Showing posts with label COVID. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COVID. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 24, 2024

The Development of North Korea's Northern Border Wall

Ever since the mass defections and rise in illegal trade caused by the 1990s famine, North Korea has tightened its grip on border security with increasing severity, but its northern border was still far from impenetrable. 

Despite fences and guard patrols, along with inhospitable terrain and weather on both sides of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, plus China's repatriation policies, total defections could reach several thousand each year. While most defectors remain in China in hiding, between 1,000 and 2,000 would make it to South Korea annually since about 2001.

But as the COVID pandemic spread, North Korea was not only faced with a possible existential threat due to the poor state of the country's healthcare system, but it was also faced with an opportunity - to use the pandemic as an excuse to finally (and completely) close down the border.

In the intervening four years, the physical barriers associated with the "border wall" were built, altered, and now appear to be undergoing a final series of changes.

In this article, I will lay out the development and current state of North Korea's anti-pandemic border measures now that the threat of the pandemic has waned, and as Pyongyang seeks to at least partially reopen its borders. 

3D render of a section of renovated border fence. This section features a levee, a double-row of fencing, guard posts, and a border guard garrison is in the background (right). Created by Nathan J. Hunt for AccessDPRK.


As far as I'm aware, I was the first person to note (with the aid of satellite imagery) that North Korea was increasing its border security with a Spotlight Report published by AllSource Analysis back in April 2021.

The report highlighted changes around the border town of Hoeryong, particularly noting an increase in the number of guard posts and the now ubiquitous primary and secondary lines of fencing.

Chronologically, however, one of the earliest examples of improved security following the border's closure in January 2020, was the addition of guard posts in Ryongchon County (south of Sinuiju) in September 2020.

Location of new guard posts built in 2020 along a section of older border fence in Ryongchon.

However, according to DailyNK reporting, the order to build a new border fence across the entire border wasn't issued by Kim Jong Un until February 2021. 

The addition of new guard posts may have been a separate order followed by a new (Feb. 2021) order to build the border fence, or perhaps the earliest order may not yet have come to light. Regardless, the timeline of increased border security was not uniform, with some areas undergoing construction sooner and others delayed. But by 2021, work was underway along the full North Korean border with China and Russia.

As mentioned, the first activity seen was the installation of thousands of small guard posts. Most were along the existing border fences, but some were placed in the middle of fields or atop river levees. In total, I have estimated that up to 15,000 guard posts dotted the landscape at the height of the pandemic.

Following the installation of numerous guard posts, secondary fence was then constructed behind the main border fence. The secondary fence was located anywhere from just a few meters behind the main fence to several hundred meters behind, and it cut through agricultural fields, forests, spanned rivers, and even incorporated the boundaries of factories and houses.

This secondary fence, based on a range of tourist photographs taken from the Chinese side of the border, was built out of either wood or reeds, depending on the raw materials available in each locality. 

Annotated photo of the DPRK border at Namyang showing the main border fence and the secondary fence made out of reeds. Annotations by AccessDPRK. Photograph comes from Weibo, March 2023.


To accomplish the work, construction units logged local forests and built temporary work camps in multiple locations along the border. 

Area of interest near Chang-ni in 2020, prior to logging.

Area of interest showing logging activities in 2022.

Timber piles for fence construction in Chunggang County, 2022.

Elsewhere, logs being staged for use in fence construction can be seen. In the above example, that area had simply been empty previously. No logging or storage activity existed prior to this event.

The work camps, as seen below, are standard for any large-scale construction project such as at the major residential projects underway in Pyongyang. 

One of multiple temporary, small worker's camps along the Taehongdan section of the Sino-DPRK border.

One of the temporary worker's camps in Musan.

Given the logistics of building a border fence across more than 1,000 km of highly variable terrain, instead of having a single centralized worker's camp, the camps (with their housing, workshops, and other facilities) are dispersed; with dozens of them along the border, each housing only few dozen to a few hundred workers. 

Worker's camp near Onsong. Numerous small buildings can be seen in October 2022.

The Onsong camp had been removed by May 2023 and the meandering secondary fence completed.


Following the addition of guard posts to tighten security and the wooden secondary fence that served to cut off access to the areas under construction, any original border fencing was then demolished section by section.

The next steps taken were to reenforce, rebuild, or newly construct flood barriers in places prone to flooding, and then building the new fence on top of those levees - with each province (and likely each county) responsible for providing most of the manpower and materials needed within their jurisdiction.

On a bend of the Tumen River, 2 km away from the Onsong worker's camp, a new levee was under construction in 2022.

By May 2023, the levee was largely completed, and the new electrified fence was placed on top. However, some soil grading activity was still ongoing. 

In at least one area, in Rason, a new quarry was opened to provide the materials needed for local levees. 

Rason quarry, with both the new main fence and secondary fence visible.

New fences were also constructed on hills and mountainsides, areas that were often left poorly controlled prior to COVID and that served as routes of defection.

The previous border fence was just a single row of barbed-wire fencing with guard posts that were only concentrated near populated areas and areas where defections were less physically difficult (open fields, narrow parts of rivers, etc.) Guard posts were often 1 km apart or even farther, and the wide reservoirs along the Yalu lacked fencing in general. 

The main border fence now comprises two rows of tall fence, allegedly electrified, with a patrol road along it. And the secondary fence appears to have become a permanent part of the system as well. 

Guard posts are considerably closer together and can be found along the entire length of the border - even in remote areas. Guard posts are positioned on both the main and secondary fences. Fencing was also added to the previously unprotected reservoirs (such as the Sup'ung Reservoir) and electronic surveillance infrastructure was improved.

Construction of the new fence was carried out by border guards, local labor brigades and, due to the immense manpower requirements, military units from XI Corps (Storm Corps) were also used. However, the same manpower requirements that necessitated the use of the military to help construct the border fence also temporarily drained the readiness of the corps.

After first being fortified with additional guard posts, the fence path in this area was moved further inland to follow an existing road. 

Between 2021-2023, fence paths were adjusted to improve local security and as better paths were identified during construction. 

Along with the fences and guard posts, over 400 border guard garrisons now dot the landscape. Most of the garrisons existed before COVID and many had already been renovated ca. 2016, but new ones were still constructed, and other changes were made to existing sites.

Example of a border guard garrison.

However, there have been changes to the level of security seen earlier on in the fence's development. What I would describe as being overkill in the number of guard posts (and thus guards needed) has been relaxed, with many redundant positions removed

Nonetheless, the northern North Korean border has become one of the most well-secured civilian borders in the world. Presently along the northern border are over 400 guard posts, 10,000-13,000 guard posts, and approximately 2,100 km of primary and secondary fencing has been identified by AccessDPRK.

Combined with increased security on the Chinese side of the border and enhancements to the DPRK coastal fence as well, it is unlikely that defection rates will return to previously seen levels anytime soon. (Only 196 made it to South Korea in 2023.)

Animation showing the development of a section of border fence from July 2020 to October 2023.

3D render of the same section of fence with the border guard garrison building shown on the left. Created by Nathan J. Hunt for AccessDPRK.


Note: if you'd like to learn more about how North Korea's border closure has impacted the lives of average North Koreans, check out this in-depth report from Human Rights Watch which I assisted with.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pearce, Douglas Martin, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, 7/23/2024


Friday, September 15, 2023

Pyongyang: COVID Fortress

AccessDPRK has been at the forefront of using satellite imagery to uncover North Korea's anti-pandemic measures. It was the first to use satellite imagery to verify reports of the "border blockade", it was the first to offer a nationwide look at those border changes via the AccessDPRK map, and it was the first to expose a network of covert COVID isolation facilities that was built across the country.

Screenshot of KCTV program (July 27, 2020) showing a COVID disinfection checkpoint along the Pyongyang-Kaesong Highway. Image source: NK News.

North Korea has used the pandemic to clamp down on human movement and trade in the most extreme ways, and it has relied on myths and pseudoscience to back up its policies. From claiming that COVID could pass into the country from Chinese dust to putting people in quarantine for coming into contact with objects from South Korea - despite there being very little evidence that one can contract the virus by simply touching an object - North Korea's anti-pandemic measures have caused an inordinate amount of harm.

Of course, given the state of the country's healthcare system, any pandemic could pose an existential threat to the state (to say nothing of the people living there). That is why it's little surprise to discover that authorities embarked on building not just border and coastal fences but have tried to erect an anti-COVID barrier around Pyongyang itself. 


