Showing posts with label Kim Jong-il. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kim Jong-il. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 14, 2021

Kim Jong-un's First Decade in Power - Entering The Family Business

Kim Jong-un with his wife, Ri Sol-ju, at the opening of the Rungra People's Pleasure Ground on July 25, 2012. Image via KCNA.

Part II - Entering the Family Business

Death and a Funeral

Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011, at the age of 70. Official reports say he died from a heart attack at 8:30 am while on his armored train touring sites in Pyongyang. Outside reports claim that he died in a “fit of rage” over serious construction issues with the massive Huichon hydroelectric power station. While this story hasn’t been confirmed, it is known that the Huichon power station (the primary hydroelectric dam in a series of dams and power plants on the Chongchon River) took much longer to build than anticipated and was beset by complications over the years.

It is interesting to note that Kim Jong-un did not attend the opening ceremony of the dam in April 2012. The dam was a major national project that saw Jong-il visit the site eight times during construction, and for Kim Jong-un to not take part could suggest that he was still upset over the circumstances that led to his father’s death.

As with the embellishment of Kim Jong-il’s birth, the North Korean version of his death was just as colorful and improbable, declaring that "the sky glowed red above the sacred Mount Paektu" and that the ice covering the crater lake at the summit cracked so loudly it "[shook] the Heavens and the Earth."

Official reporting of his death didn’t occur until 51 hours after the event. What palace intrigue went on at the time isn’t known. Despite any grumblings about another generational succession, and even though Kim Jong-un didn’t have decades to construct a solid power base, he had nonetheless been publicly “crowned” as the next leader and he did have powerful people working on his behalf. There would be no discarding the hereditary succession process that had held North Korea up for generations.

Removing any doubts as to which Kim family member was now in charge, Kim Jong-un was listed as the first person on the list of the official 232-member funeral committee. In traditional communist practice, the higher your rank in a funeral committee, the higher your rank is regarded in the ruling party and government. This was the case for Stalin during Vladimir Lenin’s funeral and it was the case for Kim Jong-il during the funeral of Kim Il-sung.

Of note, Kim’s uncle Jang Song-taek was listed as #19. Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho was No. #4. As we will see later, both men would play important roles in the transition and both men would come to regret it.

Absent an immediate coup, as some tabloids considered possible, Kim Jong-un carried out his familial and state duties to hold a funeral for his father which took place on December 28, 2011.

With all of the somber pomp and circumstance Pyongyang could muster, thousands stood out in the snow as Kim Jong-il’s coffin was carried on top of a US-built 1976 Lincoln Continental, with Kim Jong-un walking alongside with seven other high-ranking officials who were known by the foreign press as the "Gang of Seven".

The official mourning period lasted for three years and at the end of those three years, Kim would have to emerge as the undisputed leader of North Korea if the dynasty was to survive.


Completing the Transition

In the three years leading up to his death, Kim Jong-il had to focus more and more of his time on creating a transition plan for Kim Jong-un. Balancing the competing factions of the military and Workers’ Party and trying to manage smaller poles of influence within the Kim family and general leadership harkened back to the 20-year succession orchestration he himself had to go through before Kim Il-sung’s death. If it failed now, no one could predict what might happen.

Undoubtedly, there were those who wanted to influence the young Kim Jong-un. His uncle, Jang Song-taek, was the most powerful relative in the country and he had his own views on how the country should move forward. There were also older generals and traditionalists who wanted to ensure the dynasty’s continued rule through absolutism, and who rejected any notion of Chinese-style reform, as they saw it to be a threat to their own survival.

Many outside commentators questioned whether Kim Jong-un would be able to control the country and wondered if the regime might even collapse.  National Committee on North Korea founding member Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov said, “They believed Kim Jong Un’s young age and inexperience would make it easier for the time-tested party apparatchiks and Songun (military-first)-accustomed generals to manipulate the young ruler, to influence his decisions, and to control his policies from behind the scenes.”

However, we know that in the time before Kim Jong-il’s death, that there were purges and even executions to shore up Kim Jong-un’s support among the military, with younger generals being promoted up the ranks as they would be more loyal than those who served for decades under previous regimes. And we know that every diplomatic effort was being made to ensure a successful transition to Supreme Leader, including through seeking Russia’s and China’s buy-in for the move.

Jang Song-taek became a crucial link connecting Kim Jong-un with the various economic and trade organizations within the country and would also help him in the realm of foreign policy. It is suspected that Jang was actually in charge of DPRK policy regarding the United States at the time. Additionally, Jang had oversight of the various internal security agencies that would be essential for a smooth ascension to power.

Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho, chief of the North Korean Army's general staff, helped orchestrate the elevation of loyal officers within the military. He appeared with Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-il prior to his death, and he continued to serve by Kim Jong-un’s side after his succession on several occasions to tour military installations and related sites.

Jang, Ri, and others formed a kind of guiding committee while Kim’s grooming was ongoing and then went on to head an informal collective leadership throughout the transition post-2011.

As part of the pre-transition plan, Kim Jong-un was created Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the Third Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea on September 28, 2010. This firmly placed him in the “No. 2” position within the military. He was also appointed to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party.

After Kim Jong-il’s death, Kim was not immediately proclaimed chairman of this or that for each of the multiple positions he was set to inherit. He did gain several key titles soon after, but the full title collecting process was a byzantine operation that occurred over the following couple of years, with each new position signaling his increasing grasp on power. And that would signal to those now holding his hand that they may not always be required.

The next procedural step was for Kim to become the First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, to which he was elected on April 11, 2012. It was at this Fourth Party Conference that Kim was also officially made the Chairman of the CMC, a position which had been left vacant after the death of Kim Jong-il. Later in the year, Kim was also given the title of Marshal of the DPRK and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Regarding attempts to influence Kim Jong-un, one year after his rise to power Dr. Mansourov said, “[t]hese predictions proved to be close to the mark on the family side, only partially correct on the party side, largely wrong on the government side, and absolutely wrong on the military side.

Though Kim was managing to collect all of the necessary titles and positions needed to be the sole leader of the DPRK, he needed more than just a long list of appellations after his name. He needed to consolidate real power from those who wheedled it in the past, and to put an end to any possible competing claims to his authority.

With the official process of transition nearing an end, it was time to become a dictator.

 

Consolidating Power

Jang Song-taek handcuffed in court. Screenshot from KCTV news report.

Although the ruling Kim is supposed to have absolute power, as in any functional system, working power is dispersed among individuals, factions, and agencies. There remains a singular “font of power” – an individual in whom all authority is technically vested – but no individual can successfully run a nation on their own.

North Korea may be set up to have an all-powerful dictator, but the realities of governance and inter-personal rivalries will always mean that power becomes dispersed among different branches of government and those who lead them. Higher ranking elites can therefore gather considerable influence over policy and can seek to control the national leader himself.

