Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 25, 2022

Phishing for AccessDPRK


Every so often NK News will report on mass attacks against North Korea researchers by North Korean agents or pro-Pyongyang groups.

From hacking attempts to phishing, I have been the target of half a dozen of these attacks and possibly more that I'm not aware of.

One of the common methods used is to impersonate a real journalist from a real news agency, and they will send you an email with a list of questions for their "upcoming article". If you don't notice the attempt for what it is (like by observing the email being used is from a free account and not a business one) and you send them your replies, they'll turn around and send you a password protected Word document saying they have some extra questions or want your input on the final draft prior to publication.

If you download the file and try to open it, it can unleash a range of attacks against your computer or phone, or download some malicious code that just sits there, quietly sending the attacker all of your activity.

The latest attempt to scam/hack/infect came in the form of an interview request. But you know what? Instead of just ignoring the situation, the faux questions they asked were actually kind of interesting and are on a topic many have been considering lately - what impact the war in Ukraine might have on North Korea's behavior.


So just for fun, here's what I would have said in the event I was actually being asked these questions by a legitimate reporter.


Question 1: Some analysts argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may make North Korea much more reluctant to give up nuclear weapons, given that Ukraine has now been invaded by Russia after it abandoned its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. This certainly looks similar to an agreement made between Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore in 2018. What do you think about this kind of argument?

Reply 1: North Korea's nuclear program dates back to soon after the Korean War. It has been an integral part of both the military and political landscape for decades. And the leadership already learned the lessons taught by the deaths of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, which is that giving up your nuclear program is no blanket guarantee of regime survival.  

So, I don't think the invasion of Ukraine will have much of a direct influence on North Korea's thinking regarding survivability as they already strongly doubt the West's sincerity. 

A major flaw with the Singapore agreement is that it largely repeated what was agreed to in previous agreements going back to the first Inter-Korean summit in 2000, and it didn't provide a framework or guidance on how to actually accomplish the goals it set forth. In other words, unlike the Budapest Memorandum which was a legally binding agreement as part of Ukraine's accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Singapore agreement was symbolic and aspirational; something either side could easily ignore.


Question 2: While the Biden administration is concentrated on the evolving circumstances surrounding Ukraine, possibly lowering its guard in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea may try to develop new type of weapons including ICBMs or carry out nuclear tests. What do you think about North Korea’s future developments?

Reply 2: One common misconception about North Korea and the Kim regime is that they're mysterious and irrational. To the contrary, they can be quite transparent about their goals if one pays attention. Kim Jong-un laid out a series of military goals at the Eighth Party Congress in 2021 that included everything from developing hypersonic missiles to tactical nuclear warheads and even launching a military reconnaissance satellite. 

North Korea also never closed the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, they only destroyed the tunnel entrances which could quickly be repaired if needed. Low-level activity has been seen throughout the wider Punggye-ri complex every year since its "closure" in 2018, and the government has recently begun the process of repairing the tunnel entrances and are likely preparing for another nuclear test. Additionally, Kim Jong-un said that he no longer felt bound by the self-imposed nuclear testing moratorium, and in January of this year, North Korea announced that it would consider restarting all of their suspended activities. 

It seems clear that North Korea has been conducting covert weapons development and production throughout the last few years, despite claiming they had stopped, which enabled them to test hypersonic glide vehicles and rail-based ballistic missiles. And, clearly, the government has been planning to conduct more tests and produce new weapons, as Kim Jong-un explicitly laid out.

The issue isn't necessarily that the Biden Administration hasn't been focused enough on North Korea, but that North Korea has never liked feeling ignored. They have a history of missile testing and even engaging in direct attacks against South Korea whenever they feel the international community's gaze has fallen elsewhere (in this case, Ukraine). So it's certainly likely that a new missile test or even a nuclear test could be conducted soon. This risk is also enhanced because of the recent elections in South Korea and Biden's visit to Seoul and to Japan. During events like this, North Korea has a tendency of provocative behavior.


Question 3: Do you think North Korea believes that Biden is already a “lame duck” and sees this as a good chance to concentrate on developing new weapons?

Reply 3: The Biden administration has appeared to be slow in appointing the relevant special envoys and ambassadors to the region, and much of the United States' government has been preoccupied with domestic problems. The economic fallout from COVID-19 such as supply chain issues and inflation has indeed damaged Biden's prospects for the US mid-term elections and for his own reelection chances in 2024, so it is possible that Pyongyang is simply trying to ride out the clock and wait until the US has new leadership.

At the same time, North Korea hasn't exactly been dormant. They've conducted at least 17 missile tests in just the last 5 months and are repairing the facilities at Punggye-ri. Given the dramatic improvements made to their nuclear and missile programs over the last several years, it is my feeling that Kim cares less today than ever about who sits in the White House and isn't overly concerned with whether or not Biden would be capable of meaningful engagement. 

Considering that in April Kim Jong-un announced the end of North Korea's erstwhile "no first-use" policy and threatened preemptive nuclear strikes, it paints a story that Pyongyang is becoming bolder and feels more secure to do what they want (even if the actual risk of a preemptive strike is vanishingly low).


Question 4: Do you expect China will tolerate North Korea’s spate of ballistic missile launches and possible ICBM or nuclear tests? Do you think North Korea can or will maintain stable and amicable relations with China? Does Russia not afford to care about North Korea?

Reply 4: The short answer is, China has tolerated North Korea's actions so far, so why wouldn't that continue? Unless North Korea launches a full-scale war, nuclear or conventional, China will support North Korea. This isn't out of a sense of socialist brotherhood, but because it is in China's own interest to maintain the North Korean state.

China is directly responsible for North Korea's ability to evade sanctions and has been willing to supply the country with extra oil, luxury goods, and numerous other items that are banned by international sanctions. 

On occasion, it has tightened the enforcement of sanctions and admonished North Korea after particularly major events such as the 2017 nuclear test, but there is little to suggest Beijing would alter or reverse its decade's old policy toward Pyongyang absent a very serious incident - which ICBM launches apparently no longer qualify as. The rise in COVID cases in North Korea also makes China's continued support all the more necessary to avoid any potential destabilization of the country.