First, however, I want to review the other infrastructure changes that North Korea has instituted in its fight against COVID.

North Korea was the first country to completely close their borders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. To accomplish this, not only were all border crossings closed and trade & tourism suspended, but authorities erected hundreds of kilometers of new border fence (often in two layers) as well as repaired and modernized the existing border fences.

Map showing all border and coastal fencing as well as fences along the DMZ.

As part of the border closure, they added over 15,000 additional guard posts and garrisons along the border with China and Russia. They also improved security along both coastlines. AccessDPRK has verified the existence of 2,008 km of northern border fence and 1,567 km of coastal fence that now ring the country (plus hundreds of kilometers of DMZ fences). 

Within the country, numerous checkpoints were set up to further limit human movement and the spread of the disease. Some of these are simple tent-like structures where a person's temperature can be taken, and others are existing vehicle inspection points that have been expanded to allow for decontamination processes.

At the border crossings, most have simply remained shuttered. But at Sinuiju (the main crossing with China) and Tumanggang (the only crossing with Russia), new facilities to quarantine and disinfect goods and people were set up to handle what little trade has occurred since 2020, and to prepare for when trade is normalized again. There is also evidence of disinfection infrastructure being built at the ports of Nampo and Tanchon.

Location of all identified COVID isolation facilities. 

And as part of actually providing a level of medical care, albeit a questionable level, dozens of suspected COVID isolation facilities (95 at last count) have been constructed throughout the provinces. These highly secured compounds can isolate patients who test positive with COVID or have a severe "unidentified" fever, while not taking up additional room in the country's poorly staffed and supplied hospitals. Within Pyongyang, the city's hospitals have all had dedicated COVID wards set up.

It is within this context that I want to detail the latest apparent COVID infrastructure project: fencing off Pyongyang itself.

Map showing the location of the capital COVID fence. The yellow lines represent confirmed fence paths. The white lines represent rows of guard posts that may or may not be connected by fencing.

Because there are gaps in the available image data from Google Earth, I haven't been able to map out the full system as it exists today, but I have been able to locate enough of it to provide this review.

Beginning no earlier than March 2020, the construction of a series of fences, guard posts, garrisons, and checkpoints began. In parts of the city, the first iteration of the system was already built by October 2020, while in other areas construction extended until at least June 2022. 

Detailed look at the fence with a garrison building and guard posts visible.

Another detailed view of the fence. The fence's path is clear as are the guard posts and foot patrol path.

Based upon the available imagery, there are at least 63.2 km of clearly identifiable fencing with a further 22.9 km of rows of guard posts that may or may not also be connected by fencing. The guard posts are typically spaced every 75-100 meters. With 86.1 km of fenced and unfenced guard post lines, that means that roughly 1,000 guard posts (between 861 and 1,148) have been constructed around the city. 

Locations of garrison (barracks) buildings.

Just like with the country's border fence, these posts are supported by a network of at least 28 purpose-built garrisons (barracks) - six of which were actively under construction in June 2022. There are several other sites that I believe are now being used as garrisons, but they were previously used for other purposes. I haven't included them on the map because of a level of uncertainty. 

Locations of identified checkpoints, both pre-existing ones and newly constructed.

The fence system is also interconnected with the capital's checkpoint network and consists of 35 checkpoints of various types. Of those, twenty were built since 2020 and several of the preexisting sites have had visible upgrades. 

Explanation of gaps in the fence system. "Image gaps" refers to a lack of more recent imagery available on Google Earth.

There are parts of the terrain around Pyongyang where I have not been able to identify any new fencing. However, some of these areas are already "protected" by existing fences from factories or agricultural places, and those fences have been incorporated into the new system. Additionally, large sections of eastern Pyongyang are afforded security by the wide Taedong River (which serves a natural physical barrier), and northern sections of the city are mountainous and filled with military bases - effectively creating large swathes of inherently restricted territory. 


Thus, Pyongyang now sits at the center of a multilayered security network; a city that already required permits to visit, can now shut itself off from the rest of the country at-will. This doesn't only include restricting traffic from the main roads (an ability that has always existed), but even prevents Pyongyang farmers from coming too close to the city core by merely crossing a field on foot. 

The Central Quarantine Command oversees Pyongyang's anti-pandemic measures, instituting lockdowns, and enforcing the various government orders relating to the pandemic. However, whether or not this capital fence system is subordinate to the CQD, is part of the capital police force, or is part of a multi-agency force isn't yet known. 

I reached out to several North Korea experts including those with access to information from within the country, and only hints of information about this fence have begun to make it to outside researchers - and there had been no independent verification of it until now. It seems that North Korean authorities have been keen on keeping it a secret. 

However, as defector and former Pyongyang resident Hyun Seung Lee told me, it is "highly possible [that such a fence was constructed] since the country's top priority is Kim Jong Un's health. If anything COVID-19 related happened inside North Korea, none of the authorities will be free from responsibilities to protect the leader."

Considering the large number of checkpoints that already restricted access to Pyongyang, it may seem redundant to build dozens of kilometers of fences and a thousand guard posts to further cut off the city. Yet, North Korea not only built over 15,000 additional guard posts to seal off their northern border they also built fences all along the coastline. And so, North Korea seems to fight viruses with the same tactics as they would an invading army - block the enemy from being able to move. In this case, the general population plays the role of "enemy".

Although North Korea appears to be preparing to reopen its borders, it's clear that they have invested in the physical infrastructure needed to reenter lockdown at any time, and to continue to further restrict human movement within the country. This latest discovery underscores the paranoid nature of the state and demonstrates how Kim Jong Un would rather resort to force (sealing off the capital and placing thousands of guards on patrol) than take helpful steps like granting general access to vaccines or allowing adequate humanitarian aid into the country. 


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Jonathan J, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Nate Odenkirk, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 9/15/2023

Sunday, November 20, 2022

Possible Detention Centers Built Across Country

Known locations of new facilities.

Normally I don't like to write posts about unidentified things. Plenty of speculation exists about what goes on in North Korea as it is, and I keep this page updated with small finds that I am curious about. But I am very interested in discovering the point behind what is a nationwide project, not simply a single site. So I want to have the space to describe what I've found in as much detail as I can, offer a few ideas, and reach out to the public for any additional information that may exist.

Earlier this year I came across a site in Hyesan that looked a lot like a newly constructed prison. Although small, it had a wall, an outer perimeter fence, and guard posts. I couldn't find any news stories about new prisons being constructed and I didn't know of any other examples, so I wrote a small write-up in the AccessDPRK Monthly Digest which is sent out to Patreon supporters as an "interesting find".

Months later I found another similar facility and then another. Currently, I have 34 located.

New facility in Hyesan.

This site in Hyesan (41.385223° 128.199295°) was the first one I found and was constructed in 2021 but it's not the oldest. There are three others that were built in 2019. However, the rest were all built between 2020 and 2022.

They all share a few similar characteristics. They each have one (typically) small central building, that building is surrounded by a wall, and that wall is then surrounded by one to two layers of fence. There is also a guarded entrance into the fenced area, and there's at least one guard tower somewhere in or around the complex.

Sixteen of the thirty-four sites are built around previously existing buildings that had an unknown original purpose; although, they are associated with nearby agricultural activities. Additionally, most sites are located along the outskirts of the town they're in. 

Nearly all of the sites consist of one or two small buildings within the walled section, but the largest is located in Unsan (40.112068° 125.922696°) which is a whole complex of previously existing buildings that have a combined footprint of approximately 1,400 sq. meters. The smallest ones take up a mere 90 sq. m. while most fall between 130 and 200 sq. m.

The compound in Chongnam. It was constructed in a field in 2020/2021.

As well secured as these sites are, most are basically the same size as a modern middle-class house you might find in Denmark or Japan, with the larger sites being of similar size to a house in the United States. With that in mind, their size makes the idea of them being jails less probable. Particularly as every county in North Korea already has detention centers as part of Ministry of Social Security and Ministry of State Security facilities.

Standalone provincial prisons and the more well-known prison camps are also substantially larger than these sites. And, so far, most major cities lack these new facilities while several small towns have them, adding to the mystery.

If they're not jails, another option is that they're quarantine facilities for those who test positive for COVID-19.

North Korea has created a number of quarantine facilities throughout the country over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic as towns and regions would be placed under lockdown. These sites typically take the form of special hospital wards or commandeering existing facilities and re-tasking them for the purpose of medical isolation. 

