Showing posts with label Samsu-Sinhung. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Samsu-Sinhung. Show all posts

Friday, July 3, 2020

Largest Hydroelectric Project in DPRK Heads Toward Completion

North Korea is no stranger to mega projects. The May Day Stadium (largest seating capacity in the world), Ryugyong Hotel (the abandoned "hotel of doom" that would have been the tallest in the world back in 1992), and the West Sea Barrage (an 8-km long dam across the mouth of the Taedong River) all bear witness to North Korea's willingness to expend enormous resources on enormous projects, even if they don't always work out as planned.

One such current mega project is the Tanchon Hydroelectric Power Station.


Despite being named for the coastal city of Tanchon, the project centers around the border area between Ryanggang and South Hamgyong provinces, specifically around the worker's district of Sinhung, 53 km away from Tanchon as the crow flies. However, this isn't a run-of-the-mill hydroelectric dam. It is a massive complex that starts at a new water intake point at the Samsu Reservoir (near Hyesan) and then carries water through a roughly 60 km-long tunnel to the electricity generating stations in Sinhung. The tunnel is the longest such tunnel in the country and makes this the largest hydroelectric project currently underway by North Korea.

The next longest water tunnel for hydroelectricity that I am aware of is the Songwon Dam tunnel. Constructed in 1987, it runs a mere 42 km.


The Tanchon project is actually part of a larger attempt to take advantage of the rivers and steep valleys of this region. The northerly-flowing Hochon River is the primary source of water. The northern extreme is the Samsu Dam and reservoir, which lie less than 10 km from Hyesan and the Yalu River border with China (into which the Hochon empties).

In this complicated image you can see the path of the Hochon River (blue), flowing south to north. That water fills the Samsu Reservoir where the water intake site is located for the Tanchon project. That water is then diverted through a tunnel (white) where it travels north to south (against the natural gradient of the area). It will then enter the dual Tanchon generating stations in the small town of Sinhung. From there, it empties into the Namdeachon River (yellow) which flows north to south and empties into the sea at the city of Tanchon.

Moving south (aka upriver), lies the Sachophonyg Reservoir which feeds the Hochongang Power Station in Sinhung (11.8 km away and is adjacent to the new Tanchon generating stations). Both the Hochongang Power Station and the new Tanchon stations empties the waters of the Hochon River into the Namdaechon River, across a sort of continental divide thanks to the tunnels, as the Namdaechon then runs south and empties into the Sea of Japan, whereas the headwaters of the Hochon arise in the Hamgyong Mountains (also known as Gangbaekjeonggan) which create a natural border between Ryanggang and South Hamgyong provinces.


Being built at the same time as Tanchon is a smaller hydroelectric dam on the Hochon at Saphyong-ri (pictured above) and a hydroelectric dam at Sinhung (also called Power Station No. 5) on the Namdaechon River that is less than 2 km from the new Tanchon generating station.

Exploiting this riverine resource goes back nearly a century. During the Japanese occupation era, Yutaka Kubota (founder of the Japanese engineering firm Nippon Koei) was a consultant for the Hochongang River Overall Project from 1925-45, and the project was expected to eventually generate 338 MW of electricity.

Samsu Dam ca. 2011. The large propaganda sign in the background reads "Long live Songun Korea's General Kim Jong Un!" and is over half a kilometer long. Image source: Wikimapia.

In terms of North Korean efforts, the Samsu Hydroelectric Dam alone was supposed to produce 50 MW of electricity to provide for Ryanggang Province and the important Hyesan Youth Copper Mine. Built from 2004-2007, the dam was beset with problems and still fails to live up to expectations.

Kim Il Sung introduced the modern idea of exploiting the rivers in the area in the years soon before his death and wanted the project to generate 400-500 MW. But it wasn't until 2016 when Kim Jong Un announced the construction of the Tanchon Power Station that work finally began. According to a May 2017 Pyongyang Times report, the project is supposed to generate "several hundred thousand of kilowatts" and would indeed be the largest hydroelectric project in the country's history.

During Kim Jong Un's 2016 New Years' address he said, "The problem of electricity should be resolved as an undertaking involving the whole Party and the whole state." Giving little detail about the project he went on to say, "The construction of the Tanchon Power Station and other projects for boosting the country’s power-generating capacity should be promoted along with the efforts to ease the strain on electricity supply by making proactive use of natural energy." 

Such an undertaking would indeed require the effort of the "whole state".

