Growth in Military Capacities Codified by Party Meetings

During the last ten days of 2019, North Korea held two major meetings, both chaired by Kim Jong Un.

The official reports on the substance of the meetings have been short on detail, but they have mentioned a few key points that can give us an understanding of what’s going on. During the “enlarged” Seventh Central Military Commission meeting, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the, “meeting would decide on important organizational and political measures and military steps to bolster up the overall armed forces of the country…” and “discussed were important issues for decisive improvement of the overall national defence and core matters for the sustained and accelerated development of military capability for self-defence.”

Stressing the point further, the report went on to say that at the meeting they rectified “irrational structure and defects in machinery and some shortcomings in other military and political activities…” This means streamlining the military bureaucracy and realigning military and related facilities to be more effective toward accomplishing national defense goals.

During the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the KCNA reported that the agenda emphasized “the need to take positive and offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country as required by the present situation, [Kim Jong Un] indicated the duties of the fields of foreign affairs, munitions industry and armed forces of the DPRK.”

While these statements are relatively broadly worded, they echo what has come out of previous meetings. The result of those meetings, policy changes, and decisions by Kim Jong Un has repeatedly resulted in the ongoing development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and upgraded capabilities of their conventional military forces.

North Korea has generally taken a cautionary approach. When diplomacy seems to be working, they’re willing to halt major weapons testing. And when things start going sour, they resume provocations. But throughout it all, they have not altered any of their core military doctrine or cut themselves off from necessary infrastructure or strategic development.

The Center for Strategic International Studies, 38 North, myself, and many others have spent a lot of time monitoring not just North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic forces but also their conventional military capabilities, and one thing has been made very clear: under Kim Jong Un, major upgrades to all branches of their military have been underway. Regardless of any specifics, these two meetings have underscored this ongoing trend of modernization and the realignment of military structures.

This trend can be seen in the fact that Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his predecessors combined, tested the country’s largest nuclear device to-date, and, as mentioned, is currently embarking on the reorganization of military bases and expanding their training capacities.

This reorganization and the overhauling of capabilities is a keystone of what the Party has now laid out and it can be seen in the following examples.

Regarding their nuclear program, there has been a large amount of construction work in recent years at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and that work is ongoing. The Pyongsan uranium mine and milling plant continues production and seems to have taken on the role as the regime’s primary uranium milling plant as the smaller site at Pakchon has been placed in caretaker status and is somewhat now redundant. Focusing on Pyongsan saves resources and allows for needed improvements at Pyongsan, such as those seen from 2013-2015.

The Tonghae Satellite Launch Station has been placed in caretaker status as well, as additional resources have been poured into the more capable Sohae Satellite Launch Station. Keeping some sites in caretaker status also gives the regime the latitude to make token concessions (such as the demolition of a single test stand) without fundamentally degrading their capacity for testing, while still being frugal by not keeping both sites at full operational status.

In keeping with the theme of centralization, Pyongyang’s General Satellite Control Center is in the process of expansion, and ongoing work at the National Defense University has been identified as its role in both ballistic research and its place within the burgeoning personality cult of Kim Jong Un grows.

The country’s missile testing facilities have likewise been streamlined. The short-lived Kalma test site was decommissioned in favor of the expanding capabilities at the nearby Hodo Launch Area. And, a test stand was erected at the Sinpo Submarine Base to enable the further development of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

Their munitions industry has also been expanding, as the Central Committee meeting has now publicly emphasized. A very recent example of this is the expansion of the March 16 Factory in Pyongsong which produces military equipment needed for their missile program. Ongoing work can also be seen at a massive underground facility and related factories in Hamhung.

Changes haven’t been limited to industrial centers or test sites. Even the ballistic missile bases themselves have been enlarged with new housing and additional support facilities. The northern base at Yeongjeo-ri has also had a large annex constructed nearby (construction was completed under Kim Jong Un).

