The city of
Samjiyon after reconstruction. Image: KNCA, December 2019.
Introduction
After the Korean War, North Korea had to be entirely
rebuilt. Very few buildings, bridges, railways, or factories survived those
three years. With substantial aid from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and China Kim Il-sung managed to rebuild most of the country by the mid-1960s
and North Korea’s economy outpaced that of South Korea until ca. 1973.
Reforming the economy along socialist lines, introducing
Stalinist architecture, and mobilizing millions really did mean that “socialist
construction” was more than a mere slogan. And for many, who had for centuries
lived in abject poverty, a paradise of sorts did arise in the beginning. But
far from being a true socialist and self-sufficient state, North Korea relied
on massive amounts of aid and imports at below-market prices, so-called
“friendship prices”, from the Communist Bloc. New bureaucracies and elite
classes (built upon the Songbun class system) also meant that the people
were never on an equal footing, despite the official Party line.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the famine, Kim
Jong-il struggled but failed to pull the country out of its economic decline. A
mix of economic reforms, market activities, and growing illegal trade did mean
that things slowly improved; however, economic conditions still have yet to
fully recover from the famine years.
Every year, the leadership and the Workers’ Party of Korea
offers new economic agendas and promises new successes toward the construction
of a socialist paradise – a paradise that ever seems just out of reach. However,
Kim Jong-un has taken the task about as seriously as one can, considering the
huge expenditures on the military and the political and ideological constraints
that exist.
Kim Jong-un appears to have recognized the economic drag the
Songun Policy was causing through mismanagement and inefficient resource
allocation, and also paid attention to the threats the state faced by
ever-growing market-based activities and decided to take a different approach
than Kim Jong-il.
He certainly wanted to complete the nuclear
program as it practically guarantees regime survival, but there also needed
to be economic growth and reforms. Not “reform” in the sense of opening up to
the world and scrapping the centrally planned economy, but reform as in
renovating the existing system to become more efficient, to seek new ways to
evade sanctions, and help the government reign in market activity outside of
its purview.
In 2013, Kim began to move away from Songun and toward
a policy that had been promoted by Kim Il-sung called Byungjin
(parallel development). Kim Jong-un’s iteration of Byungjin prioritizes both
nuclear development and economic development, and theoretically, not one over
the other. The economic development portion is focused on light and medium industry,
tourism, science and technology, transportation, and energy, whereas under Kim
Jong-il’s Songun, he had wanted to maintain an economic focus on heavy industry
to support military requirements; often neglecting the rest of the economy and
preventing any meaningful rise in people’s living standards.
The topic of living standards has been something Kim Jong-un
hasn’t ignored. During the 2013 WPK meeting in which he promulgated his ideas
for Byungjin, Kim stressed that it would lead to a “strong and prosperous
nation where the people can enjoy the wealth and splendor of socialism.”
While weapons’ development certainly hasn’t taken a back seat,
the number of major construction projects skyrocketed after Kim’s ascent to
power. Touching every sector of the economy and culture, the proliferation of
new projects has changed the face of the country, as Kim has staked a considerable part of his legitimacy on
domestic policies and the economy.
Whether or not these projects are merely shallow attempts at
propaganda wins or will make a fundamental difference in people's lives and the
economy is largely up for debate as it will take more than concrete and steel
to cause the fundamental reforms needed for lasting economic growth.
Tourism
Chair lift at the
Masikryong Ski Resort. Image credit:
Uri
Tours, Jan. 28, 2014.
CC SA 2.0.
Early on in his rule, Kim Jong-un made tourism a key aspect
of his economic plan. With the ultimate goal of welcoming over two
million foreign visitors by 2020 and increasing domestic tourism as well,
Kim was looking forward to turning North Korea into a regional tourist
destination – with all the cash tourists bring along with it. To help accomplish
this, the government embarked on several high-profile construction projects.
The first was to continue work that began with Kim Jong-il,
modernizing the Pyongyang-Sunan International Airport and adding a new
terminal. The work, which began in 2011, carried on until 2015. The new
terminal is six times
larger than the old one, but tellingly, the airport’s fuel center was not
enlarged. With only a few international flights into Pyongyang each week, exactly how
and why thousands of new passengers would flock to the country remained
unsolved.
To drive up interest in visiting the country, in 2013 Kim
ordered the construction of the Masikryong Ski Resort. At a cost of $35 million
and with a capacity to handle 70,000
visitors a year, it opened that same year and was North Korea’s first ski
resort open to the general public. Two others had earlier been constructed in
the Mt. Paektu region, but they were only available to the country’s elite and
special guests.
Following Masikryong, a smaller ski facility was constructed
in Kanggye-ri in 2017. The country’s oldest ski facility, in Samjiyon, was
modernized in 2018 and another nearby facility that was constructed in 2001 (Pukphothae-san)
was likewise renovated and may now be opened to a larger segment of the
population; although, it hasn’t been mentioned by state media.
Waterparks were constructed in several major cities, with
Pyongyang’s Munsu Waterpark boasting 14 waterslides spread out over 15
hectares. Kim Jong-un also oversaw the opening of the Rungra amusement park and
directed the construction of numerous athletic facilities.
But perhaps the largest tourism-related project in the
country’s history was the reconstruction of the Wonsan (Kalma) International
Airport and the construction of the Wonsan Resort.