As for Russia, Putin and Kim have tried to improve relations and that has born some fruit including $10 billion in debt forgiveness, a 2015 agreement to construct a road crossing, and the expansion of the current railway crossing located in Rason. However, trade has remained minimal, and it would take more investments and time to further develop trade between the two countries.

In the wake of the war in Ukraine, it's likely that Russia and North Korea will seek to develop closer relations (North Korea was one of the five nations who opposed the UN resolution against the war) but I wouldn't predict any substantial shifts in policy. 

Along with China, Russia has also routinely blocked efforts to pass UN condemnations of missile tests and to impose new sanctions. And like China, Russia would rather have an anti-West nuclear-armed state on its border, than one that is closer to the West (which would be the result if North Korea began to cooperate).

~~~~

I've publicly released tens of thousands of map locations and have written over a thousand pages combined worth of material on this blog, NK News, 38 North, Asia Times, National Interest, and others. If you want to know what it is I know so desperately, join my Patreon like everyone else and get access to exclusive information you won't find on the AccessDPRK blog.

Speaking of Patreon, I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, and Russ Johnson. 


--Jacob Bogle, 5/24/2022

Thursday, January 18, 2018

North Korea's Great Barrier

I first wrote about North Korea's caged population in 2013, where I showed the fences that surround the country. Since then, I have been able to map the full system of fences, guard posts, and gates. And since the general situation regarding population movement has changed since then as well, I want to revisit the topic and also provide you with the Google Earth file so you, too, can explore the miles of fences and blocked off beaches, as well as to provide added evidence of the horrific human rights situation that exists. If you're primarily interested in getting the KMZ file, click here.

Guards maintaining a section of border fence along the Yalu River. (Source

First, a quick refresher. Much of North Korea's coastline and land borders are fenced off. According to multiple defector and media reports, some portions of fence are electrified while others are simply guarded by police. Of course the southern border (aka, the Demilitarized Zone/DMZ) has been turned into, perhaps, the most impenetrable 820,210 feet (155 miles) of border in the world. Ever. Apart from the hundreds of thousands of troops stationed along the DMZ, it has over 1,000 observation towers and forward military posts. Finally, the border with China (and the small section with Russia) is protected by large reservoirs, rivers, and in many places, fencing as well.
The purpose of these barriers is to keep people inside the country. Construction was sped up during the famine as the regime tried to cope with the mass movements of people, risks of defectors stealing boats, and as the government struggled to maintain their control in all sectors of society.

All of this means North Korea's population really is caged. A more colorful description of the country would be as an open-air prison.

The following images show the extent of the national fence system. Click on images for an enlarged view.


I was able to map nearly 1,400 miles (1,399.36 to be exact) of fencing. There are lots of small coastline sections where the paths of fencing can still be seen, but the fence itself is gone - likely pillaged for scrap metal by locals, however, most of the gaps you can see (and all of the large ones) are due to either natural barriers or where direct access to the sea/border is blocked by an industrial site, military base, or other construction that itself serves as a barrier.

Many coastal towns and villages lack a fence and instead the coastal portion is lined with dockyards and factories which requires locals to go through any number of gates or checkpoints, if they're permitted through at all. I've tried to map as many gate houses as possible that provide direct access to the coast. Ones that simply allow access to a factory or other site adjacent to the sea are not marked.

This next image shows the reason for each of  the major gaps in the fence system.


This image shows 837 identifiable police border guard posts and 434 stand-alone watchtowers along the the DMZ.



Under Kim Jong Un, miles of new fencing have been erected as well as older fencing upgraded in certain areas. A large number of additional watchtowers have been added along the fence routes as well, particularly in the northern regions. However, border controls extend well beyond fences and watchtowers. Cell phone single jamming towers, cameras, and other surveillance equipment have been deployed along both borders, but efforts have particularly increased along the Chinese border (which is the route most defectors take).

A related issue is the increased border protections China has been implementing. As with North Korea, China has begun to build fences (of a far greater quality than the DPRK) along certain key border sections to stem the flow of defectors. They have also constructed signal jamming towers and increased police and military patrols. China's active attempts to catch defectors by checking train stations, setting up road blocks, and patrolling neighborhoods, occur not only in the immediate border region, but far into the interior in major cities like Jilin.

The following series of images clearly show the individual fence posts and come from different parts of North Korea. Additional images can also be found in the original 2013 post, A Caged Population.





As both Kim Jong Un and China have taken a much harder line regarding border security, there has been a real and measurable effect on the numbers of successful defections. In 2017 there were 1,127 defectors who made it to South Korea, which is a decline of 27% from 2016. That was the lowest figure since 2001. The total number of defectors peaked around 3,000 in 2009, meaning there has been a decline of ~62% overall.

Despite the barbed wire fences, guards with automatic weapons, the high risk of women being sold into sexual slavery, and the risks of repatriation and imprisonment (or execution), people still brave the cold waters of the Yalu River and the forests of northern China to find their way to a better life. Even soldiers posted along the DMZ, who tend to belong to elite families and are generally more well off than soldiers stationed elsewhere, accept getting shot at 40 times (or even kill other DPRK soldiers) to cross into South Korea.

Kim Jong Un may have been successful in curbing overall defections, but the drive to feed one's family and the desire to experience the freedoms of the outside world (that North Koreans are increasingly being exposed to) will continue to inspire and embolden people to take the risks and seek a better life.

To download the full KMZ file and explore the sites yourself, click here. (Must have Google Earth to access.)


--Jacob Bogle, 1/18/2018
www.JacobBogle.com
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Wednesday, December 13, 2017

Possible NK Atmospheric Nuclear Test

North Korea is the only country to have tested nuclear weapons since 1998, when India and Pakistan both held their final underground tests, and all of North Korea's six nuclear tests have been carried out underground at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site beneath Mantap Mountain (which is adjacent to the Hwasong Concentration Camp).

The firing of the Hwasong-15 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on Nov. 28, 2017. Image from Rodong Sinmun.

Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs have become incredibly advanced and the speed of their accomplishments have often taken analysts by surprise. The development of these systems has occurred under the "two-track" or byungjin philosophy which seeks to develop the country's nuclear program and domestic economy in parallel. While their economy creeks along, it is becoming apparent that their nuclear and ballistic missile programs have been able to become largely self-sufficient and are produced with indigenous materials and technology.

The September 2017 nuclear test was their largest test by far with a yield estimated to have been between 100 and 250 kilotons, which places it several times larger than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II. Furthermore, it is possible that the tested device was a hydrogen bomb and that the warhead could have a variable yield, allowing North Korea to "dial" up or down the warhead's power.

On the ballistic front, their November 2017 test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM showed that they could theoretically hit any part of the United States (and a majority of the rest of the world). While questions remain about the missile's ability to survive reentry, there is no doubt that this is a huge step forward. Its size, range, and changes to the reentry vehicle over the Hwasong-14, all point to a program that is rapidly nearing completion.


At this point you may be asking what all of this has to do with the title? In October 2017, North Korea's Foreign Minister, Ri Yong Ho, said that Kim Jong Un was committed to testing a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere. And rumors of such a test have been heard prior to this statement, too. Atmospheric nuclear testing was last carried out in 1980, by China. The US, Soviet Union, and UK each ended their atmospheric testing in 1963 with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

North Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in red, South Korea's in green. Data from Marine Regions.

The purpose of such a test would be, ostensibly, to prove their ability to attach a nuclear warhead to a missile and then to fire it off toward the sea and have it detonate - demonstrating they are indeed a fully capable nuclear weapons state. Any test would have to be carried out within the limits of North Korea's territorial waters, or at a maximum, its exclusive economic zone. Firing a nuclear missile outside of their EEZ would trigger a major world crisis the likes of which hasn't been seen since the Korean War.
Of course such a test (regardless of whether or not it occurred within their own territory) would likely permanently alter regional relations, could easily drive China out of whatever remaining alliance with the DPRK they have, spur Japan into full-on re-militarization, and could even lead to an attack on the North by either South Korea or the US. It's also highly unlikely that the US would sit idly by and watch as North Korea mounted a nuke onto a missile and fire it. So the chances of an atmospheric test are rather low in my estimation.

Beyond the geopolitical implications, the environmental impact would also undo progress toward addressing the radioactive genie that was released after the Trinity Test in 1945.

Atmospheric testing releases huge amounts of radiation into the environment. A 2013 study that looked at atmospheric radiocarbon showed that 2010 levels were at their lowest since the late 1950s, with the PTBT being the seminal moment when radiocarbon rates began to sharply decline.

Chart showing the percentage of Carbon-14 in the atmosphere from 1950-2010. (Source: Atmospheric Radiocarbon for the Period 1950–2010)

Above ground tests (atmospheric or otherwise) also release large amounts of radioactive Iodine, Strontium, Uranium (obviously), Caesium, Xenon, and other radionuclides. The half-lives of these materials range from a few hours (as in the case of Xenon) to hundreds of years and longer. Above ground testing can throw radioactive particles as high as 50 miles into the atmosphere where they will then be carried by the winds for many miles (with minute amounts traveling the globe) until they eventually settle back down to the ground and sea where they will continue to release radiation for years to come. Local radioactive fallout can extend in a plum easily over 100 miles long, placing each regional nation at risk of receiving fallout depending on the specifics of the test and weather conditions at the time.


All of these risks - the overt threats to South Korea, Japan, and the US, the dangers of spreading fallout over Chinese or Russian territory, etc. - are why I hold strong doubts that North Korea would ever conduct an above ground test. However, while thinking on the subject, I also considered what ground locations may exist that North Korea could use to conduct an old-school non-atmospheric above ground test.

Analysts have determined that the Punggye-ri test site may have experienced tremendous damage, particularly as a result of the latest test. While activity at other tunnels around the site has been seen, continued nuclear testing greatly raises the risk of a major collapse and release of radioactive materials. So the next best thing may be an above ground test.

Possible suitable locations for an above ground nuclear test.

I searched for the criterion of a 12-mile diameter circle (an "exclusion zone") that didn't overlap with any populated areas or, in the case of islands, that didn't overlap another island group or cross onto the mainland, and that wasn't too close to China or Russia. I was able to locate four such places. Three of which are islands/group of islets, and one is the Punggye-ri site itself. Punggye-ri is isolated enough that there are no cities or towns within the 12-mile circle and the nearby concentration camp (with its thousands of prisoners) would partially be protected from the immediate radioactive fallout effects by the mountain itself.

The other three sites are far enough away from the coast and any populated islands that the civilian population would be safe from the actual blast of a nuclear device, so long as it wasn't too large. These sites also have the added benefit of being within North Korea's internationally accepted territorial claims, which would give Pyongyang some degree of diplomatic cover.

We can only wait and see if Kim Jong Un thinks it's worthwhile to set off a nuclear device in the open, be it fired from a missile into the sea, set off on an island, or even detonated in the ocean from a barge, but one thing we can be sure of is now that he has a bomb and a missile, he won't be giving them up for cheap.


--Jacob Bogle, 12/12/2017
www.JacobBogle.com
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Additional Reading
1. Nuclear Weapons Testing and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective, Remus Prăvălie, February 2014 (Ambio, A Journal of the Human Environment)

Thursday, November 2, 2017

Is North Korea's Prison System Far Larger than Expected?

By now, nearly everyone in the Western world has heard about North Korea's collection of massive prison camps. There are at least 35 jails and concentration camps in the country (including annexes), all holding around 200,000 prisoners. However, there are estimates that there may be another 10 re-education camps and there are other smaller prisons as well.

Locations of North Korea's main prison camps.

An October 2017 report by The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) titled, The Parallel Gulag, details a system of prisons that operate through the Ministry of People's Security and are called "an-jeon-bu". The report focuses on 22 possible sites. But something that really caught my eye was the design of these sites.

Within the #AccessDPRK Map are hundreds of "compounds". These are generally unspecified groups of buildings or walled-off compounds. I didn't know what they were for certain, but they occurred with such regularity that I felt it was important to map as many as I could. They could be small factories, perhaps barracks or police stations, food distribution centers, or even jails. The places within the "compound" classification vary widely in their configurations, but a good many seemed to follow the same basic design.

