out.

At Mandok, iron is also extracted. Water runoff from the mines is stained with the oxidized metal, noticeably staining the rivers a rusty color for over 20 kilometers.

The United States Geological Survey estimated that North Korea produced 1,410 tonnes of tungsten concentrate in 2018. At 65% purity, that would yield 916 tonnes of elemental tungsten - placing North Korea in the top 10 producing countries globally. This is considerably more than 2014-16, when only 70 tonnes was estimated to have been produced each year. The reason for such a dramatic increase is not explained in the report.

Komdok Mining Region

Location of magnesite related facilities. Image from "Mining North Korea: Magnesite Production at Ryongyang Mine" by Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha. Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 16, 2019. Used with permission.

Komdok is one of the largest mining regions in North Korea and produces everything from magnesite to lead to zinc to cobalt - cobalt being used in temperature-resistant alloys, stealth technology, and ammunition. 

The region holds one of the largest magnesite deposits in the world, with an estimate 2.3 billion tonnes in reserve. Magnesite can be alloyed with other metals for a range of products including aircraft parts, rocket nozzles, optics, and batteries.

The dozen or so mines in the Puktae River valley which runs through the Komdok region are also sources of lead, zinc, cobalt, and small amounts of other minerals necessary to the defense industry.

Typhoon Maysak in 2020 hit the area and caused substantial flooding. In response, Kim Jong Un ordered that 2,300 housing units be immediately constructed and that the transportation network be upgraded to facilitate future investments in the region.

Calling Komdok a "major artery of the national economy", Kim outlined his second phase for the area in order to build it into "the world's best mining city". This attention underscores Komdok's strategic importance. 

March 5 Youth Mine (41°42'19.97"N 126°49'10.99"E)

Molybdenum is used in the production of 80% of the world's steel and forms strong carbide alloys making it a needed element for creating high-temperature metals and 'superalloys'. It is used in the aerospace industry, missiles, and metal armors. 

At least three mines are known to produce molybdenum but the March 5 Youth Mine in the village of Hoha-ri has North Korea's newest molybdenum ore processing facility and it was visited by Kim Jong Il.

According to Radio Free Asia, North Korea has been stockpiling mined molybdenum in anticipation of resumed trade with China and in the hopes that molybdenum prices will have spiked by then. One organization involved in North Korea's molybdenum trade is the military-affiliated trading company Kangsung. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, GreatPoppo, Henry Popkes, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and ZS.

--Jacob Bogle, 10/23/2022

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Nuclear Fallout Part I: The health consequences of Pyongyang’s nuclear program

Pollution and health risks exists at every point along the nuclear weapons’ development chain, from the initial mining and milling operations to the enrichment process, and finally from testing nuclear devices. In this two-part series I will examine each of those areas and the health risks associated with them.

In this first part, I will give a short introduction to the history of North Korea’s nuclear program and then discuss the health risks found within the uranium mining and milling process and the production of nuclear fuel. (Read Part II here) 

Image source: Sakucae/2.0

Introduction

North Korea can trace its nuclear program to soon after the Korean War. After the war’s total devastation, Kim Il Sung vowed that the country would never again be flattened, and he sought Soviet assistance in creating Pyongyang’s own nuclear deterrent. Marshall Stalin and future Soviet leaders weren’t too keen on Kim’s aspirations initially, but they did offer help with the development of nuclear power and signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1959. Never one to let an opportunity go to waste, Kim Il Sung ordered secret research into building the A-bomb.

Yongbyon, North Korea’s main nuclear research center, was constructed in the 1960s with help from the Soviet Union. Further facilities across the country were constructed that were needed to mine the uranium, mill it, and finally, to enrich it. The country has two known milling facilities, one at at Pakchon and Pyongsan, and around dozen suspected uranium mining sites. Pakchon and Pyongsan process low-grade coal to concentrate the uranium naturally found within it (at relatively low concentrations) and then to turn it into yellowcake where the uranium concentration reaches 80%. From there it is sent to additional facilities including Yongbyon, some of which have likely not been declared by North Korea to the international community.

Mining and milling

North Korea is one of only seven countries that are not signatories to the International Labor Organization. This United Nations agency sets international labor standards, including those for nuclear research and industry. Furthermore, the country’s mining sector is notoriously dangerous and lacks modern safety precautions and necessary equipment. Injuries and respiratory diseases are common, particularly in coal mines which is where North Korea gets the bulk of its uranium. The country’s two largest uranium mines, Pyongsan and Woogi-ri (within the Undok-Rason area), hold an estimated 11.5 million tonnes of ore and employ thousands of workers.

The inhuman treatment of workers at Pyongsan, and severe negligence regarding monitoring radiation exposure and air quality was given in testimony by Dr. Shin Chang-hoon before the U.S House in 2014.