Converting the military-use Wonsan airport into a dual-use
international airport for tourists and the air force began in 2013. The old
2,400-meter runway was replaced by two runways of 3,100 and 3,500 meters, and a
modern terminal was constructed along with helicopter facilities.
The renovation cost between $150-200 million but its only
major use thus far has been as the host airport for KPA Air Force airshows and
to provide service to occasional passengers from intra-DPRK flights and
government officials.
Kim Jong-un has taken a special interest in Wonsan as it’s
home to his favorite seaside villa. Back in 2013 he expressed disappointment over
the lack of recreational opportunities in the region and ordered that the area
become a “world-class” tourism destination. These desires became the
Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Zone.
Work along the beach didn’t begin until 2018 when nearly 5
km of beachfront property suddenly sprang to life all at once with construction
equipment and workers. Kim has visited the area on multiple occasions and has offered specific
criticism along the way. Trying to meet his demands added to the complexity of
the project that was initially expected to open in April 2019. That deadline
has been moved back several times and the resort, with its hotels, luxury inns, and condos capable of handling thousands of visitors a day is still
not completed.
Somewhat more successful was the reconstruction of the city
of Samjiyon. A major part of Kim’s tourism agenda from 2018-2020, modernizing
Samjiyon and the whole Mt. Paektu region held added importance as the
mountain is the mythical home of the Korean people and was the alleged
headquarters of Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla army who fought against the Japanese
during their occupation, and thus, it is the home North Korea’s
independence.
The stated goal for the town’s reconstruction was to turn it
into
a “utopia town under socialism” as it is “the sacred place of the revolution”. The
whole transportation corridor from Hyesan to Samjiyon was also modernized.
Construction in other towns took place as well, with nearby Phothae also being
rebuilt almost entirely. Over 40 km of road, 60 km of rail, and 10 train
stations were either rebuilt or newly constructed, and new apartment blocks and
houses were built in Wiyon, Junghung, Kasan-ri, Pochon, Thongnam, Poso, and
other locales in the region.
Samjiyon and the surrounding villages have a population of
35,000-40,000. Nearly all of the homes have been rebuilt, along with schools,
theaters, clinics, and farming facilities. A further thousand homes were
reportedly constructed in 2021 as part of the ‘third phase’ of construction.
Kim Jong-un has visited the area at least ten
times, underscoring its importance to the leadership. Like his father, he
hasn’t indulged in building monuments to himself, but he must maintain the
people’s loyalty. By constantly reminding citizens that he is Kim Il-sung’s
descendant and that he is investing in the quasi-holy ground around Mt. Paektu,
Kim bolsters his own legitimacy and personality cult.
Various proposals to turn the Mt. Paektu region into
international biospheres and parks, such as a proposal to turn it into a UNESCO
Global Geopark, have also been made over the years. What effect the recent
changes to the area and increased population might have on these ideas is unknown, particularly as deforestation continues to threaten the existence
of several endangered species that live in the area.
Aside from the international situation and the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, Kim’s plans to turn North Korea into a regional tourism
hotspot may run into other more fundamental difficulties. After reviewing
satellite imagery, as I wrote for NK
News in 2019, I was unable to find adequate water treatment facilities.
What little energy infrastructure has been built hardly seems enough for the
proposed numbers of visitors during peaks months as well.
Access to Samjiyon is restricted to rail and road, with the
risk of power outages interrupting the trip always a possibility. There are also
no tour packages that would allow someone to only visit the beaches at Wonsan. If
you don’t want to be driven around Pyongyang or visit the DMZ while also going
to Wonsan, you’re out of luck.
Limitations on freedom of movement, difficulties in crafting
a personalized itinerary, and the prospect of blackouts (or knowing that your
waste may be being dumped into the sea), doesn’t make the country a good
prospect for mass tourism, even if you solved all of the geopolitical and human
rights issues.
Foreign tourism has never been a major contributor to the
economy. Prior to the Trump administration's ban on US tourism to the country in
2019, it was estimated that only $5
million came from American visitors. To compare to another money-earning
‘enterprise’, in 2020 North Korean hackers stole nearly $400
million worth of cryptocurrencies.
Of course, after a series of high-profile arrests and the
tragic death of Otto Warmbier, it became clear that American tourists weren’t
the regime’s focus to begin with. And official media has said as much, with the
government preferring to focus on drawing in tourists from China, South Korea, and
other East Asian countries. However, the tourist destinations that had been
completed in time, before COVID disrupted travel around the world, had managed
to only moderately improve the numbers of visitors to North Korea with between
250,000 and 350,000 foreign guests making the trip in 2019 depending on the
estimates used. Well below the 2 million tourists Kim had wanted by 2020.
Two areas that have improved due to the domestic tourism
push have been hot springs spas and regional amusement parks.
In October 2019 residents began moving into a new hot
springs complex that was constructed in Yangdok. Kim Jong-un has visited the
site more than once, taking the opportunity to be photographed with bathing
locals. Yangdok also includes a skiing facility, but that was closed down (along
with most recreational facilities) in the wake of COVID-19. However, preparations
to reopen
Yangdok and Masikryong were being made in November 2021.
Efforts to renovate the elite hot springs at Onpho
began in late 2018 following Kim Jong-un’s lamentation that the site was in “very
bad condition, saying bathtubs for hot spring therapy are dirty, gloomy and
unsanitary for their poor management.”