In the 2017 report The Parallel Gulag, HRNK discusses a separate, parallel prison system apart from the country's wider known system of massive concentration camps. The report details 20 sites and all share similar design characteristics between each other and the hundreds of other compounds that were mapped as part of #AccessDPRK.

Here are a few satellite images of sites discussed in The Parallel Gulag.


The site above was identified by HRNK as Kyo-hwa-so No. 2 and is located at 39°52'5.88"N 124°44'59.48"E near Tongrim, North Pyongan Province.


The site above was identified by HRNK as Kyo-hwa-so No. 88 and is located at  39°11'58.80"N 127°20'44.93"E between Munchon and Wonsan.


And this site was identified by HRNK as a likely jail in Sangtong-ri (40° 5'35.61"N 127°21'26.26"E) in South Hamgyong Province.

This next set of Google Earth images show a few of the "compounds" that were mapped as part of #AccessDPRK.


This is a site in Kangwon Province and is located at 39°13'41.87"N 127°20'22.79"E



Back in April 2017, I took to Twitter and asked people what they thought these places were. I received several suggestions, but most said they were probably associated with agriculture or food distribution. And we do know that grain warehouses and distribution points are well guarded, which would necessitate walls and guard posts. However, defector testimony has also revealed that during the famine many places were set up as detention centers to handle the huge number of orphaned children. The government simply took over any available buildings it needed and converted them to this use. They were described as little better than prisons in terms of design and security.
If you have no food but need secure buildings, former food distribution centers may have filled the role. Of course, how long the regime continued to use them for this purpose, or if they were changed to serve as another type of detention center isn't known.

With the publication of The Parallel Gulag, we can now definitively say that North Korea's system of concentration and labor camps, prisons, and local detention facilities is much larger than many realized. Considering I knew of so many similar facilities throughout the country, I reached out to North Korea analyst Joseph S. Bermudez (who also aided in the analysis of satellite imagery for the HRNK report). I gave him a few examples of the sites I had mapped, and he gave me his opinion on each one. As with Twitter, he, too, said they were a mix of detention facilities, barracks for local military/paramilitary units, and agricultural related facilities. However, he also said that a lot more study needed to be done.

Map showing the additional sites of interest.

Without further study and defector testimony, we may never know precisely what each of these locations are. However, I have located 632 such sites all over North Korea, which would mean there is a full order of magnitude more of these sites than fully functional hospitals in the whole of the country. With stories of "orphan jails", the now revealed parallel system of jails, the knowledge of historical "black sites" (like The Barn), and the highly secretive nature of the regime, it is safe to bet that at least some of these facilities are previously unknown prisons.

Here is a map of all the sites. If you open it up in Google Maps, you can save it as a KML for Google Earth as well.




If you have any additional information on any of these sites, please let me know!

--Jacob Bogle, 11/2/17 (updated 5/10/2019)
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Saturday, September 16, 2017

NoKo's Underground Nuclear Nightmare

UPDATE: On October 31, 2017, Japanese media are reporting that a large tunnel collapse occurred at the site, killing around 200 people. This has yet to be confirmed.


On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth and largest (by far) nuclear test. North Korea's only nuclear test site is Punggye-ri in North Hamgyong Province. At this point I want to say that this post is speculative in nature and that there is little concrete evidence to support what I am suggesting. However, there is anecdotal evidence and a logic to it. Enough so that I feel this is worth discussing.

The main tunnel at Punggyi-ri also happens to be less than 2 miles away from the boundaries of the Hwasong concentration camp (Kwan-li-so 16).


The apparent location (based on USGS information) of this most recent nuclear test lies a mere 0.3 miles (0.5 km) away from the camp fence, and North Korea's first test in 2006 appeared to have taken place inside the camp itself (underground, of course).


I believe the proximity of Punggye-ri and Camp 16 (with its 20,000 prisoners)  may be important.

There are multiple reports by defectors (including testimony by Ahn Myong-chol, a former guard at Camp 22), that North Korea has a history of using prisoners in medical experiments, including testing chemical weapons, as well as prison labor for the construction of sensitive military facilities, including underground sites.

Based on the relative locations[n1] of each of the nuclear tests, the underground tunnel system is massive, with the majority of test sites more than 3 miles away from the main tunnel entrance. The Sept. 3, 2017 test is almost 5 miles away! This means lots and lots of tunneling work.

A few small mounds of debris can be seen at the entrances of the various tunnel entrances; however, the amount of debris is nowhere near enough as would be required for excavating a tunnel a mile long, let alone multiple tunnels. A very basic tunnel 1 mile long, six feet tall, and six feet wide would create 190,080 cubic feet of material. However, an image released by North Korean TV suggests their tunnels aren't simply a straight line (which could easily become disastrous during testing).



This suggests that the North Koreans are using material from new tunnels to back fill the old tunnels after each nuclear test, as the growth of the outside debris mounds do not entirely reflect the growth that would be needed if they were dumping all of the excavated materials outside. The fact radioisotopes can be detected outside of the country after some tests, shows that their testing site is far from sealed, thus it would be necessary to mitigate the slow continual release of radiation by filling up used tunnels with the material taken to construct new ones. Unfortunately, the discovery of visible changes to the surface of the mountain raises the likelihood that further releases of radiation will happen.


Back to Hwasong, it's not beyond the realm of possibility that the regime is taking advantage of this nearby and captive workforce to do the difficult and dangerous task of constructing these testing tunnels. There is a fair amount of evidence that prisoners are used to construct the thousands of tunnels and underground facilities that have turned much of North Korea's ground into Swiss cheese. And, there are even occasional but brief comments that can be found in media sources that touch on the idea of these prisoners being used to do the hard work at Punggye-ri.

Average citizens are subjected to terrible conditions in the country's coal mines, and even in uranium mines and enrichment facilities safety is practically nonexistent, with workers developing multiple radiation-related illnesses. Political prisoners on the other hand aren't even considered citizens. Their very title of "human" appears to vanish along with every right and privilege that otherwise exists in North Korea.

Using these men to dig, repair, and fill the tunnels has several benefits to the regime. Here are four benefits that immediately come to mind:

1) The government doesn't have to worry about paying wages or properly feeding them, saving large sums of money.
