Showing posts with label AAA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AAA. Show all posts

Sunday, March 23, 2025

Pyongyang: Air Defense by the Hectare

I have written about different forms of land use in North Korea before; how the new border fence system affects local farming, the development of land reclamation projects, and even highlighted some of North Korea's green energy projects.

S-75 (SA-2) surface-to-air missile system. Image: KCNA.

While making broad classifications of land use (forest, rice crops, urban environments) can be straightforward and can also be assessed using multispectral imagery, getting a more granular understanding, however, is often something that requires substantial human judgement. 

Understanding land division in North Korea requires a lot of observation. Field boundaries are often based around tree lines, roads, rivers or irrigation canals, and are rarely neatly delineated with fencing or walls. And even when fences are used, being able to identify and trace them can be difficult.

A great example of that can be found at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. 

When discussing Yongbyon, attention is rightly focused on the various nuclear-related facilities that are all clearly identifiable behind their perimeter walls. But Yongbyon is more than just the nuclear reactors and research facilities. Like many examples in the former Soviet Union, Yongbyon is a closed city. It is made up of the town of Dong-an and has several small villages within a much wider perimeter fence that encloses nearly 25 sq. km. of territory.

Even with part of Yongbyon's perimeter fence highlighted, can you easily spot any difference between what's inside and what's outside of the special district? (Click on image for a larger view.)

Indeed, even places like the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the adjacent Hwasong political prison camp (kwan-li-so No. 16) rely on their remote location as much as any fence system or guard posts to secure their territories. If kilometers of fence exist around the mountain that nuclear devices are tested beneath, I certainly haven't found it.


But, back to the title of this post, Pyongyang: Air Defense by the Hectare. This will be the first of what will become a series of articles detailing how much land in North Korea is being used by the military. It's one thing to know how many individual military bases there are, it's another to understand how they fit into the larger landscape of North Korea's territory and how much land is being used for purposes other than food production or economic and industrial activity, and even its impact on the natural environment.

All countries, of course, have the right to national defense. And that right obviously requires that land be used for military purposes. In the United States, 8.8 million acres of land are owned by the Department of Defense for the purposes of training and housing troops, testing weapons, and other directly related military uses. (This excludes land controlled by the Army Corps of Engineers which administers over 5,000 individual sites for public benefit like hydroelectric dams and recreational areas).

But that's only 0.39% of the total landmass of the US. Unlike the US, however, North Korea doesn't have vast deserts that it can use for testing nuclear weapons nor does it have an abundance of available farmland. So, I think it's worth exploring how being such a militarized country impacts North Korea's land use.


To start off the topic of military land use in North Korea, I'd like to examine the air defense sites within Pyongyang.

The full network of Pyongyang's air defense. The innermost ring is the Ryongsong Residence.

In 2022 I wrote about North Korea's expansive air defense network. With over 1,500 fixed-position installations made up of surface-to-air missile batteries and short-range anti-aircraft artillery sites, North Korea has the densest such network in the world that is currently operational. 

As the capital, Pyongyang naturally has the most protected air space. Eighteen surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites positioned within 60 km of Kim Il Sung Square provide overlapping coverage of the city. And over 400 short-range anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites form concentric rings of protection, with the Kim family palace having the most well-defended airspace of them all. 

But directly inside of the Pyongyang capital administrative region, there are six SAMs and 243 independent AAAs (some SAM sites have their own AAA batteries to aid in their defense). 

Both kinds of air defense systems are made up of permanent gun emplacements, barracks, munitions storage, fire control & communication, and maintenance facilities. Some also have their own radar installations. 


A Note on Methodology

Determining the exact amount of land that is under the direct control of each unit isn't straightforward. Some air defense installations are compact and others sprawl out across the landscape. Some are located on mountaintops and others are in the middle of farmland. Some have clearly defined boundaries with perimeter fences and others require closer examination to assess their extent.

