Saturday, January 15, 2022

Kim Jong-un's First Decade in Power - Health of the Man

Note: this was originally going to be a single article detailing healthcare in North Korea, with the first half being on the health of Kim Jong-un and the second half focusing on the general state of healthcare and medicine in the country. However, due to length, I have decided to split the article into two separate ones, divided among the same two topics: health of the man and health of the nation. "Health of the Nation" will be published in the upcoming days. 


Sensationalized headline by the celebrity gossip website TMZ repeating totally unfounded claims that Kim Jong-un may have died in April 2020. Image: Screenshot of April 25, 2020 ‘breaking news’ article headline.


Introduction

   The health of a nation’s leader and the health of the population are two factors that can have an outsized role in determining the course of history, yet it is often overlooked. Immediate, visible existential threats like invading armies or economic collapse occupy far more of a government’s attention, while invisible germs or quietly ticking clogged arteries remain out of sight and all too often out of mind.

However, history is filled with the turning tides of war, the rise and fall of empires, and revolutions that are either partially or largely based on matters of health.

U.S president Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke in 1919 that severely hampered his ability to promote the League of Nations Treaty within the United States, leading to its ultimate failure in the Senate. Without the support of the United States, the weakened League’s ability to enforce its own resolutions and maintain future peace enabled the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Japan’s invasion of Chinese territories, and eventually lead to the Second World War as Germany began to systematically violate treaties and ignore post-WWI obligations.

Adolf Hitler’s continual drug use after 1941 fueled his innate sense of infallibility and compounded his manic episodes. Coupled with his lack of military knowledge, his addled brain brought about some of the greatest military disasters in history.

 

   While the leaders of North Korea are painted in semi-divine terms by state propaganda, they are, in fact, just men. Kim Il-sung died of heart failure. Kim Jong-il suffered a major stroke and then died of a heart attack three years later.

And even though Kim Jong-un came into power at a young age, his health then as now has been the subject of much discussion and concern. The illness of any leader can cause instability within a country, and as Kim currently lacks any adult heirs, an unpredictable succession could have major consequences both domestically and internationally.

Surgeries, long periods of disappearance, and even rumors of his death have dogged his first ten years in power.

As such, while Kim Jong-un can boast some legitimate accomplishments in other areas, the history of his first decade with regard to his own health can only be given a middling score.


Health of the Man

Kim Jong-un with his walking cane visible in this KCNA image dated Oct. 14, 2014.

   Nearly everyone can find some genetic history of illness in their family. Heart disease, cancer, dementia, these things are common to have in your family. But most people manage to live long, healthy lives regardless and one’s lifestyle plays a huge role in this.

For Kim Jong-un, heart disease runs in his family. It’s also likely that other conditions like high cholesterol and atherosclerosis affected both his father and grandfather, but we have little direct evidence of this.

As a teenager, Kim’s lifestyle would have placed him on a better health footing than genetics may have suggested. He was athletically inclined, loved playing basketball (even had an aggressive streak), and he enjoyed spending time at the family’s seaside villa at Wonsan which offers multiple types of recreation.

But as he got older, he began to put on weight and when he came to power at the age of 27, he may have weighed as much as 90 kg (198 lbs) while being 5’ 7” tall. This would have given him a body-mass index (BMI) of 31, making him clinically obese.

Both his predecessors also put on weight as the years wore on, fueled by extremely rich foods and copious amounts of alcohol.

Kim Jong-il once remarked that he didn’t trust people who wouldn’t get drunk during parties. And he was known to be Hennessy’s largest non-corporate customer, importing $700,000 worth of Paradis cognac in one year alone to keep himself and his friends suitably lubricated.

This raises the specter of alcoholism within the family as well which would compound any predisposition to other illnesses. I don’t mention alcoholism just because Kim Jong-il enjoyed parties, but because his sister (Kim Jong-un’s aunt), Kim Kyong-hui, has struggled with the disease for many years and because alcoholism is known to be common among North Korea’s elite.

There is little to suggest that Kim Jong-un does not enjoy an equally spiritous lifestyle.

Pointing to this is the theory that Kim suffered from gout in the early years of his reign. After being out of the public eye for forty days, Kim Jong-un appeared in public again on Oct. 13, 2014 but needed a walking stick to help him get around.

South Korean intelligence said that he had undergone a procedure on his foot; however, that belies what could have been a more complicated truth.

Media commentators and North Korea watchers speculated that he was more likely suffering from gout, a condition where uric acid builds up in the joints and causes a wide range of painful symptoms. Major contributing causes to gout include having a diet high in fats and sugars, drinking, and smoking.

