Friday, January 31, 2020

North Korea and the Coronavirus



On January 22, 2020, North Korea closed its borders to international tourism (primarily because China is the biggest source of foreign tourists) and has since begun to consider halting domestic tourism within the country as well should it be deemed necessary. The country has also started work, albeit limited, with the World Health Organization.

Pro-Pyongyang groups like the Korean Friendship Association have praised these measures and described them as proof of the regime's care for its people. Indeed, North Korea has a long history of closing its borders during other outbreaks. The reality, however, is somewhat more pragmatic and less about the fatherly love of Kim Jong Un.

Like many communist countries, North Korea built hospitals all over the country in the early years after its founding and used that to promote the morality of their ideology compared to the "exploitative" healthcare systems of other countries. What gets lost in the propaganda is the true nature of those hospitals.

North Korea allegedly has hospitals in every town and anytime a major health facility is constructed, you'll see images of the Great Leader walking around and giving "guidance" regarding every aspect of construction, operation, and even aesthetic appeal. In recent years there has been a new eye care facility, a maternity hospital, and a new general hospital constructed in Pyongyang. Even a large medical device factory near Huichon was completely reconstructed to improve their products. 

At the same time, the country has long been struggling to contain highly infectious tuberculosis outbreaks. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2018 the DPRK had 131,000 new cases of TB, in a country with a population of 25 million. Some 20,000 died (increasing each year since 2016). The country's treatment coverage rate is 69%, compared to China's treatment coverage rate of 92% and Russia's 99%. The United States with its 315 million people recorded only 9,025 cases.

While TB is indeed very contagious, its early-stage treatment is relatively straightforward and there are several outside organizations trying to help, including the Eugene Bell Foundation which focuses on the more difficult and expensive treatment of drug-resistant TB (which makes up ~4% of TB cases in the country). Yet, the death rate keeps climbing. The driving force behind North Korea's inability to control the crisis is undernourishment compounded by an inadequate medical sector. 

Undernourishment has been an ongoing problem for the country since the early 1990s. Despite the end of a nationwide famine in 1998, in some provinces as many as 32% of children under 5 years suffer from stunted growth as a result of nutritional deficiencies. This multi-generational problem even led to the North Korean military being forced to lower height and weight requirements to reflect this reality in order to meet recruitment demands.

Besides stunted growth, lack of adequate food can greatly increase one's risk of illness. Something like the annual flu becomes a much harder fight and fatality rates for at-risk populations (the very young, old, and those with other illnesses) skyrocket. This fact is also mirrored in the fatality rates of other coronaviruses such as SARS and MERS. The average death rate for SARS was 11% but jumped to nearly 50% for those over the age of 65.

Such disparities in fatality rates apply to all diseases and can be seen in all countries, but the additional stress of not having enough food or bodily energy reserves magnifies the risk of both getting infected and of dying.

This brings me back to the hospitals of North Korea. 

The state of North Korea's healthcare infrastructure is among the least capable and prepared in the world. Local "hospitals" would hardly be recognizable to many westerners and are little more than clinics where you're just as likely to find odd assortments of herbs as you are to find medicine. This reliance on traditional therapies in a modern, "scientific" socialist state is because even basic medical supplies are in short supply or nonexistent in rural areas. 

Unfortunately, international actions against the North Korean government have only worsened the health crisis. After a new round of sanctions, the country's only WHO-certified pharmaceutical manufacturer closed down in 2017. 

This shortage of fundamental medicines like antibiotics and pain relievers only serves to exacerbate outbreaks of disease and lowers recovery outcomes.

The only moderately well-provisioned hospitals in the country are in provincial capitals and the national capital of Pyongyang. However, these services are not free. Regardless of the legal guarantee to free healthcare, patients have to pay for everything from the needle used in an IV to providing their own meals if hospitalized. This is out of reach for the average citizen. Making things worse is the rationing of medications and equipment. The very best is held back for use only by the county's tiny elite and to be used by foreigners (who also have to pay). 

In view of North Korea's inability to provide adequate care to their own citizens without international support, let alone during an outbreak of a new virus, the decision to halt foreign tourism becomes about the fear of national survival. However, nations require more than just people to survive. The other thing to consider when trying to understand the actions taken by Pyongyang, is the fact that only tourism was stopped. Not trade.

Each year tens of thousands of Chinese tourists visit the country. But each year countless more thousands of North Korean citizens come in contact with further thousands of Chinese traders and businessmen. While the risk of an outbreak could threaten the North Korean state, ending trade with China would end the state. Thus, Pyongyang took a calculated risk. Lower the chances of the virus spreading by ending tourism but allow the risks stemming from trade because the country would quickly come to a halt without Chinese goods and the foreign currency generated through trade.

All of this comes not long after North Korea announced it would seek to create a medical tourism sector. This announcement came last year and was intended to begin this year. In a country where antibiotics are largely absent, aspirin is held dear, and where rumors of surgeries being performed without anesthesia routinely pop up, the regime thought it was best to use their medical resources to give outsiders new dental work and eye lifts.

The desire to become a medical tourism destination is rooted in the desire of the regime to make the money it needs to survive. Likewise, allowing person-to-person trade across borders is about maintaining the system. The risk of spreading infections is a secondary consideration. The real motivation is regime survival.

The state can survive a short-term hold on tourism, it can also survive having a few people receive amputations when a $0.05/dose antibiotic could have saved a limb or having a few people get sick from a virus which is much less deadly than SARS. The state can't survive, however, without the cash needed to fund its military or to buy the loyalty of elite families, and Pyongyang is still busy ensuring those activities continue with as little disturbance as possible.