In cases where a SAM or AAA site, with all of its constituent structures, are nicely bound by fencing, measuring its total area is simple. For those sites without fencing, I tried to create area polygons that enclose the artillery/missile location, headquarters, and storage sites. Sometimes those sites can be 100-200 meters apart and may even be separated by irrigation canals or other topographic features. In such cases, I have endeavored to draw the areas conservatively, and to use trench networks, field boundaries, waterways, tree lines, roads, and other bounding features to help constrain the area into reasonable and contiguous plots that don't include large amounts of extra land.

That is particularly important because nearly all military facilities in North Korea also engage in agricultural activities. So a particular military unit may have control over multiple hectares of farmland, but that land may extend for hundreds of meters away from the core air defense structures. It's also less obvious what bit of farmland belongs to the artillery unit as part of farming compared to the land that is part of the direct operation of that unit's military purpose. Thus, only land that is either bounded directly by a clear perimeter or is immediately adjacent to the various military structures have been included in this survey.


Surface-to-Air Missile Sites

Locations of the SAM sites within Pyongyang.

Given their limited number, SAMs don't take much land overall. Together, the six SAMs within Pyongyang occupy a total of 52.6 ha (130 acres). Two of them are also located on top of hills or mountains, with one being positioned on the top of Mt. Taebo (38.988250° 125.583587°) at an elevation of nearly 372 m (1,232 ft), making their impact on available farmland even more limited.

The SAM site at Kumdae-ri covers 9.36 hectares (23.1 acres).

However, the other four are in areas that would otherwise be used for more productive purposes, including the SAM located amongst the village of Kumdae-ri (38.937404° 125.628269°), south of the Taedong River. 

The six SAMs are SA-3 (S-125) systems dating to the 1970s and are of questionable serviceability. Nonetheless, the sites continue to be manned.


Anti-Aircraft Artillery Sites

Areas of the various air defense sites in Pyongyang. Anti-aircraft artillery sites are in yellow.

Pyongyang's 243 AAAs take up a total of 716.2 ha (1,770 acres) and are located on every kind of terrain around the city. 

As I discussed in 2022, each AAA has between one and twelve artillery pieces (such as the M-1983 Quad 14.5 mm gun and ZU-23-2 twin barrel autocannon), with most having 6-8 guns.

An example of an AAA battery with a clearly defined boundary.

The smallest sites are single gun emplacements along the rim of a large water settlement basin in eastern Pyongyang and each occupy around 500 sq. meters of space. The largest is a dual set of AAAs that share 12.2 ha (30.3 acres). On average, however, each AAA location covers 2.94 ha (7.28 acres).

Some are on mountain tops and others defend palaces or are part of larger military areas. Most are located in the low hills and plains that stretch out before Pyongyang, disrupting the networks of farms that help feed the capital.

An example of an AAA battery that lacks a clear boundary around the entire unit.

The aforementioned village of Kumdae-ri is surrounded by seven AAAs within 1.3 km along with the SAM battery. 

Most are also denuded of any tree cover. A portion of the land within each AAA site is still used for agriculture, but that is because of long-standing orders requiring military units to become as "self-reliant" as possible. Official rations are barely sufficient and so soldiers spend much of their time as farmers, working to feed themselves since the state cannot provide enough calories on its own, reflecting the severity of North Korea's food crisis. 

The number of AAA sites varies more often over time than do SAM batteries. AccessDPRK has located over 100 former AAA sites within Pyongyang. And eight active AAAs have been built since 2016.

Of the former sites, some have been completely demolished and leveled, making way for crops, houses, and factories. But many others retain their revetments and abandoned bunkers, making their complete reclamation for productive, civilian uses more difficult.


Pollution

Military "brownfield" sites, developed land that has been abandoned or underused, come with numerous special environmental considerations when converting them to other uses - especially for agriculture.

After decades of use, the artillery installations can be contaminated by accumulated heavy metal toxins, scrap metal, lead, diesel, oil and other petro-based chemicals used in the maintenance of equipment and vehicles, as well as untreated human waste (given the historically poor state of sewage transportation, treatment, and disposal in North Korea). 

There is little satellite evidence and no eyewitness testimony to suggest that detailed contamination remediation efforts occur prior to these sites being reused for farming or home construction. Indeed, many of the sites that have been fully removed appear to have simply been leveled and plowed under, with crops planted on the site soon after. 