Although, it seems that economic crisis has slowed work on
the site, and it has yet to be publicly opened again, even though it has long
been a place where the country’s elite (and the Kim family) would visit.
As briefly mentioned above, waterparks and other
recreational and leisure centers have popped up all over the country. I’ve
located 17 soccer fields and stadiums just in Pyongyang that have been
constructed or renovated in the last decade, at least 158 ‘Children’s
Traffic Parks’ have been constructed since 2017 around the country, open-air
theaters have been built in each provincial capital, and waterparks of
varying sizes, from Haeju’s 38,000 sq. m. park to Kanggye’s at only around 5,200
sq. m., were also added in each province.
While not tourism in the traditional “let’s go have fun and
see the sights” sense, places
of pilgrimage geared toward a domestic audience have also seen some
improvements. Select museums dedicated to “American atrocities” during the
Korean War, like at Sinchon, and some
locations dedicated to the Kim family have been modernized. Other improved sites span from the Mt. Paektu region to the International Friendship Exhibition.
On the other hand, North Korea has hundreds of ancient
forts, temples, pavilions, and pagodas, exposure to which could enrich the
lives of every North Korean (and even help the regime’s propaganda), but most
remain out of sight or ignored, left to decay into nothing as the sites
promoted by the government are still heavily focused on modern propaganda.
Flood Recovery & Afforestation Efforts
Flooding is a perennial problem in North Korea, creating
both losses of life and loss of harvests. The country has experienced several
severe floods in recent years that together have affected the majority of the
country, from the city of Sariwon in the south to Hoeryong in the far
northeast.
North Korea’s proactive flood mitigation efforts have
largely been pinned on the construction of dams to hold back rivers, but heavy
rainfall and narrow river valleys often negate or overwhelm these measures.
Dikes and levees have also been notoriously weak, leaving thousands of people
and thousands of hectares at risk each year. But it seems that the government
is finally taking flooding much more seriously.
For example, the town of Yonsa has experienced two major
floods since 2016. After the first one, the riverbanks were washed away taking
houses and the local stadium site with the floodwaters. New houses and levees
were built but then another flood in 2020 erased the levees and knocked out a
bridge.
This 2020 flood was part of a year that saw three typhoons
affect the country. Following the flooding, Kim Jong-un began touring the sites
from farming villages along the Chaeryong River in North Hwanghae Province to
Komdok in the country’s north.
These visits gave Kim the appearance of being a hands-on
leader who cared about getting people’s lives back together.
The result, hundreds of new homes were constructed in North
Hwanghae and around 2,300
were rebuilt in Komdok (which is now in the process of being totally reconstructed
and turned into a more modern mining region).
Flood-related construction can also be seen in Musan, home
to the country’s largest iron mine, in Hoeryong (which also suffered heavily
during the 2016 flood), Komusan, and up and down the valleys of the Hamgyong
provinces. Within North Hwanghae, housing in the small villages around Myosong,
Jithap, and Taechong was rebuilt, and a new neighborhood was constructed in
Unpha.
It will take another typhoon or flooding event to know if
the kilometers of new levees will hold and if the thousands of new homes can
stand up to the weather, but 2020 certainly initiated a large number of
construction programs in even some of the smallest towns in the country.
Flooding isn't the cause of deforestation, but afforestation can certainly help with flooding. The country has struggled with deforestation
since the famine and as wood stoves and heating stand in for electricity
shortages, and Kim Jong-un has directed several policies toward addressing the
issue.
Denuded hillsides can’t absorb as much water and contribute
to flooding as well as soil degradation, which makes agriculture more
difficult, so planting trees is an integral part of both flood control and
increasing crop yields without having to spend huge sums of money.
In 2012 Kim wrote a policy paper “On the revolutionary
switch in land management” which discussed forest management and the need for
major afforestation efforts. This was followed by a two-day conference on
deforestation and soil health in 2013 which dozens of North Korean scientists
attended.
These events culminated in the “10-year plan of Forest
Restoration” that runs from 2015 to 2024.
He also declared “war” against deforestation and in 2015
North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong told
the United Nations that the country aimed to decrease its CO2 emissions by 37%.
While it’s unlikely that North Korea’s carbon footprint has declined much
(outside of the effects of COVID on the economy), Kim Jong-un has ordered the
construction of several tree nurseries and the renovation of forest management
stations to combat deforestation.
Afterward, large tree nurseries began to pop up all over the
country. They can be found in Kanggye, Rason, Sariwon, Heaju, Pyongyang,
Kangdong, Sinuiju, Jungphyong, Wonsan, and Hamhung. Improvements to many of the
country’s smaller forestry management stations can also be seen.
In total, Kim’s war on deforestation envisions over a
million hectares of new forests with tens of millions of saplings being grown
at any given time. To underscore the state’s seriousness, he has visited several of
the new nurseries in person.
This initiative faces major odds, however. Around 30% of
forest cover was lost between 1990 and 2010 and around 15,000
hectares are further lost each year. Between slash-and-burn agriculture,
forest fires, droughts, and damaging insect infestations, just halting
deforestation will become a major accomplishment if successful.
Powering the Country
North Korea has never had an abundance of electricity, but
it had enough to meet its basic needs up until the 1970s. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist Bloc, North Korea was no longer able
to get coal and heavy fuel oil at discounted prices. Additionally, the country
lacked the capacity to repair or replace parts in their aging power plants and
struggled to keep up with rising energy needs through hydroelectricity.
