A Pyongsan Addendum

On August 8, 2019 I wrote a post about highly visible leaks at the Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Milling Factory. In the post are satellite images that clearly show waste leaking going back to at least 2003.

Despite the other things that I have been able to show through the #AccessDPRK project, this particular one caught the attention of the international media. Before long I was being contacted by Radio Free Asia and then UPI picked it up, followed by Chosun Ilbo, UK tabloids, and even state sponsored sites like Sputnik News. Some contacted me directly while others brought in their own experts to do the analysis. Almost all of these additional experts agreed that pollution of any kind from the plant would be cause for concern.

However, all of this attention also meant that people started asking other questions and needing clarification. Some, it seems, have even tried to deliberately distort what it is I actually said to fit their own narrative. I want to take this time to clear a few things up and to offer additional support for what I have said.

First, my original post is titled "Radioactive River" because it is about a uranium facility polluting a river. In that post I only talked about pollution in general terms saying, "the pipe taking waste materials to the open reservoir has leaks and has been spilling toxic water into the Ryesong's tributary". I said that the Ryesong is the main water source for 200,000. (However, if you widen the area to include a few extra miles on either side of the river, that figure doubles to 400,000.)

The first interview I had was with Radio Free Asia. The three minute phone call consisted of very few questions. One of the questions asked was if the waste material could be radioactive. I said yes, that some of the material could be. That one answer seems to be what most people are concerned about and confused over.

North Korea uses low-grade coal as the uranium source. Pyongsan's coal has 0.26% uranium concentration. Apart from that, lower grade coal also contains lead, arsenic, vanadium, cobalt, and other heavy metals as well as small amounts of additional radioactive material. Processing and burning coal leaves behind radioactive waste. A 2007 Scientific American article put it succinctly, "coal ash is more radioactive than nuclear waste". This is because burning it concentrates the impurities already existing within the coal. But the coal always had those materials inside of it, regardless of burning. The coal is still not pure. Whether it is burnt, crushed, or just dumped into a river, it is not a safe material to be placing into a water supply

The black sludge seen at the Pyongsan reservoir is the leftover coal from the plant along with residual acids and other industrial products. It is moved from the plant in slurry form and emptied into the reservoir. During that movement, some leaks out of cracks in the pipe and ends up contaminating the Ryesong River which then eventually flows into the Han River estuary.

Regardless of the inherent dangers of leaking coal slurry, uranium mining and milling (the process of turning uranium ore into yellowcake) creates its own radioactive waste.

According to the EPA, "regardless of how uranium is extracted from rock, the processes leave behind radioactive waste....The tailings remain radioactive and contain hazardous chemicals from the recovery process."

The key to making the process safe is proper handling and storage of the waste products. North Korea is not a member of the International Labour Organization which plays a major role creating safety rules for those that work around radioactive materials. Additionally, there is no evidence that the reservoir is lined. Lining the reservoir is an extremely important part of ensuring that the toxic water doesn't leak into rivers and groundwater. The fact it is unlined was mentioned by Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Dr. Lewis stressed on his website the negative health concerns associated with dumping the material into an unlined pond saying, "What is definitely happening, though, is that North Korea is dumping the tailings from the plant into an unlined pond, one surrounded by farms. That’s not a hypothetical harm.  That’s actual pollution that is harming the health and well being of the local community."

The facts are beyond dispute, and regardless of the exact amount of radioactive material being spilled into the river, there are also large amounts of other dangerous chemicals that are leaking out: the aforementioned lead, arsenic, vanadium, mercury, and others. All of those things cause health problems and there is no "safe limit" to lead and arsenic ingestion.

Aside from the leaking material, even the waste within the reservoir poses a risk. During periods of dry weather, the surface of the sludge pile can dry out. Wind can pick up those small particles and carry them for miles, depositing them on land, homes, and within the lungs of anyone breathing it.

Pyongsan doesn't exist in a vacuum, either. Defector testimony from those who have worked in North Korea's nuclear program (either as miners, technicians, scientists, etc.) or simply lived in areas around nuclear sites have pointed to ongoing heath problems and birth defects. Recent defectors have even shown evidence of radiation exposure because they lived downwind of North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The people downriver of Pyongsan aren't immune to pollution.
I am not trying to be alarmist. This is not Chernobyl or Fukushima, but all of this provides strong evidence that there is an ongoing health crisis in this part of North Korea and that some of the toxic materials being dumped into the Ryesong will inevitably reach the Han River.

I am not a nuclear weapons expert. I have never claimed to be. I am a concerned individual who has spent the last seven years of his life studying North Korea and bringing attention to important issues. I am not getting paid by any government or partisan organization. And while I don't know what constitutes being an "expert" to some, my years of work speaks for itself. I created a map with 53,000 locations, I was the first to report on a new test site at the Tonghae Satellite Launch Station, I have multiple reports on the growth of North Korea's military, I created a survey of the country's archaeological sites using open-source satellite imagery, and I was the first to report on the replica of Panmunjom. I think that qualifies me to say that black industrial waste flowing into a river is a bad thing.

Evidence of widespread contamination from various nuclear-related facilities exist around the world. And continuing fears over Fukushima and the recent accidents in Russia mean that we must all be vigilant. For my part, I will continue to observe every square mile of North Korea and to report on the things I find.


--Jacob Bogle, 8/24/2019
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Slowdown at the Pakchon Uranium Plant?

In the course of researching my article on the toxic leaks at the Pyongsan uranium mine and milling plant, I started observing North Korea's second such facility at Pakchon, North Pyongyan.

Reviewing historical satellite imagery for Pyongsan shows an ever-growing pile of tailings (waste material) and sludge from the mine and factory at its waste reservoir, indicating continual operations. The same cannot be said upon review of the reservoir at Pakchon. A lack of obvious changes to the reservoir recently could mean a few things, which I'll discuss later.

Like Pyongsan, Pakchon was constructed in the 1980s under the leadership of Kim Il Sung (with various degrees of Soviet assistance), and is the second of North Korea's two declared uranium milling plants (where uranium ore is processed into yellowcake). The other plant being Pyongsan, as mentioned earlier. A review of satellite imagery shows the evolution of the Pakchon facility's operations.

Google Earth imagery from 2005 shows that the original tailings dam had been closed and turned into farmland, while a second tailings dam had been established during the intervening years.

