During the last ten days of 2019, North Korea held two major
meetings, both chaired by Kim Jong Un.
The official reports on the substance of the meetings have
been short on detail, but they have mentioned a few key points that can give us
an understanding of what’s going on. During the “enlarged” Seventh Central
Military Commission meeting, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the, “meeting
would decide on important organizational and political measures and military
steps to bolster up the overall armed forces of the country…” and “discussed
were important issues for decisive improvement of the overall national defence
and core matters for the sustained and accelerated development of military
capability for self-defence.”
Stressing the point further, the report went on to say that
at the meeting they rectified “irrational structure and defects in machinery
and some shortcomings in other military and political activities…” This means streamlining
the military bureaucracy and realigning military and related facilities to be
more effective toward accomplishing national defense goals.
During the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central
Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the KCNA reported that the agenda
emphasized “the need to take positive and offensive measures for fully ensuring
the sovereignty and security of the country as required by the present
situation, [Kim Jong Un] indicated the duties of the fields of foreign affairs,
munitions industry and armed forces of the DPRK.”
While these statements are relatively broadly worded, they
echo what has come out of previous meetings. The result of those meetings,
policy changes, and decisions by Kim Jong Un has repeatedly resulted in the ongoing
development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and upgraded capabilities
of their conventional military forces.
North Korea has generally taken a cautionary approach. When
diplomacy seems to be working, they’re willing to halt major weapons testing.
And when things start going sour, they resume provocations. But throughout it
all, they have not altered any of their core military doctrine or cut
themselves off from necessary infrastructure or strategic development.
The Center for Strategic International Studies, 38 North, myself,
and many others have spent a lot of time monitoring not just North Korea’s
nuclear and ballistic forces but also their conventional military capabilities,
and one thing has been made very clear: under Kim Jong Un, major upgrades to
all branches of their military have been underway. Regardless of any specifics,
these two meetings have underscored this ongoing trend of modernization and the
realignment of military structures.
This trend can be seen in the fact that Kim Jong Un has
tested more missiles than his predecessors combined, tested the country’s
largest nuclear device to-date, and, as mentioned, is currently embarking on
the reorganization of military bases and expanding their training capacities.
This reorganization and the overhauling of capabilities is a
keystone of what the Party has now laid out and it can be seen in the following
examples.
Regarding their nuclear program, there has been a large
amount of construction work in recent
years at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and that work is ongoing. The
Pyongsan uranium mine and milling plant continues production
and seems to have taken on the role as the regime’s primary uranium milling
plant as the smaller site at Pakchon has been placed in caretaker status and is
somewhat now redundant. Focusing on Pyongsan saves resources and allows for
needed improvements at Pyongsan, such as those seen from 2013-2015.
The Tonghae Satellite Launch Station has been placed in
caretaker status as well, as additional resources have been poured into the
more capable Sohae Satellite Launch Station. Keeping some sites in caretaker
status also gives the regime the latitude to make token concessions (such as
the demolition of a single test stand) without fundamentally degrading their
capacity for testing, while still being frugal by not keeping both sites at
full operational status.
In keeping with the theme of centralization, Pyongyang’s
General Satellite Control Center is in the process of expansion, and ongoing
work at the National
Defense University has been identified as its role in both ballistic
research and its place within the burgeoning personality cult of Kim Jong Un grows.
The country’s missile testing facilities have likewise been
streamlined. The short-lived Kalma test site was decommissioned in favor of the
expanding capabilities at the nearby Hodo Launch Area. And, a test stand was
erected at the Sinpo Submarine Base to enable the further development of
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
Their munitions industry has also been expanding, as the
Central Committee meeting has now publicly emphasized. A very recent example of
this is the expansion
of the March 16 Factory in Pyongsong which produces military equipment needed
for their missile program. Ongoing work can also be seen at a massive
underground facility and related factories in Hamhung.
Changes haven’t been limited to industrial centers or test
sites. Even the ballistic missile bases themselves have been enlarged with new
housing and additional support facilities. The northern base at Yeongjeo-ri has
also had a large annex
constructed nearby (construction was completed under Kim Jong Un).