This assessment is supported by observing the six AAAs that were removed in 2016 on the grounds of the Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm. 

One of the Taedonggang AAAs in March 2016, before it was decommissioned and razed. (Coordinates: 39.136522° 125.966291°)

The grounds of the Taedonggang AAA after it was razed were turned into an orchard.

Without physically examining the sites it's impossible to determine the extent of the contamination and whether or not it impacts the quality of food grown over the land or if it affects ground water. But North Korean authorities have allowed far greater levels of pollution at others sites, and so it's doubtful that they place a high importance on former air defense units.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, March 22, 2025

Saturday, September 24, 2022

In North Korea Thousands of Guns Point to the Sky

North Korea has the densest network of air defense sites in the world, and their mix of low-level anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) systems, Soviet-era surface-to-air missile (SAM) bases, and early warning radars still pose a risk to adversaries. 

An M-1983 Quad 14.5 mm anti-aircraft gun being shown during a parade in this undated image.

Between the AAA and SAM batteries, over 1,500 fixed air-defense sites are arrayed to protect North Korean airspace (squeezed into an area half the size of England). 

In this article I will focus on the current capabilities of the county's anti-aircraft artillery, but I'll also touch on their surface-to-air missiles as well.

Under the control of the KPA Air Defense Command and Pyongyang Antiaircraft Artillery Command, North Korea's AAA defense are made up of M-1983 Quad 14.5 mm guns, ZU-23-2 twin barrel autocannons, M-1992 Twin 30 mm autocannons, and M-1992 Twin 37 mm self-propelled guns.

These guns have a practical rate of fire of between 150 and 1,600 rounds per minute per barrel, with effective ranges of 2.5 to 5.8 km depending on which system is being used. 

AAA batteries are typically laid out in two arrangements, the "daisy" and what I call the "I".

Example of the "daisy" layout.

Daisy arrangements refer to a circular configuration of guns. They range in size from 4 to 12 guns and may form a "chain" of daisies, with 2-3 sets of four guns each or they may simply be a single circle of guns. 

According to George Herbert, adjunct professor at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, AAA guns in this arrangement lie within a targeted environment (such as near the Yongbyon Nuclear Center) and can protect it from threats coming in from any direction.

Example of the "I" layout.

The second primary arrangement for AAA guns is "I". These are just a single straight line of guns. All but one of the "I" layout sites deploy 8 guns.

Mr. Herbert explains that this arrangement is best for firing at aircraft that still lie outside of the main target, such as on the approaches to Pyongyang, but before they actually enter the city's airspace, and can concentrate the fire from multiple guns onto the enemy aircraft.

There are 70 of these surrounding Pyongyang in an oval ring 25-30 km outside of downtown.


A Layered Defense

The country's air defense is constructed using a layered approach. The DMZ and each coast has a line of AAA batteries along them with the main coastal cities then being encircled by their own ring of defenses. Interspersed in other parts of the country are the batteries for major KPA bases, navy and air bases, missile sites, industrial centers, and key palaces. There are also a few others scattered around the country at seemingly random sites. 

Nowhere is this layered defense more obvious than at Pyongyang.

As the nation's capital city, Pyongyang is the largest population center, is where all of the main military command centers are located, and it contains the greatest concentration of industry making its capture a primary goal in any war.

Pyongyang has over 400 AAA batteries arrayed in three main lines of defense, and it is also protected by two outer rings of 19 surface-to-air missile batteries as well.

Illustrative map of the main AAA and SAM defensive ranges (approximate distances) around Pyongyang, with the Ryongsong Palace highlighted in blue. The yellow ring is the palace's dedicated air defense ring.

Within Pyongyang is also the Ryongsong Palace complex. Nestled within Pyongyang's air defense space, the palace is surrounded by its own dedicated ring of AAA batteries and is covered by at least 5 nearby SAM batteries, making the palace perhaps the most well-defended single site in the world.

Other areas that enjoy substantial air defense are Nampo, Sariwon, the Yongbyon Scientific Nuclear Research Center, Haeju, Kaesong, Wonsan (which is also home to a Kim palace), Hamhung, Kanggye, Chongjin, Tokchon, and the elite Samjiyon-Mt. Paektu area.