In terms of naval power, a major, multiyear reconstruction was carried out at the facilities around Muchon, and Changrin Island (on the west coast) has had a naval base built on it. The island recently made headlines for artillery tests carried out from it. Analyst Joseph Bermudez has given a detailed report about a large hovercraft base in Yonbong-ni under construction. Such bases can be used by strategic and special operations forces to quickly infiltrate and destroy South Korean targets.

Then there’s the aforementioned submarine base at Sinpo. Not only has a missile test stand been erected but the manufacturing abilities at the base have been improved and other construction activity can be seen. The first test of the SLBM Pukkuksong-3 was carried out in October of 2019, and there is growing evidence that North Korea is building a new type of submarine at Sinpo.

As I noted in early December, the regime has taken several steps to make the most of its aging air force. Under Kim Jong Un, the capacity to train paratroopers has been nearly doubled and their airfield infrastructure has likewise been improved.

One of the goals of the Central Committee’s meeting was also to discuss ways to improve agriculture and that, too, connects with the military changes. Unessential airports have been closed and one, Kyongsong-Chuul, was recently decommissioned to allow for the construction of a massive agricultural center. This drive to increase food production in conjunction with military improvements can likewise be seen through changes at KPA Farm No. 1116. This key agricultural site in Pyongyang underwent a modernization program in 2019 and was visited by Kim Jong Un in October.

Of North Korea’s Army, the area of training has been a major focus. An important military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) base near Kangdong added 11 km of new paths in 2019 for training soldiers on how to operate various equipment. Similarly, KPA bases near Yongbyon, Pukchin, Haeju, Changdo, and Sepo have all undergone notable expansions since Kim Jong Un came to power. 

Completely new bases have also been constructed throughout the country.

This centralization effort in training allows for key bases to be overhauled and to serve as primary training facilities, instead of new recruits being sent to dozens of smaller sites around the country, each with significantly more limited resources. It also opens up space to house new soldiers, enable larger numbers to be moved around the country for construction or harvesting activities, and will give the regime the space needed to improve ongoing training of their vast paramilitary and reserve forces.

A small but important side benefit of this comes from better land-use policies. Efficiently arranged military housing and more reasonably designed training courses allows for more hectares of land to be used in farming instead of being wasted.

North Korea is rarely a mystery to those who pay attention. They broadcast their intentions in both official pronouncements from media and Party newspapers, and in their activities (which can be observed from satellites). As broadly worded as the official statements may seem regarding the two meetings, when you see the trend that has already been happening, those reports clearly reveal the state’s objectives to continue to improve their national defense abilities across the board as well as their agricultural and economic sectors.

The dual nature of North Korea’s domestic-military system has built a unique national structure that has enabled the country to survive for seven decades. The use of the military as “builder-soldiers” to construct everything from a modern skyline in Pyongyang to new ski resorts and to the reconstruction of Samjiyon, improves the domestic economy. Improvements to the country’s general infrastructure regarding communication, fuel supplies, and illicit means of sanctions avoidance enables greater military capabilities.

From threats of “Christmas gifts” to claims of new “strategic weapon systems”, the overarching policy directions proposed by Pyongyang are now reflecting what has already been happening under Kim Jong Un and ensure the establishment of needed “offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country”. To guarantee the sovereignty and security of the country, North Korea’s wider strategic position must be secured, no matter what happens diplomatically. Kim Jong Un’s refusal to ignore the less “sexy” conventional forces while also placing an emphasis on economic matters, seems to have placed North Korea in a secure position for the foreseeable future.

Additional Reading
Major Expansion at Pyongyang Training Ground - AccessDPRK, 12/17/19
Missile Bases and Major Underground Facilities - AccessDPRK, 10/23/19

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--Jacob Bogle, 1/5/2020

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AccessDPRK in 2019

This past year has been a banner year for both the project itself and its wider goal of being a fundamental resource for helping to shed light on North Korea.

