Saturday, January 11, 2020

The Current State of North Korea’s Satellite and Missile Facilities


Rocket engine test at the Sohae Satellite Launch Station |Photo: Rodong Sinmun, April 9, 2016

Over the decades, North Korea has decentralized its satellite and missile launching facilities across its territory. One obvious benefit to this is security but it is done at the cost of efficiency. The more facilities one has, the more resources are necessary to maintain and upgrade them. It may even become necessary to neglect or demolish a site in favor of improving more important ones. Pyongyang seems to have learned this lesson and placed some sites in caretaker status, demolished others, and concentrated resources to support their core infrastructure.

In this article, I will examine the current state of the country’s launch and testing facilities and detail a few important changes that have happened under Kim Jong Un, who has overseen a greater number of missile tests than his predecessors combined.

While North Korea has a history of launching missiles from a range of locations (factories, airfields, and even along highways), the country does have a robust set of dedicated launching and testing facilities.
Currently, the country has two satellite launch sites, three rocket engine test facilities, a general launch facility, and two former sites that have been decommissioned in recent years. Within Pyongyang, two known tracking and control centers also exist.


Satellite Launch Sites

While all countries have the right to peaceful space exploration, the development of rocket engines to carry satellites or astronauts necessitates the development of ballistic technology. Indeed, this has been a concern of other nations regarding the development of private space exploration. North Korea’s official protests that their space program is solely peaceful have never been taken seriously by the West and even their own propaganda has occasionally betrayed the rouse. Most recently, the purpose of the December 2019 engine tests at the Sohae Satellite Launch Station have been described by state media as “bolstering up the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.

Image showing the rebuilt vertical engine test stand |Photo: Google Earth

Located on the western seaboard, initial construction activity at Sohae (also known as Tongch'ang) was first noticed in the early 1990s and was largely completed by 2011. The first test occurred on April 13, 2012, with the failed launch of the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 earth observation satellite.
Improvements to the site continued to be made over the years including new administrative and observation facilities, an upgraded rail station, and even the establishment of an outer perimeter fence that encompasses the original complex and its inner perimeter. In terms of recent activity, there are three primary examples.

The first occurred in 2018. As a result of the first US-DPRK summit that was held in Singapore, North Korea began dismantling key structures. However, rapprochement didn’t last long and in March 2019 the second change happened, the launch pad structures began to be rebuilt. The third change came with the end of 2019 and underlined the continued importance of Sohae, as two rocket engine tests were carried out.

The county’s second satellite launch station, on the other hand, has largely remained in caretaker status since 2013.

Tonghae Satellite Launch Station (also known as Musudan-ri) is in North Hamgyong Province along the east coast. Considerably smaller, Tonghae’s construction started in the 1980s and was originally used in the development of early generation Scud missiles. In 1998, North Korea claimed to have launched a Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 satellite from Tonghae, however, no orbital object was ever located or tracked by outside observers.

Another failed satellite launch attempt happened in 2009. In 2012, one of the last major additions to the site was constructed. The site, which has yet to be positively identified, is either a test facility or possible missile silo. However, despite initial progress, it was never completed. The most recent Google Earth imagery shows that it may actually be in the process of demolition.
Much of the trench covering has been removed and the control building has been torn down.

In May 2018, the trench covering was visible, and the control building was still standing |Photo: Google Earth

By November 2019, the covering had been partially removed and the control building demolished |Photo: Google Earth

Tonghae’s launch pad appears to be abandoned and is overgrown, while activity at the engine test stand and assembly building remains minimal. In fact, the grounds of the assembly building have been used for crop harvesting activities.

The original launch control building, tracking station, and the “new” control building (construction finished ca. 2015) have all seen little activity and signs of minor disrepair are visible. The Horizontal Processing Building has never been completed, despite construction starting in 2012.
Tonghae’s situation may be the result of the regime’s focus on launching satellites at Sohae with its superior facilities, testing missiles on mobile platforms, and keeping engine test stands near other required infrastructure, whereas Tonghae sits miles away from manufacturing and fuel production facilities. Tonghae’s future use seems rather bleak.

Rocket Engine Test Facilities

Beyond the engine testing facilities within both satellite stations are three additional test sites: at the Tae-sung missile factory (Pyongyang), the Magunpo solid-fuel engine test site (near Hamhung), and the Sinpo engine test site.