Compounding the problem is the fact that much of the energy
grid infrastructure and design is now 40+ years old. Energy loss through leaks and
inefficient designs can cost North Korea up to 30% of its electricity.
The government has made some attempts at increasing
generation through traditional thermal power plants, though, Pyongyang’s
central plant is far too old to simply be repaired and the country would need
considerable foreign assistance to modernize the plant.
Begun under Kim Jong-il in 2010-2011 the Kangdong Thermal
Plant was supposed to supply the capital with between 200 and 300 MW of
coal-powered electricity. Construction work proceeded after Kim Jong-un took
over and by 2013, the cooling tower was being raised and ten apartment
buildings for workers and their families were in various states of
construction. Work stalled out by 2014, however, and quickly came to an end.
Some work finally resumed ca. 2019/2020 and the structural supports for two boilers can now
be seen, but the plant is still far from being completed.
Between 2015 and
2018, two new generating units were added to the Pukchang Thermal Plant, which
provides energy to the country’s only aluminum plant and is the country’s
largest thermal power plant. The completion date is speculated to have been moved up in response to Kim Jong-un’s
2018 New Year’s speech in which he called on the country to “drastically
increase thermal power generation”. The expansion added 400 MW of electricity
capacity when working at full efficiency.
Additionally,
the power plant in Songbon, which had relied on fuel oil, was converted into a typical coal-fired power plant, as the
country’s supply of petroleum has been squeezed. Work on the conversion appears
to have been completed in 2020.
However, these improvements to fossil fuel power plants haven’t
been enough to put an end to blackouts. Lacking the domestic capability to
build new fossil fuel power plants, energy policy under Kim Jong-un has instead
focused on hydroelectricity and it has slowly begun to look toward solar and
wind power as well.
The unreliability of hydroelectricity in North Korea has
been an ongoing problem, as droughts are common and water levels can fall below
what is needed to turn the turbines. Many of the major dams in the country were
also constructed in the early 20th century and are aging, producing
less electricity in the process.
To help overcome these problems, dozens of small and
medium-sized hydroelectric generators have been constructed in the last decade,
and there’s also been a renewed push to install micro-generators in the
numerous small streams that cover the country. These micro-generators are only
enough to power a house or two but they can be used to run local grain mills or keep the lights on in the local clinic, helping to bring at least some
electricity to the smallest communities.
On the larger side of things, the Huichon Dam was finally
completed under Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-il’s anger over years of delays and
problems with the dam is one
theory as to what caused his heart attack in 2011.
Huichon is the first dam in a series of hydroelectric dams
that run along the Chongchon River. Over the course of 65 km, there are twelve
dams – eleven were built under Kim Jong-un. Between the main dam and the other
smaller ones, the installed generating capacity reaches 400-500 MW, enough to theoretically
power almost half a million homes in ideal circumstances. But problems at
Huichon continue and with fluctuating water levels, it’s likely the entire
system operates at less than 75% capacity.
Other important hydroelectric projects include the Orangchon-Phalhyang
Hydroelectric Dam that was completed in 2019 after twenty years of
construction, the building of two dams along the Chungman River (in Usi
County), the Wonsan
Army-People hydroelectric project, and the Paektusan Hero Youth
Power Stations – all being completed or initiated by Kim.
The last hydroelectric project I’ll mention is Tanchon.
Planning to squeeze electricity out of the Hochon River system in Ryanggang
Province dates back to a Japanese plan for the area beginning in 1925. North
Korea’s own plans were envisioned by Kim Il-sung, but it wasn’t until 2016 when
work began on what is the largest hydroelectric project in the country’s history.
It involves a 60-km-long tunnel that carries water out of
the Samsu Reservoir, south (against the direction of the river) to a hydroelectric
station in the Worker’s District of Sinhung in South Hamgyong Province. COVID
has delayed its completion and only moderate
progress has been made since 2019.
North Korea has experimented with wind and solar for
decades, but only ever at small scales. And while the price of solar panels
fell and citizens began to use them on their own, the government was still slow
to adopt the new technologies. That’s changed somewhat in the last decade.
Although there still hasn’t been any large-scale production
of wind or solar, several
small facilities have been constructed and microturbines can be seen at
several collective farms. Additionally, North Korean firms have begun to manufacture
the turbines domestically instead of relying solely on importing them from
China.
Today, experts place solar at providing less than 1% of the
nation’s total energy, yet, upwards
of 55% of North Korean households rely on solar energy at some level,
either using it to power their entire home or by having small panels just to
charge cell phones or single appliances. The government has also been adding
larger panels to new construction projects and residential towers. These panels
can easily be spotted in satellite imagery.
Wind and solar may not yet be enabling factories to run, but
they are democratizing electricity in a way that hadn’t existed in the country
before. With photovoltaic panels available in the markets, people whose
neighborhoods aren’t even connected to the national grid can now keep a light
on at night or help their local school run its equipment, all without relying
on the central government.
Pyongyang’s Construction Boom
Major areas of new
construction and renovation under Kim Jong-un. Image: AccessDPRK.com
Modern Pyongyang has been referred to as Pyongyang 3.0 not only
because there’s a third Kim in charge, but because it has gone through three
distinct periods of construction and urbanization.