2) There are no families to deal with whenever a loved one comes home with a shattered leg or dying from radiation exposure (or coming home in a body bag).
3) Due to the way such prisoners are managed, using them provides a large level of greater secrecy and security. Even loyal soldiers may inadvertently spill sensitive information to friends or family. Who are slave laborers living behind electrified fences going to tell?
4) Using expendable lives saves the lives of more valuable people.

We do know that the tunneling process itself is fairly basic. North Korea doesn't have the ability to employ the large modern mining or tunneling equipment other industrial countries have. Using dynamite, hand tools, brute force, and small carts to carry away rocks is about all they have. Satellite imagery confirms this is true at Punggye-ri, too, as the simple equipment can clearly be identified.

Beyond the horrors associated with working hour after hour and week after week near incredibly toxic mixes of radiation and heavy metals, there are also dangers faced by nearby populations.

The northern part of Korea has always been neglected. This was the case during the historic dynastic period and was the case during North Korea's famine - when supplies were cut off and redirected to the more "important" capital region. Punggye-ri is located in the northernmost province. Of North Hamgyong's 2.5 million inhabitants, nearly 2 million lie directly east and north of the nuclear site, which means any radiation release will spread to those areas on wind currents.

Absent full-on containment failure, where plumes of material is tossed into the atmosphere, partial failures can still release Cesium-137, Iodine-131, and Strontium-90, all of which can spread by the wind and contaminate the ground (and thus the grass, which in turn will contaminate any animals eating that grass and eventually the people eating the animals). Seepage of Krypton-85 and Xenon-133 through cracks in the mountain can also contaminate the area. Krypton-85 has a half-life of 10.7 years, meaning if any was released by the first nuclear test back in 2006, half of it is still hanging around. To add context and bring this closer to home, the National Cancer Institute published a study in 1997 that showed 2,800 cases of thyroid cancer in the US each year can be attributed to our own nuclear tests during the "underground era" (1962-92).

Continuing research by 38 North suggests that major fractures may have developed in the mountain, and that further large-yield nuclear tests could severely destabilize the site and release enormous amounts of radioactive debris.

We may never know for certain if prison labor was used to build these miles of tunnels and what, if any, effects have happened as a result of radiation contamination, but the fact there's enough anecdotal evidence and internal logic to support the basis of this post is very disturbing. The world already knows about the routine torture, rape, murder, forced abortions, and starvation that goes on in North Korea's prison camps. The world knows about the lasting harm to people living in the US and on small Pacific islands near nuclear testing sites. I don't see what's so difficult about expecting that the two scenarios would merge in North Korea when all of the pieces are laying in front of us.

--Jacob Bogle, 9/16/17
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Note
1. All of the locations are based on coordinates given by the United States Geological Survey. These coordinates are only approximate and may be off by over a mile.

Wednesday, August 30, 2017

North Korea's Sacrificial Islands

When North Korea isn't firing intermediate and long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from highways and hidden factories, they're firing hellish amounts of smaller artillery. For the past several years, some of the recipients of these displays of military might have been two small islands off the coast of Wonsan.

The islands of So (So-do) and Hwangto (Hwangto-do) have been pummeled multiple times. Most recently in April and August 2017, December 2016, and March 2016. This video, originally from the Korean Central News Agency, discusses the August drills and shows images of the islands.

English-dubbed Video Source: StimmeKoreas

Both islands lie off the Kalma Peninsula, which is where the Kalma Airport is located (North Korea's recently modernized airport). Kalma is also the site of two rocket launch pads and has seen at least one failed rocket test.

So Island is approx. 6.7 km east of the tip of Kalma (among a small group of islands) and, farther south, Hwangto Island is 2.45 km east of the beach. At the tip of the peninsula are several villas, a sanitarium, and a possible hotel.

(Click on images for larger view)




Without further ado, here are the island martyrs.

So Island has a more recent history. Prior to 2014, the island appears to have served as a small outpost, perhaps for local fisherman. It contained a few buildings on the western side, and the rest was left alone. The buildings were demolished in late 2014.


So Island is a mere 460 meters by 293 meters at its widest points. As noted earlier, So Island was the target of an artillery drill in December 2016. The image below shows the results of that barrage.


This is a picture from the Korean Central News Agency showing the island being hit during the 2017 drill. The large island seen the background is Sin-do.

Image Source: TheSun.co.uk

Next is Hwangto Island, which has a longer history of being a bombardment target.


Hwangto is slightly larger than So at 587 meters by 295 meters. In the image below, shelling damage can be seen from a drill that occurred not too long before May 17, 2011. There is also a small building that has been demolished. 


On both islands, the structures seem to have been manually demolished rather than destroyed as a result of artillery. 


The above image shows the various prepared firing positions along the beach at Kalma. These sites are angled to line up with the the target on Hwangto Island.

In this KCTV picture from April 2017, the firepower displayed is rather impressive. An estimated 400 pieces of artillery were used.


The below image is the most recent on Google Earth. Dated Dec. 8, 2016, you can see the damage done from additional artillery drills as well as a new target. That target was used during the April 2017 drill.


Thanks to the support of OpenDPRK, I can now show you the results of this recent onslaught. 


The largest craters are 10-13 meters in diameter. 

These displays of might happen a few times each year and usually coincide with major holidays or as a response to US-ROK drills. 

I wonder how many more artillery drills it will take before the cliffs at So Island collapse?


--Jacob Bogle, 8/30/2017
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Sunday, August 13, 2017

Why Are We in Korea and Why Do We Care?

Image Source: Vitorr.com

Once again tensions are high and concerns of impending nuclear Armageddon can be heard from some of the more embellishing talking heads on cable news. North Korea's nuclear and ballistic technology has rapidly advanced under Kim Jong-un and their path towards becoming a fully capable nuclear weapons state is appearing much shorter than many had projected. 

Kim Jong-un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined, and the individual components of a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capable of hitting the US mainland seem fairly complete. The main hurdles now revolve around joining those components together into a functional weapon. That isn't to say North Korea is only a matter of days or weeks away from having a true nuclear missile: the mating of a miniaturized warhead onto a missile has its own difficulties, and there are other questions surrounding the program. But with North Korea threatening to fire missiles into the sea near the US territory of Guam (a major cornerstone of our ability to operate in the Pacific), and with President Trump likewise threatening "fire and fury" against any Northern threat, many question why we're even involved in Korea in the first place, and why do we care. Particularly among younger generations. After all, the Korean War earned the moniker "The Forgotten War" in my father's generation. If it was "forgotten" then, how much more distant must it seem to the proceeding generations?  