The #AccessDPRK blog will celebrate its seventh anniversary in February 2020 and currently contains 97 articles which, if printed out, would equal over 570 pages worth of material.

For 2019, I was able to write 28 articles for the project which is the most in its history. Additionally, 70 images were analyzed for those articles. A further 196 images were shared and discussed on Twitter.

Some more social media stats include: over 384,000 Twitter impressions for tweets relating to North Korea and the project (that's a 92% jump over last year), and gained over 100 new followers. I also created a Facebook page that offers a variety of material that won't always be found on Twitter.

Last year's most popular tweet was about ongoing work at the massive underground complex in Hamhung.

AccessDPRK.com traffic was also 32% higher than last year, in part because of the largest news story to come from the project thus far.
In August I wrote about an ongoing industrial leak from the Pyongsan uranium milling plant that was pouring into a river. My report was picked up by RFA before quickly spreading around the world. For a time, it was the biggest news story in South Korea. Concerns over the leak (as the river eventually flows into the Han River) spurred the South Korean government to test for possible radioactive contamination. Thankfully, no dangerous levels were detected. However, 400,000 North Koreans still use the water for drinking and farming, and the risks of heavy metal contamination is far greater for them.

I finally set up a Patreon account so that people can directly support the project. With multiple support levels ($3, $5, $15, and $20 a month), it offers ways for people of any economic means to help. I have worked to come up with exclusive rewards and I'm currently in the process of creating even more.

Working on AccessDPRK isn't free. It costs money to have websites and domain registration, and books and other research materials come at a price. Then there's the matter of fairness. I have literally put thousands of hours into creating the maps, analyzing images, and writing articles, all because I believe in the mission of sharing information about North Korea. But I can't keep doing it alone or at the cost of working on other things in my life.
So if you see value in the last seven years of the project and look forward to more in the future, please do think about helping out. The more support I get, the more I can do. 2019 was certainly proof of that.

Speaking of doing more. Last year I added well over a thousand new places to what will become the final Google Earth-based map: Phase III. I also set a goal of completing it by 2021 and expect it to contain around 60,000 places of interest. There's nearly 100 individual categories of places that I am mapping divided into three broad sections: monuments, military, and domestic/economic. The end result will also be organized somewhat differently than 2017's Phase II, to improve its ease of use.

Finding examples of people using the project to help in their own research is always great. For the second year in a row RAND Corporation used parts of Phase II to assist in creating their report "Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula". Additionally, I was able to help a number of university students and researchers with their respective projects.

AccessDPRK also received a little unexpected publicity in December with the publication of "The Self-Appointed Spies Who Use Google Earth to Sniff Out Nukes" by Amy Zegart for The Atlantic. In the piece, Zegart looked at the open-source community and its efforts to serve as watchdogs against nuclear proliferation. She used several examples of non-government individuals and groups who monitor North Korea, Iran, and China, and AccessDPRK was among them.

I have also been able to occasionally contribute articles to NKNews.org (Pro). These articles draw upon what has been learned from the most recent North Korea research including things exposed by this project. I'm really proud of this.

North Korea's recent WPK Central Committee's Fifth Plenary Meeting strongly indicates that 2020 is going to be a rather interesting and provocative year, and I am looking forward to taking on the challenge with your support.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/1/2020
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Nuclear Fallout Part II: the health consequences of Pyongyang's nuclear program

Pollution and health risks exists at every point along the nuclear weapons’ development chain, from the initial mining and milling operations to the enrichment process, and finally from testing nuclear devices. In this two-part article I will examine each of those areas and the health risks associated with them.

In this second part, I finish discussing the health consequences of North Korea’s nuclear program by examining issues related to their underground testing. (Part I can be read here.)

Testing

After producing the needed nuclear fuel and solving the other matters associated with creating a nuclear device, the next step is testing.