Under the authority of the State Emergency Anti-Epidemic Command, the Ministry of State Security and the Military Security Command have been given charge of enforcing the government’s anti-pandemic policies and ensuring quarantine measures are followed. Quarantine in the country has taken the form of keeping individuals quarantined at home, establishing mobile response units, and creating stand-alone facilities that can take in quarantined individuals and provide them with basic medical support.

Despite two years of state denial that the illness was in the country, numerous reports have been noted of “fevers” striking one city or another throughout the pandemic. However, all of that changed in May 2022 when the government officially acknowledged that there were COVID-19 cases in the country and further admitted to millions of other cases of a rapidly spreading “fever”.

Regardless of Pyongyang’s new willingness to discuss the presence of disease among the population, many experts believe that COVID-19 has existed in North Korea almost as soon as the virus began to spread out of China, and lockdowns have been noted throughout the country including in Pyongyang, Kaesong, and, of course, Hyesan.

According to DailyNK, “Chapter 2 of Article 16 of the emergency quarantine law calls on central health authorities, local people’s committees and other relevant bodies to create quarantine facilities “in keeping with quarantine and containment demands” to separate and isolate infectious disease patients, suspected cases and contacts.”

And in 2022 it was reported that the government was going to start building permanent sites to isolate and treat patients; whereas many of the previous locations were temporary and only lasted for as long as a local outbreak did. But as "fevers" have been spreading sporadically since the very beginning of the pandemic, it's likely that the government had already embarked on constructing purpose-built quarantine facilities regardless of their public admissions. 

As North Korea's healthcare system is broken and Kim Jong Un has refused to import vaccines, the country's only real line of defense is to isolate people.

So, could these be quarantine centers? The fact that nearly all of them have been built after the pandemic began and are often positioned outside of a town's urban area would support this notion. But they are still quite small and would ideally need to include a patient ward, room(s) for administration and offices, a supply room, and bathroom facilities.

If the government feels COVID is an existential threat to the country, every effort should be expended to ensure proper treatment and safety. One might look at the emergency hospitals constructed in Liberia during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak or pop-up centers built in the rest of the world during the early stages of COVID.

The main Ebola treatment center in Monrovia, Liberia during the 2014-2016 outbreak.

These small, single-building compounds, while secure, do not seem like the best facilities to serve as medical sites. Nonetheless, it's hard to come up with alternate explanations for their construction.


Other possibilities are that they're military storage sites (such as for ammunition), grain facilities, or perhaps even barracks to house mobilized workers doing local construction.

I don't think they're any of those three things. 

These sites are not located within military bases, and they lack the protective earthen berms used to contain explosions in the event of an accident that are common to such storage sites. 

The design of grain facilities is fairly well understood, and they are considerably larger as well. Although they do have perimeter walls, they do not have a second layer of fencing and they are comprised of multiple buildings. The AccessDPRK 2021 Map has around 900 of these sites located.

A typical grain storage/drying and distribution facility. Located at 38.320893° 126.139527°.

Lastly, the I am not sure why a mobilized labor unit would need to be housed behind fences. Temporary worker's housing and workshops are a regular feature of construction sites, and they lack defined boundaries (like fences or walls). And even though mass labor may not be entirely voluntary, the camps are hardly treated as dangerous places in need of tight security. Additionally, I haven't noticed adjacent construction work at any of the identified locations. 


I have reached out to several individuals and organizations involved in human rights and imagery analysis for comment and almost no one even knew of their existence, let alone what they were for. So the main purpose of this article is to call attention these sites and to describe them as best as I can.

I still believe that they are some kind of detention center. Perhaps to quarantine positive COVID cases, perhaps as part of a larger rejuvenation of the country's penal system, or perhaps for something else. Unfortunately, in this case, it's difficult to come to a confident conclusion based on satellite images alone. Once more concrete information comes to light, I will update the article accordingly. 


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 11/19/2022

Thursday, February 24, 2022

Kim Jong-un's First Decade in Power - The Next Decade

Kim Jong-un with his wife, leading DPRK officials up Mt. Paektu in 2019. Image source: KCNA.

 

Introduction

Throughout this series, I have tried to draw from numerous sources to provide an accurate accounting of the first decade of Kim Jong-un’s rule and to limit the number of my own opinion-based comments. For this final article, opinion is about all that anyone could offer. Informed opinion, but opinion and supposition, nonetheless.

People have offered predictions about North Korea since its inception. That there was no way it could survive the Korean War. That Kim Il-sung would end the nuclear program. That Kim Jong-il would falter in the face of famine and the whole system would collapse. That Kim Jong-un couldn’t handle power at such a young age or that war is inevitable.

Those predictions were all wrong. At the same time, plenty of other predictions have been right. That the government would survive the famine because it didn’t care about cutting less desirable citizens off from food. That the country would achieve nuclear miniaturization. That it wouldn’t stop illicit trade activities regardless of the United Nations and especially regardless of the United States.

So, this ‘look to the future’ opinion piece is just as likely to be wrong and to be right and to have areas of grey as the future unfolds and becomes the present. With that caveat, I will attempt to look at the trends of the last decade, the changes, and what’s stayed the same from Kim to Kim to Kim to inform my own views of what the next decade of Kim Jong-un’s rule may look like.

 

COVID and the Economy

The most pressing issue that Kim Jong-un will have to resolve is that of economic contraction due to his lockdown of the country over COVID-19 fears. After two years of very limited trade and internal quarantine measures, the economy is suffering more than it has at any other point during his rule and the food situation, in particular, has reached a critical point.

Although illicit activities have continued unabated, bringing in hundreds of millions each year, there is little indication that those funds are being used to prop up the economy; rather, they are most likely being used to maintain Kim’s lifestyle, provide gifts to the elites to keep their loyalty, and to continue the country’s military buildup.

As such, legal trade must resume before a crisis becomes inescapable, leading to future disease outbreaks (such as from tuberculosis), a limited famine, or even popular unrest. Kim will also have to consider finally allowing vaccines into the country as COVID-19 stops being a pandemic and transitions to an endemic global illness that will be around for years.

Leaving no opportunity behind, the COVID lockdown actually provides Kim the opportunity to gain greater control over the broader economy and over the economic activities of the people as the ‘border blockade’ has made it even more difficult for unapproved cross-border trading to continue. This places the state in a better position to control and monitor what goods come into the country, and it has set up at least two decontamination centers to help facilitate the resumption of trade: one in Sinuiju and one at the Port of Nampo.

A test run at the Sinuiju center recently took place on January 17, 2022, when a train entered North Korea from China after a two-year border shutdown resulted in an 80% drop in trade with the country. The outcome of the train visit and how well the government thinks the Sinuiju facility handled the operation may allow for a slow resumption of trade in the near future.

One twist in North Korea’s economic story has been how Kim, in the early years, allowed limited reform and the markets to continue to grow, but under COVID he has reverted back to more anti-market policies, desperately trying to reign in free market activities and strengthen the state’s central control over the economy. How this struggle against marketization will play out is anyone’s guess, but one complication that Kim is currently having to deal with and will continue to need to contain in future years is the “tyranny of growing expectations”.

As people become accustomed to a certain living standard, they begin to expect more from their government and begin to expect that life in the future will be better than what they have today. In a growing globalized world, this works itself out through expanding free markets and liberalized governments. But in North Korea and other closed states in the past, it can turn into a major threat to the regime as the government cannot compete with the gains made by marketization, and as the people realize that the outside world is much wealthier and freer than what they have at home.

Kim Jong-un made improving living standards and access to consumer goods a key pillar of his rule since the beginning. Promising no more ‘belt tightening’ in 2012, the government is today telling people that they should expect food shortages until at least 2025. After the moderate but measurable rise in living standards of the last 10-15 years, if the government isn’t able to maintain upward growth, then the popular pressure of growing expectations can serve to destabilize the regime.

Should this meld with other pressures against the current system, an inescapable domino effect may occur in the future, leading to the end of the state. This has been one of the biggest threats to the Kim’s and it is something they have managed to avoid thus far, but no one knows where the ultimate tipping point lies.

Regardless of economic reforms or further ossification, one thing, of course, that continued throughout the pandemic and will continue well into the future is North Korea’s illicit activities. Whether it’s selling counterfeit goods, money laundering and theft, or busting sanctions with oil, fish, luxury goods, and other commodities, the state will keep relying on these ill-gotten millions each year to try to stabilize the system and keep the elites in lockstep with Kim Jong-un.