By 2014, activity at the dam can still be seen, as new materials are dumped into it via truck (unlike the reservoir at Pyongsan, which has waste material moved via pipe).

The addition of new waste to the dam appears to have slowed down by 2016.

The small sections of the reservoir that were active in 2014 no longer seem to be undergoing change, and there isn't much (if any) additional activity as evidenced by the lack of surface disturbances.

The general lack of new waste deposits has continued into 2019. Any changes to the reservoir from 2016 and 2019 are very minimal, indicating a lack of production. By comparison, the growth of the "sludge pile" within the Pyongsan tailings reservoir grew substantially.

The Pyongsan plant is much larger than Pakchon and processes coal with a uranium concentration of 0.26%, compared to Pakchon's 0.086%. Both are considerably low-quality concentrations by most definitions but seem to be among the best ore the country has domestic access to.

The sludge pile within the Pyongsan reservoir occupied some 69,000 square meters of space by May 2017.

The pile had grown to approximately 87,000 square meters by March 2019, an apparent increase of 26%. An exact figure can be difficult to ascertain because water levels may have changed slightly over time.

The only area of Pakchon that seems to have maintained activity is the associated mine, 1.3 km south of the main factory building.

Aside from monitoring tailings, the physical state of the factory complex gives us more information.

The main building is roughly 120x100 meters, but there are several other buildings involved in the process of concentrating and milling the uranium. The administration section of the complex seems perfectly fine, but two industrial buildings are falling apart, and one of those is in the process of being demolished.

Google Earth imagery from March 19, 2012 gives a clear view of the two buildings of interest. They are in good order and appear functional.

By March 2019, the roof of building #1 has several holes in it and building #2 has been torn down.

What does all of this mean?

It would make sense that Pyongsan would be the country's primary facility, as the ore used is of much greater quality than the ore at Pakchon. Indeed, Pyongsan underwent a refurbishment in 2014-2015, with additional improvements being seen even more recently. But is Pakchon slowing down?

A lack of obvious waste deposits and the fact that some of the buildings have been neglected or demolished points to problems. Mining operations have continued, but there doesn't seem to be a new tailings dam that would explain the lack of activity at the current one. The mine has settling/separation ponds but doesn't appear to have a dedicated spot to hold waste from the processed material. This could indicate that the country is stockpiling material for processing but has cut back on the overall amount of milled uranium it can produce at Pakchon. This may be backed up by the fact that, at least for 2019, even work conducted at Yongbyon has been scaled back.

Another possibility is that there are problems with the factory itself. North Korea's industrial sector has long been crippled for its lack of spare parts and its general inability to repair and replace complex equipment in a timely fashion. Additionally, uranium processing is expensive and energy intensive. During the early days of North Korea's nuclear program, the Soviet Union told them that it wasn't economically feasible to extract the low-quality uranium sources within the country. Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung persisted. The energy intensive and expensive nature of the process may have finally caught up with them, leading to scaling back Pakchon.

Pakchon has never operated every single day, but this prolonged period with little to no activity is a change from the time under Kim Jong Il. It will take more observations to know exactly what is happening, but for now, Pakchon certainly doesn't seem to be operating at its full capacity.


--Jacob Bogle, 8/21/2019
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North Korea to the United States - You First

Any North Korea watcher worth their salt knows that North Korea and Western countries have a problem with definitions. What denuclearization means to one is quite different from what it means to the other. Despite having decades of experience with North Korea, successive US administrations appear to know that this difference exists but have refused to adjust their actions accordingly. Well, North Korea just made it impossible to ignore the reality of the situation.

On December 20, 2018, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released a statement saying, “The United States must now recognize the accurate meaning of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and especially, must study geography, when we talk about the Korean Peninsula, it includes the territory of our republic and also the entire region of (South Korea) where the United States has placed its invasive force, including nuclear weapons. When we talk about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it means the removal of all sources of nuclear threat, not only from the South and North but also from areas neighboring the Korean Peninsula…”

This provides an all too clear meaning to the otherwise vague terms agreed to during the June Trump-Kim summit, and to the many other general agreements signed over the years. 

When America talks about denuclearization, it means no nuclear or long-range ballistic technology for the North. It means no peaceful nuclear power capacity that could be converted to weapons use. It means North Korea pledging to never engage in preemptive attacks. From the perspective of the North (as reinforced by this latest announcement), denuclearization means the removal of the United States’ nuclear umbrella over not only South Korea, but Japan as well. It means an agreement by the United States to never launch a preemptive attack (nuclear or otherwise) against the DPRK. It means the United States drawing down its forces in South Korea and the removal of nuclear-capable bombers from the country (there are no nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea). And it means that the path toward denuclearization must be taken across the whole peninsula, jointly, and accompanied by sanctions relief as Pyongyang is loathe to take any action without some kind of reciprocal action by either (or both) South Korea and the US.

North Korea has shown that it prefers joint action over the years, but that it will quickly revert to bellicose language and even take military actions if they don’t feel like the other side is keeping its end of the deal. Continuing inter-Korean cooperation is evidence of this. At the same time, their language has shifted regarding the United States as the US has, in the northern mind, only given token concessions while North Korea has refrained from any nuclear or ballistic testing since November 2017.

2017 Pukguksong-2 ICBM test launch. (KCNA)

I feel it’s important to quickly discuss why nuclear weapons are so important to the DPRK and why the regime seems quite content to let their people starve while they spend billions of dollars trying to acquire these weapons. Korea as a whole has always been a “shrimp squeezed between two whales”. It has long had to stave off being the play thing of Japan and China, and since WWII, it has had to contend with Soviet/Russian and American influences. Kim Il Sung began North Korea’s nuclear ambitions practically from day one of liberation from Japan. It was spurred on after the devastation of the Korean War and has slowly become incorporated into the national psyche.

Nuclear weapons are seen as the final guarantor of the regime’s survival, as countries that gave up their nuclear ambitions have a history of falling to the United States (namely Gaddafi’s Libya and Saddam’s Iraq). Generations of North Koreans have grown up with government propaganda praising the importance of nuclear weapons, spurring them to take on greater hardships to enable their development. And the leadership has spent generations promising to deliver them and promising that achieving such a goal will also guarantee national economic strength and put and end to hardship. For the regime to relent and simply turn over everything after they have finally constructed dozens of functional warheads as well developed needed missile delivery systems would be seen as a betrayal of the people.