The Tae-sung rocket engine test stand as seen after a 2016 modernization program |Photo: Google Earth

The vertical test stand at Tae-sung (also called Chamjin) is located within the Tae-sung Missile Factory complex in Chollima, Pyongyang. Though the fairly rudimentary site can test engines for Scud and Nodong missiles, it underwent a period of general inactivity from 2006 to 2016. In 2016 the facilities were modernized, and a nose cone test was carried out. This suggests that testing larger engines may no longer be feasible (or necessary as other purpose-built sites exist) but that the site can still play a role in developing other aspects of ballistic missile technology.

Magunpo engine testing facility |Photo: Google Earth

Magunpo is one of North Korea’s newest testing sites (along with Sinpo). Vertical and horizontal test stands were constructed between 2013 and 2014. It also lies a mere 3 km from the No. 17 Explosives Factory in Hungnam where solid rocket propellant is produced. Since its construction, multiple tests have been carried out (as well as the launching of several missiles from the nearby Yongpo airfield to the southwest). Magunpo remains an important cog in North Korea’s missile program as it is currently the largest such site in the country.

Sinpo engine test stand |Photo: Google Earth

Within the city of Sinpo and including the nearby Mayang Island lies a key submarine base and is where most of the development of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) occurs. Initial work on the land-based test stand began in 2012 and supports “both the development of the Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM and SINPO-class SSBA’s missile launch systems,” according to Joseph Bermudez. There have been several “ejection tests” at the site as well as tests carried out on sea-based, submersible barges. The most recent barge-based test was of the Pukguksong-3 (KN-28) which was conducted on October 2, 2019.

Work at the submarine base has been ongoing and, according to 38 North, the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) "revealed the presence of the North Korean SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) and its submersible test stand barge positioned beneath a recently constructed, dockside awning designed to conceal and environmentally protect these vessels.” 
This is strong evidence that the development of SLBMs is a primary focus of the regime.

Hodo Launch Site

The Hodo missile launch site and artillery testing grounds |Photo: Google Earth

The Hodo Launch Site is a dedicated missile launch facility that lies on the Hodo Peninsula, north of Wonsan. The area has been used for artillery training since the 1960s but within this decade the training area has been increasingly used for long-range artillery and ballistic missile testing. Concrete launch pads, a dock, and other support buildings were constructed beginning in 2014.

Two launch pads were constructed at the relatively close-by Wonsan-Kalma International Airport in 2016 and several tests were carried out there, however, the subsequent construction of resorts and hotels along the same beach meant that those launch sites were demolished. Since then, activity at Hodo has greatly increased with several tests happening in 2019 including a test on May 4, 2019 and two short-range missile tests occurring in July.

Decommissioned Launch Sites

The first decommissioned launch site in recent history was the aforementioned site at Wonsan. Those two pads were the location of several high-profile launches including a Hwasong-10 launch which Kim Jong Un himself oversaw. The extremely basic facility was demolished for expediency as Wonsan was about to undergo an enormous construction project to build beach resorts. The upgraded facilities at nearby Hodo also meant that Wonsan became redundant.

A comparison image showing the Iha-ri driver’s facility with the test stand visible in 2017 and in 2019 after its demolition |Photo: Google Earth

Perhaps the most significant change happened at the Iha-ri military driver training base in North Pyongan Province. Between 2016 and 2017 a vertical engine test stand was constructed at the base. It was only used once, as a canister-launched ballistic missile ejection test for the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) before being demolished in mid-2018 as part of Kim Jong Un’s April 2018 announcement that they would suspend future ballistic missile tests. The base has since been returned to its original purpose.

Control Centers

Pyongyang is host to the country’s central missile and satellite control centers.

The General Rocket Control Center is located within the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (also known as the Academy of Defense Science or the Sanum-dong missile factory) in northern Pyongyang. It is responsible for tracking and other activities related to the testing of ballistic missiles and was constructed sometime between 2001 and 2005. The facility has remained largely unchanged except for a new hexagonal building that was constructed in 2016. The Academy lies adjacent to the Kim Jong Un National Defense University which also plays a role in the development of missile technology.