Gout can also cause tophi, hardened deposits of uric acid on the joints. One place they tend to develop on is the Achilles tendon.

Kim continued to use the cane for three weeks.

Of course, none of this is conclusive that he had gout and it’s never a good idea to do armchair diagnoses, but it is one reasonable possibility to explain why someone with his history and lifestyle would also need a cane for weeks.

What is known without doubt is his family history of heart disease and stroke, and that he is obese, eats an unhealthy diet, smokes, and has a history of minor surgery.

 

   Kim’s smoking is both a family trait and a national pastime. Some 46.1% of North Korean men smoke cigarettes daily, compared to 15.3% in the U.S.

Kim has tried to stop smoking at least twice, in 2016 and in 2020. Each of those years was also times when the regime promoted anti-smoking campaigns. In 2020, Kim actually banned smoking in public places.

The issue of Kim’s smoking even came up during a March 2018 meeting with South Korea National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong, as Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, said she had been wanting him to stop smoking for years. Unfortunately, smoking can be a very hard habit to break and he is still seen with a lit cigarette in many of the official photographs released by state media.


A portly Kim Jong-un walking around Ryomyong Street in Pyongyang. Image: KCNA, Jan. 26, 2017.

 

   By 2015, his weight had further ballooned, possibly to as high as 130 kg (286 lbs), giving a BMI of nearly 45. This level of weight gain, if the estimates are accurate, would drastically increase his risks for developing diabetes, liver steatosis (fatty liver) – made even worse by drinking alcohol – and would require his heart to work harder, almost certainly leading to heart disease at a younger age.

Making understanding his health situation more difficult is that speculations on the health of the Kim family, replete with lurid tales about their lifestyles, have long been fodder for tabloid writers and intelligence agencies alike. Western reporters often lack translators (or perhaps just the discipline) to correctly divine whether or not a story is coming from a satirical online discussion board or is legitimate breaking news, and foreign intelligence agencies lack the resources required (both human and electronic) to get close to the leadership to validate or refute every rumor that pops up.

South Korean media, in particular, have an unfortunate reputation for getting things wrong when it comes to North Korea or for taking a mere suggestion from an “unnamed intelligence officer” and running with it as though it were the gospel truth.

There have been numerous examples where stories of one or another North Korean official is reported to have been executed – with no substantial evidence, and then the story gets copied and repeated in otherwise legitimate media around the world only to have said official show up days or months later.

And things haven’t been any better regarding reporting on Kim Jong-un. In 2016 a baseless rumor about his death was picked up and reported as fact. Such shocking news caused defense stocks to temporarily rise and the South Korean won to fall.

The fake story even claimed that the Korean Central News Agency had announced the news. All anyone had to do was to check the KCNA website. Absolutely no such official story existed. And yet, by the next day, 115 articles had been written on the topic and it began to make the rounds internationally.

Needless to say, Kim wasn’t dead. But this highlights the dangers of not checking sources first and exchanging one’s journalistic standards to post sensational and clickbait-y stories.

Unfortunately, such lessons never get learned.

 

   In 2020, Kim Jong-un was not seen visiting the Kumsusan Memorial Palace (Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s mausoleum) for the April 15 Day of the Sun ceremony, the country’s most important holiday. It was the first time he missed taking part in the ceremony since coming to power.

Missing such an important event sparked many questions. Soon after, DailyNK reported, based on an unnamed source inside North Korea, that Kim Jong-un had undergone a heart procedure at the exclusive Hyangsan Hospital on April 12 and was recuperating. It gave few other details but was clear in that Kim was stable and resting at one of his villas.

It wasn’t long after this that other reports started claiming he was in critical condition, brain dead, in a coma, and even dead. Many of these false reports claimed to be citing DailyNK, even though nothing in the DailyNK article could be construed to mean he was near death.

This absolute journalistic negligence didn’t even stop when 38 North reported, with clear satellite images to back it up, that Kim Jong-un’s armored train had been sitting at Wonsan Palace since April 21 and reports by others that leisure boats from the palace had been moved around the bay. The combination of evidence made it almost certain that Kim Jong-un was not only alive but had moved from Pyongyang to spend the rest of his recovery time at his favorite residence.

The rumor mill didn’t finally stop until both U.S. and South Korean officials came out and said they agreed with the assessment that he underwent a medical procedure and that he was alive and there were no indications of anything more serious.

Kim finally reappeared in public on May 1 during the official opening of the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory. There was continued speculation about his recovery, but as Jefferey Lewis remarked on Twitter, “Well, I wouldn't say Kim looks healthy, but he definitely doesn't look dead.”