After decades of work the regime was able to test its first nuclear device in 2006. The underground test was carried out within Mount Mantap at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. However, there is no such thing as a safe nuclear test, even when they’re underground. The original tunnel for the 2006 test was closed up shortly after the test as a result of radiation releases according to 38 North. Since 2006, five additional tests have been carried out in different tunnels. Further reporting indicates that another delayed leak was also detected as a result of post-tunneling activities in 2013.

Even under the best circumstances, underground nuclear testing still can release some radionuclides into the atmosphere. Less than optimal testing can pose a much greater radiation risk to those downwind of the test site. Initial radiation releases from a containment failure occur through “venting” but releases can continue for longer through “seeps”, where radiation finds its way out of the underground site through small fissures and openings in the overlying rock. Radioisotopes of xenon (such as ¹³³Xe and ¹³⁵Xe) are almost impossible to contain and can travel across the globe, as Canadian detectors picked them up after the very low-yield 2006 test.

Punggye-ri is in a mountainous area with little population but the main tunnel entrances are less than 2 miles away from the boundary of the Hwasong Concentration Camp. Due to the extreme human rights violations facing prisoners, we can’t hear their stories or send professionals over to determine how much radiation they have been exposed to. Residents within the larger area, however, have been able get their experiences to the broader world.

In 2017, South Korea reported that four defectors who lived in the area around Punggye-ri showed signs of radiation exposure. Defector Lee Jeong Hwa, who lived in Kilju County, said, "So many people died we began calling it 'ghost disease’…We thought we were dying because we were poor and we ate badly. Now we know it was the radiation." Unfortunately, the inability to do detailed testing on people still living in the area and gather more definitive evidence prevents us from knowing the full effects of the testing.

Negative health impacts from underground nuclear testing is easily supported by looking at the results of underground testing in the United States. According to the US National Cancer Institute, some 2,800 annual cases of thyroid cancer within the US can be attributed to the “underground era” of 1962-1992, when the United States (and the Soviet Union) was limited to testing nuclear devices underground by treaty. While North Korea has only had a limited number of tests, those tests have increased radiation levels for the region and caused an unknown level of damage to the population. Of particular concern are the 20,000 Hwasong prisoners, who are also suspected of being used as slave labor to help dig the tunnels used at Punggye-ri.

The stability of portions of Mount Mantap is also of concern after six tests, and surface changes as a result of ground shifting have been studied in detail. The first two (of four) tunnels are likely to be unusable for any future testing. Worries over accidental radiation releases from collapsing tunnels spurred China to install additional radiation detectors along their border with North Korea in 2017 and at a newly constructed border crossing in 2019.

The other two tunnels exist to the west and south and have not been used to-date. Their entrances were demolished in May 2018; however, questions remain about the irreversibility of those closures.

Occasional rumors of a possible future above-ground test (for which there are very few potential testing sites) raises the stakes even more. Radiation would flood over Japan and would reverse decades of atmospheric radionuclide decline around the globe.

Conclusion

The known risks associated with the chemicals and processes involved in mining, milling, and enriching uranium, as well as in the production of other radioactive materials, supports the descriptions of illnesses as told by unrelated sources, each with first-hand knowledge of the locations discussed.

Despite the guarantees of the North Korean constitution and international law regarding the right to favorable working conditions and the right to pick one’s career (or to leave it), expert and defector testimonies, coupled with satellite imagery, paints a very different and dangerous story. It can be said that a major humanitarian and health crisis is brewing within North Korea as we know the substandard state of their nuclear program – not just in terms of technology but also safety.