Kim Jong Un must be seen to get security assurances and to get the United States to step back before taking any concrete steps toward true disarmament. Otherwise, he risks losing everything and a stable rule is the only thing that matters to the country’s elite. That’s why it should come as no surprise to anyone who has observed the country for more than five minutes, that North Korea will continue the operation of hidden missile bases, continue the operation of nuclear facilities, and continue to develop and expand their conventional military forces until such time as real, highly detailed and specific agreements are signed.

Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump at the June 2017 Singapore Summit. (Evan Vuccia/AP)

Getting full, verified, and permanent denuclearization up front is basically like trying to eat an elephant in one bite. As the moral implies, though, you can only accomplish a major goal if you take lots of small bites. The United States has been preoccupied with getting North Korea to comply entirely and immediately while ignoring the reality of the matter. Nuclear weapons to North Korea aren’t like some random weapons system the US may discard because it’s too costly or the technology fails. Nuclear weapons are intimately tied to the country’s identity and their belief that it ensures their survival. The decades-long game we have been playing has resulted in failure. They will never give up their weapons overnight and it’s time we came to understand this.

Achieving the goal of denuclearization is one that may take years of consistent work and countless small steps. Trust building measures are a must. Understanding that North Korea will likely deflect, obfuscate, and outright lie in the process must also be expected. However, it’s these small steps that will lead to ultimate success. We can’t underestimate the value of trust building measures or small steps. To quote the Bible, “despise not small beginnings” (Zechariah 4:10). Recent examples of these small beginnings, taken by both Koreas, is evidence that they can deescalate, defer further testing and cross-border attacks, and accomplish the dismantling of a portion of the DMZ. In other words, from North Korea’s view, it’s up to the United States to make bold concessions for every bold concession they demand from North Korea, otherwise, we're all just wasting our time.

As I said, reaching the full goal may take years. In fact, it may take an entire generation. New ways of thinking and having the willingness to act outside of the tried and failed current box of tricks will take time to permeate leadership and bureaucracies. The question is will we create an environment that gives us the time needed, or will we continue shouting at each other until someone makes a very big, very bad mistake?

--Jacob Bogle, 12/21/2018
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Possible NK Atmospheric Nuclear Test

North Korea is the only country to have tested nuclear weapons since 1998, when India and Pakistan both held their final underground tests, and all of North Korea's six nuclear tests have been carried out underground at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site beneath Mantap Mountain (which is adjacent to the Hwasong Concentration Camp).

The firing of the Hwasong-15 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on Nov. 28, 2017. Image from Rodong Sinmun.

Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs have become incredibly advanced and the speed of their accomplishments have often taken analysts by surprise. The development of these systems has occurred under the "two-track" or byungjin philosophy which seeks to develop the country's nuclear program and domestic economy in parallel. While their economy creeks along, it is becoming apparent that their nuclear and ballistic missile programs have been able to become largely self-sufficient and are produced with indigenous materials and technology.

The September 2017 nuclear test was their largest test by far with a yield estimated to have been between 100 and 250 kilotons, which places it several times larger than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II. Furthermore, it is possible that the tested device was a hydrogen bomb and that the warhead could have a variable yield, allowing North Korea to "dial" up or down the warhead's power.

On the ballistic front, their November 2017 test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM showed that they could theoretically hit any part of the United States (and a majority of the rest of the world). While questions remain about the missile's ability to survive reentry, there is no doubt that this is a huge step forward. Its size, range, and changes to the reentry vehicle over the Hwasong-14, all point to a program that is rapidly nearing completion.


At this point you may be asking what all of this has to do with the title? In October 2017, North Korea's Foreign Minister, Ri Yong Ho, said that Kim Jong Un was committed to testing a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere. And rumors of such a test have been heard prior to this statement, too. Atmospheric nuclear testing was last carried out in 1980, by China. The US, Soviet Union, and UK each ended their atmospheric testing in 1963 with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

North Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in red, South Korea's in green. Data from Marine Regions.

The purpose of such a test would be, ostensibly, to prove their ability to attach a nuclear warhead to a missile and then to fire it off toward the sea and have it detonate - demonstrating they are indeed a fully capable nuclear weapons state. Any test would have to be carried out within the limits of North Korea's territorial waters, or at a maximum, its exclusive economic zone. Firing a nuclear missile outside of their EEZ would trigger a major world crisis the likes of which hasn't been seen since the Korean War.
Of course such a test (regardless of whether or not it occurred within their own territory) would likely permanently alter regional relations, could easily drive China out of whatever remaining alliance with the DPRK they have, spur Japan into full-on re-militarization, and could even lead to an attack on the North by either South Korea or the US. It's also highly unlikely that the US would sit idly by and watch as North Korea mounted a nuke onto a missile and fire it. So the chances of an atmospheric test are rather low in my estimation.

Beyond the geopolitical implications, the environmental impact would also undo progress toward addressing the radioactive genie that was released after the Trinity Test in 1945.

Atmospheric testing releases huge amounts of radiation into the environment. A 2013 study that looked at atmospheric radiocarbon showed that 2010 levels were at their lowest since the late 1950s, with the PTBT being the seminal moment when radiocarbon rates began to sharply decline.

Chart showing the percentage of Carbon-14 in the atmosphere from 1950-2010. (Source: Atmospheric Radiocarbon for the Period 1950–2010)

Above ground tests (atmospheric or otherwise) also release large amounts of radioactive Iodine, Strontium, Uranium (obviously), Caesium, Xenon, and other radionuclides. The half-lives of these materials range from a few hours (as in the case of Xenon) to hundreds of years and longer. Above ground testing can throw radioactive particles as high as 50 miles into the atmosphere where they will then be carried by the winds for many miles (with minute amounts traveling the globe) until they eventually settle back down to the ground and sea where they will continue to release radiation for years to come. Local radioactive fallout can extend in a plum easily over 100 miles long, placing each regional nation at risk of receiving fallout depending on the specifics of the test and weather conditions at the time.


All of these risks - the overt threats to South Korea, Japan, and the US, the dangers of spreading fallout over Chinese or Russian territory, etc. - are why I hold strong doubts that North Korea would ever conduct an above ground test. However, while thinking on the subject, I also considered what ground locations may exist that North Korea could use to conduct an old-school non-atmospheric above ground test.