 

Weapon Development

Missile development is the next most important issue as Kim Jong-un works toward realizing his “wish list” as laid out in his speech to the 8th WPK Congress in January 2021. This list includes everything from developing improved ICBMs to hypersonic glide vehicles to tactical nuclear bombs and other weapon systems.

Kim Jong-un spent much of 2021 testing multiple weapons and showed off a wide range of equipment (some known, some new) during the “Self Defense 2021” exhibition. He also began 2022 with a series of seven missile launches that included its longest-range missile test since 2017.

Since the failed summits, North Korea has embarked on a series of technology demonstrators like the hypersonic glide vehicles (showing off two different designs) and rail-based missile launches. Having declared the country’s nuclear deterrent complete, Kim is going to need to continually develop new delivery methods and to improve his nuclear arsenal’s survivability, as it currently relies on a limited number of large, slow-moving TELs that cannot be easily replaced. This helps to explain the proliferation of weapon designs as well as radar and improved air defense systems.

I believe that future nuclear tests are unlikely, but they can’t be ruled out as Punggye-ri still has two functional tunnels. And after North Korea implied that the self-imposed moratorium on testing would no longer be adhered to, it does place future tests on the table.

 

In terms of sanctions, I think that it is unarguable that they have been an abject failure. Upwards of two hundred thousand citizens are still locked in prison camps, the country has tested nuclear weapons and created miniaturized warheads, North Korea has missiles that can reach the United States, and the Kim family is still firmly in control. However, one reason why sanctions have failed is that the enforcement of those international sanctions is rooted in each individual UN member state’s own interpretations of the sanctions and their own willingness to enforce them.

China has been integral to North Korea’s ability to skirt sanctions and carry out illegal activities. And while China occasionally gets tired of Pyongyang’s behavior and temporarily gets stricter with enforcement, the existence of North Korea is within their own national self-interest. This means that China will never do anything that might directly cause the collapse of the current government short of North Korea declaring war or causing significant damage to China itself.

Therefore, absent greater international pressure on China to plug the enforcement leaks and loopholes, China will continue to be North Korea’s lifeline and Kim Jong-un will continue using this to his advantage.

Until China becomes willing to strictly enforce sanctions or until either the United States or South Korea becomes willing to cave on major issues (all unlikely scenarios), North Korea is going to keep testing weapons. The goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) is now completely unrealistic unless the United States is willing to go to war, which it hasn’t been despite the murder of multiple US military personnel and the assassination of multiple South Korean officials over the decades.

In my view, the only viable option is that of arms control, limiting the number of warheads and their yields, limiting the range of missiles, and limiting the numbers of launchers North Korea can have in exchange for substantial sanctions relief.  However, the human rights situation complicates matters as does Pyongyang’s history of ignoring agreements.

At least in the near term, we should certainly engage in talks but the longer-term position is likely to be merely “wait and see,” as neither side seems willing or capable of making the difficult decisions or want to risk losing face, and as North Korea hasn’t been patient enough for slower confidence-building measures prior to more substantial agreements.

 

Human Rights

Domestically, human rights abuses will assuredly continue. Kim Jong-un has shown little inclination to degrade the state’s system of prison camps and he has ramped up internal surveillance to levels not seen since Kim Il-sung.

Although Camp 22 was closed under his watch in 2012, many of the prisoners were merely transferred to other sites, and others are alleged to have been allowed to starve to death to enable the camp’s closure.

In contrast, prisons in Pokchong-ni, Kangdong, Chidong-ri, Yongdam, Nongpo, Chongjin, Hwasong, Pukchang, and others have all seen new construction or renovations to their facilities. Additionally, public executions outside of the prisons, within regular towns and villages, have reportedly not ended and are now carried out for things like watching certain foreign media.

Since coming to power, Kim Jong-un has directed the Ministry of Social Security, Ministry of State Security, the People’s Border Guards, and other relevant agencies to crackdown on defections and unapproved cross-border economic activity. In 2011, 2,706 defectors made it to South Korea. By 2018, only 1,137 defectors were able to make it to the South. However, COVID-19 gave Kim a great opportunity to ramp up the repression of freedom of movement.

Hundreds of new border guard huts and hundreds of kilometers of new border fencing have been erected during the pandemic. While anti-defection measures had been begun prior to COVID, nearly the entire northern border ended up with a double row of electrified fencing since the beginning of the pandemic. Although the ‘border blockade’ is ostensibly to prevent the spread of the virus from Chinese persons and goods illegally crossing the border, it has served to nearly end defections.

In 2021 a mere 63 defectors made it to South Korea.

 

Freedom of expression and thought have also come under greater assault, especially in the last few years, as Kim has solidified his rule and now looks forward to being the only Kim in charge for another generation or two, in the model of his grandfather.

There is no greater threat to a closed society than information and no greater threat to an authoritarian system than individuality. It is said that blue jeans helped bring down communism. This wasn’t because jeans come with guns or brings down economies, but because they became a symbol of capitalism and individuality. While the saying is overly simplistic, that basic article of clothing became subversive and was a reminder that the free world and its values were thriving, while breadlines and secret police were all communism had to offer.

Similarly, North Korea has relied upon the group subsuming the individual. The masses, as a unified whole, are what the North Korean government and society are built upon. The individual only exists as an entity for so long as they give themselves over the larger group and never turn their back on socialism by highlighting their individuality or demanding to be treated as a human being equal to any other.

This feature of all authoritarian regimes, left and right, is relied on to keep the masses in line and curtail any risk of nonconforming thoughts and actions. It is this feature that Kim Il-sung wielded to such a great effect that for a stretch of thirty years, almost no known public demonstrations or other protests occurred.

And after the breakdown of the information cordon in the 1990s, it is this feature that Kim Jong-un must learn to wield again, or else he will have to accept that permanent cracks in the system exist and may one day bring the entire system crashing down.

To this end, more and more effort is being expended on hunting down purveyors of smuggled media material, cell phone tracking and blocking technology has been installed along the entire Sino-DPRK border, and the government has taken greater steps to punish officials and police who turn a blind eye toward or take bribes to overlook illegal activity. Even attacks on everything from non-traditional hairstyles to using foreign slang have been couched in terms of national salvation – of restoring a true socialist community by going after impure, reactionary elements.

Kim Jong-un has even leveraged South Korea’s desires for diplomatic normalization to get the South Korean government to pass laws violating human rights within the ROK merely to appease him. But all that has done is hurt the South’s own legitimacy and standing as a democratic beacon in the region while enabling Kim Jong-un to limit the flow of outside information and culture into the country.

In my view, it’s hard to see a time when this rise in human rights abuses will end so long as the invisible yet existential threat of COVID exists. Of course, the government has never needed a real threat to its existence to lash out at foreign elements within the self-proclaimed racially and culturally pure North Korean community, but COVID happens to be a very real threat and provides an excellent opportunity for Kim to maintain his veer toward greater authoritarianism.

 

Future of Foreign Relations

Between assassinations, further missile and nuclear tests, and a never-ending list of illicit activities, North Korea has become more and more isolated under Kim Jong-un. The government’s anti-pandemic measures have only exacerbated this with the removal of diplomatic and foreign aid staff from the country. But North Korea has still tried to strengthen ties with China and Russia, as well as Eastern European and African countries through the exploitation of DPRK citizens as foreign labor and, occasionally, construction project leaders.

The long and turbid history of North Korea’s interactions with the world has created an unstable environment with little ingrained goodwill or trust among all parties. Its history with the United States has been particularly fraught.

The Clinton administration thought it had a workable deal in the development of the Agreed Framework, but the death of Kim Il-sung and subsequent famine radically altered the world Kim Jong-il was forced to face, and the Bush administration posed a much different threat in Kim Jong-il’s view after North Korea was labeled as part of the Axis of Evil and with the eventual invasion of Iraq. Under Obama, ‘strategic patience’ only allowed Kim Jong-il and eventually Kim Jong-un to continue their military buildup and created no real progress on the diplomatic front. With President Trump, ‘maximum pressure’ was about as unserious a campaign as one could think of. Despite the horrifying bluster with both sides threatening the annihilation of the other, maximum pressure was more like moderate suggestions, particularly as international efforts continued to hinge on China’s willingness (or lack thereof) to enforce the will of the United Nations.

