North Korea by the Numbers

Phase II of the #AccessDPRK Mapping Project was published on March 5, 2017, but simply knowing where everything is doesn't make understanding the full picture much easier - especially when considering there's over 50,000 places marked. So I've put together these basic charts showing the total number of items per division (monuments, military, and domestic), the total items per province, and the total number of items within each type mapped (AAA sites, elite compounds, dams, communication centers, schools, etc.).

I'd like to point out that the overall figures here will differ slightly form the ones listed in the March 5th publication article. All told, there are some 600 individual sub-folders I have to keep track of and the resulting numbers take up 24 pages; minor mistakes happen. A couple numbers were inverted, and a few others were slightly off, however the overall discrepancies are very minor when compared with the whole. After making those needed corrections, the information below should be considered as authoritative as it will get with regards to the project.

The following charts (monuments, military, and domestic) represents the most detailed map of North Korea ever released to the public.

Many monuments are clustered closely together, making marking each one individually impractical. Instead, some markers are placed next to a group of monuments (2-4 generally), so while Pyongyang may have 1,049 markers on the map, those markers represent 1,230 individual monuments.

It's important to note, for those unfamiliar with the project, that the numbers below represent the numbers within the various folders by those names. There will be some items where there will only be one or two places within a province - those didn't necessitate their own folders. In such cases, they're often located in the "un-categorized" folder. An example of this is military training centers and military factories. Just about every province has at least one, but only a few have a folder dedicated to them.  A similar situation exists within the domestic file; bunkers, water towers, jails, and others may or may not have their own folder, but they will all be mapped.

While the purpose of this project is to map every one of a particular item, there are some items that I did not intend on mapping each and every one of, such as "firing positions". These trenches and prepared (but empty) gun positions cover the country and number in the thousands. In many cases it's also difficult to determine whether or not something was just a leftover temporary fortification from the Korean War or is part of the country's current defense structure (which does include having trenches in just about every available space). Additionally, the "radar" count is predominantly stand-alone radar sites, not the numerous smaller radars that accompany permanent artillery positions; although some of those are mapped as well. "Gates" are only mapped when they help define the boundaries of an area or are large - there's no real need to map every single gate at every single military site.

With the exception of a few items: canals, signs, factories and farming (to a degree), mountaintop sites, gates, and water supply, I have tried to be as comprehensive as possible in mapping each and every one of the other sites. Regarding the number of factories and farming/agricultural facilities, I focused on only mapping the larger sites, while also mapping some smaller agricultural facilities (like wheat threshing sites) to provide examples of what those numerous places look like. 

In short, the map contains 8,865 monument markers (representing 9,896 individual monuments), 9,594 military sites, and 35,252 domestic and economic sites for a total of 53,711 placemarks. There are also hundreds of fences and other things outlined in the map, but those aren't included in the counts as the places fenced in have already been accounted for.

#AccessDPRK will occasionally be updated to provide greater accuracy as new information comes in, fixing any unintentional errors, and adding more details.

--Jacob Bogle 7/4/17
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The Rise of Cell Phones

The government of North Korea has been experimenting with allowing and expanding mass communication for over a decade. Prior to 2002, mobile communications had been limited to top government and military personnel. Cell phones were then introduced for public consumption and by the following year some 20,000 North Koreans had cell phones. Although the system has always (technically) limited usage to in-country calls, there have been a few hiccups along the way and the government has been playing catch up ever since in an attempt to limit outside information leaking into their formerly hermetically sealed country, and to keep undesirable internal information from spreading throughout the nation.

Despite the initial success in 2002 and 2003, the service was suspended in 2004. The reason for that suspension and the confiscation of phones was an explosion at a train station that, allegedly, was targeted at killing Kim Jong-Il as he passed through the area via train. The bomb was triggered by a wireless device. It wasn't until late 2008, when the Egyptian telecom company Orascom negotiated a contract with Pyongyang, that cell service was reinstalled. This new 3G service, officially called Koryolink (75% owned by Orascom and 25% by the North Korean government), initially had fewer than 1,700 customers its first year, but now serves over 2 million people (about 8% of the population). The country has a 2G provider, SunNet, that services Pyongyang, but little else is known about it.

Under Kim Jong-un, the number of cell towers has risen sharply. I've mapped around 360 cell towers across the country so far, and I estimate there will be a total of 550 to 600 by the time I'm finished. For some perspective, the US state of Tennessee has more cell towers than the whole country of North Korea. If they were all evenly distributed, that would mean 30% of the DPRK's land area would have some kind of cell coverage. In reality, most major and medium sized cities do have at least one cell site nearby, meaning that the majority of citizens resided in an area with some cell coverage.

Cell phone usage is still heavily regulated though. Not only does an individual need permission to have a phone, calls are routinely monitored, and service can be cut at any time, particularly during disasters or various crisis. The government has embarked on erecting signal jammers/interceptors, particularly along the border regions, and has a fleet of vehicles that randomly sweep areas in an attempt to catch people calling out of country.

The rise of cell phones has greatly contributed to the country's burgeoning market economy and enabled a true middle-class to emerge. A substantial black market has also arisen associated with cell phone acquisition: cutting through red tape etc. with people using bribes, intermediaries, and "buying" the names of impoverished people (paying them in food or small amounts of money) so that others can use the name in an attempt to get around regulations.

Phone prices range from $150 to $700, which is no small purchase in a country where per capita GPD is a mere $1,800/year. Phone plans offer 200 minutes for a small fee, but after that the price can be as much as $10 for an additional 200 minutes. Naturally, a used phone market has developed. Even though the phones can facilitate business, many people still struggle to afford additional minutes.

Most phones are of Chinese origin, though party cadres and other wealthy individuals can afford LG and other western phones. In 2013 North Korea unveiled their "domestic" Arirang touch-screen phone, however, many experts believe it is simply a knockoff Google Android design and is manufactured in China.

Kim Jong-un inspecting packaged Arirang phones.

While the phones are predominately used for business, keeping in touch with friends, sending pictures, and other normal things, the government does have the ability to use the phones to spread state propaganda by sending text messages to all subscribers. There have been reports that data transfers (like sending pictures) are now tightly controlled and in some cases that ability is no longer included. Random police checks also occur frequently. The government is also trying to promote a new phone model, the "1913", which limits the phone's use to the city of its registration. SD card slots are blocked, and internal memory is drastically limited compared to other models.

When Koryolink was first introduced, many observers hoped that it would herald a new era of openness and that it might even lead to regime change. Eleven years later, while there have been improvements when it comes basic communication and market activity, the government has been effective enough, along with the service's cost and inconsistent quality, as to render those hopes little more than dreams for some future time. Using phones to even set up a soccer club resulted in sending 20 college students to do hard labor.

And though word of rumors, scandals, and disasters can now travel across provincial borders and in rapid time, the other systems of government control make any type of organized or mass resistance nearly impossible.

For the government, cell phones enable better communication between departments, improved control standards when it comes to production and agriculture, faster responses in the face of emergencies, and the added benefit of hard currency thanks to a growing economy (even if much of that money comes from bribes and corruption), and hundreds of millions itself from the establishment and expansion of cell service.

Here is a map of the towers in Pyongyang and surrounding provinces:

And in the northeast of the country:

For more information, check out this report published by the US-KOREA Institute and Voice of America about the rise of mobile phone usage in North Korea and its possible political implications.

Also, see North Korea News for the article "Inside North Korea's Cell Network" featuring former technical director of the network, Ahmed El-Noamany.

---Jacob Bogle, 7/11/2015
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