All three Kim’s have disappeared from view on multiple occasions, but those periods don’t always concern ill health. The birth of a new child, taking vacations, or simply needing time to reflect on new policies can drag even the most spotlight-loving dictator away from making daily appearances.

However, there has been one other recent absence that did restart discussions about his health.

 

   After missing for a few weeks, Kim Jong-un oversaw a parade celebrating the country’s 73rd founding anniversary on Sept. 9, 2021. The nighttime parade offered a lot for observers to discuss (like the inclusion of civilian emergency personnel) but it was Kim Jong-un’s physical appearance that also caught attention.

He had lost a noticeable amount of weight and had an overall better look and energy level than in the past. Further appearances substantiated the initial assessment that he had, indeed, lost significant weight.

It was first reported that he may have lost between 10 and 20 kg (22-44 lbs.). More recent images of him at the end of 2021 places the weight loss at the higher end of that estimate and also show that he is managing to keep the weight off for now. Although he would still be considered obese for his height (his thinner weight is still between 117 and 120 kg (258-264 lbs.)), it is a good start.

His mobility and breathing have visibly improved as a result as well.

The weight loss doesn’t only have a positive impact on his health, which seemed to be deteriorating over time. Particularly after the DPRK-US summit process collapsed and as North Korea faces tremendous economic problems due to COVID-19, Kim must be seen as a vigorous leader. His “on the spot guidance” tours, pioneered by Kim Il-sung, are an integral part of his rule, and the only way to keep such an active touring schedule is to maintain a certain level of health.

Additionally, gossip within North Korea by average people about his weight had increased over the course of his first decade. Even though such talk against the “highest dignity” is illegal, gossip, jokes, and criticisms about him routinely spread. In a country of chronically undernourished people and after he raised the specter of additional “belt tightening”, being caricatured as the plump Supreme Leader poses a threat.

These concerns over the people’s opinion of Kim have not just shown up in secret government meetings. State media has publicly addressed his weight loss, implying that Kim was eating less to help the country, harkening back to the days of the famine when Kim Jong-il was reputed to only eat a single bowl of rice a day. So, his thinner look pays both political and health dividends for the leader.

 

   The leaders of North Korea are no different than any other person in their desire to live as long as possible, but they do have far greater resources to apply to accomplishing that. To reach for that goal, a secretive research organization was established during the rule of Kim Il-sung, the Longevity Research Institute, to help keep him happy, healthy and living as long as possible through the use of herbal and folk medicine mixed in with modern medical science (along with practices of questionable ethics and effectiveness).

The Institute continued its activities throughout the life of Kim Jong-il, with 130 doctors and scientists eventually being involved. While there has only been indirect evidence that the Institute is involved in Kim Jong-un’s life, it is likely they’re working hard to keep the third generation of Kim going.

 

   With all of the real (and imagined) health problems Kim Jong-un has faced, governments and pundits around the world have been contemplating his eventual death. What would the aftermath of his sudden death mean? Can there be yet another dynastic succession? What about who controls the nuclear weapons? Who could maintain internal stability?

These and other questions were all raised during his 2020 absence and literally thousands of articles and reports were written to try to answer them.

I myself wrote three. One for AccessDPRK, one as part of a digital symposium by The National Interest, and one discussing the future of the Kim family cult after his death for Asia Times.

The opacity of North Korea’s governing system and a lack of knowledge about any official succession or continuity of government plans renders discussions about Kim Jong-un’s incapacitation or death little more than speculation, but his health must be considered to be part of North Korea’s national security planning. And until his children reach adulthood, there will be an extra layer of doubt and concern over his health and what might happen in the future.


Conclusions

   With no clear heir, the status of Kim Jong-un’s health does become more pressing. Although Kim does not engender the same devotion and loyalty as Kim Il-sung, and although it is unlikely that he has the same level of absolute control over the state as previous generations of Kim have held, Kim Jong-un is still the center spoke for a nuclear-armed nation.

With the family medical history such as it is, his recent weight loss could be the first concrete sign that his health has been precarious, and that he is now taking steps to ensure his survival and the continuance of the regime.

There are also hints that Kim has begun to make subtle reforms to the country’s laws and to the rules of the Workers’ Party that would theoretically enable someone other than him or a direct heir to one day rule the country. These changes may only be temporary steps to shore up the regime in the event of his demise, changes that could be reversed once an official successor is named, but they are nonetheless incredibly important and exhibit a level of foresightedness in the face of his medical history.