After a year of a new administration under Biden, it has become obvious that the United States lacks the bandwidth to deal with Kim Jong-un. In the face of continual missile tests, failed summits, and mounting geopolitical problems elsewhere, Americans and the international community itself seem to be going numb to Pyongyang.

Launches no longer draw the media attention they once did and South Korea’s official announcements regarding activity at various nuclear facilities have basically become exact copies of each other, with only the dates changed.

In such an apathetic environment, it’s difficult to see how any progress can be made. And as Russia and China continue to serve as lifelines in the face of international will, dealing with Pyongyang can never simply be a bilateral proposition.

Of course, the only reason anyone even cares about North Korea is because North Korea made itself a problem. It has commanded the world’s attention for generations through threats and belligerent actions. Receding into the background is not the Kim way.

Kim Jong-un will eventually do something that catches the world’s eye once again, and we can only hope that the international community is willing to address whatever that is. Ignoring Pyongyang only emboldens the regime. And while there may be no good options currently and although there have been many failures over the years, discussion and diplomacy are still the best policy – even in the absence of grand agreements or apocalyptic threats. 

 

Tomorrow’s Personality Cult

The half-life of the North Korean cult of personality is roughly the reign of one Kim. During Kim Il-sung’s rule over the country, he was a genuinely beloved and respected leader. The cult under Kim Jong-il fell precipitously as upwards of 1 million North Koreans died under his watch, but the state’s system of indoctrination from birth and its security apparatus insured that the cult survived. Under Kim Jong-un, the cult has weakened further, with many young people reportedly not caring about the great ‘Paektu Bloodline’ or his alleged brilliance.

To counter this, Kim has taken multiple steps to shore up the cult, and, assuming he survives another ten years, these steps can be expected to continue as the cult forms one of the ideological pillars for the state’s very existence and must be maintained.

During his first years, Kim tried to solidify his rule by drawing direct comparisons between himself and Kim Il-sung. His appearance, dress, more personable qualities, and even riding around on white horses, all reminded the people that he was not just another leader but was the rightful heir to Kim Il-sung.

Even his ability to complete the country’s nuclear program and bring a United States president to cross the DMZ all underscored the divine blood flowing in his veins. Still, younger generations have been far more concerned with economic betterment and cultural exchanges than they have been with ridged ideologies. And this poses a long-term threat to the government.

Kim has taken the opportunities provided by COVID-19 to try to reestablish a sense of national unity through a shared crisis, and in doing so, has double-downed on the development of his own personality cult. To do this, he has turned the sacrifice of personal liberties into an expression of true patriotism, for only the Kim family, Juche, and the Monolithic Ideological System can save the country.

As part of this, he has attacked foreign cultural influences, particularly that of South Korean music and other entertainment, with a key focus on rooting out these influences from among the nation’s youth. A so-called “thought law” was implemented in 2021 that goes after those using South Korean slang, efforts have been redoubled to punish those watching foreign media, with executions in store for those accused of distributing the material, and even personal fashion choices have been attacked as being anti-socialist and part of the corrupting influence of capitalism.

With the information cordon that so dramatically cracked under Kim Jong-il being reestablished and cross-border travel becoming ever more difficult, Kim Jong-un is working toward rebuilding the ‘hermit kingdom’ of his grandfather, with as many vestiges of western influences wiped out as possible. The end results being a population less susceptible to revolution, greater government control over the people’s daily lives, less market activity, and it has prolonged the longevity of the Kim family’s rule over the country.

 

Succession & Future of Government

With questions about Kim Jong-un’s health dogging his entire reign, and the fact it is known that he has experienced medical emergencies, the matter of succession is more pressing than it otherwise would be for a ruler still in his thirties.

Kim Jong-un has made a series of structural changes to the rules of the WPK that could, theoretically, allow for the future succession of a non-Kim family member. He has also placed his sister, Kim Yo-jong, in positions of moderate official power while giving her substantial practical authority. She appears to be the most trusted person in his orbit and can routinely be seen following behind her brother taking notes and keeping meetings/events on track. Additionally, she has been given more leeway to voice her own views than anyone since Kim Jong-il was still being groomed by Kim Il-sung.

Given that Kim doesn’t have any adult children, killed his half-brother, and his other brother has largely been kept in the background, this points to Kim Yo-jong being the de facto successor in the event of an emergency.

Once Kim’s own children come of age, this is likely to change but for the time being, Yo-jong can be considered to be the second most important person in the country. While she lacks the needed official Party and military titles to take over, what’s important is Kim Jong-un’s faith in her and the fact that she has been able to build her own support base within the Party and even the military.

 

Kim Jong-un will also continue to reform the government and Party to fit the particular needs of his era. Loosening agricultural controls to improve productivity, seeking greater government revenue via market fees/taxes, the further militarization of the civilian police force, and the ongoing shift away from the Songun Policy have all made their mark.

What’s more, is as Kim has replaced older Party apparatchiks and military officers, he has opened up the opportunity to rearrange the inner workings of both organizations to cut down on corruption (which drains money and authority away from the central government), introduce and enforce his own ideological views, and he can gradually set up frameworks to deal with major crises of leadership such as if he became incapacitated or died, as well as to develop a more robust command and control system regarding nuclear weapons.

Trying to understand the decision-making process and the “why’s” within North Korea is often a form of reading tea leaves, but it is my suspicion that the cumulative effect of Kim’s efforts on the structure of the WPK and the military will lead to organizations that, in the end, will be markedly more modern and forward-looking, creating a more viable system for the future.

 

Final Thoughts

Contrary to predictions of the Kim regime collapsing or that Kim Jong-un would be a Western-minded reformer, as Pratik Jakhar has noted, his rule has been “remarkably resilient and consistent. Kim Jong Un has stayed within the confines of the framework established by his grandfather Kim Il Sung and inherited from his father Kim Jong Il. In the process, he has preserved state oppression, class divisions, purges, military adventurism, economic control and mandated glorification of the Kim family.”

Jakhar’s view sums up the last ten years and I believe it is prescience for the next ten years as well.

Throughout this biographical series, we have seen that although Kim has initiated a number of changes, they have been on the periphery and still uphold the core values of the regime. Massive construction projects and megafarms have always been part of Pyongyang’s agenda. The roots of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs date to soon after the Korean War and have melded into the national psyche, making their development an integral part of the state’s legitimacy. And there has been no decline in rampant human rights abuses nor has there been a move away from the personality cult.

External forces always elicit responses and policy changes to fit the moment, but they have followed tried and true formulas that have kept North Korea going for 77 years. Meaningful structural changes to the way things are done are never done in haste. What drift there has been over the years since the early days of Kim Il-sung has largely been incremental, with Party hagiographers and archivists taking care to erase any public trace of old policies that are no longer supported by the current ideological flavor.

Over the next decade, Kim Jong-un will undoubtedly face new challenges and will continue to face growing threats from within the country such as information sharing and marketization. But if the last ten years have taught us anything, it’s that he can be relied upon to employ terror tactics within and without, and that he is only open to reform so long as that reform can help ensure the state’s longevity and his premier position within it.

And until China decides to step up its enforcement of international sanctions, there is little reason to believe that things like missile tests, illicit trade, financial crimes, and human labor trafficking won’t continue.

 

~ ~ ~ ~

 

I have scheduled this project to run through to the end of the year, with a new article coming out roughly every 10 days or so. If you would like to support the project and help me with research costs, please consider supporting AccessDPRK on Patreon. Those supporters donating $15 or more each month will be entitled to a final PDF version of all the articles together that will also have additional information included once the series is finished. They will also receive a Google Earth map related to the events in the series, and can get access to the underlying data behind the supplemental reports.

Supporters at other levels will be sent each new article a day before it’s published and will also receive a mention as seen below.

 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, and Russ Johnson.

--Jacob Bogle, 2/23/2022

Tuesday, January 18, 2022

Kim Jong-un's First Decade in Power - Health of the Nation

Temperature screening in Pyongyang. Image: KCNA, March 4, 2020.

 

Introduction

While the health of a nation’s leader can have an outsized role on a country, more important to a nation’s strength and wellbeing is the health of the general population. It is from this population that government officials, soldiers, technicians, and farmers are drawn, and if the health of the people is poor, it will be reflected up and down economic, government, and military institutions.

For North Korea, the general state of the healthcare system and the presence of poor health in large segments of society has affected a poorer educational performance, led to higher rates of work-related disability, and has even influenced national security as the military has had to lower recruitment criteria in a reflection of the impacts of long-term malnourishment.

