Wednesday, August 25, 2021

Kim Jong Un's First Decade in Power - Introduction

Kim Jong-un overseeing the test of a “super-large” multiple rocket launcher in August 2019. Image via KCNA.

Introduction

Successful hereditary succession in communist regimes was unheard of until Kim Jong-il inherited power from his father Kim Il-sung in 1994. Kim Il Sung founded North Korea in 1948 and over the years the source and legitimacy of his power morphed away from popular power and became based on a kind of divine right, a right that separated his bloodline from any other and made his descendants the only ones with the legitimacy to rule. Fast forward to the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, his son (Kim Il-sung’s grandson) assumed the mantel of power for the next generation.

Kim Jong-un was only 28N1 and became the youngest world leader to have nuclear weapons at his disposal. He was Kim Jong-il’s fourth child and so wasn’t the clear choice to become Supreme Leader until relatively soon before Jong-il’s death. In fact, he was such an unknown that prior to his ascent, even the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency only had a single picture of him as an eleven-year-old.

In the decade since Kim Jong-un became the Supreme Leader and Marshall of the Republic, North Korea has become a fully-fledged nuclear weapons state, he held the first-ever meeting between a North Korean leader and a sitting U.S. president, he has placed the Worker’s Party of Korea back into the center of governance (reversing the policy of his father), and the regime embarked on billions worth of construction and tourism programs. All the while killing relatives, enduring food shortages, maintaining a vast prison system, and is currently struggling with the greatest economic downturn since the 1994-98 famine due to COVID-19.

Kim Jong-un has a family, laying the foundations for a future fourth generation of Kim rule if he manages to maintain control for succeeding decades. But the chances of a successful future lie in his actions during this first decade.

The purpose of this multi-part series is to examine the history, challenges, successes and failures of Kim’s first decade in power and to probe whether or not a future decade is likely based on the performance of the last.

A lot has transpired these ten years and new challenges such as Kim’s health, abrupt changes in U.S. foreign policy, and other unforeseen events can have a major impact on the future of North Korea. The last decade gives us a template to consider how Pyongyang may react to such events and reminds us that they always carry the risk of swamping the man and the apparatus of state.

This series will be broken down into these primary themes:

·       A brief biography of Kim Jong-un prior to his succession
·       Kim entering leadership and consolidating power
·       Nuclear and ballistic developments
·       Foreign affairs and diplomatic efforts
·       Economic developments and construction
·       His health and the health of the country
·       Looking toward the next ten years

Additionally, occasional supplemental articles may be added to help expand certain topics that are relevant to Kim’s first decade and will be based on the findings of the AccessDPRK 2021 Pro Map.

 

It is important to avoid caricatures and popular biases when investigating a county and a man already viewed in the popular imagination as unstable and irrational; a view often prompted by reports in mass media. While occasional literary flourishes may be used throughout this series, I have endeavored to present a fair and accurate accounting of the facts of this last decade and will not shy away from objective successes or indulge in a tragedy of horrors to fit certain political narratives.

Kim Jong-un is a complex individual and North Korea is a nation of 25 million other individuals all with their own hopes and dreams, who share 75 years of history. Attempting to minimize their experiences or warp them through overt political lenses does not serve the wider debate and dishonors the realities of life in North Korea as best as we can understand it from an outside perspective.

 

I have scheduled this project to run through to the end of the year, with a new article coming out roughly every 10 days or so. If you would like to support the project and help me with research costs, please consider supporting AccessDPRK on Patreon. Those supporters donating $15 or more each month will be entitled to a final PDF version of all the articles together that will also have additional information included once the series is finished. They will also receive a Google Earth map related to the events in the series.

Supporters at other levels will be sent each new article a day before it’s published and will also receive a mention as seen below.

 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, and ZS.

--Jacob Bogle, 8/23/2021

Note 1: Kim Jong-un’s birth year is uncertain. It is either 1982 or 1983 but is generally accepted to be 1983 based on U.S. and South Korean sources.

Sunday, July 25, 2021

Probable Ballistic Missile Training Facility Located

AccessDPRK has located, with moderate probability, a ballistic missile training facility for North Korea’s Strategic Rocket Forces.

Located near the city of Jangjin at 40.328529° 127.228468°, Landsat imagery shows that the facility was established ca. 1994 and high-resolution images are available from Google Earth starting in 2009. 