As such, relying solely on his family name to press his legitimacy and to shield himself from threats was not enough. Kim had to engage in harsher measures when suspicions (real or imagined) arose about others who might threaten his direct rule.

Within two years of Kim Jong-il’s funeral, five of the “Gang of Seven” senior officials who walked with Kim Jong-un beside the hearse were purged.

Among those were Kim Jong-un’s uncle Jang Song-taek and Vice Marshal Ro Yong-ho.


Jang Song-taek married Kim Il-sung’s sister in 1972. As part of the inner family, he was able to amass considerable influence over the decades, and by the time of Kim Jong-il’s death, he was the Chief of the Central Administrative Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, had been created a general, and became 2nd Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. Jang also held multiple other posts and oversaw various economic and trade interests. All of this gave him access to nearly every sector of the North Korean government and economy, but also enabled him to build relationships with foreign countries, particularly China.

Jang was one of several high-ranking officials charged with assisting the young Kim during his short apprenticeship and was supposed to help maintain stability during the transition after Kim Jong-il died. Throughout this time, Jang was able to secure ever-greater positions within the government, rising from #19 in the funeral committee to #5 among the Party’s Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee in less than a year.

His activities exposed him to criticism regarding his own apparent autonomous level of influence, and also placed him in the middle of internal power struggles between military-controlled enterprises and those government-controlled enterprises headed by Jang and his allies. This and his alleged sympathy for Kim Jong-nam created the environment for his downfall.

Hints of cracks in the relationship between Jang and Kim Jong-un may have first publicly appeared on Nov. 4, 2012. He was appointed chairman of the newly created State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission. While this may look like yet another promotion superficially, it was actually the first move to sideline him by giving him more responsibilities but responsibilities of little significance.

Then in December, Jang, who was the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, wasn’t invited to a meeting of top officials to address UN sanctions. During which, Kim Jong-un made the decision to “take substantial and high-profile important state measures” in response to the sanctions.

Making his precarious position even more obvious was when he was passed over by Choe Ryong-hae to be Kim’s first special envoy to China in May 2013. Choe had been a protégé of Jang Song-taek’s.

Although Jang survived previous rounds of purges and demotions, his time was up.

Two of his aides were executed in November of that year and thereafter Jang wasn’t seen in public until he was publicly expelled from the Party on December 8. He was then given a show trial on December 12 and quickly executed. In the 2,700-word official press release regarding his downfall, Jang was accused of everything from embezzling funds to undermining the cult of personality to working with others to effect a coup. Regardless of the veracity of the alleged crimes, his life and legacy were over.


Lest we see Jang Song-taek in a purely sympathetic light, he was likely responsible for the downfall of another, Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho.

Ri had been a leading figure organizing the military’s rallying around Kim Jong-un. He was responsible for numerous promotions of younger officers who would be loyal to Kim, and he had been a close confidant for years.

Ri was relieved from all of his posts on July 15, 2012, during a meeting of the WPK Central Committee’s Political Bureau. A list of his posts included being a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK, and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The official reason given was “illness”, which, according to NK Leadership Watch, can be a euphemism for insubordination or corruption. Ri’s last known public appearance was on July 8 during a visit to the Kumsusan Memorial Palace alongside Kim Jong-un. The exact reason(s) for his loss of favor isn’t known, but it may have been the result of changes in policy and influence between the political leadership and the military leadership. If so, this would also have been part of Kim’s desire to move away from the Songun (military-first) policy and toward a policy that reestablished control of the economy to the WPK. As Ri was a proponent of Songun, he would have been placed in direct political conflict with Kim Jong-un and with Jang Song-taek, who also favored reform (perhaps favored too radical reform as evidenced by his death a year after Ri’s).

Ri's ultimate fate is still not publicly known. It is rumored that he was either killed during a firefight with personnel loyal to Kim Jong-un or that he was executed soon after his dismissal. Either way, he has not been seen since.


Following these actions and the successful December 12, 2012 launch of the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2 satellite, the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Region in April 2013, and conducting two successful nuclear tests in 2013, along with the economic reforms that moved the country away from Kim Jong-il’s Songun policy to Kim Jong-un’s Byungjin (parallel development) policy (which will be discussed in detail in future articles), Kim Jong-un demonstrated he had gained full authority over the government and military, and that he could freely exercise power.


A New First Family

In any hereditary system, the main business of the family business is having kids. Without heirs to carry on your legacy, the regime collapses and you become the ultimate failure.

Kim Il-sung was married twice. First to Kim Jong-suk who died in 1949 and was Kim Jong-il’s mother. And secondly to Kim Song-ae, who died in 2014. Kim Song-ae was given the official title of “First Lady” in 1963 but that term stopped being used in 1974. The end of the official use of the title corresponds with Kim Jong-il’s own rise in power, as she was not his mother and as he spent years reinforcing his own direct line within the Kim family personality cult. 

Kim Jong-il, who had two wives and two known mistresses, left the position of First Lady vacant and was never seen in public with any female partner; although, the women would occasionally meet with domestic and foreign dignitaries without him. It was Kim Jong-il’s lack of a public family life that helped shield the Korean people from knowledge of Kim Jong-un’s existence for most of his life.

Establishing even more contrast with his father, Kim Jong-un would not shy away from portraying himself as a family man. Kim married popular singer Ri Sol-ju in 2009. Particularly in the first years of Kim's rule, she would often accompany him on guidance tours and gained an international following for her modern fashion style. Ri has been compared to former U.S First Lady Jackie Kennedy.

She gave birth to a son in 2010 and then finally, in 2018, she received the long-dormant title, “Respected First Lady”. She received this title soon before attending the DPRK-ROK summit that year and became the first Kim spouse to meet a foreign head of state, South Korean president Moon Jae-In.

The daily activities of Kim’s family are unknown. Ri is seen less often than in the past, likely busy being a mother, and she is rarely away from her husband when she is seen. And when not on "On the Spot Guidance" tours, Kim is known to spend a lot of time at the family palace in Wonsan. 

This compound was Kim’s favorite during childhood and offers a wide range of leisure activities. He also renovated the large Ryongsong palace complex in Pyongyang, which is the official family residence constructed by Kim Il-sung in 1983. Changes, including the addition of horse-riding tracks, have also been noted at other less frequented villas around the country.

Doing her duty to provide an heir and spares, Ri gave birth again in 2012, this time to a girl named Ju Ae. And a third child was born in 2017 according to South Korean intelligence reports. During Dennis Rodman’s 2013 visit to North Korea, he claimed to have met their daughter Ju Ae and said that Kim Jong-un was a “good dad”. Of course, the value judgments of a man who has spent very little time with Kim and who seems to willingly ignore the country’s vast prison system can only be given so much weight.