Most of the facilities within Punggye-ri’s 17-kilometer-long compound still stand, waiting to be used again. Yongbyon continues to grow and thousands of additional scientists, laborers, and their families have been moved in under Kim Jong Un. The mines and milling plants still produce materials to be sent to enrichment facilities. And the regime keeps working on their abilities to deliver ballistic missiles to any part of the globe. It is clear that the sixty years of nuclear harm now affecting the tens of thousands of North Koreans who have worked to develop Pyongyang’s nuclear program over three generations of Kim will continue into the future, causing more harm, more sickness, and will likely require the efforts of multiple countries to finally resolve once the Kim Era is over.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

Jacob Bogle, 12/26/2019

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Nuclear Fallout Part I: The health consequences of Pyongyang’s nuclear program

Pollution and health risks exists at every point along the nuclear weapons’ development chain, from the initial mining and milling operations to the enrichment process, and finally from testing nuclear devices. In this two-part series I will examine each of those areas and the health risks associated with them.

In this first part, I will give a short introduction to the history of North Korea’s nuclear program and then discuss the health risks found within the uranium mining and milling process and the production of nuclear fuel. (Read Part II here) 

Image source: Sakucae/2.0

Introduction

North Korea can trace its nuclear program to soon after the Korean War. After the war’s total devastation, Kim Il Sung vowed that the country would never again be flattened, and he sought Soviet assistance in creating Pyongyang’s own nuclear deterrent. Marshall Stalin and future Soviet leaders weren’t too keen on Kim’s aspirations initially, but they did offer help with the development of nuclear power and signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1959. Never one to let an opportunity go to waste, Kim Il Sung ordered secret research into building the A-bomb.

Yongbyon, North Korea’s main nuclear research center, was constructed in the 1960s with help from the Soviet Union. Further facilities across the country were constructed that were needed to mine the uranium, mill it, and finally, to enrich it. The country has two known milling facilities, one at at Pakchon and Pyongsan, and around dozen suspected uranium mining sites. Pakchon and Pyongsan process low-grade coal to concentrate the uranium naturally found within it (at relatively low concentrations) and then to turn it into yellowcake where the uranium concentration reaches 80%. From there it is sent to additional facilities including Yongbyon, some of which have likely not been declared by North Korea to the international community.

Mining and milling

North Korea is one of only seven countries that are not signatories to the International Labor Organization. This United Nations agency sets international labor standards, including those for nuclear research and industry. Furthermore, the country’s mining sector is notoriously dangerous and lacks modern safety precautions and necessary equipment. Injuries and respiratory diseases are common, particularly in coal mines which is where North Korea gets the bulk of its uranium. The country’s two largest uranium mines, Pyongsan and Woogi-ri (within the Undok-Rason area), hold an estimated 11.5 million tonnes of ore and employ thousands of workers.

The inhuman treatment of workers at Pyongsan, and severe negligence regarding monitoring radiation exposure and air quality was given in testimony by Dr. Shin Chang-hoon before the U.S House in 2014.

Once the ore leaves the mines, it is transported to the milling plants to be converted into yellowcake. Even though coal itself is generally considered safe to handle, every form of uranium extraction leaves behind dangerous waste.

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency,

"regardless of how uranium is extracted from rock, the processes leave behind radioactive waste....The tailings remain radioactive and contain hazardous chemicals from the recovery process."

 Google Earth image showing the residue of leaked waste material at both ends of the waste transfer pipe.

The Pyongsan milling plant is a prime example of the environmental damage done within North Korea’s nuclear sector. Satellite imagery shows that the country’s primary milling facility has been spilling industrial waste into the Ryesong River for decades, and that the waste material reservoir is unlined. This can allow contaminated water to seep into groundwater supplies and also contaminate crops. Hundreds of thousands live within the area of Pyongsan and downriver of the plant.

Non-proliferation expert Dr. Jeffrey Lewis summed it up nicely in 2015 when he said, “What is definitely happening, though, is that North Korea is dumping the tailings from the plant into an unlined pond, one surrounded by farms. That’s not a hypothetical harm.  That’s actual pollution that is harming the health and well being of the local community."