All of these overlapping clusters also end up creating a thicket of AAA sites within the "Kaesong-Munsan" invasion corridor. This would be the most contested stretch of airspace as it is the most direct path from connecting the capitals of North and South Korea. The corridor is roughly 50 km wide and 155 km long, stretching from the DMZ up to Pyongyang. 

Map of invasion routes including the two Kaesong approaches. Image: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, North Korea Country Handbook, May 1997.

In any given 5 km circle (the maximum range of most AAA guns) a pilot would only have three, perhaps four, brief moments where they weren't in range of any guns if they were flying through the center of the corridor. Of course, where AAA may not reach there are still the dozen+ SAM sites that lie within the corridor and whose ranges are between 25 and 300 km depending on the missile system being used.


Point to the Sky

Nationwide, North Korea currently has 1,463 active AAA sites. These batteries have the capacity to field 8,641 individual artillery pieces. Each battery consists of anywhere between a single gun to up to 12 guns. The majority fall in the 6-8 gun range. Not every fixed position has a gun in it at all times, but around 90% do. This means that at any given moment there are 7,777 artillery pieces ready to fire.

There are also 521 known decommissioned sites. Having decommissioned sites mapped is important, particularly within the public sphere, in order to have accurate maps available. Many of these older sites haven't been demolished, merely closed, and so they still look like they could be used. That has led to some of them being incorrectly identified as active on other databases (like OpenStreetMap and Wikimapia).

Additionally, knowing when sites are closed or newly constructed allows researchers to better track trends in air defense strategies (among other things).


Surface-to-Air Missiles

Map of current SAM positions.

The country also maintains between 57 and 61 surface-to-air missile batteries, with two of them being modern constructions. Most field S-25, S-75, and S-125 systems that are from the Soviet-era. North Korea has attempted to develop their own SAM systems with the KN-06 and KN-30 which are clones of Russian S-300 and S-400 SAMs. However, despite being promoted in official state media, these mobile systems haven't yet been verified to have been fully deployed through open-source imagery and publications.

If they are being used, they would most likely first be sent to the new SAM batteries constructed at Wonsan (39° 7'16.21"N 127°44'16.26"E) and near the town of Haeju (38° 5'28.79"N 125°27'2.18"E).

Between AAA and SAM sites, approximately 75% of all of North Korea's airspace is covered using conservative measurements. The largest gaps in coverage are in the highly mountainous border areas with China and access to those gaps would require either flying in from China or making it through already defended areas.


An updated explorable map of North Korea's air defense sites is available through purchase of the AccessDPRK Map (Pro Version)


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and ZS. 

--Jacob Bogle, 9/23/2022

Saturday, April 27, 2013

Coastal Defenses

North Korea's coasts are littered with defensive positions, a hodgepodge collection of modern defenses mixed with those remaining from the Korean War.

Their design takes a layered approach and is dependent on the topography of the area. Naturally, locations closer to the DMZ and those along the eastern coast (facing the historical enemy of all Korea, Japan) are more built up. To the southwest, the land border between North and South Korea gives way to a series of river mouths and tidal inlets, most notably at the confluence of the Imjin and Han rivers. This area opens up to the sea and is where I consider the North Korean coast in this region to being.

Within 3 miles of the Northern Limit Line (the de facto maritime border between the two countries, although it is disputed) are a series of observation posts located along the river banks, fences to the rear of the posts, a number of sand berms which divide up the patty fields, successive layers of road blocks/tank traps, and mixed throughout are anti-aircraft artillery sites (AAA), gun lines, trenches dug into the hills, and hardened artillery sites (HARTS). There are also ammunition caches and other storage facilities dispersed throughout.

Here is a sample region.

(click images for larger view)

The Northern Limit Line runs in the middle of the river, naturally South Korea is to the south. The wider yellow line is the area I have marked as encompassing most of the border defenses which include the DMZ. It is approximately 3 miles (with some variation) from the NLL and the Military Demarcation Line which serves as the land border. The "P" icons are small position, observation posts etc. The red circles are HARTS positions, the "S" icons are storage facilities, "F" is for fortifications, the pink icon denotes bunkers or tunnels and the "policemen" mark road blocks of the type I discussed in this post

Here is an example of the sand berm and fence which runs the length of this region (as well as nearly all low-lying coastal areas).