While still too young to rule if Kim Jong-un died today, these children do provide a future lineage for the regime and help give a sense of stability among the elites in Pyongyang.

It is likely that these children, who are not seen in public, will one day be sent to Switzerland (or perhaps Russia or China) for their educations and that they will experience their formative years in a manner similar to that of their father’s. Afterward, they will attend elite institutions within North Korea before being given roles in government and beginning their own grooming processes as the next generation.


Growing the Cult

Kim Jong-un receiving the crowd’s praises from the observation pavilion overlooking Kim Il-sung Square during the September 2021 parade celebrating the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Korea. Image via KCNA.

North Korea’s cult of personality is the most pervasive and advanced expression of a personality cult in modern history. The roots of a nascent cult can be traced back to before the founding of the state, but it really began to take hold after Kim Il-sung’s victory over “factionalists” within the government through the 1950s and 1960s. Kim Jong-il was able to clinch the role of successor by further expanding the cult and creating a legal system and culture that deified his father.

Today, it is not unreasonable to say that the existence of the government is predicated on the existence of the Kim family. The highest body of law isn’t the constitution but the Ten Principles for a Monolithic Ideological System which explicitly demands loyalty to the Kim family above all else. But even the national constitution itself places Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in the role of “eternal leaders” and asserts that North Korea is based on the ideologies put forward by the Kim family.

While the blind adulation of the masses may indeed decline with each generation, the heir of the Mt. Paektu bloodline is still the supreme ruler. He is father, mother, and the source of all power in the country.

Extreme stories about the people believing the Kims can read minds or don’t require unseemly bodily functions may make for interesting headlines, but the reality is clear enough without the need for embellishment: without the Kims, there is no North Korea.

And so, it has been imperative that Kim Jong-un not only find his place within the existing cult that surrounds his grandfather and father, but that one is established for himself.

One thing commentators immediately remarked on regarding Kim’s appearance is how much he looked like a young version of Kim Il-sung. Connecting the young Kim to the nation’s father has been of paramount importance to bolstering his otherwise thin resume. As defector Kim Kwang Jin discussed in his 2011 paper for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, “Acting in his father’s name, Kim Jong-Il was able to seize and retain power. His son, Kim Il-Sung’s grandson, must now do the same thing. The regime knows that this basis for power succession cannot be used so easily again, and is rushing to tie the young man to his grandfather’s political legacy.”

Kim Kwang Jin went on to say, “To facilitate the transfer power to Kim Jong-Eun, Kim Jong-Il again sought to gain legitimacy for his son from Kim Il-Sung…Every image of Kim Jong-Eun was deliberately designed to imitate his late grandfather.” And that this manufactured image of Kim Jong-un as a kind of Kim Il-sung Version 2.0 “had the effect of pre-empting any opposition, since the second incarnation of Kim Il-Sung cannot be challenged.”

From his dress and outward style to his public persona, Kim Jong-un has done just about everything possible to remind North Koreans that he is indeed the direct descendent of Kim Il-sung.

To further enhance Kim's position within the cult, over the years, his mother has been given various titles such as "The Mother of Pyongyang", and "The Mother of Great Songun Korea”, elevating her within the family pantheon. She was also the subject of at least one state-sponsored documentary The Mother of Great Songun Korea.

Kim himself has received multiple titles and epithets such as Dear Respected Comrade, Brilliant Star, Beloved Father, Peerlessly Great Man, and has been described by the state as “the only and unique successor and leader of the Juche Revolution”.

One of the first physical manifestations of the cult came ca. 2012 in the form of a 560-meter-long sign on a hillside above the Samsu Hydroelectric Dam which proclaimed, “Long live Songun Korea's General Kim Jong Un!” The word “Songun” was later changed to “Juche” in 2020, as a reflection of the change in Kim’s policies away from Songun.

Other earlier works to build up his own cult revolved around elevating ancestors and reinforcing his connections to Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung. These took the form of airing documentaries, giving even more titles to Kim Jong-il (like making him Eternal General Secretary of the Party and updating the constitution to include Jong-il as one of the “eternal leaders of Juche Korea”), and requiring the people to attend ideological lectures. Through this, Kim Jong-un’s own position was magnified and his legitimacy to rule the country became even more unquestionable. After all, who could oppose the anointed son of eternal beings?

To reinforce this in a way inescapable to people’s daily lives, he had murals of Kim Jong-il erected in every county seat, bronze statues of Jong-il added next to the ones of Kim Il-sung, and he had the text on thousands of Towers of Immortality changed to reflect the “eternal life” of Jong-il as well. 

Kim Jong-un’s cult has been established, books have been commissioned, songs have been written, and people swear fealty to the man not to the constitution or rule of law, but in keeping with tradition, we shouldn’t expect large monuments to him in any great number until after his own death. For now, he is a living deity and continually studying his words will be the primary form of (required) “worship” for every man, woman, and child for years to come.

Developing His Own Style

Every new leader, elected or otherwise, tries to leave their own mark on the role and differentiate themselves from the previous ruler in one way or another.

While still being a ruthless dictator, it must be acknowledged that Kim Jong-un has taken up the role of “Kim Il-sung 2.0” seriously. Unlike his father, he does not shy away from public speaking, and he has done something his father never explicitly did, admit when there have been failures.

Doing this creates a beneficial situation for Kim whereby officials and bureaucrats can be more easily scapegoated for failures and Kim can remain above the fray as the caring leader. Together with visiting the sites of natural disasters (such as after the summer floods of 2020), this gives him the public image of a concerned and accessible leader, which then reinforces the cult of personality’s assertion that the Kims are fatherly figures who labor day and night over the cares of the common man.

As Atsuhito Isozaki, Faculty of Law at Keio University, noted in his 2020 article Characteristics of Kim Jong-un’s Leadership, Kim has proven himself to be pragmatic when it serves the regime, continually calling for the rejection of “formalism”, and has demonstrated a contempt for the overly rosy government reports of the past in favor of greater directness and accuracy.

He also seems to understand the fact that genuine loyalty and devotion to the Kim family has waned over the years. By channeling Kim Il-sung and making himself repeatedly available in times of crisis, he can inculcate in the people a deeper sense of loyalty and willingness to obey the latest Supreme Leader.

 

He began demonstrating this new leadership style almost immediately. His first attempt at a satellite launch failed, a failure Pyongyang admitted, and he didn’t shy away from criticizing past policies that left people hungry. He has carried on with this policy of relative transparency through to the present day.

During the 8th WPK Congress in January 2021, Kim told the assembled delegates that “though the period of implementing the Five-Year Strategy for the National Economic Development ended last year, almost all sectors fell a long way short of the set objectives” and that officials should “be bold enough to recognize the mistakes, which, if left unaddressed, will grow into bigger obstacles.”

He has further acknowledged corruption within the government more than once and made mention of ongoing food shortages.