At Pakchon, which began uranium milling around 1982, a former waste reservoir is now covered in cultivated land. This practice can be seen at many mining and industrial sites. If the waste isn’t properly covered, any crops grown over this material may become contaminated with heavy metals such as vanadium and chromium, as well as lead and arsenic. Those contaminates are passed up the food-chain into animals and humans.

Image showing that a former waste reservoir is now farmland and the plant’s proximity to a river.

According to defector Kim Tae-ho, who worked at Pakchon in the 1990s, when the “experimental plant” would operate, yellow smoke would fill the plant and cause “severe difficult breathing and unbearable pain.” The short-term effect of inhaling yellowcake particles is primarily kidney damage which will resolve itself unless there is recurrent exposure (such as from working at the site each day). However, the main radiological risk comes from the radioactive gas radon and its non-gaseous “daughters” like polonium-218. Improperly vented air can lead to a build up of these radioactive materials and will cause immediate tissue damage to the lungs and mucus membranes. Additionally, the use of acids in the production process raises the risk for inhalation of sulfur-containing gases (which can have a yellow tint to them) and cause irritation and eventually burns to the eyes and lungs.

Pakchon and Pyongsan are combined mine and milling facilities, but illnesses and food contamination have been reported at stand-alone mines as well, such as at the Walbisan uranium mine (near Sunchon).

Sources told Radio Free Asia that, “local residents are forced to eat radioactive food and drink radioactive water,” and “[i]n Tongam village, the miners and their families suffer from incurable diseases or various types of cancer. In particular, many people die of liver cancer.”

Enrichment and fuel production

Even within the uranium enrichment compound, almost every inch of available land has been cultivated.

The next steps along the nuclear development chain happen at Yongbyon. The complex exists as a closed-city and people are not free to enter or exit without permission. Scientists, engineers, and others may work for many years within the fenced off complex. They will marry and will raise children.

While being able to work within a prominent field brings many benefits, it also brings risks. Brief exposure to radiation is rarely dangerous. Short exposure risks are also not catastrophic when it comes to inheritable genetic damage, either, as the world learned from the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But continual exposure because you’re living in a contaminated environment increases those risks each day. This concern grows when you consider that in recent years, dozens of new buildings have been constructed with room for thousands more residents.

Scientists who were involved during the early days of Yongbyon’s operation have been reported to have suffered from wasting illnesses and hair loss.

Fast-forward to 2019, a former resident of Yongbyon told DailyNK,

"In other districts it is very difficult to find people with cleft lip but here there are many individuals with crooked mouths, those lacking eyebrows, incidents of dwarfism, and those with six fingers. There are even children who just look like bare bones."

Adults can also be affected, with the most severe cases eventually causing mental deficiencies, cancers, and wide array of other illnesses at relatively young ages.

The aforementioned Dr. Shin Chang-hoon also interviewed a defector who worked at Yongbyon. He was told that the dosimeters (which measure radiation exposure) were only checked every three months and workers were not told of the results unless they had already begun to exhibit signs of radiation sickness.

Adjacent to an area of improperly stored nuclear waste is a grove of dying trees and farmland. It is only separated from the waste by a covering of dirt.

Improper disposal of radioactive materials can pollute the soil, kill trees, and contaminate any food that is grown in the area. Releases of gases into the atmosphere will likewise blanket the region and small, aerosolized particles will eventually make their way down to the ground, bringing with them radiation or forming toxic compounds. These gases can travel for many miles and place other sites within North Korea at greater risk, not just the immediate Yongbyon complex.

Concern over Yongbyon is especially grave considering the large number of nuclear and chemical facilities in such a small area. Not just in terms of ongoing dangers that defectors have told the world about, but also in terms of a future accident, flood, or fire that could devastate the region and require international intervention to solve. 

The fact North Korea is largely cut off from the world and often must rely on outdated science, manufacturing techniques, and potentially unreliable indigenously produced parts and equipment means that the risk of accidents and errors is greater than in other nuclear countries. It is something of a small miracle that a large-scale incident hasn’t already occurred.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.