Analysts have determined that the Punggye-ri test site may have experienced tremendous damage, particularly as a result of the latest test. While activity at other tunnels around the site has been seen, continued nuclear testing greatly raises the risk of a major collapse and release of radioactive materials. So the next best thing may be an above ground test.

Possible suitable locations for an above ground nuclear test.

I searched for the criterion of a 12-mile diameter circle (an "exclusion zone") that didn't overlap with any populated areas or, in the case of islands, that didn't overlap another island group or cross onto the mainland, and that wasn't too close to China or Russia. I was able to locate four such places. Three of which are islands/group of islets, and one is the Punggye-ri site itself. Punggye-ri is isolated enough that there are no cities or towns within the 12-mile circle and the nearby concentration camp (with its thousands of prisoners) would partially be protected from the immediate radioactive fallout effects by the mountain itself.

The other three sites are far enough away from the coast and any populated islands that the civilian population would be safe from the actual blast of a nuclear device, so long as it wasn't too large. These sites also have the added benefit of being within North Korea's internationally accepted territorial claims, which would give Pyongyang some degree of diplomatic cover.

We can only wait and see if Kim Jong Un thinks it's worthwhile to set off a nuclear device in the open, be it fired from a missile into the sea, set off on an island, or even detonated in the ocean from a barge, but one thing we can be sure of is now that he has a bomb and a missile, he won't be giving them up for cheap.


--Jacob Bogle, 12/12/2017
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Additional Reading
1. Nuclear Weapons Testing and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective, Remus Prăvălie, February 2014 (Ambio, A Journal of the Human Environment)

NoKo's Underground Nuclear Nightmare

UPDATE: On October 31, 2017, Japanese media are reporting that a large tunnel collapse occurred at the site, killing around 200 people. This has yet to be confirmed.


On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth and largest (by far) nuclear test. North Korea's only nuclear test site is Punggye-ri in North Hamgyong Province. At this point I want to say that this post is speculative in nature and that there is little concrete evidence to support what I am suggesting. However, there is anecdotal evidence and a logic to it. Enough so that I feel this is worth discussing.

The main tunnel at Punggyi-ri also happens to be less than 2 miles away from the boundaries of the Hwasong concentration camp (Kwan-li-so 16).

The apparent location (based on USGS information) of this most recent nuclear test lies a mere 0.3 miles (0.5 km) away from the camp fence, and North Korea's first test in 2006 appeared to have taken place inside the camp itself (underground, of course).

I believe the proximity of Punggye-ri and Camp 16 (with its 20,000 prisoners)  may be important.

There are multiple reports by defectors (including testimony by Ahn Myong-chol, a former guard at Camp 22), that North Korea has a history of using prisoners in medical experiments, including testing chemical weapons, as well as prison labor for the construction of sensitive military facilities, including underground sites.

Based on the relative locations[n1] of each of the nuclear tests, the underground tunnel system is massive, with the majority of test sites more than 3 miles away from the main tunnel entrance. The Sept. 3, 2017 test is almost 5 miles away! This means lots and lots of tunneling work.

A few small mounds of debris can be seen at the entrances of the various tunnel entrances; however, the amount of debris is nowhere near enough as would be required for excavating a tunnel a mile long, let alone multiple tunnels. A very basic tunnel 1 mile long, six feet tall, and six feet wide would create 190,080 cubic feet of material. However, an image released by North Korean TV suggests their tunnels aren't simply a straight line (which could easily become disastrous during testing).

English notation provided by F. Pabian and S. Hecker/Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

This suggests that the North Koreans are using material from new tunnels to back fill the old tunnels after each nuclear test, as the growth of the outside debris mounds do not entirely reflect the growth that would be needed if they were dumping all of the excavated materials outside. The fact radioisotopes can be detected outside of the country after some tests, shows that their testing site is far from sealed, thus it would be necessary to mitigate the slow continual release of radiation by filling up used tunnels with the material taken to construct new ones. Unfortunately, the discovery of visible changes to the surface of the mountain raises the likelihood that further releases of radiation will happen.


Back to Hwasong, it's not beyond the realm of possibility that the regime is taking advantage of this nearby and captive workforce to do the difficult and dangerous task of constructing these testing tunnels. There is a fair amount of evidence that prisoners are used to construct the thousands of tunnels and underground facilities that have turned much of North Korea's ground into Swiss cheese. And, there are even occasional but brief comments that can be found in media sources that touch on the idea of these prisoners being used to do the hard work at Punggye-ri.

Average citizens are subjected to terrible conditions in the country's coal mines, and even in uranium mines and enrichment facilities safety is practically nonexistent, with workers developing multiple radiation-related illnesses. Political prisoners on the other hand aren't even considered citizens. Their very title of "human" appears to vanish along with every right and privilege that otherwise exists in North Korea.

Using these men to dig, repair, and fill the tunnels has several benefits to the regime. Here are four benefits that immediately come to mind:

1) The government doesn't have to worry about paying wages or properly feeding them, saving large sums of money.
2) There are no families to deal with whenever a loved one comes home with a shattered leg or dying from radiation exposure (or coming home in a body bag).
3) Due to the way such prisoners are managed, using them provides a large level of greater secrecy and security. Even loyal soldiers may inadvertently spill sensitive information to friends or family. Who are slave laborers living behind electrified fences going to tell?
4) Using expendable lives saves the lives of more valuable people.

We do know that the tunneling process itself is fairly basic. North Korea doesn't have the ability to employ the large modern mining or tunneling equipment other industrial countries have. Using dynamite, hand tools, brute force, and small carts to carry away rocks is about all they have. Satellite imagery confirms this is true at Punggye-ri, too, as the simple equipment can clearly be identified.

Beyond the horrors associated with working hour after hour and week after week near incredibly toxic mixes of radiation and heavy metals, there are also dangers faced by nearby populations.

The northern part of Korea has always been neglected. This was the case during the historic dynastic period and was the case during North Korea's famine - when supplies were cut off and redirected to the more "important" capital region. Punggye-ri is located in the northernmost province. Of North Hamgyong's 2.5 million inhabitants, nearly 2 million lie directly east and north of the nuclear site, which means any radiation release will spread to those areas on wind currents.