So, why are we there and why do we care?

A little backstory is required. A unified Korea was occupied by Japan in 1910. After WWII, the USSR took over the northern half of the Korean peninsula and we took over the south with the agreement that at some point in the near-ish future, a free and general election would be held under UN supervision so that the Korean people (they’re all the same blood) could decide if they wanted to be a free and democratic country, or set up a communist state.

That election never happened. The Soviets took a small-time anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter named Kim Il Sung and installed him as leader, and we put in the Harvard and Princeton educated Syngman Rhee. Both sides claimed to represent all of Korea (even now, defectors who make it to the South are automatically granted citizenship) and both sides wanted to reunite the peninsula under their respective systems. After a few years, the American and Soviet troops withdrew from Korea. Not wanting to wait any longer and assuming the US wouldn't come back to defend an Asian backwater, Kim invaded the South in 1950 with overwhelming force. However, since the United States pledged to help keep our new ally safe from Communism, we certainly did come back (under the authority of United Nations and with dozens of other countries directly supporting the war). The resulting war the North initiated left half a million Allied soldiers (including 140,000 Americans) dead or wounded, and over 2 million Korean casualties.

No peace treaty was ever signed, but an armistice was signed in 1953, technically putting the war on hold. And our agreement with South Korea turned into a formal treaty, also signed in 1953, to which we are still bound. The Mutual Defense Treaty requires each country to come to the aid of one another in the event one is attacked. I feel it's important to note, that South Korea has sent troops and matériel to assist all major conflicts the US has been a part of since that time.
As part of the terms of the Treaty, American forces were to be stationed in South Korea to help prevent another invasion. This "status of forces agreement" is updated every so often.

Image Source: Metrovaartha.com


But it's been 64 years since the armistice was signed! Why should we remain?

Since the signing of the 1953 Armistice (which created the Demilitarized Zone -DMZ), North Korea has violated the terms of it over 220 times. North Korean soldiers hacked to death with axes two American soldiers on the southern side of the DMZ. North Korea captured the USS Pueblo and tortured its crew. North Korea has kidnapped hundreds of Japanese and South Korean citizens. North Korea has bombed South Korea islands, sunk Southern ships, and launched a raid on the South Korean president’s residence in an assassination attempt. They even continue to secretly lay landmines by infiltrating the DMZ. 

North Korea has sold weapons to Cuba, Iran, Syria, and others (and worked with them on nuclear matters). They have supported terrorist groups like the radical Japanese Red Army. They blew up a passenger jet killing all 115 on-board. They have engaged in economic warfare against the US via counterfeiting US currency. They are a large source of illegal drugs (like methamphetamine) in East Asia, and a source of other counterfeited goods. (For more information, read Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea's Illicit Activities by the Strategic Studies Institute.)

North Korea attempted another assassination attempt on a South Korean president, this time while he was visiting a foreign country. The bomb, planted in Rangoon, killed 21 and injured 46. Kim Jong-un also murdered own brother by using a WMD (VX nerve agent); the use of which in a foreign state is an act of terrorism.

Even if you ignore the nuclear weapons (and their long-held desire to develop them going back to the 1950s, and their continual threats to use them), North Korea still controls one of the largest conventional militaries in the world. They have over 1 million active-duty soldiers, 180,000 special forces, enough artillery within range of Seoul to lob half a million shells into the city within the first hour, and nearly 6 million belonging to reserves and paramilitary organizations. Plus numerous underground and hidden sites throughout the North that store fuel, food, and munitions to launch a full-scale war and carry it out for 6 months before reserves run out.

US-ROK 2010 Naval Exercise "Invincible Spirit". Image Credit: US Navy Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class (SW/AW) Adam K. Thomas

OK, but other than protecting South Korea, what do we get out of it?

Besides keeping our word? The Korean peninsula has been a contested region for thousands of years. Its importance today has not diminished. Some of the world's most important trading routes pass through and near Korean waters. The combined GDPs of South Korea, China, and Japan equals nearly $18 trillion, or more than 20% of the entire world's economic output.

Bilateral trade between the United States and South Korea amounts to $112 billion annually (up from $82 billion since 2007). Globally, South Korea is a key production center of electronics like cell phones, LCD screens TVs, and semiconductors, as well as automobiles, shipping, and petrochemicals. South Korea's impact on the global economy amounts to over a trillion dollars, and during periods of heightened tensions, global markets connected to the region tend to slow down and even drop until the immediate threats end. Aiding in the defense of South Korea enables that trade to continue to grow. It preserves the jobs of countless American workers who work for South Korean firms here and sell South Korean goods (and the many products that rely on parts from South Korea). It helps stabilize the overall world economy by keeping shipping lanes and factories open, allowing products that are vital to every industrial nation to get to their destinations.

Despite signing an armistice to end hostilities, North Korea has a 64 year-long history of open and active aggression. In the event of a war, yes, they’d lose. That isn’t quite the point. The North wants to harass and intimidate South Korea into giving them massive amounts of concessions (which has happened before). They want to hold the South hostage via threats and cause them to weaken and buckle. And yes, they want to preserve their regime, but that regime's survival means not having to reform their economic and political systems. It means the continuation of starvation, torture, attacks against its neighbors, and the perpetuation of one of the longest-running prison camp systems in world history.

The world is faced with a handful of choices that can be boiled down to two: do we accept a nuclear-armed North Korea, or do we prevent that from happening? The implications of either choice are not simple nor are they necessarily comforting, but the time to figure out which path we're going down is closer than ever. And despite which path we (and they) take, the fact remains, it is in America's best interest to help guide this long tale to its conclusion.


Further Reading
1. Terrorism and the Future of North Korea at the UN (AccessDPRK, March 2017)
2. The Nuclear Question (AccessDPRK, March 2013)
3. Arsenal of Terror (Joshua Stanton/HRNK, 2015)

--Jacob Bogle, 8/13/2017
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Tuesday, July 4, 2017