As discussed in the Songwon article, one reason to not locate the electric generating station at the site of a dam or to excavate miles of tunnels to divert water elsewhere, is to take advantage of a substantial change in elevation. The greater the difference between the elevation of where the water is stored (in this case the Samsu Reservoir) and where it runs through the turbines at the generating station, the greater the power generated.


The approximate elevation of the water intake site at Samsu is 2,500 ft above sea level. The tunnel cuts through mountains and valleys on a downhill gradient to deliver the water to a point roughly 1,800 feet above sea level. This represents a 700-foot drop, something no existing traditional hydroelectric dam in the country could provide. For some perspective, to otherwise maintain a hydraulic head of 700 feet would require a traditional dam on the scale of the Glen Canyon Dam in the United States.

The elevation drop also allows a relatively small amount of water to pick up momentum and hit the generating turbines with more energy, producing more electricity. Both the Songwon and Samsu water intake sites are placed at shallow ends of their respective reservoirs, meaning limited amounts of water can transit the tunnel system. This may seem counter intuitive, to only have a little water flowing through, but considering the number of droughts North Korea has, it could also allow for a more constant supply of electricity (albeit limited) but without draining the reservoirs or damaging the tunnels over time.


Despite all the work visible via satellite images, by March 2020 the project was only fifty-percent completed. On April 17 the regime announced that the number of "national projects" would be cut from 15 to 5 projects. One such project is the new Pyongyang General Hospital and it is consuming substantial resources from across the country.

However, according to the Pyongyang Times, by June construction was being "pushed dramatically" and key parts of the project are now nearing their "final stage". This jump in activity is a common theme among North Korean projects and suggests that Tanchon is one of those five main national projects still being given priority as their economy struggles due to COVID-19 measures and ongoing sanctions.

Once completed, Tanchon would be the culmination of generations of planning and levels of backbreaking work rarely seen in today's modern world.


The 60-kilometer tunnel was built by cutting dozens (over 50) of individual access tunnels into solid rock to slowly expand and lengthen the main water tunnel. North Korea lacks tunnel boring machines, so the work is being done with small excavation equipment and by hand.
The construction of the generating station will consume thousands of tons of concrete and steel, and its power distribution lines will run for untold miles connecting the site to the national energy grid.

Unfortunately, any projections that Tanchon will substantively ease regional energy needs should be taken with a grain of salt. As mentioned, Samsu Dam has failed to generate electricity at its designed capacity and other dams have likewise suffered from setbacks. Even the backbone of North Korea's energy grid like the Pyongyang and Pukchang thermal power plants are constantly plagued by generation and efficiency problems, and blackouts in Pyongyang itself are still a common occurrence.

However, if Tanchon does live up to the majority of expectations, it and the other hydroelectric stations along Hochon's 220 kilometers will finally surpass the planned generating capacity by the Japanese all those many years ago.


Additional reading:
38 North has been covering the construction progress of the Tanchon project. You can read their detailed work here and here. Also, see AccessDPRK's November 2020 update.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., Anders O., GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.

--Jacob Bogle, 7/2/2020
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Sunday, June 14, 2020

Powering Up North Korea

As anyone who has ever visited the country can attest, North Korea's electrical supply is limited and unreliable. Compared to its highly wired northern and southern neighbors, North Korea looks like a black hole, as this well-known NASA image shows.


North Korea has several rivers and an abundance of coal that it can exploit for electricity generation, but a lack of equipment, spare parts, technical know-how, and an inefficient electric grid has meant that providing stable power to the country (or even the capital) has been a never ending problem for decades.

To try and address the electricity problem, North Korea has been trying to mine ever larger amounts of coal (since building entirely new coal plants appears to be beyond their current capabilities due to cost and sanctions), constructing new hydroelectric dams, and making attempts to fix inefficiencies within the system.

The country uses three main types of hydroelectric generation: traditional hydroelectric dams, low-head hydroelectric generators which don't require large amounts of water, and gravity pumped hydroelectric generators which can be used to supplement the energy supply. One major problem with hydroelectricity production is the region's weather which leaves the country in drought conditions fairly often. Since the water is most needed for crop irrigation, a stable nationwide supply of electricity from this source has yet to be achieved.

To help mitigate this problem, North Korea has begun to move away from building giant hydroelectric dams and is switching to building smaller dams that run along the course of a river as a set. Their combined electrical generating capacity can be large but without the constant problems the country has encountered while building larger dams. 38 North has published two articles disusing this trend. (Part I, Part II)

The country's energy portfolio does include wind power, but the current generating capacity is only enough to power a few thousand homes. However, experiments in wind continue, especially on the small scale of individual farms or small factories. I have noted that a site near Cholsan could be interpreted as the foundations for several large turbines but as of Feb. 2020, any additional construction has yet to occur.