To the north of this beach, in an area about 5 miles wide, there are 8 road blocks.


Now, moving away from the NLL here is a map of some of the small coastal positions located along the coast of South Hwanghae province. 


The island to the bottom right, labeled Keunyeonpyeong-do (also known as Yeonpyeongdo), is the South Korean island which was bombed by the North in 2010 which killed 4 and wounded 18 others. 

This is a close up of one of the larger positions. 


Literally thousands of miles worth of trenches can be found throughout the county. Some are left over from the Korean War and have no real use, but others are part of their active defenses. Like these:


Both east and west coasts are intermittently lined with obstacle courses aimed at preventing any rapid movement inland during an invasion. These "dragon's teeth" consist of row after row of concrete blocks which have been sunk into the sand. The rows, usually 10 running parallel to each other, make up a full "band" around 100 feet wide. Most of these were put in place decades ago, some have been removed and others still have simply been covered up with drifting sand and mud. Still, in some areas they would slow an advancing force. They tend to be found in low-lying areas which lack mountainous terrain within a few miles of the coast and they are often paired with road blocks and berms further inland as well as rows of berms along the beach itself.

In this example the obstacle band has been marked in red, you can see the multiple sand berms in nice little rows.


And a close-up of the dragon's teeth themselves:


Next is the defensive positions around a few coastal towns. If you look at the coastal defense map I gave you above, this area is roughly the 4 blue places marks in a cluster, to the north of Yeonpyeongdo Island. 


The blue lines are fences and the three red lines are the tank traps. As before, the red circles are HARTS, the blue marks are small positions, "G" is a gun line and "B" is a coastal battery.

Finally, these are just three additional images of some interesting coastal places:

An AAA site with trenches - 


A close-up of a hardened artillery site - 



And a reserve fleet of 10 ships. There are a number of these types of locations dotted around the coast. Some are just sitting in dry docks like these and others are actually housed in underground naval yards.


--Jacob Bogle, 4/27/2013

Monday, March 4, 2013

North Korean Artillery Sites

As I have mentioned before, North Korea is the most militarized country on Earth. They spend 20% of their GDP on their military (more than 5x higher than the US), males are required to spend 10 years in the military and at any given time 5-10% of their population is on active duty with an additional ~30% of the population in reserves or paramilitary units.

The country has successive layers of defensive positions, most notably around Pyongyang. This shows the location of many Anti-aircraft artillery sites (AAA) around Pyongyang and their ranges are shown by the circles.



One of the most common AAA platforms is the ZPU-4, pictured below.[1]

(Image source: Commons, CC 3.0)

This is just an example of the weapon and wasn't taken in the DPRK. It has a range of 8km.

There are currently between 1,500-2,000 AAA and HARTS (Hardened ARTillery Sites) sites in North Korea. Due to their economic difficulties and sanctions it is likely that 20-25% of the sites are non-functional (lack of parts, repair capability etc). Although it is very likely that the sites around the capitol and the DMZ are given priority and are functional.

While it is widely agreed that the technology and weaponry used by the DPRK is outdated and would offer little resistance to a full on assault by a modern military the fact that they retain such a vast number of guns and men under arms means that they represent a very real and credible conventional force.[2] Plus, they have special units trained in asymmetric warfare thus any land invasion would be an arduous and costly undertaking.

This realization and the ever-present reality that Seoul, South Korea lies within range of many of the North's weapon systems is why war cannot be considered as a series action. Should a war break out, within 48 hours it is estimated that South Korea could suffer 1 million casualties.[3]

There are two main layouts of their AAA sites and an asymmetrical layout. The most common is the "daisy" or "flower" design.



Here is a smaller version.


This is an example of a linear site. A number of traditionally "daisy" sites have been converted to linear sites.



An asymmetrical site. These are typically located along the thin ridges of low-lying hills or near populated areas lacking in uniform open spaces.