North Korea by the Numbers



Phase II of the #AccessDPRK Mapping Project was published on March 5, 2017, but simply knowing where everything is doesn't make understanding the full picture much easier - especially when considering there's over 50,000 places marked. So I've put together these basic charts showing the total number of items per division (monuments, military, and domestic), the total items per province, and the total number of items within each type mapped (AAA sites, elite compounds, dams, communication centers, schools, etc.).

I'd like to point out that the overall figures here will differ slightly form the ones listed in the March 5th publication article. All told, there are some 600 individual sub-folders I have to keep track of and the resulting numbers take up 24 pages; minor mistakes happen. A couple numbers were inverted, and a few others were slightly off, however the overall discrepancies are very minor when compared with the whole. After making those needed corrections, the information below should be considered as authoritative as it will get with regards to the project.

The following charts (monuments, military, and domestic) represents the most detailed map of North Korea ever released to the public.


Many monuments are clustered closely together, making marking each one individually impractical. Instead, some markers are placed next to a group of monuments (2-4 generally), so while Pyongyang may have 1,049 markers on the map, those markers represent 1,230 individual monuments.

It's important to note, for those unfamiliar with the project, that the numbers below represent the numbers within the various folders by those names. There will be some items where there will only be one or two places within a province - those didn't necessitate their own folders. In such cases, they're often located in the "un-categorized" folder. An example of this is military training centers and military factories. Just about every province has at least one, but only a few have a folder dedicated to them.  A similar situation exists within the domestic file; bunkers, water towers, jails, and others may or may not have their own folder, but they will all be mapped.


While the purpose of this project is to map every one of a particular item, there are some items that I did not intend on mapping each and every one of, such as "firing positions". These trenches and prepared (but empty) gun positions cover the country and number in the thousands. In many cases it's also difficult to determine whether or not something was just a leftover temporary fortification from the Korean War or is part of the country's current defense structure (which does include having trenches in just about every available space). Additionally, the "radar" count is predominantly stand-alone radar sites, not the numerous smaller radars that accompany permanent artillery positions; although some of those are mapped as well. "Gates" are only mapped when they help define the boundaries of an area or are large - there's no real need to map every single gate at every single military site.

With the exception of a few items: canals, signs, factories and farming (to a degree), mountaintop sites, gates, and water supply, I have tried to be as comprehensive as possible in mapping each and every one of the other sites. Regarding the number of factories and farming/agricultural facilities, I focused on only mapping the larger sites, while also mapping some smaller agricultural facilities (like wheat threshing sites) to provide examples of what those numerous places look like. 

In short, the map contains 8,865 monument markers (representing 9,896 individual monuments), 9,594 military sites, and 35,252 domestic and economic sites for a total of 53,711 placemarks. There are also hundreds of fences and other things outlined in the map, but those aren't included in the counts as the places fenced in have already been accounted for.

#AccessDPRK will occasionally be updated to provide greater accuracy as new information comes in, fixing any unintentional errors, and adding more details.


--Jacob Bogle 7/4/17
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Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Otto Warmbier, Dennis Rodman, and North Korea

The following is based on an interview I had with Dan Mandis on his Nashville, TN radio show (99.7 FM) on June 20, 2017. It is not a direct transcript but covers everything discussed and adds some additional information that we weren't able to get to due time restraints. The actual interview is available on iTunes for free (my segment begins at minute 18:44).


Dan Mandis Show 99.7 WWTN, Nashville
6-20-17
12:35-12:55 CST

Why was Otto Warmbier there and why does anybody still go to North Korea?
Otto was travelling in China and the decision to visit North Korea seems to have been fairly impulsive after he saw an advertisement from a tour group. North Korea holds a certain allure for many and several hundred Americans and a few thousand Westerners visit each year, along with thousands of Chinese and smaller numbers from countries around the world.

As for why, North Korea is unique and can offer a lot in the way of throw-back Soviet-style culture that’s mixed with ancient Korean history. And for the most part, they leave people alone. There’s an argument to be made that people shouldn’t visit because you’re giving money to an evil regime, but there’s also a counter argument that defends travel because you expose North Koreans to different people and ideas – which can help weaken the leadership over time. And really the only people who can resolve the dispute are the people who decide for themselves to either visit or not.

Who are remaining prisoners?
There are three Americans still being held by North Korea: Kim Sang-duk, Kim Hak-song, and Kim Dong Chul. All three are Korean-American Christians and are charged with crimes relating to missionary work, something North Korea takes very seriously. Of the 16 Americans detain by the North since 1999, 5 were connected to Christian groups. Nine were Korean-Americans.

What happened to Otto?
The official North Korean story is that he had botulism poisoning, which you can get from inappropriately packaged food – something that’s plausible given the state of affairs over there. Of course, Otto’s American doctors say there was no evidence of that. What really happen may never be known; he could have easily been hurt during an accident, beating, or during a torture session. We know from previous detainees that North Korea is not afraid to abuse American prisoners. And while his death is very sad, given how long he was in a comma and the damage to his brain, his death wasn’t surprising.

North Korea tries to hide anything that hints at the terrible conditions in their prisons or the failure of their medical system, so it’s reasonable to think they held him for so long in the hopes he would recover so they could coverup the whole thing. But the last thing North Korea wanted was to have a dead American in their custody, and I think his inability to come out of the coma played a role in them releasing him.

Describe what hard labor is really like in North Korea?
Honestly, it depends. But looking at the average, hard labor usually involves working in agriculture or in mining operations. The lack of equipment means using brut human strength and simple things like Ox carts and hand tools to farm the land – very much Medieval technology. Mining is done in deplorable conditions with little to no safety considerations. Accidents and mine collapses are common.

Prisoners are forced to work up to 15 hours a day, every day, and often receive less than 400 grams of food rations (usually corn with salt) – that’s a maximum of 1,500 calories a day. That means prisoners have to find mice, bugs, and even weeds to supplement their diets. When you add nonexistent sanitation, under those conditions the body quickly starts falling apart.   