While honesty and transparency are typically seen as good qualities of government, within North Korea, they raise the risk of highlighting contradictory realities. The government reality of a “strong and prosperous nation”, with occasional difficulties vs. the reality experienced by most people of never-ending privation with occasional benefits. This could lead to a greater awakening of the people of the state’s failures to provide even the most basic necessities that all people expect of their governments.

Regardless, Kim seems confident enough in his approach and has taken steps to quell any internal dissent as well as to end the flood of outside information that was unleashed after the breakdown in order following the 1994-98 famine.

Defections are at all-time lows since the famine and the border has been sealed more tightly than at any point in the country’s history. Kim has also directed the government to take measures against foreign cultural influences.

Despite some positive habits, Kim’s dictatorial nature extends far beyond punishing teens for watching South Korean dramas.

Not only did he execute his own uncle, but he also went after his half-brother Kim Jong-nam.


Kim Jong-nam had been seen by some as a possible replacement to Kim Jong-un should a coup or regime change ever happen, and these things were openly discussed in foreign media. Making matters worse, Jong-nam had publicly criticized the North Korean government and Kim Jong-un.

In a move of ultimate confidence, Kim Jong-un ordered the public assassination of Jong-nam using a banned chemical weapon, through foreign agents he had recruited to carry out the killing all while Jong-nam was in another country – Malaysia.

On February 13, 2017, a group of women from Vietnam and Indonesia were tricked into placing a cloth covered in VX nerve agent onto Kim Jong-nam’s face while he was at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. Within minutes, he collapsed into unconsciousness and died soon after. The event shocked the world due to its brazenness and cruelty.

According to Professor Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, in Kim's eyes, killing his half-brother and uncle placed him on the same footing as his father and grandfather, and it demonstrated his "strategic intention" to strengthen one-man rule in the country.

 

Despite hopes that his exposure to Western education and to the ideals of capitalism, human rights, and the rule of law would have given the world an “enlightened” ruler of North Korea, it has become clear that he has taken the lessons of the modern world only to modernize systems of oppression.

By the time of the 7th Congress of the Workers Party of Korea in 2016, Kim Jong-un had not only managed to successfully complete the transition and emerged as the country’s true supreme leader (with any remaining rumors of a de facto regency or of him not having the skills required fully squashed), he also oversaw substantial progress over the country’s nuclear and ballistic programs, embarked on billion’s worth of construction and tourism projects, successfully established an improved relationship with South Korea through the 2012 Olympics (an improved relationship South Korea would work hard to maintain), and he would be confronted with new challenges on the international stage as the United States elected a president viewed by many as just as brash as Kim Jong-un.

With ten years of rule to look back on, no one can doubt that Kim has created a leadership style far different than that of his father’s. And that he has taken well to the family business, as whatever real improvements have been seen, the core of the regime remains violent and willing to dispose of anyone deemed a threat. 

~ ~ ~ ~

I have scheduled this project to run through to the end of the year, with a new article coming out roughly every 10 days or so. If you would like to support the project and help me with research costs, please consider supporting AccessDPRK on Patreon. Those supporters donating $15 or more each month will be entitled to a final PDF version of all the articles together that will also have additional information included once the series is finished. They will also receive a Google Earth map related to the events in the series.

Supporters at other levels will be sent each new article a day before it’s published and will also receive a mention as seen below.

 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Rinmanah, Russ Johnson, and ZS.

--Jacob Bogle, 9/13/2021

Monday, May 20, 2019

Why Has There Not Been a North Korean Stauffenberg?

The short answer is, there may have been. Maybe even more than once during the seven decades of the Kim family regime. Word of the event(s) simply may have never made it to the outside world, as little does. It’s also possible that the Korean Stauffenberg(s) never made it as far as the real Stauffenberg and were cut down before they could make a serious attempt on the lives of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, or Kim Jong Un. But all signs point to there never having been a coup attempt with any realistic chance of success.


For those who may be unaware, Colonel (German: Oberst) Clause von Stauffenberg was a German military officer and minor noble who was a leading figure in the July 20 plot of 1944 to assassinate Adolf Hitler by blowing him up in a conference room. July 20 was the last known attempt to kill Hitler. Despite the murder of 6 million Jews, the deaths of millions of rank and file German soldiers and tens of millions of European civilians, and despite the creation of an authoritarian regime that eliminated nearly every freedom one can think of, no mass uprisings occurred in Germany. Even during the final year of the war, when it was obvious to everyone that the war was lost and that Germany would be destroyed, after July 20, 1944, not one stray bullet or bomb found Hitler, and certainly not a nationwide coup as July 20 had attempted.

So what does World War II history have to do with North Korea? (Besides a lot) North Korea has created a state every bit as brutal and oppressive as Nazi Germany or the Stalinist-era Soviet Union. Nazi Germany was only destroyed from the outside after nearly six years of war. The Soviet Union managed to survive for a staggering 69 years. However, even the USSR wasn’t immune to challenge and revolt. The countries behind Iron Curtain chaffed at Moscow’s reigns and occasionally this spilled out onto the streets, such as during the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Within Soviet Russia itself, you had the Kronstadt Rebellion and anti-Bolshevik peasant revolts. But North Korea appears to lack this kind of internal strife, at least, to a very large degree. It has certainly managed to hold off mass violence and protesters marching in the streets longer than any country I’m aware of, communist or otherwise.

Andrew Scobell’s 2006 monograph Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System mentions the fact that totalitarianism demands tremendous resources, both human and material. By necessity it creates systems for coercion and surveillance. And after a while, resources start to dry up and wear down. The economy suffers, infrastructure breaks down, and people grow weary of constant “ideological struggles”, mass mobilizations, as well as the more immediate and constant struggle of feeding one’s family. This leads to a burnout of faith in the regime and a burnout at a more fundamental level – the people themselves simply become tired of it all. North Korea has managed to hold on for 71 years and counting, longer than any communist country in history. The Nazis fell because of outside forces and the Soviets fell because of unstoppable economic forces. And both countries had to deal with internal dissent and the burnout of their people. The question I’d like to answer is, why has North Korea not only been able to survive, but why hasn’t it even had a Stauffenberg figure?

I suspect that a full answer and explanation would end up being many, many pages long, too long for the purposes of this blog. So, I will attempt to give a satisfactory but abridged answer here as told through a history of the country.



Kim Il Sung

After the July 20 plot, Stauffenberg was viewed by his contemporary citizens as a traitor. This wasn’t necessarily because he tried to kill Hitler the person, but because he tried to kill the leader of the nation during a time of crisis and war. The people of Germany saw this as dishonorable and as an act that, if successful, would have hurt Germany – after all, the average German still saw Hitler as the reason for the economic improvements of the 1930s and directly responsible for the amazing military successes earlier on in the war. Hitler was still viewed as the only one who could bring about ultimate victory. The world may have been collapsing, but the Führer was the personification of their ultimate hope.