North Korea has an estimated twenty operating ballistic missile bases, and most have gone undescribed in public sources except for brief mentions of the existence of “Base A” or “Base B”. Many of these bases have their establishments in the 1980s and 1990s, coinciding with an important period of missile development in North Korea as the country moved away from simply reverse engineering Egyptian-sourced SCUDS and began to develop their own indigenous weapons.

North Korea also has a number of areas used for testing rocket engines and the missiles themselves; areas such as the Hodo Peninsula Testing Facility, the Sinpo Shipyard, and many more. Getting even less public mention are the numerous smaller parts of the country’s missile infrastructure.

There’s more to developing a credible ballistic missile force than just having the ability to launch them. Having locations to do everything from research and development to training your nascent missile force personnel in handling, moving, mating, fueling, raising, and arming the missiles is necessary.

If no one can drive the large vehicles needed to move the weapons from one place to another, you’re left with sitting targets.

The Jangjin complex is one of the smaller ballistic missile-related facilities in the country. From its headquarters to the rear of the base is only about 1 km, while some operating missile bases cover dozens of square kilometers. 

The base is situated in a forested part of Jangjin County and is arranged along a single dirt road. Moving south from the headquarters are four transporter-erector launchers (TELs), each with their own bunkers for protection.

There are also smaller objects and excavated emplacements throughout the complex, but they are too nondescript for me to identify. 

The TELs are approximately 17 m long and 3 m wide, while the bunker structures are 18-19 meters long and 5 meters wide. Each one is also protected by an earthen berm positioned roughly 28 meters away from the bunker entrances. 

A question exists whether or not the base is currently active. A review of Google Earth imagery shows that the TELs barely move, if at all, over a sequence of seven available images from 2009 to 2018. The TELs are not seen fully housed inside the bunkers nor are they seen moving around other parts of the base. 

The headquarters and road are maintained, suggesting the site hasn’t simply been abandoned, but what its current status is isn’t known, as North Korea’s modern intercontinental missiles are too large to fit the TELs at Jangjin. However, that may help give us an answer.

Jangjin may have been one of the first dedicated ballistic missile/TEL training bases constructed. At the time, the country only possessed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (which fits the size of the visible TELs). Training for these missiles and equipment is still needed, but the country’s focus has since been on developing and deploying larger and larger missiles leading to the need for the enormous 11-axle TEL seen in 2020. Jangjin may simply no longer be a key training complex, particularly as other bases improve their own training capabilities.

The reason I don’t think this is an operating missile base is because it lacks many of the features common to known operational bases like Sakkanmol and Kal-gol. Some of the features it lacks are:

  • Jangjin lacks any perimeter fencing or obvious secured entrance other than the headquarters itself. 
  • Jangjin lacks any dedicated air defense sites. All of the air defense positions in the area are there to protect the Jangjin Airbase (6 km away) which is home to Il-28 bombers and MiG-21 fighter jets.
  • Jangjin lacks any underground facilities.
  • Jangjin only has three buildings on site. This is not enough to house the thousands of soldiers, munitions, vehicle sheds, maintenance facilities, etc. seen at other bases.
  • North Korea’s missile forces are arranged into three main belts: Tactical, Operational, and Strategic. The Tactical and Operational belts are for short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and are located nearest the DMZ. The Strategic Belt is located across the northern part of the country and is where their intercontinental ballistic missiles are deployed. Jangjin is located in the Strategic Belt but does not have any known ICBMs. However, this makes sense from a security standpoint, as the base is situated beyond the range limit of South Korea’s operational missile arsenal at the time of the base’s construction.

If not a training base, another possibility (though unlikely) is that Jangjin is actually a decoy site to fool foreign intelligence agencies into thinking North Korea has a larger force than they really do. Of course, after being around for so many years and with very little mock operations occurring to fool foreign observers, such a decoy site would quickly be identified as such and it would no longer serve a useful purpose. 

North Korea does have up to 10 decoy surface-to-air missile batteries, but I am not aware of any fake ballistic missile sites in the country or anywhere else. 

If it is indeed a training facility, the Jangjin site fits within the logical development course of a missile program and it takes its place within a large network of related infrastructure that analysts are still trying to fully uncover.


I haven’t been able to find any public information about this facility and those whom I have asked about it were either unaware of its existence or only knew that “something” was in the area. One of the purposes of AccessDPRK is to provide what information can be found and then to ask the public to do their own digging and to work collaboratively so that ever more information becomes available. If you know anything more about this facility or think I have gotten something wrong, please share.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Amanda O., GreatPoppo, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Planefag, Russ Johnson, and ZS.

--Jacob Bogle, 7/24/2021