Despite some marginal attempts by Kim Jong-un at improving healthcare (such as the construction of the Pyongyang General Hospital and modernizing the Myohyangsan Medical Equipment Factory) and attempts to improve the food supply, illnesses like tuberculosis still rage through the country and over 42% of the population suffers from undernourishment.

Compounding the problems associated with limited healthcare, food production, and endemic disease has been the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic and the regime’s response to it. Closing the border has all but ended foreign trade, expelling foreign aid workers has prevented medical and food aid from being distributed, and Kim Jong-un has rejected offers by the international community to provide millions of COVID vaccine doses.

As such, while Kim Jong-un can boast some legitimate accomplishments in other sectors, the efforts to better the health of the people must be seen as a failure.

 

Health of the Nation

The South Hamgyong Provincial Hospital after the 2021 renovation. Image source: KCNA, May 2021.

 

The State shall protect the people’s lives and improve the working people’s health by consolidating and developing the system of universal free medical service and improving the district doctor system and the system of preventative medicine.” - Article 56 of the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea’s constitution, 2016 version. Emphasis added.

  

   On paper, one might suspect that North Korea has a fairly robust healthcare system. With 133 provincial-level hospitals, 1,608 county-level hospitals, and 6,233 primary care clinics, there are almost 37 doctors per 10,000 people: a ratio on par with Australia. However, despite impressive gains in life expectancy and the proliferation of medical clinics into small villages around the country during the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea currently has some of the worst healthcare infrastructure in the world.

Most clinics are capable of diagnosing basic diseases and setting broken bones, but everything from sterile needles to antibiotics and anesthesia is in short supply. In Kim Jong-un’s North Korea, there still remains no national emergency number (like 119 in South Korea or 911 in the U.S.) and patients must arrange transportation directly with their local hospital. As there are not enough ambulances in the country, private taxis may be required or even asking for transport on a passing tractor.

Despite the constitution guaranteeing free healthcare, people are often required to pay for supplies and medicine prior to receiving any care (including emergency care), and there have been reports of patients needing to provide their own blankets as well as meals for the nursing staff and doctors.

Hospitals capable of providing more complicated services are limited to Pyongyang and provincial capitals, but electricity shortages and shortages of everything from IV bags to modern medical beds hamper even these favored institutions.

The constitution’s guarantee of preventative medicine has likewise gone unfilled under the rule of Kim Jong-un.

The rate of smoking among North Korean men has indeed fallen from 59% in 2008 to 46.1% in 2019 according to the World Health Organization, but smoking rates remain above the global average of 36.7%.

An estimated 71,300 North Korean die each year from smoking-related causes. These represent 31% of the total deaths in the country. Although the rate of smoking has gone down, deaths caused by tobacco use are compounded due to a lack of early detection and available treatment options.

To tackle this problem, all three Kim’s have instituted various anti-smoking initiatives, but they have only met with moderate success. Under Kim Jong-un, such initiatives have been seen in 2016 and 2020 which included bans on smoking in certain public buildings.

However, Kim Jong-un continues to smoke in public, undermining efforts to curb smoking among the people.

 

   Tuberculosis isn’t a self-inflicted disease the way lung cancer can be, but it is still an illness that has been controlled in many parts of the world thanks to antibiotics and routine screenings (86% of all new cases can be found in just 30 countries). North Korea has the highest rate of TB among its neighboring countries, and it has been reliant on international aid to keep its spread in check. However, the regime hasn’t always been fully cooperative, and international sanctions have hampered efforts as well.

But while these joint efforts between Pyongyang and NGOs had produced consistent positive results in the decline of TB deaths since 2000, that trend began to reverse in 2016. North Korea’s expulsion of foreign aid workers and border closures in response to COVID-19 also means that the country has been left for over a year with almost no assistance fighting this highly contagious disease.

By December 2020, experts and aid workers who had worked in combating TB in North Korea warned that North Korea would soon run out of the life-saving drug supplies it had acquired in the run-up to the country’s lockdown. One U.S.-based humanitarian official said, "Every untreated TB patient could infect 10 to 15 other people. We could be looking at a much bigger epidemic [in North Korea]”.

Organizations were able to send 918,000 doses of the Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccine, but the usage rate is over 300,000 doses a year as every newborn is given it. This left North Korea with only a three years’ supply in the best of circumstances.

A further shipment of TB-related treatments was stuck in a Chinese port for months as North Korea worked through their extreme quarantine measures (which extends to both people and products). Lapsed TB treatment plays a role in the development of antibiotic-resistant strains. These ‘super strains’ already account for 21% of new TB cases in North Korea and the country has run out of the drugs needed to fight them.

If Kim Jong-un doesn’t end the lockdowns soon, whatever progress had been made in fighting TB (and drug-resistant TB in particular) could largely be undone. With an estimated 135,000 people currently infected, without treatment, each of those individuals could infect a further 10 to 15 people as stated above.

It must also be said that in the case of North Korea, of five main risk factors, over 65% of TB cases are attributable to undernourishment according to the WHO “Global Tuberculosis Report 2020”; a problem that has only increased due to the extreme nature of the country’s lockdowns.

 

   In terms of being able to provide services and access, North Korea’s healthcare system is deficient in multiple areas.

According to the article “Surgical Diseases in North Korea: An Overview of North Korean Medical Journals” published in the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health in 2020, North Korea’s healthcare infrastructure seems to be unable to provide complex surgical procedures like organ transplants.

Based on a review of medical literature from hundreds of DPRK-specific reports, the 2019 study “Systematic review of evidence on public health in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” found that cancer screenings appear lacking, particularly for cervical and breast cancers. While both rural and urban women are aware of diseases like cervical cancer, only 6% of women reported having a cervical cytology smear test and 62% of rural women said that travel distances were a barrier to getting screened.

It is this lack of access and loss of faith in the medical system (due to distance, medical costs, and shortages of medicine) that leads many patients to forego visiting hospitals and instead seek medications on the black market and herbal/folk remedies for self-treatment for a wide range of illnesses. 

Unfortunately, this has helped to fuel drug addiction in the country as upwards of 61% of patients end up buying opioids on the black market. Without adequate monitoring, both addiction and physical dependence can quickly develop, leading to a host of other problems.

 

   Attempts to limit or ban drug abuse and alcoholism have occurred for decades. Although drug addiction is not as widespread as some suggest, the lack of proper medicine and treatment options requires that people seek help elsewhere. The state doesn’t help matters by being behind the manufacture of drugs like methamphetamine and heroin. In fact, for a time in the 1990s, most of the methamphetamine being abused in northern China came from North Korea.

Despite crackdowns on domestic drug use, abuses of amphetamines and opioid narcotics remain more than a passing fad among the country’s youth. Occasionally reaching epidemic proportions within the northern provinces of the country, the drugs aren’t merely being used for people to get high, but are used to cope with never-ending demands for labor, long working hours, physical exhaustion, and to try to address health problems like chronic pain from injury, disability, and even end-stage cancers.

As briefly mentioned above, compounding the spread of drug use is also its state-sponsored manufacture. With sanctions cutting into the regime’s finances and China taking a harsher view toward drug sellers, domestic drug sellers and criminal gangs have had to find local buyers for their highly potent drugs.

No proper study has been conducted on drug abuse within the country, and the regime often claims it doesn’t even exist, but the reports from defectors are consistent in that drug abuse exists and has reached what could be described as an epidemic at different points since the 1990s, with drug addiction being almost unheard of prior to the famine.

 

   In the field of mental health, competent institutional support for psychiatric problems is almost completely lacking. While some facilities exist, named No. 49 Hospitals, they are described by defectors as little more than prisons for the mentally unwell.

Words like “psychiatrist” and “mental health” are rarely known of by the average person, and the most common way to address mental illnesses of all sorts, it would seem, is for people to either ignore it or try to treat it (as though it were a regular disease) with herbal medicines.

In general, mental health disorders are simply not recognized as such and there is little in the way of research or treatment. Additionally, people can be accused of anti-state activities because they are non-conforming and don’t simply “snap out of it” after being subjected to greater ideological indoctrination. To summarize defector sentiment about the state of mental health in the country, in North Korea, only the mentally sound exist. A sentiment underpinned by the general view that,psychiatric disorders should not exist in an ideal socialist society.”