Kim Il-sung’s Pyongyang was the rebuilt showcase capital
born out of war. Kim Jong-il’s Pyongyang was crowned by the abandoned Ryugyong Hotel
and became a city frozen in time. With few modernization programs, it still
stressed the “‘monumentality’ and the reification of state ideology” with
little regard for the practical needs of the population.
The city’s main urban
area grew from 70 sq. km. in 1984 to over 103 sq. km. by 2017, but the most
impressive changes that have occurred involve the mix and density of new
buildings in the last decade, not merely outward suburbanization which is
something that remains a slow and organized process due to existing
administrative barriers.
The skyline of Kim Jong-un’s Pyongyang would be
all but unrecognizable to denizens from the 1960s and 70s. During his rule, he
has preferred to embark on the monumental,
not to the state, but in providing monumental housing projects, monumental
recreational facilities, and monumental economic/industrial construction –
setting his legitimacy not only in the completion of the country’s nuclear
forces but in raising living standards and attempting to pull the country out of
the economic quagmire that arose in the 1990s.
A number of housing projects had been initiated under Kim
Jong-il, particularly in the Rakrang District on the southern bank of the
Taedong River and in Hyongjesan to the north of downtown. These projects
involved dozens of buildings and thousands of housing units but were left
incomplete. Construction has carried on through the first decade of Kim
Jong-un’s rule and they have become part of his ‘grand plan’ to construct over
66,000 new housing units in the capital by 2025. This figure includes 16,000
that were already under construction at the time of his March 2021 announcement
and a further
50,000 to be built in several large sections throughout the city.
These new housing projects include a section of high-rise
apartments in the Sadong District, new apartments in the Mansu District where
the International Taekwondo Federation Headquarters used to be located, and
there are plans for more housing in the Mangyongdae
District.
As seen in the image above, there have also been numerous
individual apartment buildings added in various places along with new
factories, schools, and other facilities.
Two other major housing projects that were completed were the
Mirae Future Scientists Street along the Taedong River and the Ryomyong New Town.
Mirae involved construction along 1.2 km of Mirae Street and consists of some
of the tallest buildings in the country including the famous Unha Tower.
Completed in 2014, the development consists of 2,500 apartment units for
scientists, students, and staff from the Kim Chaek University of Technology.
Following Mirae was the 2017 opening of the Ryomyong
New Town. This redevelopment of land along Ryomyong Street by Kim Il-sung
University saw the construction of 40 new apartment buildings and the
renovation of a further 67 existing buildings of different types. The 2 km-long
development stretches from the giant Tower of Immortality to just before the
Kamsusan Palace of the Sun.
Kim Il-sung University has also been undergoing an expansion
that began in 2014 and has yet to be completed.
A major criticism, however, of these projects has been the
speed at which they were constructed. The tallest occupied building in North
Korea is the Ryomyong Condominium Building No. 1 which reaches 82 stories. It
was built in less than 3 months. Critics note that in the rest of the world, to
safely and properly construct a building that tall it would take around 2
years.
Building
collapses are not unknown in Pyongyang and land subsidence, a direct hit
from a typhoon, or an earthquake could one day topple many of the buildings.
Additionally, with power outages still a recurring event,
elevators can be a dangerous proposition, leaving the top floors in many
Pyongyang buildings unoccupied or used by the lowest-ranking citizens in the capital. The
lack of water pressure and fire suppression systems as a result of energy
shortages also makes the higher floors undesirable.
As with all other major towns in the country, a new
orphanage was constructed in 2014, the city’s amphitheater was renovated,
and multiple soccer fields and stadiums have either been constructed or
modernized. In the last decade, the Sunan International Airport was modernized,
at least four medical facilities have also been built in Pyongyang, a new
civilian airstrip was built along with a VIP heliport, the Victorious
Fatherland Liberation War Museum and the Korean Revolution Museum were both
enlarged, the Pyongyang Zoo was modernized, and there has been a wide range of
factories and workshops constructed covering well over 730,000 sq. meters
combined.
Updating the Provinces
While Pyongyang did see some new construction under Kim
Jong-il, particularly in the last few years of his life, the rest of the
country was largely left behind. Under Kim Jong-un, numerous towns and cities
of all sizes have experienced some level of modernization and expansion.
Whether in an attempt to prove the successes of the Byungjin
Line policy on the national economy or because the government recognized that
there was a very real need for modern housing and other facilities throughout
the country, dozens of population centers have benefited from new construction.
The cities of Sinuiju, Hwangju, Hamhung, Rason, Kanggye, Nampo,
Pyongsong, Sariwon, Kosan, Wonsan, Chongjin, Haeju, and most recently, the
Komdok mining region have all seen multiple construction projects ranging from
renovating their downtown areas to enlarging factories and building new
recreational facilities.
A few specific examples:
Komdok is currently in the middle of being reconstructed
almost entirely, with 25,000 new homes planned
by 2025 to turn Komdok into
“the world’s best mining town”. This is being accomplished through the use of
so-called “soldier builders,” who are merely members of the armed forces
conscripted into civilian construction projects as a source of free labor – a
very common practice in the country.
Sariwon has seen renovations of its downtown area, at least
20 mid-rise apartment buildings have been built, and nearly 13 hectares in the
city’s west now hosts nurseries, schools, and recreational facilities.