--Jacob Bogle, 12/22/2019
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Major Expansion at Pyongyang Training Ground

The Soe-gol military training facility in Pyongyang has undergone major changes in 2019.

The military base, which consists of a military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) section and open training grounds, may be most well-known for a set of military exercises carried out there in October 2016 which was caught on satellite imagery.

Situated near the village of Soe-gol, 6 km south of Kangdong, the base is in the process of becoming a major training center.

The base appears to have been constructed sometime around 2001-2003 and the MOUT facility had been built by 2005. Lying within the Pyongyang region, it is part of the Capital Defense Corps and is used to train some of North Korea's most important troops.

MOUT facility in 2005.

The MOUT facility has mock buildings aligned along a central "boulevard" and the first buildings constructed have designs reminiscent of South Korean architecture of the 1970s. Newer buildings have been constructed over the years and their designs reflect more current building trends in the south.

MOUT facility in 2019.

Between 2007 and 2011, the base underwent a first stage of expansion and another expansion stage occurred in 2016. These expansions saw additional mock buildings constructed at the MOUT facility and added targets at the smaller vehicle driving and firing range to the south.

The driving and firing range has existed since the base was constructed and includes a short driving course, stationary vehicles for target practice, and a small number of obstacles. Other than the addition of painted targets in 2016, little else has changed. The entire original driving range (not all shown in the above image) covers an area of just about 0.25 sq. km.

The biggest changes have been ongoing this year and are located within the large open fields of the base complex. There were some minor changes made in preparation of the 2016 exercises, but the latest upgrades dwarf any preceding it.

The new driving range occupies approx. 1.7 sq. km. making it nearly seven times the size of the old one. It includes a main driving course consisting of two roads which total a combined 11 km when shorter, secondary paths are also included.

Image showing the general main driving course. There are two lanes (which occasionally diverge paths) as well as secondary routes. Taken together, they total over 11 km.

This new training course includes multiple obstacles, terrains, intersections, and a "bridging task".

What I'm calling a "bridging task" is either one of two things, as I am uncertain as to its exact nature.
Trainees drive up an elevated road which isn't connected to the lower elevation continuation of the road. The most recent image shows a basic bridge crossing the gap. That bridge is either permanent but teaches recruits how to cross an unstable structure in heavy vehicles or it's actually a bridging operation where the recruits must place a temporary bridge (similar to the US Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System) over the gap and then cross over it.

This next series of images will show the construction of the training site.

Construction of the elevated portion is underway in February 2019.

By April 3, the elevated section is completed and the roadways are being built.

Bridge sections are in place by April 21, 2019.

The crossing span at the two gaps is between 15 and 17 meters which is technologically possible with current bridging vehicles such as the MT-55A which has a folding bridge 20 meters long and is in North Korea's inventory.

As I have mentioned in previous articles, North Korea is much more than nuclear weapons. Their conventional forces continue to be a major regional threat and the regime is pouring countless millions into upgrading their capabilities and training capacity on the ground, at sea, and in the air.




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--Jacob Bogle, 12/16/2019
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DPRK Gas Station Survey

Keeping an eye on every aspect of North Korea, be it their nuclear sites or more mundane things like gas stations, is the only way we can create a deeper understanding of what's happening within the country despite the limited amount of official data coming from Pyongyang.
Regardless of sanctions, North Korea's domestic economy continues to grow ever so slowly and taking a look at the transportation sector helps to shed light on this growth.

As the economy rebounded after the famine and subsequent economic collapse, market activity helped spur greater internal travel for trade and even domestic tourism (something that was largely absent for much of North Korea's history). Private car ownership is still rare, but the streets of Pyongyang and other major cities have steadily filled up, with the occasional traffic jam even being seen. Taxi services, buses, motorcycles, and private transportation companies (typically not entirely legal) all require one major commodity to function: fuel.