Undiagnosed and untreated mental illnesses are also associated with higher rates of suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, and can even express itself through violence in a country where domestic abuse and abuse against women outside the home are already common.

 

   Regarding infant and maternal mortality, North Korea has made continued improvements in infant mortality with the mortality rate per 1,000 live births dropping from 55 deaths per 1,000 in 2000 to just 20 in the year 2020. On the other hand, maternal fatalities are on the rise.

According to the “Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” by the UN Human Rights Council and published in 2014, “almost half of the women surveyed did not see a doctor throughout their pregnancy and almost half delivered their babies at home regardless of whether they were from a major city or village. Women also reported that the death of the mother or baby during or after childbirth was not uncommon. Maternal mortality rates almost doubled in the decade from 1993 to 2003, largely due to inadequacies in emergency obstetric care.  The maternal mortality rate in 2010 was estimated to be 81/100,000 live births.”

Maternal mortality has thankfully dropped from 81 deaths down to 66 deaths per 100,000 live births as of 2014, but it is still six times as high as in South Korea, over twice as high as in China, and higher than Cuba’s, another country who has held on to a strict command economy and has been the subject of sanctions for decades.

In particular, the high level of maternal mortality is due to the fact “that many hospitals were unable to provide adequate obstetrical emergency care such as anticonvulsants, antibiotics, and blood products.” Such inadequacies can be seen throughout the whole of North Korea’s medical system.

 

Dental procedures in Pyongyang. Image: Wikimedia Commons by (Stephan), June 9, 2008. CC 3.0.

 

   Although North Korea’s healthcare system has several severe deficiencies, there are areas in which the system is not only competent but has the resources required to provide care such as in basic dental and eye health, and as mentioned above, the system has been able to make strides in infant mortality.

The problem is that these improvements aren’t equally distributed. The most modern equipment and best medicines are first reserved for a handful of elite hospitals that are allowed to work on Kim Jong-un, the rest are distributed throughout Pyongyang. Finally, the main provincial hospitals can expect to receive occasional modernization efforts; although, medicines are often diverted into the black markets or given to the military.

Kim Jong-un has mentioned healthcare in five of his New Year’s speeches, but they were simply token remarks with the exception of 2018. That year he moderately expounded upon the state’s goals saying the state should “apply the people-oriented character in public health service in a thoroughgoing way, and boost the production of medical equipment and appliances and different kinds of medicines.”

Interestingly, “anti-epidemic” work was expressly mentioned in his 2015 speech, but what concrete measures were implemented is hard to say.

Over the last decade, there have been a few large construction projects related to medical infrastructure. One of the earliest was the opening of a new breast cancer research center at the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital in 2012. Although it is reported to be the cutting-edge research and treatment center for breast cancer in the country, as discussed above, travel difficulties remain a major barrier to accessing treatment. Additionally, as entry into Pyongyang itself is restricted, rural women being able to get emergency treatment is even more precarious.

Following that, the nearby Okryu Children's Hospital was opened in 2013. Billed as the best children’s hospital in North Korea, it is where the bulk of pediatric specialists can be found.

North Korea has a high incidence of cataracts and other eye conditions. To combat this, foreign specialists have been allowed to occasionally enter the country and direct mass evaluations of patients and to conduct procedures. However, in 2016 Kim Jong-un order the construction of the Ryugyong General Ophthalmic Hospital. It is the second of two identified eye-specific hospitals in the capital.

In late 2018 Kim Jong-un ordered the modernization of the Myohyangsan Medical Appliances Factory which he found lacking during a visit that October. The factory is responsible for the manufacture of medical beds, dental chairs, and a wide range of other equipment.

A year later in 2019, a medical oxygen plant was constructed. As we have seen in India and elsewhere during the COVID-19 pandemic, having the capacity to domestically produce enough medical oxygen is an essential part of the medical supply chain and is a requirement for the treatment of scores of diseases.

The most recent major medical construction project has been the Pyongyang General Hospital. Slated for completion in October 2020, it sits unopened today. Causes for the delay have been numerous including poorly manufactured electrical insulators and Pyongyang’s inability to import needed equipment. Located in the heart of Pyongyang, right next to the WPK Founding monument, the hospital must be viewed through the lens of being a personal prestige project for Kim Jong-un and the regime; one that is now 15 months overdue.

A kind of long-distance medical system was also introduced in recent years, with a drive to expand the system in 2021, but accessing it still requires patients to travel to their local clinic or hospital, and as personal computers and smartphones are banned for most of the population, patients can’t directly access the system at home. However, according to senior researcher Kim Young Hui of the Korean Peninsula New Economy Center, this remote medicine system has allowed provincial doctors to learn new skills and improve their treatments as they are monitored by doctors at more advanced medical facilities around the country.

 

   Worker health and safety is another key indicator of a government’s commitment to its people, as well as the strength of workers’ rights and labor laws. In a ‘worker’s paradise’ like North Korea, one would expect that labor laws and safety requirements are rigidly adhered to, with tough repercussions for neglectful managers.

However, as there are no independent labor organizations, lobbying or pressure groups, and no independent enforcement agencies, the North Korean state has a monopoly over the entire labor market and set standards as they see fit, and ignore them with impunity.

The constitution guarantees an eight-hour workday and prohibits child labor, but these regulations are routinely ignored. Grade school students, college students, and soldiers alike are all required to work on farms for portions of each year. Teenagers and the adult population are also often called upon to engage in ‘speed campaigns’ of mass, manual labor to build the regime’s latest megaproject. Hundreds of thousands of others are called to duty to perform mass games and serve in military parades.

The labor activities and the training for things like the mass games and parades place a tremendous burden on the body, with injuries being very common and with participants unable to take time off for sickness, to use the bathroom at will, and are rarely provided with enough calories to meet the increased activity level.

A lack of robust occupational safety regulations means that injuries and disabilities in the mining, timber, and construction industries are common. Repetitive stress injuries and the development of chronic conditions within agriculture (which is still largely a feudal activity involving significant human labor) are also routinely found.

All of this means that North Korea has been ranked by the World Health Organization as having the third-worst worker-related death and injury rate in the world.

Based on the “WHO/ILO Joint Estimates of the Work-related Burden of Disease and Injury, 2000–2016” report (published in 2021), North Korea had 76.9 work-related deaths per 100,000 workers in 2016. That's an increase from 56.2 in the year 2000. For comparison, in 2016 South Korea had 20.6 work-related deaths per 100,000 workers, China had 39.7, and the United States had 25.7.

Despite alleged worker protections limiting the workday to eight hours, North Korea also had among the worst rates of “stroke attributable to exposure to long working hours.” Long working hours is defined as more than 55 hours a week. North Korea had 28.1 work-related stroke deaths per 100,000 workers in 2016. South Korea and Japan, both countries well-known for their stressful working conditions and long hours had significantly fewer stroke-death rates at 3.9 and 4.9 respectively.

All of this has a significant impact on the North Korean economy, with the country losing an estimated $1.5 billion each year due to work-related injuries, disabilities, and death.

Although North Korea has enacted numerous domestic laws and multi-year plans stated to protect workers and bolster healthcare, and despite voting in favor of multiple international resolutions calling for improved access to trauma medicine, surgical care, and increasing access to basic medicine in rural areas, the lack of implementation means they currently have not made a measurable impact on people’s lives.

North Korea’s Ministry of Public Health announced in their 2016-2020 plan to modernize 200 local hospitals outside of Pyongyang. Yet, the regime has failed to even complete the flagship project of North Korea’s medical sector, the Pyongyang General Hospital, despite it being slated for completion in October 2020 – let alone hundreds of smaller facilities. And a review of satellite imagery indeed shows only a handful of provincial hospitals that have been upgraded.

Also affecting both civilian workers and those in the military is North Korea’s nuclear program. From mining and milling uranium to producing plutonium and testing the finished bombs, the process is fraught with physical dangers and toxic chemicals. In 2019 I wrote two articles detailing the health consequences of Pyongyang’s nuclear program (Part I, Part II).

In short, pollution leaking into the environment from the mining and milling process affects the drinking and irrigation water for thousands downriver. Former workers of the Pakchon Uranium Concentration Plant and from the Yongbyon Scientific Nuclear Research Center have all reported on a number of diseases consistent with both acute and long-term radiation exposure. And, defectors who lived in the areas downwind of the Punggye-ri Underground Nuclear Test Site have reported spikes in illness following the nuclear tests, describing the illness as the “ghost disease” as it comes and goes (following the tests) and causes its victims to become very weak (also consistent with radiation exposure).