Likewise, Kim Il Sung became the embodiment of the hopes and dreams of the North Korean people.

The Kingdom of Korea, it would be fair to say, was one of the last quasi-feudal kingdoms in the world by the time it was annexed by Japan in 1910; slavery wasn’t even officially banned until 1930. Millions of people lived in abject poverty and few had access to education. Japan’s annexation brought with it rapid modernization. The northern half of Korea was industrialized, while the southern half became the breadbasket of the peninsula. But all of this “good” also brought tremendous, continued suffering on the part of the native Korean people. Korean language and culture were banned in favor of Japanization. Japanese citizens were moved into Korea and countless Koreans were forcibly moved out to the far reaches of Japan’s growing empire.

The treatment of the Korean people continued to be abysmal. Then came along a shining example of Korean nationalism and the greatest general of all time, Kim Il Sung. (So says the official myth, anyway.) Japan was defeated in 1945 and a Soviet-backed state was created in 1948, with Kim Il Sung at its head. He instituted broad reforms, imprisoned the landlords and gave the farms to the people. He attacked the Christian minority (seen as a stain of imperialism) and replaced such superstitions that "oppressed" the people with faith in him; a demigod they could see. Education, healthcare, housing, no sector was left untouched by his brand of Korean-Marxism. Then, a short two years later, he launched his country into the most devastating war it had ever seen.

Millions of Koreans died and nearly every building in Pyongyang (and everywhere else) was destroyed. The truth is that North Korea only survived because of Chinese intervention, but the official regime story is that it was the iron-willed leader, Kim Il Sung, who saved the northern half of Korea from American imperialism – while the southern half was forced to languish under the American whip until a new war of unification could be waged. The end of Japanese occupation and the Korean War created a situation that gave Kim Il Sung the opportunity to lay claim to the titles “creator” and “savior” of North Korea. The people, naturally, had been given a front row seat to the horrific abuses of the Japanese and the devastation of modern warfare. North Korea would now forever be at risk. It would always be in the sights of much larger powers just waiting to destroy them.

However, while the peasantry was happy enough to take their anger out on abusive landlords, the apparatus of state was far from settled. Kim Il Sung was only one of many would-be national heroes. In fact, by the end of WWII, he had spent more time outside of Korea than living inside the country. Multiple factions existed and it wasn’t until 1961 before he could really lay claim to being an absolute dictator. But this struggle was largely limited to political machinations on the part of those that opposed him, or at least against his desire to be a dictator. Unfortunately for them, Kim & Co. wasn’t afraid of violence. He and his guerrilla warrior faction cared little for the rules of war (or law) and they didn’t mind purging those who opposed his will – either by exile or outright murder. By the 1960s, his Manchu-based guerrilla faction was the only one that had any real power.

Afterward, the dictatorship he created was constructed to help ensure his continued rule. Some dictatorships are “cooperative”. Those in the military, the bureaucracies, and economic bosses tend to work together within their respective sectors to create a stable state. Lots of other dictatorships lean on a more competitive design. They pit people against each other, and agencies try to usurp one another in the grab for resources and political favor. This creates an inefficient and unstable state, but it also breaks up possible alternate bases of power and limits the risks to the dictator from anyone within government or the military. Kim chose the latter design.

As the country recovered from war and Kim rebuilt the nation, the average person genuinely respected him and had faith in “socialist construction”. It’s important to recall that most Koreans were poor, uneducated farmers and laborers prior to the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The only education they received after that was education that promoted the state and made Kim Il Sung the center of the universe. And the country’s elite and military leaders knew to respect and fear him. They were also well aware of the threats facing their country and that they would not have their positions without Kim, thus loyalty was required.


Kim Jong Il

Kim Jong Il on the other hand was disliked by basically everyone by the time he died in 2011. When Kim Il Sung died in 1994, many outside observers thought the country would soon collapse. What Kim Jong Il had going for him (and the first hereditary succession of a communist state) was that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, he had been maneuvering himself into being the only viable successor to his father. He built up the personality cult surrounding his father beyond anything Stalin received. He placed himself at the center of every powerful agency, and most importantly, he ingratiated himself with the military. He played up Kim Il Sung’s “divine” bloodline, which he, too, shared. And by necessity to gain the power he needed, he slowly cut the elder Kim out of active politics and control.

Kim Jong Il didn’t escape unscathed in his transition to power. But, once again, the opposition was limited to palace intrigue, with the requisite purges that followed. There wasn’t visible public out crying against this most un-socialist of transitions and there weren’t any overt attempts on his life by the elite. Once again, their own survival depended on his, much like the survival of the Nazi elite depended on the continued patronage of Hitler, even in the last weeks of World War II.

The great famine of the 1990s proved to be his greatest threat and it became the greatest example of the regime’s durability. Around a million people died and the state failed in many of its obligations. This is one of a few periods when consistent, but limited, stories pop up of dissent; however, they’re largely limited to local factory strikes and such. But this dissent wasn’t necessarily aimed at Kim Jong Il himself (although any dissatisfaction or grumble is viewed by the state as going against the Leader and is a crime). The people simply wanted food. Luckily for Kim Jong Il, there were plenty of plausible things to blame the famine on that deflected attention away from him and the inherent flaws within socialism: droughts and floods, corrupt officials stealing, and the perennial favorite, Western hostility.

The closest example of a Stauffenberg-like revolt is rumored to have happened in 1997, while the famine was still ongoing. Elements of the Korean People’s Army Sixth Corps, based in North Hamgyong Province, conspired to begin a general uprising. This is where the regime’s insistence on extreme political surveillance and “centralized decentralization”, where Kim is the only one with an overall view of the nation, while the military and state apparatuses are fragmented – particularly when it comes to communication – came into play. The plotters were unable to reliably contact others to arrange a mass uprising. They also failed to overcome the fact that every high-ranking official has their own (one or more) state security officer watching their every move. The commander of the corps refused to take part and the Sixth Corps was disbanded. The conspirators and their families were never heard from again.

The popular perception of organizations like the Nazi SS or Soviet KGB is that they had absolute control over the people. That they knew everything, saw everything, and heard everything. But that isn’t reality. The reality is that Colonel Stauffenberg was recruited by others and that they had far reaching support (even if that support wasn’t exactly based on mass support). An entire apparatus including military officers and political leaders was able to be assembled for the purposes of the July 20 coup attempt. (Some 7,000 people were eventually arrested in connection to the plot.)

What little we know about the 1997 plot paints a much different picture. The conspirators weren’t even able to reach outside of their own units, and they didn’t seem to have had any political supporters. North Korea’s multilayered approach to state security and the security of the supreme dignity (another term for Kim) far surpass the capabilities of the SS or KGB.