Absent full-on containment failure, where plumes of material is tossed into the atmosphere, partial failures can still release Cesium-137, Iodine-131, and Strontium-90, all of which can spread by the wind and contaminate the ground (and thus the grass, which in turn will contaminate any animals eating that grass and eventually the people eating the animals). Seepage of Krypton-85 and Xenon-133 through cracks in the mountain can also contaminate the area. Krypton-85 has a half-life of 10.7 years, meaning if any was released by the first nuclear test back in 2006, half of it is still hanging around. To add context and bring this closer to home, the National Cancer Institute published a study in 1997 that showed 2,800 cases of thyroid cancer in the US each year can be attributed to our own nuclear tests during the "underground era" (1962-92).

Continuing research by 38 North suggests that major fractures may have developed in the mountain, and that further large-yield nuclear tests could severely destabilize the site and release enormous amounts of radioactive debris.

We may never know for certain if prison labor was used to build these miles of tunnels and what, if any, effects have happened as a result of radiation contamination, but the fact there's enough anecdotal evidence and internal logic to support the basis of this post is very disturbing. The world already knows about the routine torture, rape, murder, forced abortions, and starvation that goes on in North Korea's prison camps. The world knows about the lasting harm to people living in the US and on small Pacific islands near nuclear testing sites. I don't see what's so difficult about expecting that the two scenarios would merge in North Korea when all of the pieces are laying in front of us.

--Jacob Bogle, 9/16/17
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Note
1. All of the locations are based on coordinates given by the United States Geological Survey. These coordinates are only approximate and may be off by over a mile.

Why Are We in Korea and Why Do We Care?

Image Source: Vitorr.com

Once again tensions are high and concerns of impending nuclear Armageddon can be heard from some of the more embellishing talking heads on cable news. North Korea's nuclear and ballistic technology has rapidly advanced under Kim Jong-un and their path towards becoming a fully capable nuclear weapons state is appearing much shorter than many had projected. 

Kim Jong-un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined, and the individual components of a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capable of hitting the US mainland seem fairly complete. The main hurdles now revolve around joining those components together into a functional weapon. That isn't to say North Korea is only a matter of days or weeks away from having a true nuclear missile: the mating of a miniaturized warhead onto a missile has its own difficulties, and there are other questions surrounding the program. But with North Korea threatening to fire missiles into the sea near the US territory of Guam (a major cornerstone of our ability to operate in the Pacific), and with President Trump likewise threatening "fire and fury" against any Northern threat, many question why we're even involved in Korea in the first place, and why do we care. Particularly among younger generations. After all, the Korean War earned the moniker "The Forgotten War" in my father's generation. If it was "forgotten" then, how much more distant must it seem to the proceeding generations?  

So, why are we there and why do we care?

A little backstory is required. A unified Korea was occupied by Japan in 1910. After WWII, the USSR took over the northern half of the Korean peninsula and we took over the south with the agreement that at some point in the near-ish future, a free and general election would be held under UN supervision so that the Korean people (they’re all the same blood) could decide if they wanted to be a free and democratic country, or set up a communist state.

That election never happened. The Soviets took a small-time anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter named Kim Il Sung and installed him as leader, and we put in the Harvard and Princeton educated Syngman Rhee. Both sides claimed to represent all of Korea (even now, defectors who make it to the South are automatically granted citizenship) and both sides wanted to reunite the peninsula under their respective systems. After a few years, the American and Soviet troops withdrew from Korea. Not wanting to wait any longer and assuming the US wouldn't come back to defend an Asian backwater, Kim invaded the South in 1950 with overwhelming force. However, since the United States pledged to help keep our new ally safe from Communism, we certainly did come back (under the authority of United Nations and with dozens of other countries directly supporting the war). The resulting war the North initiated left half a million Allied soldiers (including 140,000 Americans) dead or wounded, and over 2 million Korean casualties.

No peace treaty was ever signed, but an armistice was signed in 1953, technically putting the war on hold. And our agreement with South Korea turned into a formal treaty, also signed in 1953, to which we are still bound. The Mutual Defense Treaty requires each country to come to the aid of one another in the event one is attacked. I feel it's important to note, that South Korea has sent troops and matériel to assist all major conflicts the US has been a part of since that time.
As part of the terms of the Treaty, American forces were to be stationed in South Korea to help prevent another invasion. This "status of forces agreement" is updated every so often.

Image Source: Metrovaartha.com

But it's been 64 years since the armistice was signed! Why should we remain?

Since the signing of the 1953 Armistice (which created the Demilitarized Zone -DMZ), North Korea has violated the terms of it over 220 times. North Korean soldiers hacked to death with axes two American soldiers on the southern side of the DMZ. North Korea captured the USS Pueblo and tortured its crew. North Korea has kidnapped hundreds of Japanese and South Korean citizens. North Korea has bombed South Korea islands, sunk Southern ships, and launched a raid on the South Korean president’s residence in an assassination attempt. They even continue to secretly lay landmines by infiltrating the DMZ. 

North Korea has sold weapons to Cuba, Iran, Syria, and others (and worked with them on nuclear matters). They have supported terrorist groups like the radical Japanese Red Army. They blew up a passenger jet killing all 115 on-board. They have engaged in economic warfare against the US via counterfeiting US currency. They are a large source of illegal drugs (like methamphetamine) in East Asia, and a source of other counterfeited goods. (For more information, read Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea's Illicit Activities by the Strategic Studies Institute.)

North Korea attempted another assassination attempt on a South Korean president, this time while he was visiting a foreign country. The bomb, planted in Rangoon, killed 21 and injured 46. Kim Jong-un also murdered own brother by using a WMD (VX nerve agent); the use of which in a foreign state is an act of terrorism.

Even if you ignore the nuclear weapons (and their long-held desire to develop them going back to the 1950s, and their continual threats to use them), North Korea still controls one of the largest conventional militaries in the world. They have over 1 million active-duty soldiers, 180,000 special forces, enough artillery within range of Seoul to lob half a million shells into the city within the first hour, and nearly 6 million belonging to reserves and paramilitary organizations. Plus numerous underground and hidden sites throughout the North that store fuel, food, and munitions to launch a full-scale war and carry it out for 6 months before reserves run out.

US-ROK 2010 Naval Exercise "Invincible Spirit". Image Credit: US Navy Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class (SW/AW) Adam K. Thomas

OK, but other than protecting South Korea, what do we get out of it?