Like Sariwon, Kanggye is another provincial capital that has
seen substantial construction. Its stadium is being renovated, a plaza was
added in front of the People’s Palace of Culture, at least 25 new apartment
buildings have been constructed, three hydroelectric dams have been built downriver, and as mentioned in the tourism section, Kanggye has a small ski resort and
waterpark.
Outside of city facelifts, relatively large housing projects have been
constructed in Bukchang, Yongbyon,
Paekun, Yomju, Tongrim, Chollima, Chunghwa, Songchon, Pyongsan, Hwadae,
Tongchon, and Ongjin, just to name a few. Of the examples listed, these residences
provide space for as many as 8,200 families.
Children’s nurseries, orphanages, and new schools have been
built in each provincial capital. Additionally, the Ministry of Public Health announced as
part of their 2016-2020 plan to modernize 200 local hospitals outside of
Pyongyang. As many local clinics haven’t been positively identified via
satellite, it’s difficult to ascertain whether or not the government has been
successful at this, particularly if the changes were all on the interior (new
equipment, basic building maintenance, etc.), but we do know that the South
Hamgyong Provincial Hospital in Hamhung recently underwent renovations, as
did hospitals/clinics in at least Kanggye, Jasong, Samjiyon, in the village of Hunggyesu,
Sariwon, Songnim, Nampo, and Haeju.
Agriculture and Land Reclamation
During the Communist Bloc era, North Korea could rely on
‘friendship prices’ for just about everything and never managed to develop
food independence. Since then, Pyongyang has received nearly a billion dollars
worth of food aid from the United States alone since 1995 and it is in greater
need today than it has been in several years.
Famine, droughts, floods, and huge levels of mismanagement
have all plagued the country’s ability to feed itself. Yet, despite the oft-quoted fact that North Korea only has 17% arable land, it actually has 46% more
land dedicated to agriculture than South Korea and yet still produces
substantially less food.
It’s within this context and with the memory of famine and
belt-tightening that Kim Jong-un came to power proclaiming in 2012 that
he would banish hunger once and for all through a ‘scientific approach' to
agriculture and by going after corrupt officials.
Fast forward to 2021 and the government tacitly admits it’s
failed, telling the people to tighten their belts once again and to be prepared
to endure
hunger until at least 2025. Although the government is blaming the
situation on COVID, North Korea has needed to import food every year under Kim
Jong-un and received international food assistance most years.
As such, the food supply has featured heavily in Kim
Jong-un’s speeches and policy announcements. And indeed, many changes have been
seen. From policy changes allowing farmers to sell more of their surplus
produce to letting people have much larger “kitchen gardens”. And while these
changes may
have had a measurable impact in certain years, it’s clear they haven’t been
enough.
In concert with policy changes, Kim has also embarked on
several high-profile construction projects aimed at improving food supplies.
The Jangchon Vegetable Farm in Pyongyang has grown
substantially since 2013 and is touted
as being “a standard of the socialist rural cultural construction”. And in what
may be the largest single agricultural project of Kim Jong-un’s rule was the
development of the Sepho
Tableland. With projects spread across 30 sq. km. the development involved
everything from improving livestock grazing and production to increasing crop
yields in the area.
Another giant project that has continued to be developed is
the enlargement of the Kosan
Combined Fruit Farm in Kangwon. The fruit farm occupies more than 3,400
hectares, with hundreds of homes constructed throughout the plain, and was
redeveloped to allow for mechanized harvesting. And then there’s the Taedonggang
Fruit Farm in Pyongyang that extends for 9 km along the Taedong River.
On the other side of the country, the Jungphyong
Vegetable Greenhouse Farm and Tree Nursery was constructed from 2018 to
2020. The 130 hectares worth of greenhouses are meant to provide food during
the winter to Chongjin and the surrounding area.
Other large farms have that either been constructed or
enlarged during his rule can be found in Rason, Hamhung, Samjiyon, and in Wonsan,
where a full 1,000 hectares are currently being converted into greenhouses and
related facilities across from the Wonsan Villa. In 2018 there were also 430
hectares of land brought back into cultivation in Mubong, Ryanggang to increase
the production of potatoes, one of the regime’s most extolled crops.
And most recently, another large vegetable farm was announced,
this time at Ryonpho south of Hamhung. The 100-hectare site will be constructed
on the site of another airfield, as was the case with Jungphyong.
However, despite the creation of large ‘modern’ farms and
regional experimentations with letting farmers have full control over small
plots, food production has still fluctuated year-to-year, as natural disasters
and weather changes still play a far greater role in food production than
the state’s attempts to control the situation.
Beyond trying to boost crops, efforts into livestock have
also been made.
As mentioned above, the work at Sepho partially dealt with
grazing lands and around half a dozen livestock centers were constructed in the
process. Existing poultry farms in Sijuiju and Kusong were remodeled and a new
large poultry farm was constructed south of Pyongyang in 2019-2020 at Kwangchon.
In terms of other animals, the Phyongbuk Pig Farm was
remodeled in 2020 and in 2021 a new black
swan hatchery was established at the Kwangpho Duck Farm in Chongpyong. Fish
farms are also an important source of protein, with over 60,000 tons produced
each year between fresh and saltwater species.