To directly address Kim Jong-un’s health, his surgeries point to a relatively young man that may be facing some serious medical issues. His weight loss is a concrete step toward warding off everything from heart disease to diabetes, but he will need to go further still. He must eventually stop smoking and his diet is going to have to change substantially if he wishes to live – healthily – into his 80s.

Another move would be to lower his stress levels. Genuinely placing focus on the people’s health and wellbeing and working to finally solve longstanding issues like food shortages would benefit Kim and the 25 million others living in North Korea. Of course, if history is any guide, this is unlikely.


~ ~ ~ ~

I have scheduled this project to run through to the end of the year, with a new article coming out roughly every 10 days or so. If you would like to support the project and help me with research costs, please consider supporting AccessDPRK on Patreon. Those supporters donating $15 or more each month will be entitled to a final PDF version of all the articles together that will also have additional information included once the series is finished. They will also receive a Google Earth map related to the events in the series, and can get access to the underlying data behind the supplemental reports.

Supporters at other levels will be sent each new article a day before it’s published and will also receive a mention as seen below.

 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, and Russ Johnson.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/15/2022

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Monday, January 3, 2022

AccessDPRK in 2021

This last year marked a milestone for AccessDPRK, and thanks to your continued readership and the support of my Patreon supporters, 2022 will see some great additions to the project.


The biggest event of the year, of course, was the publication of the Phase III map.

The journey that led to the 2021 map began in December 2012, and after 7,000 hours of work, I was finally able to publish the final version of this nationwide map. 

The Free Version contains over 61,000 locations of interest. The Pro Version includes an extra 3,400 locations along with added information on thousands of others. In terms of locating military bases, industrial facilities, and cultural sites, it's the most comprehensive map available to the public...anywhere.


For the AccessDPRK blog, I was able to write 21 articles and analyzed 116 images for those articles. I also started the Kim Jong-un's First Decade in Power biographical series which takes a look at his first decade ruling the country. The series is broken down into twelve topical articles and eight have already been published.

The top 5 articles of the year were:

  1.  What's Inside North Korea?
  2.  Is Wonsan Prison No. 88 Closing?
  3.  What Lies Beneath the Underground Republic
  4.  Border Blockade
  5.  The Unique Buildings of NK's Missile Program
AccessDPRK articles were also cited by Chosun Ilbo, One Earth Future Foundation, i News and various other UK papers.

The blog's 142 articles now contain the equivalent of 937 printed pages of material and include 938 images. I also added 65 images this year through Twitter that are not duplicated in the articles on this blog. In total, I've added nearly 500 Twitter images, providing a very large range of visual material for those interested. 

Web traffic to the site increased by nearly 20% year-over-year. On Twitter, I added 185 new followers and AccessDPRK-related tweets earned 346,000 impressions. The year's most 'popular' tweet was one in response to North Korea's September 2021 cruise missile test and reported range.


As announced at the start of 2021, I also began working on a book. Thanks, in particular, to my Patreon supporters I was able to purchase several books and journal articles to help research for mine. The future book's current layout is broken down into three main sections and will contain seventeen chapters. Of course, this is subject to change.

 
Looking to 2022

The amount of work required to research and write the biographical series necessitated that I largely take a break from other parts of AccessDPRK, but once the series is finished, I will be focused on completing the watershed map and the map of DMZ trenches. I will also work toward editing and publishing the rest of the 31 'city briefs' that I have written on various towns across the country.

Afterward, I would really like to place more focus on research and writing my book. Although that may mean less blog activity, I will still be looking out for new changes in North Korea and if a topic piques my interest, I'll write a post about it. I currently have a list of 20 article ideas & drafts, so there shouldn't be a dramatic decline in regular content output. It just won't be my main focus.


Patreon

I set up a Patreon account in 2020 and have gained some great supporters. Currently, you can help support the project for $3, $5, $10, $15, and $20 monthly, each coming with its own rewards.

I am constantly thinking about new rewards to add, one of them being that I am working on a kind of virtual tour of the country. But you can already get early access to new articles, monthly digests that feature information I haven't discussed publicly, you can have me analyze places you're interested in, and get access to multiple exclusive datasets. Plus, blog and Twitter mentions for any support at $3 or more.

If you believe in sharing facts-based information with the public about all aspects of North Korea (defense, culture, economy), please think about helping out. Every dollar really does help make this possible.

With that, I want to give a huge THANK YOU to my Patreon supporters throughout the year: Amanda O., Anders O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Planefag, Rinmanah, Russ Johnson, and ZS.

Lastly, I want to wish everyone a wonderful upcoming year!