In terms of naval power, a major, multiyear reconstruction
was carried out at the facilities around Muchon, and Changrin Island (on the
west coast) has had a naval base built on it. The island recently made headlines
for artillery tests carried out from it. Analyst Joseph Bermudez has given a
detailed report
about a large hovercraft base in Yonbong-ni under construction. Such bases can
be used by strategic and special operations forces to quickly infiltrate and
destroy South Korean targets.
Then there’s the aforementioned submarine base at Sinpo. Not
only has a missile test stand been erected but the manufacturing abilities at
the base have been improved and other construction activity can be seen.
The first test of the SLBM Pukkuksong-3 was carried out in October of 2019,
and there is growing evidence that North Korea is building a new type of
submarine at Sinpo.
As I noted
in early December, the regime has taken several steps to make the most of its
aging air force. Under Kim Jong Un, the capacity to train paratroopers has been
nearly doubled and their airfield infrastructure has likewise been improved.
One of the goals of the Central Committee’s meeting was also
to discuss ways to improve agriculture and that, too, connects with the
military changes. Unessential airports have been closed and one,
Kyongsong-Chuul, was recently decommissioned to allow for the construction of a
massive agricultural
center. This drive to increase food production in conjunction with military
improvements can likewise be seen through changes at KPA Farm No. 1116. This key
agricultural site in Pyongyang underwent a modernization program in 2019 and
was visited by Kim Jong Un in October.
Of North Korea’s Army, the area of training has been a major
focus. An important military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) base
near Kangdong added 11 km of new paths in 2019 for training soldiers on how
to operate various equipment. Similarly, KPA bases near Yongbyon, Pukchin,
Haeju, Changdo, and Sepo have all undergone notable expansions since Kim Jong
Un came to power.
Completely new bases have also been constructed throughout
the country.
This centralization effort in training allows for key bases
to be overhauled and to serve as primary training facilities, instead of new
recruits being sent to dozens of smaller sites around the country, each with
significantly more limited resources. It also opens up space to house new
soldiers, enable larger numbers to be moved around the country for construction
or harvesting activities, and will give the regime the space needed to improve
ongoing training of their vast paramilitary and reserve forces.
A small but important side benefit of this comes from better
land-use policies. Efficiently arranged military housing and more reasonably
designed training courses allows for more hectares of land to be used in
farming instead of being wasted.
North Korea is rarely a mystery to those who pay attention.
They broadcast their intentions in both official pronouncements from media and
Party newspapers, and in their activities (which can be observed from
satellites). As broadly worded as the official statements may seem regarding
the two meetings, when you see the trend that has already been happening, those
reports clearly reveal the state’s objectives to continue to improve their
national defense abilities across the board as well as their agricultural and
economic sectors.
The dual nature of North Korea’s domestic-military system
has built a unique national structure that has enabled the country to survive
for seven decades. The use of the military as “builder-soldiers” to construct everything
from a modern skyline in Pyongyang to new ski resorts and to the reconstruction
of Samjiyon, improves the domestic economy. Improvements to the country’s
general infrastructure regarding communication, fuel supplies, and illicit
means of sanctions avoidance enables greater military capabilities.
From threats of “Christmas gifts” to claims of new “strategic
weapon systems”, the overarching policy directions proposed by Pyongyang are
now reflecting what has already been happening under Kim Jong Un and ensure the
establishment of needed “offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty
and security of the country”. To guarantee the sovereignty and security of the
country, North Korea’s wider strategic position must be secured, no matter what
happens diplomatically. Kim Jong Un’s refusal to ignore the less “sexy”
conventional forces while also placing an emphasis on economic matters, seems
to have placed North Korea in a secure position for the foreseeable future.
Additional Reading
Major Expansion at Pyongyang Training Ground - AccessDPRK, 12/17/19
Missile Bases and Major Underground Facilities - AccessDPRK, 10/23/19
Additional Reading
Major Expansion at Pyongyang Training Ground - AccessDPRK, 12/17/19
Missile Bases and Major Underground Facilities - AccessDPRK, 10/23/19
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--Jacob Bogle, 1/5/2020