One very plausible reason for the military’s opposition to revolt, even though their own families were suffering during the famine, is that Kim Jong Il switched the center of national power away from the Worker’s Party (WPK) and state bureaucracies and moved it to the military. Kim promoted the military by instituting the Songun (military first) policy. By securing his power base among the largest and most powerful (literally) organization in the country, he ensured his continued survival. He also managed to build up a base of support early on, before his succession, by taking over the ideological and propaganda departments. With these behind him, there was little chance of a sustained or deeply rooted challenge to his authority.

A rare example of popular dissent comes from 2009. The people were protesting unpopular currency reforms which wiped out what little people had managed to save. It was viewed as an attempt by the government to steal wealth and crack down on market activities. However, Kim Jong Il, unlike many dictators, learned to listen to the opinions of others and made just enough limited changes to the reforms in response. He also had the “mastermind” behind the reforms executed. The ability to know when to bend to pressure while maintaining the appearance of personal infallibility served Kim Jong Il well. For the second time in a row, a dictator was able to die of natural causes, as he did in 2011.


Kim Jong Un

Successful dynastic succession is completely unheard of among communist and totalitarian regimes. Within communism, such a thing as hereditary leadership cuts against every aspect of the ideology. And totalitarian systems are largely created by a single strongman and then fall apart as soon as he dies. Kim Jong Un is the grandson of Kim Il Sung. Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il, he didn’t have decades of grooming. In fact, he didn’t have more than two or three years. To outside observers none of this bode well for the young man. However, Kim the Third seems to have taken rapid actions to secure his reign. A series of purges and executions allowed him to consolidate his power. He took steps to reaffirm the authority of the Party while emphasizing a parallel track that allowed the military to hold on to its power.

Kim Jong Un has also managed to accomplish what his father and grandfather couldn’t - the completion of the nuclear program, the successful test of a missile that could hit any part of the US, and face-to-face meetings with the leader of their greatest enemy, President Donald Trump. Furthermore, whatever problems arise from sanctions, Kim Jong Un has still managed to oversee a billion-dollar construction boom. He has also learned the lessons of his forefathers and struck against those who could harm him (like his uncle Jang Song-thaek and his half-brother Kim Jong Nam), and he has begun to reach out and rebuild relationships with old allies. His personal characteristics play in his favor, too. Like his grandfather, he is outgoing and more charismatic than his father. Not to mention his striking physical resemblance to Kim Il Sung.

From the outside, it seems like he is in a very good position to maintain power.

Conclusion

Kim Il Sung was the father of the nation. Kim Jong Il led the country out of famine and protected it while it was weakest. Kim Jong Un has managed to accomplish multiple regime promises. And all were able to maintain ruthless control, even if absolute power has waned slightly generation-to-generation. North Korea’s take on Confucianism, filial piety, ultra-nationalism, and severe coercive and security systems has meant that at any given time, the people were either unwilling or unable to reject the Kim’s. Kim Il Sung is viewed as the father of each of the 25 million North Koreans alive today and the Kim dynasty is the personification of the people’s will and of the state. A lyric to a North Korean song goes, “without you, there is no motherland. Without you there is no us.” The leadership has built for itself a system in which the people are instinctively opposed to the very idea of open dissent or overthrowing the Kim’s, and built a system in which broad dissent or revolt is all but impossible.

The regime’s ability to react positively, but only just, to popular demands and its ability to navigate and command the numerous group interests within the “competitive dictatorship”, has enabled the Kim family to rule for 71 years. In 2019, there is no real outward sign of imminent collapse. Going back to Andrew Scobell, perhaps instead of collapsing the way Libya or the Soviet Union did, North Korea will take the path of China (albeit more slowly) and manage a gradual transition toward a post-totalitarian system. Pyongyang’s total control over the flow of information and economic activity has been greatly reduced over the years. The average citizen no longer relies solely on the state for their needs, but instead relies on their own ingenuity to get what they want. And, the system has become highly corrupt. These weaknesses may enable the transition to a post-totalitarian state, or they may simply be the first visible cracks before the entire edifice comes crashing down. Either way, a Korean Stauffenberg seems as unlikely today as yesterday.

Saturday, July 15, 2017

The Price of the Cult of Kim

(To save and read for later, you can download the PDF here)

Figure 1: Visitors bowing before statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il at the Mansu Hill Grand Monument. (Image credit: Commons/J.A. de Roo)

Summary

While state-directed personality cults are nothing new, the magnitude of the North Korean personality cult surrounding the ruling Kim family surpasses any other. The cult’s main foundations are structured around the thoughts and orders of the Kims. Having a large effect on the nation’s economy, culture, and military, the cult and its associated “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” (the revolutionary political and philosophical thought of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il) has been described as the primary focus of the country and a central motivation behind the activities of the government. [1][2]

The amount of resources dedicated to the construction, maintenance, and expansion of the cult over its decades of existence has cost the country billions in direct and indirect costs. The funding apparatus of this system features heavily within the bureaucratic hierarchies and helps to “grease the wheels” when it comes to providing assets for military programs and large construction projects; ostensibly to enable the construction of a “strong and prosperous nation”. In a country where one man rules with an iron grip and in which no major decision can be made without him, the use of the cult (and its mix of nepotism and bribery) is essential to Kim Jong-un’s ability to preserve his power and to direct resources to the parts of the economy he wishes to improve. However, the net effect of this has led to a byzantine system of kickbacks and inefficiencies that have hampered economic growth and progress as enormous efforts and monies are redirected away from the general economy to keep the system functioning.

History

The personality cult began soon after Kim Il-sung came to power in 1948. However, its intensity and the level of resources dedicated to it vastly expanded during Kim Jong-il’s rise to power as he elevated his father in an attempt to secure his own eventual succession as the unquestioned leader after his father’s eventual death in 1994 (after death he was then elevated to the position of Eternal President). Part of the cultural foundations of the cult that have allowed it to take root and survive for so many years, stem from Korea’s traditional imperial and Confucian past and its highly patriarchal nature. 

Additionally, in light of Korea’s history of reliance on and subjugation by outside forces, the development of Juche in the early history of North Korea (in practice, a mix of self-reliance and nationalist racialism) makes more sense. In such a context, the invention of a supreme leader (or Suryong) who is vested with the “will of the people” and who alone can guide and protect the nation is understandable. Since then, the cult has been embellished, refined, and expanded with each generation of Kim, as though by Divine Right. All fundamental documents and guiding principles of North Korea codify and are bound by the cult: the Constitution, the Juche Idea, and the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideology. It touches on every aspect of life: education, daily work, the economy, art, and the military.