 

An ‘epidemic prevention’ unit took part in the 73rd DPRK Founding Parade on September 9, 2021. Image: KNCA.

 

   The state of health in North Korea is also having substantial impacts on arguably its most important institution, the military.

Around 60% of North Korea’s population are either currently serving in the military, have served, or will end up serving for at least a few years, this makes the health of the military not only a concern to national defense but impacts the broader issue of public health as well.

The health of KPA military personnel received a lot of international attention in 2017 when a soldier defected across the DMZ. He was shot multiple times by fellow DPRK soldiers and required intensive medical care in South Korea. During his treatment, it was revealed that he had large intestinal parasites.

This discovery was not surprising. As many as 47% of North Koreans have helminthiasis, parasitic worm infections. What is surprising is its existence within a soldier who was serving in a relatively elite KPA unit as a frontline soldier of the DMZ.

Food rations in North Korea have long been based on one’s social and political standing, with the military receiving better rations and other supplies as part of the Songun Policy. Thus, one would expect to see fewer infections and other health problems among the military. Yet, this does not seem to be the case ever since the collapse of the economy in the 1990s.

Exposure to these parasites is predominantly due to poor hygiene (only 59% of the population has access to flush toilets), the use of improperly prepared “night soil” (a euphemism for fertilizer made from human waste), and eating food that hasn’t been properly cleaned.

All strata of society, from soldiers to farmers to students, are required to collect night soil and are also required to engage in farming activities. This creates a large level of exposure to parasites and other pathogens.

Chronic parasitic infections are associated with everything from poor cognitive development in children to liver damage. They can also exacerbate malnutrition and make one more susceptible to tuberculosis infections.

Although the levels of malnourishment have fallen since the days of the famine, most soldiers still do not receive their full dietary requirements, leading to soldiers robbing civilians of their food in some instances.

This multigenerational experience of malnutrition has been reflected in the military changing some of its recruitment criteria. Among them, the acceptable shortest height for new recruits was lowered in 2012 to 142 cm (4’ 6”). This change remains today and is not always enforced as the military struggles to maintain recruitment quotas.

Malnourishment and chronic disease can only have one impact – lowering the soldier’s readiness and endurance, regardless of their ideological fervor. Repeated injuries are also common in basic training, while taking part in labor activities, as well as for those who are called up to be part of mass parades. This lack of caring on behalf of the state has been discussed by multiple former KPA defectors, some of whom have taken to YouTube to describe the difficulties associated with military parades.

 

   While the state is ultimately responsible for the general welfare of its people, the inescapable role of international sanctions, levied as a result of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, on the country’s healthcare system cannot be overlooked.

Overbroad sanctions and bureaucracies that move with the speed of pitch have created a complex web of import controls and trade barriers that even make it illegal for North Korea to acquire computer monitors for hospitals and many medicines. Getting specialized equipment into the country is nearly impossible.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, aid organizations have had to seek exemptions from the United Nations to send even the simplest of medical goods. Gloves, masks, and thermometers are all tightly regulated by international sanctions.

Of course, the regime in Pyongyang has not been helpful in this regard, either. Ignoring their continued development of nuclear bombs which lead to the sanctions being put in place to begin with, Kim Jong-un’s actions to combat COVID-19 can only be seen as criminal.

 

   Kim closed down the country’s borders in January 2020 and put an end to tourism as well. Soon after, foreign diplomats and aid workers were being sent out of the country, group by group. By March 2021, not a single foreign aid worker was left in the country.

This ‘border blockade’ has had multiple effects. It prevents goods and medical supplies from entering the country through legitimate trade and it keeps international groups from being able to bring in and distribute much-needed aid.

The regime’s extreme stance is underpinned by the mistaken belief that the surface of products can be a major source of COVID infections. Everything from visitors to Pyongyang to bus seats has been disinfected more than once, and the government issued shoot-to-kill orders regarding any foreigner who may wash up on their shores (for instance, a wayward fisheries official from South Korea in need of help).

COVID’s threat to North Korea is very real. Although the country is perhaps better equipped than most to enforce local and regional lockdowns to stop any spread of the virus, the country’s medical infrastructure is incapable of dealing with numerous severe cases at once.

To that end, the regime has taken strict measures to quarantine people with COVID-like symptoms and increased legal penalties for those who disobey lockdown orders. North Korea has also tested roughly 50,000 people for COVID-19 and reported zero positive cases. While this has raised a number of doubts (particularly as small outbreaks of COVID-like illnesses have occurred), it does seem that North Korea’s extreme measures have prevented any widespread infection.

However, there have been major consequences to the country’s lockdown measures. Food supplies are running low, people are unable to find daily hygienic items in the marketplace, medications for tuberculosis are running out, and the government can’t import the vast majority of things they need to keep hospitals operating because the border has basically been hermetically sealed.

Although UN medical supplies were sent to North Korea in October 2021, the lack of personnel to distribute the supplies and to independently monitor that distribution means the supplies could easily be diverted elsewhere, as has happened with various other aid and food shipments in the past.

Making matters even worse is Kim Jong-un has the power to end this suffering while also combating the virus. As NK News reported, “North Korea is one of only two countries that has yet to administer any COVID vaccines, despite being promised over 8.12 million doses from COVAX and rejecting another 3 million Sinovac doses.”

Instead, he has taken the opportunities afforded by having a sealed border and almost no foreigners at all in the country for the first time in a generation to crackdown on everything from market activity to going after people wearing skinny jeans (something viewed as being foreign and anti-socialist).

While the war on pants endures, mothers can’t get the help they need during childbirth.

There has been a recent glimmer of hope, however. At least one train has recently been granted permission to enter the country from China to test out North Korea’s new disinfection center at Uiju. If the process goes well, this may open up opportunities for cargo to once again regularly enter the country.

Additionally, the state-party newspaper Rodong Sinmun published on January 10, 2022, that the regime is modifying its anti-epidemic policies to be more “people-oriented”, suggesting that some restrictions may be lightened up. While no specific changes were announced, it is clear that two years of total shutdown have wrecked both the economy and the country’s healthcare system, all without a single COVID case ever (officially) being reported.

 

Conclusions

   The current state of healthcare in North Korea is due to multiple factors. From economic mismanagement to diverting products away from hospitals and clinics to sell for foreign currency to the cumulative effects of years of sanctions. But Kim Jong-un has had a chance to address each one of these major factors and has opted not to.

His anti-pandemic measures have only served to make matters much worse.

The construction and modernization of select medical facilities in the country reflect the regime’s “our way” attitude and are an attempt at self-sufficiency, but the country lacks the indigenous manufacturing capacity to adequately supply itself with even the most basic of supplies. In 2017 the last WHO-certified drug manufacturer in the country was closed down, leaving citizens with only folk remedies and highly dubious “Koryo-medicine cures” made of everything from ginseng to rare earth minerals.

While there have been some statistical improvements, the lack of reliable sources of medicine and equipment, along with constant electricity shortages, has meant that the North Korean healthcare industry is moribund and unable to right itself.

Patients dealing with advanced cancer, mental health problems, or work-related trauma face a medical system that can’t cope due to its inherent structural inefficacies, and that may often actually be detrimental to the patient.

The rapidly declining availability of everything from food to hygienic supplies to antibiotics as a direct result of Pyongyang’s anti-COVID measures does not inspire confidence that the state of North Korean healthcare will improve in the near term, particularly as UN food aid has not been able to enter the country since March 2021 and the regime refuses to accept COVID vaccines that could help them end the lockdown.

And while Kim Jong-un has recently directed that future COVID measures be more tailored and “people-oriented” perhaps hinting at a loosening of some controls, only time will tell if these new policies will have any real impact at all. Currently, all that can be said is that the average North Korean has fewer medical options today than just a few years ago.

 

~ ~ ~ ~

I have scheduled this project to run through to the end of the year, with a new article coming out roughly every 10 days or so. If you would like to support the project and help me with research costs, please consider supporting AccessDPRK on Patreon. Those supporters donating $15 or more each month will be entitled to a final PDF version of all the articles together that will also have additional information included once the series is finished. They will also receive a Google Earth map related to the events in the series, and can get access to the underlying data behind the supplemental reports.

Supporters at other levels will be sent each new article a day before it’s published and will also receive a mention as seen below.

 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, and Russ Johnson.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/17/2022

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