Several examples of fish farms built in the last decade
include the Ongjin Coastal Fish Farm which has been increasingly developed over
time and encompasses nearly 3 sq. km, the Monggon Fish Farm was built in 2018,
Paechon Fish Farm No. 2 was established in 2017-18, a medium-sized facility was
constructed in Hungdok in 2016-17, and others in Hwanggok and Muggye were built
in 2016.
Existing fish farms have also been expanded or had
improvements made to their facilities such as the Sokmak Salmon Farm, Songdo
fish farm in Kaesong, the 22-hectare Poman fish farm, and the Samchon Catfish
Farm which can produce 3,000 tons a year.
Since the period of Japanese occupation through to today,
over 850 sq. km. of land in northern Korea has been reclaimed, either through
passive reclamation (letting enclosed areas silt up) or through actively
filling tidal flats and river deltas. The state of North Korea took up this
process after independence and has laid out multiple ambitious reclamation
plans over the decades.
The new areas can be used for everything from rice paddies
to salterns to aquaculture (sheltered fish farming) and are intended to make up
for the lack of arable land in the country.
Under Kim Jong-un, dozens of plots, large and small, have
been walled off from the sea and older projects begun by his predecessors such
as the Ryongmae Island Project and Taegye Island Reclamation Project have been
allowed to progress. The total area of the new sites, once completed,
will add over 160 sq. km. of territory. Kim has said that he wants to add
a total of 3,000 sq. km. of reclaimed land. In order to do this, however, the
country will have to destroy several whole habitats: tidal flats, marsh and
reed lands, and inter-island zones.
Marginal lands behind the West Sea Barrage and within the Kangryŏng
Reservoir that was created after the Kangryŏng Bay was dammed in 1984-87 have
slowly been turned into farmland, while some of the newer projects begun by Kim
Jong-un are so large that they’ll forever change the coastline of the country
and can be seen from space.
According to 38
North, twelve major reclamation projects are ongoing, with some having
been initiated before Kim Jong-un’s ascent. Some of the ones that were started
entirely by Kim Jong-un include projects around Sohae which encompass ~33 sq.
km., one near Kwaksan that will encompass 7.2 sq. km., and another between
Sinmi Island and Ansan that encompasses over 64 sq. km called the Honggondo
Tideland Reclamation Project.
With rising sea levels, it’s unclear what efforts in design and
construction have been made to prevent saltwater infiltration and to deal with
additional erosion. It’s also unclear if the country will reap more benefits
from rice production than they might have through fishing, shellfish
production, and other activities had the reclaimed areas been left as tideland
and marshes.
Transportation
New electric
locomotive model by the Kim Jong Thae Electric Locomotive Complex. Image
source: Rodong Sinmun, October 2020.
Adequate and modern transportation infrastructure has been
lacking for decades. Although North Korea has 7,435 km of railway and 25,554 km
of roads, the physical tracks and ties are decades old and most of the railcars
are over 30 years old. A lack of sufficient electricity also means that a two-day
railway trip using diesel locomotives could take 10
days using electric locomotives, which make up the bulk of North Korean
railways, as prolonged electricity cuts can be common.
Efforts have been made to modernize
the railcar fleet, with a new electric locomotive design being introduced in
2020, but most of the rail lines and rolling stock remain dated and in need of
considerable repair.
The country’s road network is another matter. The lack of
paved roads (less than 3% of the total) and winding mountain routes was chosen
on purpose by Kim Il-sung to slow any invasion in the event of a second Korean
War. Select roads and highways continue to be repaired as needed, particularly
within Pyongyang, but new road construction has been rather limited, with major
highway projects connecting Wonsan to Hamhung (began in 2012) and Hyangsan to
Huichon having been abandoned.
Although Pyongyang is still seeking Chinese
and Russian
investment in new road construction, there has yet to be any progress on the
ground despite various agreements signed years ago with the exception of the
New Yalu River Bridge which I discuss later on.
However, considerable effort has gone into enlarging and
modernizing the country’s main port facilities. As North Korea’s limited
foreign trade and fishing fleet are major lifelines, the aging ports needed a
facelift to facilitate both legal and illegal trade.
As the country’s primary port, Nampo’s port and oil
facilities, in particular, have undergone major improvements.
Constructed on the former site of the Nampo Smeltery, a
container port was added in the early 2000s and was later enlarged in 2011-13
to cover 21.3 hectares. A container gantry crane was added in 2019. A small
ship repair facility was also built nearby, opening in 2015.
Of larger concern to international sanctions, Nampo’s oil
and coal terminals have undergone improvements as well.
North Korea is prohibited from exporting coal yet managed to
earn as much as $410
million from coal exports in 2020. Several vessels were also noted to be
docking at the coal terminal that year which had seen the construction of a new
covered coal bay in 2016.
Nampo’s oil storage capacity has grown considerably. Two new
facilities have been constructed since 2016 and 14 new petrochemical storage
tanks have been built since 2011, dispersed among the several oil facilities
around the city. Foundations for a further 12 tanks also exist.
Many of the tanks are around 23 meters in diameter. If we
assume that all 14 new tanks average out to 23 meters in diameter and are a
conservative 10 meters tall, that gives an added maximum capacity of 29 million
liters of oil. In other words, Nampo alone has added over 187,600 barrels in
additional storage capacity under Kim Jong-un.
Other ports and harbors around the country have likewise
seen modernization efforts. At Chongjin, the country’s largest fishing harbor,
three new storage tanks have been constructed and several buildings within the
shipyard, manufacture, and repair complex were completely remodeled beginning
in 2018.