In order to enforce the cult in the minds of the people, there are approximately 10,000 individual stone and bronze monuments throughout the country [3], and every train station, government office and home must contain images of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un (images of other family members, like Kim Jong-suk, can also be found). Many schools contain miniature models of Kim Il-sung’s Mangyongdae birthplace, and even the various places the leadership has visited become elevated; with ink pens used or benches sat upon turned into mini-shrines. [4] The most obvious evidence of the enormous resources poured into the cult is easily found in the thousands of monuments, propaganda signs, and museums which cover the nation.


Figure 2: Map showing some of the over 40 monuments in the city of Nampo. (Satellite base image: Google Earth, May 18, 2017)

Costs

The impact of the cult on the economy and culture is a complicated matter, not just due to the opaque nature of North Korea as a general rule, but also because so much of its effects aren’t as obvious as the many statues.

Perhaps the easiest area to review is in terms of hard dollars. There are no firm estimates about the overall cost of the cult, either in direct costs such as those of constructing monuments, or in the muddier costs due to its effects on education, its general impact on culture, etc. Having said that, the estimates that have been published vary somewhat as to the cost of maintaining the cult, with lower bound figures at $40 million to $100 million annually. [5][6] This doesn’t necessarily take into consideration large single expenditures such as the renovations to the Kumsusan Memorial Palace. In 1994 Kim Jong-il ordered the palace converted into Kim Il-sung’s mausoleum at a reported cost of $100 million. The palace underwent further changes after Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011. Upper bound estimates suggest several billion (note A) are spent each year on direct glorification of the Kims and indirectly via "cultural" and other spending which serve as a conduit to spread government propaganda.

Going further back in time, many of the costs of the cult during the Kim Il-sung-era are generally lacking, making acquiring firm estimates for that period even more difficult. What is known is that projects such as the original 1972 golden statue of Kim Il-sung at the Mansudae (Mansu Hill) Grand Monument, with a value estimated at $851 million, so appalled visiting Chinese dignitaries that it was later replaced with a bronze version [7], and that such large-scale projects have been blamed for part of North Korea’s economic decline in the 1980s, [8] with a famine following in the 1990s.


Figure 3: Monuments at the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang. (Image credit: Google Earth/DigitalGlobe, October 4, 2016)

After Kim Jong-un’s rise to power, in part to help secure his rule due to his young age and perceived lack of experience, the government took rapid steps to build up a cult around him. At the same time, the state worked to escalate the veneration of Kim Jong-il - during which the government installed him as the nation’s second eternal leader: the Eternal General Secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party. The roughly 3,000 “Towers of Eternal Life” which were erected after Kim Il-sung’s death have been modified to include references to the eternal life of Kim Jong-il. And, based on a review of satellite imagery, included in the escalation of the Kim Jong-il cult was the construction of twenty-seven bronze statues in major cities to be placed alongside those of Kim Il-sung (some of which were replaced with newer versions). These statues range in size from 5.3 meters in height to the large 23-meter tall Mansudae statues. Additionally, approximately 150 five-meter high murals of Kim Jong-il were installed next to existing murals of Kim Il-sung in county seats and other towns.

Figure 4: Twenty-three-meter-tall statue of Kim Il-sung at Mansu Hill, Pyongyang. (Image Credit: Google Earth/NASA, April 10, 2011)

Figure 5: Image showing the newly installed statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il at Mansu Hill. (Image Credit: Google Earth/DigitalGlobe, Nov. 26, 2014)

Figure 6: Jangdae Hill, Pyongyang. Left: A mural of Kim Il-sung in 2010. Right: Twin murals of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il (installed in February 2011). Image credits: (Left) John Pavelka/Flickr; (Right) Wikimedia Commons.

Not to be out done, some monumental works glorifying Kim Jong-un are large enough to be seen from space, like a half-kilometer long sign in Ryanggang Province which reads, “Long Live General Kim Jong-un, the Shining Sun of [North Korea]!” Additionally, plans are now underway to place stand-alone “mosaic murals” of Kim Jong-un in each provincial capital. Funding of the cult comes not only from government sources, but also from the people themselves in the form of “loyalty payments” exacted from each citizen and business.

One area that is difficult, but not impossible, to estimate costs are in terms of misdirected labor and lost production due to the cult. Each year millions of man-hours are committed to constructing and maintaining facilities, preparing for parades and mass games, and on other projects. This continual labor is done in spite of regional food shortages, the flooding of cities, and other problems which could otherwise use that manpower to address those difficulties. The largest example of mass labor is the 100,000 people who train (unpaid) for months to produce the Arirang Mass Games each year. If we assume a base salary of $100 per month and calculate 351 hours of training per person, we reach nearly $22 million in lost pay for other work that could have been done instead of putting on a propaganda performance. [9] An account of what went in to Arirang can be found in the book In Order to Live, by defector and human rights activist Yeonmi Park, who wrote: 

"Most impressive were the thirty-thousand to fifty thousand children who had trained for many months to sit in the risers behind the stage, holding up colored squares like a living mural to create enormous, ever-changing scenes and slogans glorifying the regime. Only much later did I realize how abusive it was for these children to preform for hours and hours without even a small break to eat or use the bathroom." 

It’s important to look at the overall costs of non-penal forced labor as well (as those in the country's vast prison camp system are generally thought unworthy to participate in the glorification of the Kims). According to Open North Korea, a Seoul-based NGO, an estimated 400,000 people form a class of laborers called dolgyeokdae. These workers receive little pay and are required to work on major construction and prestige projects that the leadership can show to the world. Apart from general construction, work on monuments is part of their duties. All of this results in the leadership’s continued ability to boast about building a strong and prosperous nation. A feat that, according to the cult, can now only be done under the “wise leadership” of Kim Jong-un. The value of the labor is estimated to be $975 million annually.


Figure 7: Arch of Triumph, Pyongyang. Dedicated to the period of “Anti-Japanese Struggle” under Kim Il-sung. (Image Credit: Google Earth/DigitalGlobe, Oct. 4, 2016)

Less easily accounted for are the indirect costs to the nation’s ability to innovate and engage with international partners. From grade school to university, much of a student’s academic career is spent learning about the deeds of the leadership, so much so, that even elite students may struggle with relatively simple scholastic tasks.

Yeonmi Park speaks to the ordinary education of children, too:  "In the morning, after we finished cleaning the streets or polishing the monuments, we were marched off to class." And, "In the classroom every subject we learned...was delivered with a dose of propaganda... This worship of the Kims was reinforced in documentaries, movies, and shows broadcast by the single, state-run television station." Later on she recounts, "As soon as you are in school you are drilled in the 10 Principles of the regime...You learn the principle of juche...and you are taught to hate the enemies of the state with a burning passion." 

She continues, "In North Korea, even arithmetic is a propaganda tool ...[and] any mention of the Kims had to be preceded by a title or tender description to show our infinite love and respect." 