National map of the 113 gas stations I was able to identify.

South Korea has approximately 11,800 gas stations. With half the population, North Korea might be expected to have half the number of gas stations: 5,900. After looking at every major town and highway, I was only able to identify 113 gas stations in all of North Korea. However, while that number may be small, it actually speaks to the fact that vehicle ownership, mass transit, internal travel, and the domestic economy have all undergone rather significant changes under Kim Jong Un, as over half of those gas stations have been constructed since he came to power in Dec. 2011.

Wonsan gas station "Number 1". Despite the city's importance, I was only able to find three stations.

Wonsan gas station "Number 2" as seen on Jan. 30, 2014 under construction.

The need for and consumption of more refined petroleum raises its own set of questions.
Based on measuring the fuel tanks at the second Wonsan station pictured, if we make these few assumptions, that each of the 74 identified stations built in or after 2012 were indeed operational and each held two uniform-sized fuel tanks, and each one was refilled once a month, then that equals an annual consumption of 15.2 million gallons for those 74 stations. That added consumption equates to an additional 363,000 barrels of refined petroleum product above what North Korea was using under Kim Jong Il and above the annual import limits in place through sanctions. United Nations' reports and various countries all accuse North Korea of violating the sanctions regime. The expansion of gas stations suggests that advanced sanctions evasion practices are how they have been able to keep their gas stations full and their cars fueled.


For a more detailed report, please see my article at NK News Pro.

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Patreon supporters at the $20 tier are entitled to exclusive data sets. The Google Earth file for this post is one of those exclusive offers. This is the only nationwide map of the country's gas stations that I am aware exists. Please consider supporting me on Patreon and get access to the details behind this survey and other exclusive information.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters:  Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

--Jacob Bogle
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Chongjin Prison Camp Update

Chongjin Prison, officially known as Kwan-li-so No. 25, is a North Korea prison near the city of Chongjin. Unlike sprawling camps like Hwasong or Kaechon, which occupy many square miles of territory, Chongjin is relatively compact, with prisoner housing and forced labor facilities all within a single walled compound. The one exception being an agricultural area that is surrounded by a fence.

Chongjin has undergone various changes over the years, one of largest being an expansion of the outer perimeter in 2010, and then the addition of a mining site in 2014. The most recent change is within the light industrial section of the prison.

All North Korean prisons use forced labor to engage in a range of activities from agriculture and light industry to mining and sewing clothes and uniforms. At Chongjin, its 3,000 prisoners must engage in agriculture, livestock activities, mining, and light industry. However, major changes to one of the factory buildings has been ongoing this year.

The factory building in question is approx. 185 feet by 105 feet in size. Its initial demolition had begun by February 2019 and only the basic framing of the building remained by March 15. An apparent partial roof section was placed on the structure by April 5. Little else has happened as of July 22, 2019 which is the latest Google Earth image available. As of that time, the factory sits as just a shell and is missing the vast majority of its roof.

In this February 2019 image, you can see that some portions of the roof have been removed.

By March 15, only the metal frame of the building remains. The roof has been completely removed.

A partial roof coverage was added to the central hall by May. The outer wings of the factory are still without coverage as are other parts of the central hall.

The addition of roofing material in May (no matter how incomplete) suggests that the factory isn't being completely demolished. The prison managers possibly decided to either change the activities at the building or to begin a process of renovation. As of July 2019, nothing else had changed since May.

With occasional rumors about various prisons being closed or large prisoner transfers, it's important to keep an eye toward any substantial changes such as this. One less factory could be an indication of fewer prisoners. However, I need to stress that that can't currently be inferred as the basic structure still stands and no other substantial changes to the prison complex has been identified.


Related reading: Prison Camp 22 Today (AccessDPRK, Nov. 1, 2018)


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.


--Jacob Bogle, 12/5/2019
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