Finally, there's solar. North Korea only has a few "large" solar farms (by international standards, they're fairly small), but there are multiple reports that solar panels are being installed all around the country, mostly by individuals trying to power their home appliances. While many of these solar sites are too small to be seen via satellite, there are plenty of buildings with sets of solar panels that give evidence to the reports.

Building in west Pyongyang with solar panels covering the roof. Source: Google Earth, Jan. 16, 2017.

Obviously nuclear power could greatly help North Korea's problems. North Korea received a research reactor from the Soviet Union in 1963 and in 1979 it began to build its own indigenous reactor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and a lack of domestic nuclear fuel greatly hindered further research into nuclear energy production, but the country didn't give up. Pyongyang began construction on a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon; however, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to halt construction of that reactor in exchange for two 1000 MWe light-water reactors (which can't be used in weapon's programs). As so often happens, the deal fell through after several years and the final oil shipments and other associated programs as part the agreement ended in 2006.

Since then North Korea seems to be far more interested in developing weapons than building a peaceful nuclear energy capacity. Thus, the country must continue to rely on outdated coal plants and try to squeeze every kilowatt of power out any available river. One can hope that they will continue to develop wind and solar energy.

According to most sources, North Korea's energy production breaks down to 76% from hydroelectricity and 24% from coal. However, as noted, there has been real investment (both private and state) into wind and solar. I think it is possible that up to 5% of North Korea's energy portfolio now comes from these two sources, as many homes produce and use electricity that isn't connected to the official grid and can't be methodically measured through standard means.

The backbone of North Korea's energy grid (2012). Source: Geni.org

Based on #AccessDPRK mapping for Phase III, North Korea has eleven coal and oil-fueled thermal electric generating plants. Of those, one is inactive and another is under construction (which has been stalled since 2014). There are at least 475 hydroelectric generating stations and associated dams (the dams and generators can sometimes be miles apart, but both are counted as they are part of the overall hydroelectric system). Many of these sites only run during periods of high water or seasonally for irrigation purposes, while lying inactive the rest of the year. Many of the smallest sites (that produce only a few kilowatts) might actually be completely inactive due to flood damage over the years. It's impossible to tell via satellite for each and every site.

Those sources of energy, along with the new solar and wind locations, distribute their electricity through a network of at least 1,322 electrical substations.

The following set of images show the locations of the country's fossil fuel power plants, its hydroelectric plants, main wind and solar farms, and all of the substations.





The country continues to try to improve its energy production through all means available. A kilometer-long solar farm was constructed in Sinuiju in 2019 and the country is in the middle of finishing up construction of its largest hydroelectric project that's currently underway. The Samsu-Sinhung hydroelectric station (also called Tanchon) will rely on a 60 km tunnel to deliver water from the Samsu reservoir in Ryanggang Province to a generating station in Sinhung, S. Hamgyong Province.

Additionally, they have been taking steps to decrease the energy demand on the main grid by installing solar panels at most cell phone towers. With the country's 1,150 or so cell towers, this step alone contributes anywhere from 1 to 3 megawatt hours of power to the system during peak hours. (Cell tower energy production levels depends on several variables which aren't easily discoverable with North Korea.)

Powering North Korea relies on a complex network of generating sites, distribution points, and other infrastructure that is often many decades old. Inefficiencies within the system continue to pose a major obstacle to achieving energy sufficiency as upwards of 30% of electricity is lost through transmission and distribution by the time you get to rural areas, with a 2014 national loss average of 16% - five times the loss rate of South Korea.

Reviving the entire system would cost billions the country doesn't have. In the meantime, the regime seems to be dealing with this perennial problem by investing more in hydroelectricity to ensure energy levels are sufficient to meet core industrial and agricultural needs, and has been letting individual families fend for themselves by buying solar panels, solar water heaters, and installing micro-wind turbines on their homes and apartments. This approach will not solve the energy problem, but it does give the state some extra options until more systemic and economical solutions are discovered.


Patreon Special Access
Patreon supporters at the $20 tier are entitled to exclusive data sets. The Google Earth file for this post is one of those exclusive offers. The file contains every identified thermal power plant, hydroelectric dam, wind turbine, every major solar site, the country's network of electrical substations, and dozens of examples of small-scale solar installations. In all, it has over 1,800 places marked and with additional information where available. Please consider supporting the #AccessDPRK Project on Patreon and get access to this and other exclusive information.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., Anders Omholt, GreatPoppo, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and Travis Murdock.


--Jacob Bogle, 6/13/2020
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