What is our policy?
Currently the only policy the US has regarding travel to North Korea, is that Americans are discouraged from going. We don’t have diplomatic relations with them so direct travel is not possible. Every American that goes there must do so via a third-party nation, usually China. Even if we were to outright ban travel there, unless China helped us enforce that ban, Americans could still find a way if they were intent on it. The US State Department doesn’t (or can’t) even keep track of who goes to North Korea.

We don’t have any explicit policy on dealing with the North either when it comes detainees – and Otto was the first American prisoner to die since basically the Korean War. All we can do consider stronger sanctions – which haven’t stopped the slow progress of their military or prevented their economy from grinding forward.

What has Dennis Rodman accomplished this time around?
What role Rodman played in Otto’s release, if any, isn’t known. Prisoner releases have happened whenever a high-profile politician or former official payed a visit, because it confers a level of legitimacy on the regime, or when the North extracted some kind of food aid or other concession. They basically use prisoners as pawns. Having said that. Rodman’s visit could have just been coincidental, as he does consider Kim Jong-un a friend of sorts and since the US had been working toward Otto’s release since day one.

What About Young Pioneer Tours?
People are always encouraged to travel to North Korea using one of several official tour companies. Visiting on your own invites disaster. The problem with the company Otto used, Young Pioneer Tours, is that they appear to have used deceptive marketing to make the risks associated with going to North Korea seem less than they really were for Americans, while also promoting the allure of a “risky adventure” by saying their company somehow held sway in North Korea and if you used them you were less likely to be harassed or arrested.

Since these companies are often based in China, China’s obligation in this would be to tighten regulations associated with such companies. As I said earlier, even if the US were to enact a travel ban, it would be up to China to be the main enforcer.


In the end, the real point is to never take travelling to North Korea lightly and do a whole lot of research before you go. The overall risk is relatively low (it’s less than 1%), but even bending the rules there can get you in deep trouble and without adequate research, you may inadvertently break a law you didn’t realize even would be a law. An example of that is the disposal of newspapers that have the image of Kim Jong-un on them. You are not allowed to just throw it away, you can’t even fold the paper to where the picture is folded in half. 


--Jacob Bogle, 6/20/2017

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

Kim Jong-un's Secret Escape Plan

Pyongyang has one of the deepest subway systems in the world. It dives as much as 360 feet (110 meters) beneath the earth. And like many subways in national capitals, there are rumors of secret train lines that stand ready to spirit the country's elite to safety in the event of war or revolt. North Korea applied much of what it learned from the Soviet Union when it comes to protecting the leadership: from secret subway lines, to tunnels that run for miles connecting various palaces and government buildings, and even an alleged one that extends all the way to China!

There are special runways, helipads, and train stations that allow the Kims to travel the country in luxury and safety (and without having to wait in line for hours like the average peasant). These "No. 1" train stations are well known and easily identifiable, and even the special runways can be found with little effort (including the new ones that keep popping up), but it can be difficult to find tunnels via satellite. It's even more difficult to verify the rumors about secret underground escape routes.

There is an arc of natural hills that lie north of downtown Pyongyang, and each of them is covered with military bases, intelligence buildings, artillery sites, etc., but one of them is special. Located next to the Ministry of Armed Forces District, a hardened, partially underground heliport reveals itself. Its exact coordinates are 39.0633°, 125.7336°, and since I haven't seen any (ANY) information about it, I thought it would be a good idea to share what I know.


It's within a mile of four known metro stations, adjacent to the West Pyongyang Train Station, and near a main arterial highway. You can use all three modes of transportation to rapidly go from Pyongyang's secured government quarter to the Military District. And if there are secret tunnel connections, Kim Jong-un could make the trip without fear of being blown up. It's also only 4 miles (6.4 km) away from the newly modernized elite heliport which is used by Kim and the regime's top dogs, and 10 miles (16 km) south of Pyongyang Int'l Airport (which doubles as the home of North Korea's version of Air Force One).

This secret "get out" heliport is not directly connected to the Military District above ground. In fact, a multilayered fence divides the two areas, however, a tunnel exits near a villa that goes into the hill and could theoretically connect the two areas, which are less than 500 meters apart.

Google Earth/DigitalGlobe image clearly showing the tunnel entrance and villa. Dated May 7, 2013.

Based on satellite imagery, the heliport and associated buildings was under construction in June 2000 and was completed by November 2000.

Here is a Google Earth image from June 12, 2000 showing the construction process.


This one shows the completed work on Nov. 5, 2000.


The area surrounding the heliport also underwent drastic changes over a number of years. Below is an image of the area on Nov. 5, 2000.


After several years of work, the area had been completely changed. Most of the work was completed by the end of 2006.


More recent activity was seen in 2013, when one of the hardened hangars was demolished following what appears to have been a collapse. The apparent collapse occurred at the start of 2013 and the cleanup work seems to have been completed by the end of the year.


While helicopters haven't been seen in any public access satellite images, the protective hangar doors have been seen opened in several images. One such time was May 10, 2016.


In September 2016, what looks to be the scorch marks from a fire or explosion can be seen on the left landing pad. On the Google Earth image dated Aug. 27, 2016, an unidentified object or mound of material can be seen on the landing pad. By the Sept. 23 image, a large blackened area can be seen, indicative of a fire or explosion.


While I don't know if the object/mound in the first image is actually related to the explosion, the fact it was there soon before is worth mentioning. The burnt area hasn't been repaired as of April 22, 2017.

Trying to figure out where Kim Jong-un could go without knowing what kind of helicopters are available here is a bit of a guessing game, but if we assume they're one of the known helicopter types North Korea has (such as the Mi-8 Hip, or Mi-2 Hoplite), he could easily reach 270-300 miles (434-482 km) before needing to refuel. That range places nearly every other airport, palace, and key military base in North Korea within reach. It would also enable an emergency flight to China.

What exactly goes on at this site or where Kim Jong-un could ultimately end up if he had to flee can only be a matter of speculation (for now), but it's obvious the regime has taken great steps over the years toward protecting itself.


--Jacob Bogle, May 24, 2017
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Additional Reading
1. Report: US has mapped North Korean underground escape facilities (Aug. 5, 2015, Stars and Stripes)