The ports and harbors at Changjon, Tongchon, Rangsong-ri,
and Muchon-Koam have all seen improvements. At Tanchon, an entirely new harbor
was constructed from 2010 to 2012 and has been well maintained ever since. Then
there are the facilities in Rason (Rajin-Sonbong) which have undergone small
but continual work ever since the creation of the Rason Special Economic Zone
in the 1990s.
North Korea has 19 road and rail connections with its
neighbors. Under Kim Jong-un, ten of them have been modernized and their
capacities expanded. The freight regauging yard at the Tumangang Station
connecting North Korea and Russia has been in the process of being upgraded,
and construction on new customs facilities began back in 2017.
In a process that took a decade to complete, the Wonchong
border crossing with China (just up the river from Tumangang) was constructed
and provides a 4-lane bridge connection.
The Namyang-Tumen
border crossing was completed in 2020 as part of a project that also saw 42
apartment buildings built.
New or enlarged customs facilities have also been
constructed at Sambong, Hoeryong, Hyesan, Chunggang, and Manpo. And an entirely
new overland border crossing was constructed north of Samjiyon. The single-lane
road cuts through the forests before hitting the Chinese border and was
established in 2014; although, it is not a regular commercial border crossing
and seems to have limited use.
However, North Korea’s most symbolic cross-border
connection, the New Yalu River Bridge, still has yet to be opened.
Construction of the newest official Sino-DPRK crossing point began in
2011 and is estimated to have cost $350 million, but due to multiple delays and
eventually COVID, the opening has been postponed for years. The bridge wasn’t
even connected to the country’s road system until 2021 and none of the customs
facilities have been constructed.
Mass transit upgrades
have also been made in Pyongyang specifically. New subway cars have been
introduced and the city has slowly been updating its tram and bus fleet, as
some buses from the 1970s can still be found traversing the streets.
Between 44 and 100 Chollima-321 trollies have been
manufactured since the refurbishment of the Pyongyang Trolley Bus Factory in
2018 (after getting Kim’s personal approval). Twenty were sent
to Wonsan to improve inter-city transportation in anticipation of greater
traffic due to the Wonsan Resort, but the majority remain in use in the capital.
And most recently, the city is in the process of building
its first subway
extension since the primary lines were completed in the 1970s. Based on the
visible tunnel excavation points, the subway extension will run for
approximately 3.5 km from the current Kwangbok Station to a new station that
will be located somewhere near the Mangyongdae Children's Palace. Although
planning for the extension goes back many years, active construction along the
whole line wasn’t occurring until 2019 and continues through to today.
Lastly, a former 30 km-long railway segment from Hyangsan to
Unsal is in the process of being reconstructed along with at least one new
train station. The line had been decommissioned in the 1990s. This is the
longest segment of railway that I am aware of that has either been
recommissioned or completely overhauled other than the Hyesan to Samjiyon line.
Conclusions
Whether they’re prestige mega-projects or simply new housing
to keep up with population growth, construction has been a major theme
throughout Kim Jong-un’s first decade.
Over 100,000 housing units have either been constructed
or are planned nationwide. Provincial theaters, orphanages, and tree nurseries
have popped up with regularity. And, of course, the regime has spent countless
millions on military
construction as well.
Some of these projects have had real impacts on the people’s
lives and fulfills part of the state’s pledge to build a nation for the people.
Whether it’s housing, recreation, or water purification sites, one cannot argue
that there hasn’t been some improvement. However, Pyongyang continues to
misallocate millions on tourist projects that will never draw in millions of
visitors and on projects that only have propaganda value, that only serves to
divert money away from much more needed infrastructure projects like updating
the national power grid or improving water quality.
And despite what could be a billion-dollar construction
spree over the last decade, many of the projects appear to be superficial and
will have little real impact on the economy so long as North Korea continues to
isolate itself and arrest foreigners for things that wouldn’t be criminal in
the rest of the world.
At $40 a ticket, most North Koreans can’t afford to go
skiing. With precious few international flights to Pyongyang, there’s yet to be
a substantial uptick in the number of tourists. And even all of the residential
construction comes with caveats. Elevators don’t always work, and water can’t
be pumped up to the top floors of the tallest buildings rendering those floors
uninhabitable. The lack of electricity also affects everything from mass
transit to the ability of hospitals to perform their services.
COVID-19 also set several projects behind from the Wonsan
Resort to the Tanchon Hydroelectric Project, hampering associated developments
and preventing additional electricity capacity from coming online.
And so, while projects have proliferated to every corner of
the country, it is difficult to assess their real impact in this current climate,
recalling that other prestige projects in the past actually helped to plunge
the country into economic collapse instead of helping.
~ ~ ~ ~
I have scheduled this
project to run through to the end of the year, with a new article coming
out roughly every 10 days or so. If you would like to support the project and
help me with research costs, please consider supporting AccessDPRK on Patreon. Those
supporters donating $15 or more each month will be entitled to a final PDF
version of all the articles together that will also have additional information
included once the series is finished. They will also receive a Google Earth map
related to the events in the series, and can get access to the underlying data
behind the supplemental reports.
Supporters at other levels will be sent each new article a
day before it’s published and will also receive a mention as seen below.
I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O.,
GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, and Russ Johnson.
--Jacob Bogle, 2/1/2022
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