The General Satellite Control Center is the control center of the National Aerospace Development Administration. The modern-looking complex was constructed near central Pyongyang along the Pothong River between 2014-2015. It handles satellite launches and tracking. An expansion of the facility began in 2017 with multiple large buildings being added to the complex. Construction at the site has carried on well into 2019. The exact purpose of these new buildings is unknown, but it is possible that they may be research facilities and will also provide museum space.

Conclusion

While some facilities may have been shuttered or demolished, the core of North Korea’s testing infrastructure and their ability to research and to construct missiles and launch vehicles remain undiminished. Pyongyang’s insistence that the recent Sohae tests were part of their nuclear deterrence, and their ongoing work toward developing SLBMs at their Sinpo facilities, clearly demonstrate the regime’s intentions. The question becomes, will the international community listen to what North Korea is broadcasting with the current state of their testing facilities?


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

Monday, January 6, 2020

Growth in Military Capacities Codified by Party Meetings



During the last ten days of 2019, North Korea held two major meetings, both chaired by Kim Jong Un.

The official reports on the substance of the meetings have been short on detail, but they have mentioned a few key points that can give us an understanding of what’s going on. During the “enlarged” Seventh Central Military Commission meeting, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the, “meeting would decide on important organizational and political measures and military steps to bolster up the overall armed forces of the country…” and “discussed were important issues for decisive improvement of the overall national defence and core matters for the sustained and accelerated development of military capability for self-defence.

Stressing the point further, the report went on to say that at the meeting they rectified “irrational structure and defects in machinery and some shortcomings in other military and political activities…” This means streamlining the military bureaucracy and realigning military and related facilities to be more effective toward accomplishing national defense goals.

During the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the KCNA reported that the agenda emphasized “the need to take positive and offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country as required by the present situation, [Kim Jong Un] indicated the duties of the fields of foreign affairs, munitions industry and armed forces of the DPRK.

While these statements are relatively broadly worded, they echo what has come out of previous meetings. The result of those meetings, policy changes, and decisions by Kim Jong Un has repeatedly resulted in the ongoing development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and upgraded capabilities of their conventional military forces.

North Korea has generally taken a cautionary approach. When diplomacy seems to be working, they’re willing to halt major weapons testing. And when things start going sour, they resume provocations. But throughout it all, they have not altered any of their core military doctrine or cut themselves off from necessary infrastructure or strategic development.

The Center for Strategic International Studies, 38 North, myself, and many others have spent a lot of time monitoring not just North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic forces but also their conventional military capabilities, and one thing has been made very clear: under Kim Jong Un, major upgrades to all branches of their military have been underway. Regardless of any specifics, these two meetings have underscored this ongoing trend of modernization and the realignment of military structures.


This trend can be seen in the fact that Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his predecessors combined, tested the country’s largest nuclear device to-date, and, as mentioned, is currently embarking on the reorganization of military bases and expanding their training capacities.
This reorganization and the overhauling of capabilities is a keystone of what the Party has now laid out and it can be seen in the following examples.

Regarding their nuclear program, there has been a large amount of construction work in recent years at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and that work is ongoing. The Pyongsan uranium mine and milling plant continues production and seems to have taken on the role as the regime’s primary uranium milling plant as the smaller site at Pakchon has been placed in caretaker status and is somewhat now redundant. Focusing on Pyongsan saves resources and allows for needed improvements at Pyongsan, such as those seen from 2013-2015.

The Tonghae Satellite Launch Station has been placed in caretaker status as well, as additional resources have been poured into the more capable Sohae Satellite Launch Station. Keeping some sites in caretaker status also gives the regime the latitude to make token concessions (such as the demolition of a single test stand) without fundamentally degrading their capacity for testing, while still being frugal by not keeping both sites at full operational status.

In keeping with the theme of centralization, Pyongyang’s General Satellite Control Center is in the process of expansion, and ongoing work at the National Defense University has been identified as its role in both ballistic research and its place within the burgeoning personality cult of Kim Jong Un grows.

The country’s missile testing facilities have likewise been streamlined. The short-lived Kalma test site was decommissioned in favor of the expanding capabilities at the nearby Hodo Launch Area. And, a test stand was erected at the Sinpo Submarine Base to enable the further development of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

Their munitions industry has also been expanding, as the Central Committee meeting has now publicly emphasized. A very recent example of this is the expansion of the March 16 Factory in Pyongsong which produces military equipment needed for their missile program. Ongoing work can also be seen at a massive underground facility and related factories in Hamhung.