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/30/2020

Friday, January 17, 2020

Work on Major Hovercraft Base Advances

Image of 2016 landing exercises using hovercraft. | Photo: Rodong Sinmun
I recently wrote about an ongoing trend under Kim Jong Un to vastly overhaul every branch of the country's military, and this, of course, includes the construction of new naval bases and the redeployment of equipment.

High-speed hovercraft play a key role in North Korea's special operations forces (SOF). Beginning in the 1980s, the Korean People's Navy (KPN) started slowly improving its capabilities to quickly attack or infiltrate South Korean targets and by the mid-1990s their hovercraft inventory reached ~140 craft (a number which has largely remained stable over the years). While the KPN’s inventory may have remained somewhat stable, a number of new naval bases and related facilities have been under construction (or expansion) since Kim Jong Un came to power. One such base is near the small village of Yonbong-ni (37.9071°, 125.2242°).


Starting around March 2014 constructed began on this new hovercraft base. The Yonbong-ni facility compliments two others that were completed ca. 2012-2013. However, Yonbong-ni (once completed) will be much larger than the other two and, at 22 miles from the Northern Limit Line, will also be the most forward-deployed hovercraft base and one of the most forward-deployed naval bases North Korea has. (There is a small naval facility on Sunwi Island which lies 11 km from the NLL.)

The first indication of the base's construction was the placement of a small earthen dam across an inlet to moderate the flow of water into the bay from the mainland. I'd like to note that while the base's location may seem fairly remote, from the dam, it is less than 2 km away from a long-standing patrol boat station to the west.


By October 2015, commercial satellite imagery showed an apparent administrative area under construction as well as the excavation of seven hovercraft storage bays into the side of a hill (in three groupings of two and an individual one, located immediately east and south of the dam).

Part of the national coastal barrier was also in the process of being demolished which would otherwise have blocked access to the sea.

October 4, 2015 image showing the initial excavation of the hovercraft housing bays and the location of the old barrier.

Fast forward to April 2018, and a total of 54 individual housing bays were in various stages of construction, foundations for additional support facilities had been laid, and a seawall and small pier were also constructed. Several bays also had concrete walls built and their entrance structures completed. The entrance structures also allow for on-site maintenance instead of needing to move the hovercraft around various other parts of this rather expansive base.

By April 2018 construction had begun on three large groupings of housing bays as well as support facilities across the base.

At the same time, approximately 560 meters of sea wall had been put in place as well as a pier.

By October 2018, additional foundation work at various sites within the base had been carried out, as well as some further construction of other buildings.



However, the most recent Google Earth imagery (Nov. 6, 2019) shows a mixed picture.

Two bays have been completed with roof framing added to another set of two bays. Four additional bays have had their side walls constructed as well, and the temporary worker's quarters still exists.
At the same time, none of the administration or support buildings have been completed and some of the bays still haven't been fully excavated. In fact, some sites appear to be neglected and overgrown.

In this image, the original three sets of two bays are nearing completion. The left-most bay is finished and covered in dirt, the middle bay has framing installed for the roof, and the far-right bay doesn't have framing but does have its side walls and entrance structure completed. These three sets are the only ones with their entrance & maintenance structures in place.

In this image you can see the partial construction of three sets of two bays and the incomplete excavations of four bays on the far left. 

Despite construction elsewhere, these two sets of four storage bays seem to have been neglected and are overgrown with grass and shrubs.

The partial neglect of certain areas of the base appears to extend to the largest group of housing bays as well.

In this image, room for up to 18 individual hovercraft shelters has been partially excavated but none have been completed. Four barracks/support buildings were halfway built by mid-to-late 2018 but no further work has been carried out on them in the year or so since. However, a small area of newer work (new since Oct. 2018) can be seen to the left of the barracks.

Additionally, the temporary housing and warehouses used for construction still exists regardless of the construction slowdown.

Construction has certainly advanced beyond where it was in 2018 but the KPN may have decided to scale-back its initial scope. Another possible explanation for the apparent neglect of some parts of the base is that work began in 2019 on a kilometer-long tidal dam (which may eventually house a hydroelectric station) and personnel may have been redirected to that site to help finish it quickly, as military personnel are often used as general labor. This new dam is located roughly 0.8 km to the north of the northernmost sector of the base.

While the base isn't yet fully finished, the ongoing work at Yonbong-ni and work at military bases around the country demonstrates Pyongyang's continued dedication to their asymmetrical capabilities and their desire to have the capacity to inflict rapid and painful attacks against South Korea, as well as being able to defend their own territorial claims.

According to Joseph Bermudez, who wrote in detail about the initial construction phases of Yonbong-ni and the other hovercraft bases in 2018, the layout of the base "provide[s] significantly better protection from blast and fragmentation damage than any of the existing sheds or shelters found at other hovercraft bases."
Additionally, it offers "the advantage of being able to more easily land an assault force from the south and east without having to pass the heavily defended north side of [Baegnyeong-do]. More significantly, hovercraft from the Yŏnbong-ni base can quickly reach the ROK islands of Daecheong-do (Taech’ŏng-do), Socheong-do (Soch’ŏng-do) and Yeonpyeong-do (Yŏnp’yŏng-do) in approximately 30, 40 and 70 minutes, respectively; and the port city of Incheon can be reached in 90 minutes."

Additional Reading:
For more information on North Korea's hovercraft bases and special operations forces, check out Beyond Parallel's four part series (by Joseph Bermudez): Part IPart IIPart IIIPart IV


I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters: Kbechs87, GreatPoppo, and Planefag.

--Jacob Bogle, 1/16/2020
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