Figure 8: Tower of Eternal Life and "Juche Study Hall" at Pyongyang University. (Image Credit: Google Earth/DigitalGlobe, Sept. 7, 2015)

Society and the Cult

The role of the public education system in instilling the tenants of the cult in the people can’t be overestimated. One of the first phrases children learn to speak is “thank you, Father Kim Il-sung”. [10] Similar to Christians thanking God before a meal, all North Koreans are taught that their food, housing, education, leisure activities, etc. are given to them by the grace and love of the leadership. This isn’t an abstract notion of gratitude either, but rather it is giving thanks for what is seen as the benevolence of the leadership, literally to each person individually, and without which they would go hungry.

North Korean society is divided into three main classes under the Songbun system. This system is how the government determines who gets what. What kind of careers and educational opportunities will be available, who can marry whom, and more. The top class of people are those who are seen as the most loyal while those at the bottom are seen as “hostile”. Political crimes and crimes of thought (such as questioning the regime) are considered to be some of the most serious offenses and can result in the “criminal” and their family being sent to a prison camp. In this way, one’s place in the very fabric of society is tied to one’s obedience and acceptance of the leadership and Party.

Recurring rituals, like the laying of flowers at statues, or the regular “self-criticism” sessions during which people are supposed to acknowledge their faults and the various ways they let the Great Leader down (even for the most minor offenses), have enabled the indoctrination of millions of North Koreans for generations into the Cult of Kim. Nearly every holiday is concerned with the Kims. The “Day of the Sun” is Kim Il-sung’s birthday, for example. Through these events people can prove their loyalty and maintain their positions, or be raised up (or made low). These times also serve as opportunities for the government to prove that the Leader is indeed the great benefactor of the people. Gifts proportionate to each citizen’s Songbun class are distributed during major holidays. Holidays are also times when the government tends to announce new large construction projects or the success of military projects, thereby validating (through exaggerated propaganda) what they have been telling the people year-round.

The cult can be looked at as a double-edge sword. It has the benefit of creating a fairly obedient and docile society who are bound to their fatherly leader, but it also results in huge amounts of money, labor, and material (as well as human lives) being expended to glorify the leadership. The loyalty payments the government demands from the people (along with other sources of income) creates a kind of “court economy” that can be used for anything from statues to ballistic technology, which in turn raises the risks of new international actions against the state. By spending so many hours teaching students about the great feats of the Kim family, a nation with millions of hard working people can be mobilized to complete massive projects at a frenzied pace. But it also results in less innovation. And a lack of understanding about trade hobbled the recovery after the famine as people were forced in order to survive into crash courses in economics in the streets at nascent, illegal markets. That disconnect between the government and the economic reality on the ground has enabled even more corruption and uncertainty to take hold. [11]

Conclusion

For those things that can be seen and measured, so long as the government continues to demand absolute fealty, millions will continue to be spent on stone edifices that dot the landscape and in countless other ways to remind the people that ‘without him, there is no us.’ [12] The people’s heart-felt dedication to the cult may have diminished since the days of Kim Il-sung, but it remains, nonetheless, an integral part of the whole society. This entrenched reality makes it highly unlikely that there will be any fundamental changes in the near future as any such changes would alter the structure of the cult and weaken the Kim's position. Additionally, outside attempts to diminish the cult (and thus its hold over the nation) through sanctions or other hard power methods are unlikely to have much effect, as the country itself relies on upholding the cult. Those in power remain in power through their loyalty and by finding ways to help finance the desires of Kim Jong-un. Likewise, those wishing to rise in influence can only achieve their wishes by contributing to the Cult of Kim. The best example of this was the rise of Kim Jong-il himself, who, prior to the years of work he engaged in the idolization of Kim Il-sung, was not originally seen to be a probable successor to his father.

One only needs to look at the remodeling of the Korean Revolutionary Museum, [13] the expansion underway at the underground vaults of the International Friendship Exhibition, or the Tower of Eternal Life in Pyongyang, which recently underwent renovations, to verify the continued outlay of resources on the personality cult and to see that Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism remains "the only guiding idea of the party" and nation. [14]

Figure 9: Scaffolding is visible on the Tower in this image dated October 4, 2016. (Image Credit: Google Earth/DigitalGlobe.)

Figure 10: Image from KCTV April 2017 broadcast showing the opening of Ryomyong Street and the Tower of Eternal Life after renovations. 




Additional Reading
1. Who Are They? - Some Historical Perspective, Frontline/PBS
2. The 1st Marxist Monarchy, The Washington Post (1978)
3. North Korean Cult of Personality, Wikipedia


Notes
A. A 2007 study by the Korean Institute for International Economic Policy reported that state expenditures on the cult grew from 19.5% of the nation's budget in 1990, to 38.5% by 2004. Outside of the military, which is a separate economic and budgetary entity within North Korea, Professor Rüdiger Frank suggests that the national budget can be viewed as synonymous with the economy. If this is the case, 38.5% of an approx. $23 billion GDP (2004) equals $8.8 billion.

References
1. Jin-sung, Jang, Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee – A Look Inside North Korea. New York, NY. 37INK/Atria, 2014. Page 132.

2. Kim Jong-un, The Cause of the Great Party of Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il is Ever Victorious, Foreign Languages Publishing House, October 4, 2015.

3. The number of monuments is derived from a four-year long mapping project by the author.

4. Oberdorfer, Don Carlin, Robert, The Two Koreas A Contemporary History, New York, NY, Basic Books, 2013. Page 16.

5. Kim Jong-il Personality Cult 'Cost $40 Million', The Chosun Ilbo, August 25, 2012, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/08/25/2012082500347.html

6. Mike Firn, Kim Jong-il personality cult costs North Korea £62m, The Telegraph, December 5, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9723048/Kim-Jong-il-personality-cult-costs-North-Korea-62m.html

7. Becker, Jasper, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2005. Page 150.

8. Martin, Bradley, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, New York, NY, St. Martin's Griffin, 2006.  Pages 322-323

9. The figure is derived using a base salary of $100/month. Each participant trains for at least 90 minutes a day, six days a week from January to September. That gives 234 days of training (six-day weeks), multiplied by 90 minutes equals 351 hours per person. 351 hours equals 2.19 months’ worth of 40-hour work weeks, or $219 in would-be salary per person. Multiplied by 100,000 participants and you reach $21,900,000.

10. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion in North Korea. November 2005. Page 1

11. Babson, Bradley O., The North Korean Economic System: Challenges and Issues, International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XX, No. 1. DPRK Economic Forum, U.S.-Korea Institute, SAIS, Spring 2016. Page 156

12. “Without you, there would be no us!” is a verse from the North Korean song “No Motherland Without You” about Kim Jong-il.

13. Remodeled Korean Revolution Museum Opened, Rodong Sinmun, April 1, 2017


14. Rüdiger, Frank, North Korea in 2012: Domestic Politics, the Economy and Social Issues, Brill Publishers, 2013. Page 45