Besides keeping our word? The Korean peninsula has been a contested region for thousands of years. Its importance today has not diminished. Some of the world's most important trading routes pass through and near Korean waters. The combined GDPs of South Korea, China, and Japan equals nearly $18 trillion, or more than 20% of the entire world's economic output.

Bilateral trade between the United States and South Korea amounts to $112 billion annually (up from $82 billion since 2007). Globally, South Korea is a key production center of electronics like cell phones, LCD screens TVs, and semiconductors, as well as automobiles, shipping, and petrochemicals. South Korea's impact on the global economy amounts to over a trillion dollars, and during periods of heightened tensions, global markets connected to the region tend to slow down and even drop until the immediate threats end. Aiding in the defense of South Korea enables that trade to continue to grow. It preserves the jobs of countless American workers who work for South Korean firms here and sell South Korean goods (and the many products that rely on parts from South Korea). It helps stabilize the overall world economy by keeping shipping lanes and factories open, allowing products that are vital to every industrial nation to get to their destinations.

Despite signing an armistice to end hostilities, North Korea has a 64 year-long history of open and active aggression. In the event of a war, yes, they’d lose. That isn’t quite the point. The North wants to harass and intimidate South Korea into giving them massive amounts of concessions (which has happened before). They want to hold the South hostage via threats and cause them to weaken and buckle. And yes, they want to preserve their regime, but that regime's survival means not having to reform their economic and political systems. It means the continuation of starvation, torture, attacks against its neighbors, and the perpetuation of one of the longest-running prison camp systems in world history.

The world is faced with a handful of choices that can be boiled down to two: do we accept a nuclear-armed North Korea, or do we prevent that from happening? The implications of either choice are not simple nor are they necessarily comforting, but the time to figure out which path we're going down is closer than ever. And despite which path we (and they) take, the fact remains, it is in America's best interest to help guide this long tale to its conclusion.


Further Reading
1. Terrorism and the Future of North Korea at the UN (AccessDPRK, March 2017)
2. The Nuclear Question (AccessDPRK, March 2013)
3. Arsenal of Terror (Joshua Stanton/HRNK, 2015)

--Jacob Bogle, 8/13/2017
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Activity Spotted at Possible Nuclear Site

There's a massive underground complex hidden away in the hills of North Korea. For years it has laid dormant (as far as one can tell), that is until recently. The facility at Hagap (40° 04′ 48″ N, 126° 10′ 56″ E), is a suspected underground nuclear site, either to store material or produce it.

According to Dr. Jeffery Lewis, at Armscontrolwonk.com, the site became publicly known in 1998 (the US government knew about it since 1996) and was constructed at the same time as another underground site, Kumchangni (40° 7' 8 "N 125° 8' 32"E). Since such a site could possibly violate the bilateral 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea didn't say a word about the place. After the site became public, the US managed to send a delegation to visit it. They didn't find much besides an oddly designed underground facility.

The debate about what exactly is going on at Hagap continues to this day. It has been speculated that the site is used for nuclear materials storage, centrifuge production, or even just a large secure warehouse for archival materials. However, the connection with Kumchangni still remains. There is a third site too, at Yeongjeo-ri (Ryanggang Province), but little is known about it.

North Korea's nuclear program has been ramping up since the final days of Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong Un seems to be increasing that pace. In the light of that, it is disconcerting to see fairly substantial new activity happening at Hagap.

(Click image for larger view.)

At the site you can see a large mound of new rock debris which has been piled up in the pond below the main entrance. You can also see an increase in the number of small buildings and debris that are in the small valley.

Here are some closeup images:

This one shows the debris mound.

This image shows the extended activity area with new buildings.

There is also an odd collection of towers nearby. They look like electrical transmission pylons, but are clustered together into three groups. There are no visible power lines either. It's possible these were laid out when Hagap was originally constructed to provide power, but haven't been needed since the site was largely abandoned. Or they could be some kind of radar/communication array. The towers are located around a bend in a river with small hills on either side, those hills have an anti-aircraft artillery battery stationed on each one. If you'd like to study the area further, it can be found here  40° 4' 50"N 126° 6' 35"E.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/12/2016
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New Airbase Near Panghyon

UPDATE: According to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., the sites is actually a military vehicle training facility.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

While I was continuing my mapping project, I found quite a surprise. Six miles (9.7 km) north of Panghyon Airport, near the town of Kusong in North Pyongan Province, is a brand spanking new air facility.

Here's the exact coordinates: 40°00'42.0"N 125°13'09.0"E (link opens Google Maps)

(Click for larger view.)

It has a little over 3,000 ft (914 m) of runway space and features two helipads. At the moment, it also has six bunkers (one of which is a large rectangular structure in the center of the runway) and the image suggests there will be two more.

Imagery dated May 27, 2014 shows that this airbase was created by Oct. 21 and was likely done as a military "speed" campaign.

(Click for larger view.)

Here's another view of the facility.

(Click for larger view.)

(Click for larger view.)

As the above wide-view satellite image shows, this new facility is surrounded by military units ("people" icons), artillery positions (red "A" icons), as well as other military locations and factories (hexagon icons).

According to the Federation of American Scientists, the region around Kusong is a "significant military industrial area" with multiple munitions plants. Some of North Korea's uranium mines also lie near the city and the facilities around Kusong played a role in the development of North Korea's nuclear program. Taechon Northwest Airfield also lies 8 miles (12.9 km) to the east.

Here are some additional close-up images.

(Click for larger view.)

(Click for larger view.)

I also want to note that this new airfield lies less than 20 miles (31.5 km) from the abandoned Taechon 200 MWe Magnox Nuclear Reactor and 33 miles (53 km) from the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center.

--Jacob Bogle, 12/28/14

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North Korea: 2013 in Review

The year 2013 has been a busy one for we DPRK watchers. Lest we forget, here is a list of all things North Korea, both important and not so important.

2013 Crisis

2013 had barely begun when the provocations started pouring out of North Korea. On Jan. 22, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2087 which condemned the North's launch of their "satellite" back in Dec. 2012. In response, the North announced plans to conduct further nuclear tests (its last one was in 2009) and rocket launches. They also called America "the sworn enemy of the Korean people". Usually, the threats and bluster made by the North tends to be empty, and although threats are taken seriously there is often an underlying mood of "yeah, yeah, calm down kid". This time they weren't joking.