Once the ore leaves the mines, it is transported to the milling plants to be converted into yellowcake. Even though coal itself is generally considered safe to handle, every form of uranium extraction leaves behind dangerous waste.

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency,

"regardless of how uranium is extracted from rock, the processes leave behind radioactive waste....The tailings remain radioactive and contain hazardous chemicals from the recovery process."

 Google Earth image showing the residue of leaked waste material at both ends of the waste transfer pipe.

The Pyongsan milling plant is a prime example of the environmental damage done within North Korea’s nuclear sector. Satellite imagery shows that the country’s primary milling facility has been spilling industrial waste into the Ryesong River for decades, and that the waste material reservoir is unlined. This can allow contaminated water to seep into groundwater supplies and also contaminate crops. Hundreds of thousands live within the area of Pyongsan and downriver of the plant.

Non-proliferation expert Dr. Jeffrey Lewis summed it up nicely in 2015 when he said, “What is definitely happening, though, is that North Korea is dumping the tailings from the plant into an unlined pond, one surrounded by farms. That’s not a hypothetical harm.  That’s actual pollution that is harming the health and well being of the local community."

At Pakchon, which began uranium milling around 1982, a former waste reservoir is now covered in cultivated land. This practice can be seen at many mining and industrial sites. If the waste isn’t properly covered, any crops grown over this material may become contaminated with heavy metals such as vanadium and chromium, as well as lead and arsenic. Those contaminates are passed up the food-chain into animals and humans.

Image showing that a former waste reservoir is now farmland and the plant’s proximity to a river.

According to defector Kim Tae-ho, who worked at Pakchon in the 1990s, when the “experimental plant” would operate, yellow smoke would fill the plant and cause “severe difficult breathing and unbearable pain.” The short-term effect of inhaling yellowcake particles is primarily kidney damage which will resolve itself unless there is recurrent exposure (such as from working at the site each day). However, the main radiological risk comes from the radioactive gas radon and its non-gaseous “daughters” like polonium-218. Improperly vented air can lead to a build up of these radioactive materials and will cause immediate tissue damage to the lungs and mucus membranes. Additionally, the use of acids in the production process raises the risk for inhalation of sulfur-containing gases (which can have a yellow tint to them) and cause irritation and eventually burns to the eyes and lungs.

Pakchon and Pyongsan are combined mine and milling facilities, but illnesses and food contamination have been reported at stand-alone mines as well, such as at the Walbisan uranium mine (near Sunchon).

Sources told Radio Free Asia that, “local residents are forced to eat radioactive food and drink radioactive water,” and “[i]n Tongam village, the miners and their families suffer from incurable diseases or various types of cancer. In particular, many people die of liver cancer.”

Enrichment and fuel production

Even within the uranium enrichment compound, almost every inch of available land has been cultivated.

The next steps along the nuclear development chain happen at Yongbyon. The complex exists as a closed-city and people are not free to enter or exit without permission. Scientists, engineers, and others may work for many years within the fenced off complex. They will marry and will raise children.

While being able to work within a prominent field brings many benefits, it also brings risks. Brief exposure to radiation is rarely dangerous. Short exposure risks are also not catastrophic when it comes to inheritable genetic damage, either, as the world learned from the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But continual exposure because you’re living in a contaminated environment increases those risks each day. This concern grows when you consider that in recent years, dozens of new buildings have been constructed with room for thousands more residents.

Scientists who were involved during the early days of Yongbyon’s operation have been reported to have suffered from wasting illnesses and hair loss.

Fast-forward to 2019, a former resident of Yongbyon told DailyNK,

"In other districts it is very difficult to find people with cleft lip but here there are many individuals with crooked mouths, those lacking eyebrows, incidents of dwarfism, and those with six fingers. There are even children who just look like bare bones."

Adults can also be affected, with the most severe cases eventually causing mental deficiencies, cancers, and wide array of other illnesses at relatively young ages.

The aforementioned Dr. Shin Chang-hoon also interviewed a defector who worked at Yongbyon. He was told that the dosimeters (which measure radiation exposure) were only checked every three months and workers were not told of the results unless they had already begun to exhibit signs of radiation sickness.

Adjacent to an area of improperly stored nuclear waste is a grove of dying trees and farmland. It is only separated from the waste by a covering of dirt.

Improper disposal of radioactive materials can pollute the soil, kill trees, and contaminate any food that is grown in the area. Releases of gases into the atmosphere will likewise blanket the region and small, aerosolized particles will eventually make their way down to the ground, bringing with them radiation or forming toxic compounds. These gases can travel for many miles and place other sites within North Korea at greater risk, not just the immediate Yongbyon complex.