Changes haven’t been limited to industrial centers or test sites. Even the ballistic missile bases themselves have been enlarged with new housing and additional support facilities. The northern base at Yeongjeo-ri has also had a large annex constructed nearby (construction was completed under Kim Jong Un).

In terms of naval power, a major, multiyear reconstruction was carried out at the facilities around Muchon, and Changrin Island (on the west coast) has had a naval base built on it. The island recently made headlines for artillery tests carried out from it. Analyst Joseph Bermudez has given a detailed report about a large hovercraft base in Yonbong-ni under construction. Such bases can be used by strategic and special operations forces to quickly infiltrate and destroy South Korean targets.

Then there’s the aforementioned submarine base at Sinpo. Not only has a missile test stand been erected but the manufacturing abilities at the base have been improved and other construction activity can be seen. The first test of the SLBM Pukkuksong-3 was carried out in October of 2019, and there is growing evidence that North Korea is building a new type of submarine at Sinpo.

As I noted in early December, the regime has taken several steps to make the most of its aging air force. Under Kim Jong Un, the capacity to train paratroopers has been nearly doubled and their airfield infrastructure has likewise been improved.

One of the goals of the Central Committee’s meeting was also to discuss ways to improve agriculture and that, too, connects with the military changes. Unessential airports have been closed and one, Kyongsong-Chuul, was recently decommissioned to allow for the construction of a massive agricultural center. This drive to increase food production in conjunction with military improvements can likewise be seen through changes at KPA Farm No. 1116. This key agricultural site in Pyongyang underwent a modernization program in 2019 and was visited by Kim Jong Un in October.

Of North Korea’s Army, the area of training has been a major focus. An important military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) base near Kangdong added 11 km of new paths in 2019 for training soldiers on how to operate various equipment. Similarly, KPA bases near Yongbyon, Pukchin, Haeju, Changdo, and Sepo have all undergone notable expansions since Kim Jong Un came to power. 
Completely new bases have also been constructed throughout the country.

This centralization effort in training allows for key bases to be overhauled and to serve as primary training facilities, instead of new recruits being sent to dozens of smaller sites around the country, each with significantly more limited resources. It also opens up space to house new soldiers, enable larger numbers to be moved around the country for construction or harvesting activities, and will give the regime the space needed to improve ongoing training of their vast paramilitary and reserve forces.

A small but important side benefit of this comes from better land-use policies. Efficiently arranged military housing and more reasonably designed training courses allows for more hectares of land to be used in farming instead of being wasted.


North Korea is rarely a mystery to those who pay attention. They broadcast their intentions in both official pronouncements from media and Party newspapers, and in their activities (which can be observed from satellites). As broadly worded as the official statements may seem regarding the two meetings, when you see the trend that has already been happening, those reports clearly reveal the state’s objectives to continue to improve their national defense abilities across the board as well as their agricultural and economic sectors.

The dual nature of North Korea’s domestic-military system has built a unique national structure that has enabled the country to survive for seven decades. The use of the military as “builder-soldiers” to construct everything from a modern skyline in Pyongyang to new ski resorts and to the reconstruction of Samjiyon, improves the domestic economy. Improvements to the country’s general infrastructure regarding communication, fuel supplies, and illicit means of sanctions avoidance enables greater military capabilities.

From threats of “Christmas gifts” to claims of new “strategic weapon systems”, the overarching policy directions proposed by Pyongyang are now reflecting what has already been happening under Kim Jong Un and ensure the establishment of needed “offensive measures for fully ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country”. To guarantee the sovereignty and security of the country, North Korea’s wider strategic position must be secured, no matter what happens diplomatically. Kim Jong Un’s refusal to ignore the less “sexy” conventional forces while also placing an emphasis on economic matters, seems to have placed North Korea in a secure position for the foreseeable future.

Additional Reading
Major Expansion at Pyongyang Training Ground - AccessDPRK, 12/17/19
Missile Bases and Major Underground Facilities - AccessDPRK, 10/23/19

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/5/2020