--Jacob Bogle, 1/2/2022
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Saturday, December 25, 2021

Update on the Pakchon Uranium Mill

The Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant is the first uranium concentration plant in North Korea and is one of only two known to exist, the other being the Pyongsan plant

Operations at Pakchon take uranium-bearing ore (usually from coal) and concentrate it into 'yellowcake' which has a uranium concentration of 99% pure U-238, a low radioactivity, long half-life form of uranium. From here, it is sent to other sites (such as Yongbyon) where it is converted into highly enriched U-235 which can be used for bomb production.

However, its operations have been scaled down and it has been in caretaker status since perhaps as far back as 2002.

But although uranium production has been shunted to the more modern Pyongsan, Pakchon's caretaker status certainly doesn't mean abandoned. Recent satellite imagery suggests at least some limited operations are still ongoing and that the regime has been fairly active in maintaining the complex. The continued importance of Pakchon in the country's nuclear program is evidenced by the fact that the United States was interested in having it permanently closed and dismantled as one of five nuclear facilities offered up by North Korea in exchange for sanctions relief. 

When I first wrote about the site in 2019, I noted two buildings that were either being demolished or that had been left to fall apart. Since then, commercial satellite imagery from Sept. 14, 2021 shows that one of those buildings has been completely reconstructed. Additionally, a repaired section of roof on the main milling building can be identified.

The imagery also shows that the complex's administrative section has seen construction and that the waste material reservoir is still being used.

The nearby mine that provides uranium-bearing ore has also been continually active. Whether it's sending its full production to the Pyongsan Uranium Mill or diverting small amounts to Pakchon, I can't say, but the improvements made at Pakchon suggests that the ore from the mine would likely one day be sent back to Pakchon if it becomes reactivated in the future.


Taking these changes one-by-one, the first I'll talk about is the reconstruction of the thermal building which provides extra electricity for the plant. 

Thermal plant as seen on March 19, 2012.

In the above image from 2012, the thermal plant complex is clearly visible. Coal is housed in the bulk storage building where it is then moved uphill via a conveyor belt to the generating hall. The coal ash is then dumped outside of the building in a pile next to the conveyor where it accumulates until removed.

In 2019, the generator hall was being demolished.


By October 2019, the generating hall had been torn down to its foundations.

There is a gap in the Google Earth imagery, but by September 2021, a new structure can be seen.


The absence of a conveyor system, either above or below ground, suggests that construction to modernize the plant may not yet be complete.

Nearby are two other unidentified support buildings that have been left to fall apart.

Building #1 has a partially collapsed roof while building #2 is missing its roof entirely.

 

In this image, from right to left, you can follow the production process as described by the Center for Strategic International Studies.

The September 14, 2021 image also shows that a section of roof has been repaired in the section of the production building that is responsible for drying and filtering the yellowcake uranium before it is shipped out.


Pakchon's waste reservoir is split into two reservoirs, an upper and a lower one, divided by an earthen dam. The area of the reservoir that is filled with waste is approximately 3.4 hectares, with the upper section usually being filled with water and the lower section containing sludge and newer waste materials.

While the size of the reservoir hasn't changed in at least 17 years, the sludge pool has seen continued activity, particularly in the last few years. 

Beginning in 2019, a new staging area was constructed to accommodate vehicles and other equipment involved in the management of the reservoir. The staging area covers roughly 2,900 sq. .m. 


One other section of the Pakchon complex that has seen recent activity is in the administrative area. In 2019 a new theater/assembly hall was constructed over the course of the year.

The new hall is on top of substantial construction work that happened between 2008 and 2012, when nearly every current structure visible was either renovated or added.

Additionally, the fish farm that exists next to the administrative area had more modern facilities built in 2019-2020. These fish farms can be found throughout the country and help provide needed protein to local workers, military personnel, and the fish can even be exported to earn the country foreign currency.  


While none of this activity suggests full-scale operations have resumed at the concentration plant, it does support the idea that, like Punggye-ri, the site remains part of the country's nuclear program and may be ready to resume limited production should the order come.

As Joseph Bermudez wrote for CSIS back in 2019 about the low-level activity that can be observed, "the most likely explanations for this activity would be small processing runs of iron-bearing ore of some type, caretaker maintenance work, or decommissioning of equipment within the plant." 

However, with the newer imagery and changes, I would like to suggest that some of the activity could be part of pollution mitigation efforts or reprocessing older ore/waste material to extract small amounts of formerly discarded minerals (an activity seen at certain mining sites in recent years).


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Rinmanah, and Russ Johnson.

--Jacob Bogle, 12/24/2021
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