During the 1970's there were many more sites but over the years they have been removed or consolidated. I can only presume that it is because they lack the funding to keep all of them operational and that over the years many of the guns have broken beyond repair. This is one such site.



HARTS are largely a North Korean style of defense. They can take many forms but typically include AAA guns, SCUD missiles, SAM's, radar sites etc located in bunkers either cut into the side of a hill or in hardened facilities. Then they are rolled out into the open to be deployed. Some are also locations with gun positions cut into a hill or berm and are only covered by simple sheds. Although this might not sound all that secure the gun lines are very thin and are backup against a hill with tree cover. This presents a rather small target and depending on time of year they can be hidden rather well from aerial view.

Most of the artillery HARTS (HARTS can also be used to describe underground naval facilities and others) are located along the DMZ and there are 200-500 of them spread out along its 160 mile border. [4]


This is a typical position for the interior of the country.

And here is one typical of the DMZ. Note the small sheds.




Sources:
1. ZPU-4, Federation of American Scientists
2. North Korean Military, US Dept. of Defense
3. From Lambs to Lions, by Thomas Preston, pg 127
4. HARTS in North Korea, Nautilus Institute

Additional Reading:
Fortress North Korea, from GE user "Planeman_" at Militaryphotos.net
North Korea's WMD programs, Federation of American Scientists

--Jacob Bogle, 3/4/2013
www.JacobBogle.com
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Sunday, February 24, 2013

Mapping Project Update 1

In 2005 Mike Ane started a file containing several hundred locations of interest and then in 2007 Curtis Melvin and his associates at www.NKeconWatch.com greatly expanded the file by mapping the economic, cultural and military sites of North Korea using Google Earth. Their work brought to light thousands of locations and their KMZ file has been downloaded well over 151,000 times. However, as I would look over the country, I would spot something they had missed, and then it dawned on me that no private citizen (to my knowledge) has ever gone through the whole of North Korea, literally square mile by square mile, and marked every single item of interest.

So, a few months ago, I decided to take on that challenge. The work of Curtis and another avid GE user ( "Planeman_") laid the foundation and their descriptions taught me a lot about what places look like. For example, what an anti-aircraft artillery site looks like from aerial imagery, what an electric sub-station looks like, monuments, train stations and so forth. Building on that knowledge and what I have learned through hundreds of hours of research, I have been able to mark thousands of new places without duplicating the findings of others. 

This has been and continues to be a tremendous undertaking, but I think it is very important to shed light on a country so few know anything about. Even since Google Maps began, there was always a black hole in their data - North Korea - and it wasn't until a few weeks ago that Google began filling in the blanks, largely thanks to the work of individuals submitting information. It is my hope that in time North Korea opens up as a country, but until that time comes, I consider it worthwhile to use technology to reach out from my computer to data gathered from space and pull North Korea (or at least what I find) out of the void and bring it to the world. 

North Korea is divided into 9 provinces, 2 special cities, and the capital district. There is also the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) which I count as its own geographic division. Each area has its own file which is then subdivided in categories: Military, Monuments and Domestic. Each category may have further sub-categories such as: Sub-stations, Irrigation control and Dams, AAA sites, Road & Rail Tunnels etc. I have been making use of the placemark icons and try to make them self-explanatory and use one icon for each different type of location to avoid confusion.  

The image below is a screenshot of all the places I've marked (excluding completed areas). Obviously, it looks like a mess and you're only seeing a handful of individual sites since they're all piled on top of each other, but I think it gives you some idea of what I've been doing and talking about for so long. 

(click for larger)

I have started files on almost every area and completed the DMZ, the Rason Special City and Ryanggang Province. It is my intention to publish the files once I am closer to completing the project, although I may publish what areas I've finished sooner. 

With completed divisions and the portions of partially completed divisions combined, I estimate that I am 25% finished and have marked roughly 2,200 items. The completed areas cover nearly 6,000 sq miles of territory out of NK's total land area of 46,541 sq miles. Due to the lower quality of some of the data there will be portions that have very few placemarks simply because the resolution is so low that specific individual items can't always be identified.

--Jacob Bogle, 2/24/13
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