On Feb. 12, they conducted an underground nuclear test which was by far the largest test they had ever done with a yield somewhere between 6 and 8 kilotons. Although it was small compared to international standards (the 1945 Trinity Test by the U.S. came in at 20 kt), it was a clear sign that they had advanced their capabilities (the 2009 test was a mere 2.5 kt) and that they were serious about developing an operational nuclear arsenal.

In March, the U.S. and South Korea (ROK) began preparations for "Foal Eagle" which is an annual joint-military training exercise and dates back to 1997. It is one of the largest (if not the largest) annual military exercises in the world and in 2013 more than 210,000 troops participated (only 10,000 were American soldiers). By March 13, in response to the exercise, the DPRK announced it would withdraw from the 1953 Armistice and all non-aggression pacts with the ROK (which has happened 6 times) and they cut off the direct Seoul-Pyongyang hotline. The North went further and stated that the next action they would take would be to actually attack the South and the United States.

Over the course of March tensions continued to climb. The U.S. sent B-52 bombers (nuclear capable) to patrol the South, set up additional Ground-Based Interceptor missiles in Alaska to protect the U.S. from any potential nuclear or other ballistic attack from the North, and deployed fighter jets and other defense systems. Japan also boosted their defensive position by deploying additional warships to the region. On March 20, banks and TV stations in South Korea were hit with a cyber attack linked to the North.

April saw the Kaeson Industrial Region closed. The region had served as an important symbolic joint-industrial facility between North and South, and an important source of hard currency for the North. Construction began in 2003 and cost billions of dollars to build, mostly financed by South Korean companies and the government. The purpose was to foster relations between the two countries and to benefit them both financially through light industrial activity. On April 8, the North recalled their 53,000 workers. Several hundred South Korean employees stayed at the complex and were subsequently cut off from food and aid, effectively serving as prisoners. The region remained closed until mid-September and the closure resulted in a loss of $944 million.

More importantly in April, the North announced that it would restart operations at the Yongbyon Nuclear Center which had been closed since 2007. The facility is crucial to the North's production of plutonium and thus their nuclear weapons program. By June, new satellite pictures showed the cooling tower had been rebuilt and pictures released on Aug. 31 showed the facility operating. During April the North also moved an intermediate-range ballistic missile platform to the east coast (with Japan being their nearest east coast neighbor) and the DPRK warned that certain countries with embassies in the North should evacuate their staff, including the U.K, Russia, and Sweden.

After several other weapons movements (on both sides), the North's fueling of their missiles, a dedicated war game by the U.S. to determine how easy/difficult it would be to secure the North's nuclear stockpiles (result: 90,000 troops and 59 days), the month ended with some additional bluster but most tellingly, the North agreed to re-enter into dialogue.

On May 6, the North withdrew two Musudan missiles from their launch sites, however, between May 18 and 20, they launched a total of six missiles into the Sea of Japan. May also saw several of China's largest banks putting an end to doing business with North Korea which was a significant step since China has usually turned a blind eye to the North's provocations.

At the beginning of June, North Korea rejected China's request that it halt any further nuclear tests, but on June 16, the DPRK government proposed direct talks with the United States to ease tensions. For the rest of the year things slowly began to cool down and saw North Korea, China, and Russia all proposing a resumption of the Six Party Talks. The Seoul-Pyongyang hotline was restored, both sides agree to re-open Kaeson and things returned to the schizophrenic "normal" that is so common on the Korean Peninsula.

However, there were still occasional threats, refusals to sign non-aggression pacts, and more threats; and this will likely continue for a very long time. 

Cargo Ship Seizure

North Korea has maintained a fairly healthy international arms trade for decades, yet as time goes by and international sanctions pile up, it is becoming ever increasingly more difficult for them to carry out their activities. The 509-foot long North Korean cargo ship Chong Chon Gang had been traveling in and out of the Panamanian area between April and July. In July, the ship was flagged for inspection, in part, because they had stopped signaling their location (which ships are required to do for navigation safety purposes). On July 15, Panamanian authorities seized the vessel and began searching it. They found 10,000 tons of Cuban sugar which was lying on top of undeclared cargo. That cargo included 240 tons of Cuban made weapons, two MiG-21 fighters in working condition, radar & control systems for missile launchers, 15 aircraft engines, 12 motors, and a quantity of ammunition. 

The official line from Cuban authorities was that the equipment was being sent to North Korea for repair (there is precedent for this so they could have been telling the truth). Of the 35 crew members, 33 were arrested for arms trafficking - the captain attempted suicide. The majority of the crew were finally released back to North Korea in November.
  

Kenneth Bae and Merrill Newman

From 1977 to 1983 the DPRK kidnapped dozens of Japanese citizens, they have also kidnapped South Korean actresses, producers, and other people from various countries (westerners were mostly kidnapped to work at the Foreign Language Office). I say that to impress upon you that the North Korean government has had no problem stealing people. In other cases, such as Kenneth Bae and Merrill Newman, the situation wasn't about making movies for Kim Jong-il, or the need for translators.

     Kenneth Bae is a Korean-American who has traveled to North Korea several times on business grounds. However, he has also been known to aid Christian groups in either spreading the Gospel or to assist them in getting people out of the country (both activities are strictly forbidden). On Nov. 3, 2012 Bae was visiting the Rason Special Economic District with five Europeans when he was arrested, it is claimed, for carrying a thumb drive filled with pictures of starving children, of conducting a smear campaign against the government, and of planning to toppled the DPRK government in collusion with the U.S., South Korea, and interestingly, China.

Bae was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor. In July 2013, after being sent to a prison camp, he became severely ill and has been detained in a prison hospital since he can no longer take part in manual labor. Because the United States does not have diplomatic relations with the DPRK, all diplomatic matters are handled by the United States' protecting power, Sweden. And due to this it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure his release. Bae's imprisonment has also been a point of irritation for Dennis Rodman thanks to his "friend for life", Kim Jong-un.

     Merrill Newman is an 85 year old Korean War veteran from the United States. During the war he was a member of the United Nations Partisan Infantry (also known as the "White Tigers") and engaged in guerrilla type activities as well as training anti-communist insurgents. In October 2013, Newman traveled to North Korea, something many veterans have done before, for a nine-day trip. At the end of the trip, on Oct. 26, Newman boarded an Air Koryo plane, but just prior to takeoff he was escorted off the plane and arrested.