Concern over Yongbyon is especially grave considering the large number of nuclear and chemical facilities in such a small area. Not just in terms of ongoing dangers that defectors have told the world about, but also in terms of a future accident, flood, or fire that could devastate the region and require international intervention to solve. 

The fact North Korea is largely cut off from the world and often must rely on outdated science, manufacturing techniques, and potentially unreliable indigenously produced parts and equipment means that the risk of accidents and errors is greater than in other nuclear countries. It is something of a small miracle that a large-scale incident hasn’t already occurred.

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--Jacob Bogle, 12/22/2019
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Slowdown at the Pakchon Uranium Plant?

In the course of researching my article on the toxic leaks at the Pyongsan uranium mine and milling plant, I started observing North Korea's second such facility at Pakchon, North Pyongyan.

Reviewing historical satellite imagery for Pyongsan shows an ever-growing pile of tailings (waste material) and sludge from the mine and factory at its waste reservoir, indicating continual operations. The same cannot be said upon review of the reservoir at Pakchon. A lack of obvious changes to the reservoir recently could mean a few things, which I'll discuss later.

Like Pyongsan, Pakchon was constructed in the 1980s under the leadership of Kim Il Sung (with various degrees of Soviet assistance), and is the second of North Korea's two declared uranium milling plants (where uranium ore is processed into yellowcake). The other plant being Pyongsan, as mentioned earlier. A review of satellite imagery shows the evolution of the Pakchon facility's operations.

Google Earth imagery from 2005 shows that the original tailings dam had been closed and turned into farmland, while a second tailings dam had been established during the intervening years.

By 2014, activity at the dam can still be seen, as new materials are dumped into it via truck (unlike the reservoir at Pyongsan, which has waste material moved via pipe).

The addition of new waste to the dam appears to have slowed down by 2016.

The small sections of the reservoir that were active in 2014 no longer seem to be undergoing change, and there isn't much (if any) additional activity as evidenced by the lack of surface disturbances.

The general lack of new waste deposits has continued into 2019. Any changes to the reservoir from 2016 and 2019 are very minimal, indicating a lack of production. By comparison, the growth of the "sludge pile" within the Pyongsan tailings reservoir grew substantially.

The Pyongsan plant is much larger than Pakchon and processes coal with a uranium concentration of 0.26%, compared to Pakchon's 0.086%. Both are considerably low-quality concentrations by most definitions but seem to be among the best ore the country has domestic access to.

The sludge pile within the Pyongsan reservoir occupied some 69,000 square meters of space by May 2017.

The pile had grown to approximately 87,000 square meters by March 2019, an apparent increase of 26%. An exact figure can be difficult to ascertain because water levels may have changed slightly over time.

The only area of Pakchon that seems to have maintained activity is the associated mine, 1.3 km south of the main factory building.

Aside from monitoring tailings, the physical state of the factory complex gives us more information.

The main building is roughly 120x100 meters, but there are several other buildings involved in the process of concentrating and milling the uranium. The administration section of the complex seems perfectly fine, but two industrial buildings are falling apart, and one of those is in the process of being demolished.

Google Earth imagery from March 19, 2012 gives a clear view of the two buildings of interest. They are in good order and appear functional.

By March 2019, the roof of building #1 has several holes in it and building #2 has been torn down.

What does all of this mean?

It would make sense that Pyongsan would be the country's primary facility, as the ore used is of much greater quality than the ore at Pakchon. Indeed, Pyongsan underwent a refurbishment in 2014-2015, with additional improvements being seen even more recently. But is Pakchon slowing down?

A lack of obvious waste deposits and the fact that some of the buildings have been neglected or demolished points to problems. Mining operations have continued, but there doesn't seem to be a new tailings dam that would explain the lack of activity at the current one. The mine has settling/separation ponds but doesn't appear to have a dedicated spot to hold waste from the processed material. This could indicate that the country is stockpiling material for processing but has cut back on the overall amount of milled uranium it can produce at Pakchon. This may be backed up by the fact that, at least for 2019, even work conducted at Yongbyon has been scaled back.

Another possibility is that there are problems with the factory itself. North Korea's industrial sector has long been crippled for its lack of spare parts and its general inability to repair and replace complex equipment in a timely fashion. Additionally, uranium processing is expensive and energy intensive. During the early days of North Korea's nuclear program, the Soviet Union told them that it wasn't economically feasible to extract the low-quality uranium sources within the country. Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung persisted. The energy intensive and expensive nature of the process may have finally caught up with them, leading to scaling back Pakchon.

Pakchon has never operated every single day, but this prolonged period with little to no activity is a change from the time under Kim Jong Il. It will take more observations to know exactly what is happening, but for now, Pakchon certainly doesn't seem to be operating at its full capacity.


--Jacob Bogle, 8/21/2019
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