Although word of his detainment quickly reached the U.S. embassy in Beijing via one of his travelling companions, North Korea did not acknowledge his arrest until late November. Then, on Nov. 29, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released a video of Newman reading from a prepared document in which he "confessed" and apologized to a wide array of war crimes. It was also alleged that he had, during his visit, been in possession of forbidden and subversive items. He was finally released on Dec. 7, thanks in part to our friends the Swedes.

Generally speaking, so long as you follow the rules during a trip to North Korea you aren't likely to be arrested, detained, or otherwise harassed. However, people who are of South Korean origin, who fought during the Korean War, or whose family had fled the North during the war are more likely to be targeted. Kenneth Bae was born in South Korea and he was also a part of a Christian organization (Christians are particularly singled out for persecution) and, there is a chance he really was engaged in illegal activities. Of course, what the North considered illegal most of the world calls fundamental human rights. Bae could end up being released due to his health (it wouldn't look good if he died) but it's just as likely he will spend years more in prison.

In Merrill Newman's case, he was part of hostilities during the war (a war which technically is still ongoing), and his name, along with the names of thousands of others, were known to DPRK authorities before the 1953 Armistice was even signed. It is likely they singled him out not to capture or to kill, but to be used in domestic propaganda and then released, which is what happened. The valiant North Korean soldiers had finally caught an imperialist invader and forced him to confess to all the things the North routinely accuses the west of doing.

Anyone interested in travelling to North Korea, especially if you're an American, needs to be aware of the rules. If the North Korean government allows you to visit it's a good bet they have checked out your background and they will use the several sanctioned travel agencies to assist in determining your history, and thus your likely hidden agenda for going to the country. Carrying thumb drives, non-DPRK newspapers & books, Bibles, CDs, DVDs, U.S. currency, are all no-noes. Photography is controlled and if you tick off your minders you will either have your camera run over by the bus or confiscated, be immediately kicked out of the country, or if they're in the mood, you'll be charged with crimes against the state - something you really don't want to have happen. Here is an interesting & lighthearted article on being a tourist "20 Things I Learned While I Was in North Korea".

Jang Sung-taek

As I discussed earlier, Jang Sung-taek, Kim Jong-un's uncle, was executed on Dec. 13 for crimes against the state. Among the charges were: attempting to overthrow the government, collapse the economy, and degrade the cult of personality. His death was the highest level execution - and most public - since the time of Kim Il-sung. Jang's associates were also rounded up, including hundreds of family members (regardless of their actual guilt or complicity) and were either killed or sent off to concentration camps. These events are connected to a wider series of purges which Kim Jong-un has conducted ever since coming to power in 2011, all in an attempt to solidify his own absolute power. He was executed by firing squad.

His case reminds me of the arrest & execution of Pak Hon-yong in 1956. Pak was accused of trying to overthrow the government, of embezzling money (870,000 won as well as gold), and he held incredibly high office right up until the moment he was arrested. In reality, his real crime seems to have been questioning the power of Kim Il-sung.

Attack Notice

The year would not be complete without an obligatory warning to strike without warning. One Dec. 19, the North sent a fax to their southern counterparts warning them that they would hit the South with a "merciless strike without warning." These warnings are actually very common and their content from year-to-year doesn't change much, same for the medium through which they are sent. The purpose of these "surprise warnings" is up for debate, but the rationale behind the North's activities is about as clear as mud. On the one hand, constant warnings and even the occasional real attack has, at least for the past 30 years or so, led the South and international community to come to the bargaining table and allowed the North to elicit aid (food, fuel, cash, etc.). On the other, the North knows full well that it hasn't a chance of winning a true war, yet they are constantly drilling into the minds of their own people that war is always just around the corner and so it can serve as a means of propaganda and stress relief - as well as serving to keep the South in a constant (albeit just below the surface) state of anxiety, which can be thought of as a mild punishment for whatever sins the South had done that week. 

In Film

And now time for Hollywood. Apparently, North Korea has finally entered into public consciousness and because of that, the hermit kingdom known for its isolation has made a big splash on the big screen.

Olympus Has Fallen, featuring Gerard Butler and Aaron Eckhart, hearkens back to the 1968 Blue House raid in South Korea except this time the target is the White House. In the movie, North Korean assassins have infiltrated the South Korean president's protection unit. During an official ROK visit to the White House, these agents show their true colors and, in conjunction with a "sleeper cell" already in DC, overrun the White House and hold the U.S. president hostage. The goal? To use a top secret U.S. program to detonate our entire stock of nuclear weapons - irradiating the whole country. Thankfully, at the very last moment we're all saved.

The DPRK has a long history of assassination attempts against their southern brethren. Not only did they try to over take the ROK's executive mansion in 1968, they set off a bomb during an official ROK visit to Burma in 1983 which killed 21 people. North Korea maintains 150,000-200,000 special forces personnel and they truly are a force to reckon with. There is little doubt that they have at least considered such an attack on the U.S.

World War Z, is Brad Pitt's zombie apocalypse movie, and while the DPRK did not play a starring role in the film they were mentioned. North Korea was one of the few countries in the world which did not fall due to the zombie plague. Their defense? Since zombification was caused via biting, Kim Jong-un ordered that all of North Korea's 25 million citizens have their teeth removed; a feat accomplished in a matter of days (and according to the related book, they fled underground into the North's myriad of underground bunkers).

Next comes G.I. Joe: Retaliation. In this film, the "Joe's" infiltrate one of the North's many prisons to find an informant and bring him back to the U.S. Later on, the evil Zartan calls world leaders to a conference where he threatens the planet with destruction based on a new weapon. He says that the weapon could destroy each of the countries 14 times, but in the case of North Korea - 15 times (as, presumably. Kim Jong-un gives a "why pick on me?" look).

...and let's not forget Red Dawn from 2012 (it came out in November, so close enough). This remake of the 1984 cult classic was one of my favorite movies of the year. Unlike the Soviet terror in the original, the 2012 version features the DPRK (with help from the Russians, those bastards) unleashing a new, very high tech weapon - an EMP device. The lead character, played by Chris Hemsworth, leads an army of local youths in a battle to rid the American northwest of the surprisingly well fed Korean invaders. While the film's plot is unlikely, the threat of a surprise attack from the DPRK is not.


--Jacob Bogle, 1/17/2014
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