Temporary Border Fence Demolished

During the COVID pandemic, North Korea began to seal off its entire norther border with China and Russia - marking the first time the full northern border has been physically sealed in North Korea's history. 

AccessDPRK has closely monitored the development of the border fence which has undergone several phases of construction since 2020. 

As a quick reminder, to increase security of the border while the primary border fence was being constructed, authorities built at least 950 kilometers of a secondary fence to the rear of the primary fence. Photographs from the Chinese side of the border show that this secondary fence was largely made up of reeds and wood, and it was obvious from its construction quality that it was never intended to be a permanent fixture. 

The secondary fence helped to delineate a "no go" zone and even cut off thousands of hectares of farmland and forest from use in order to allow military construction units the time and space needed to build the far more substantial primary border fence - which is made up of two rows of electrified fencing, uses concrete fence posts, and is secured by thousands of guard posts and numerous patrol paths.

Annotated photo of the DPRK border at Namyang showing the main border fence and the secondary fence made out of reeds. Annotations by AccessDPRK. Photograph comes from Weibo, March 2023. (Click for larger view.)

Google Earth has slowly been updating the available imagery of the border and in the most recent images, the secondary fence has been removed from those sites.

Only a portion of the border has imagery for 2024 and 2025, but locations include (from west to east) the area around the Yalu River estuary at Ryongampo and Sindo (Pidansom) Island, a 10 km section west of Manpo, a 20 km section around the town of Chunggang, and a 29 km section south of Musan. 

Map showing the four areas of interest reviewed for this article.

The imagery around Chunggang and Manpo is from April and October 2024 and shows that the fence was in the process of being removed, but that some segments still remain in place. 

Satellite image from September 2022 showing the secondary border fence near the town of Chunggang (41.788063° 126.933754°). 

Satellite image from April 2024 showing that the secondary fence around Chunggang has been removed, and only the foot path used for border guard patrols remains visible.

Likewise, at the village of Ha-dong (41.094134° 126.172053°) near Manpo, the secondary border fence was removed between 2022 and 2024. 

Satellite image from October 2022 showing the secondary border fence at the village of Ha-dong. In this image you can clearly see the fence crossing across fields and a local stream.

By October 2024, the reed fence had been removed in this area.

Elsewhere along the border, imagery from June 2025 shows that the fence had been almost completely removed at Ryongampo and south of Musan by the middle of 2025, with only a few disconnected segments still being visible. 

October 2022 image of the secondary border fence at the village of Hasimdae, near Musan (42.139535° 129.099791°).

The June 2025 image shows that the fence has been completely removed. 

At Ryongampo, the secondary fence was less complex and was even missing in some areas as late as 2022, likely due to the fact the town is further away from the Chinese mainland. But in the areas where the fence was present, those segments have also been demolished.

A hillside segment of the fence in Ryongampo in April 2022. This segment cut through a small area of traditional burial mounds (unrelated to COVID); they can be more clearly seen in the next image.

The fence is gone by February 2025.

North Korea's largest island, Pidansom (commonly referred to as Sindo) was ringed by over 25 km of secondary fence. 

This particular section of fence was constructed on top of a levee. The multiple, evenly spaced guard posts are also clearly visible.

By February 2025 the fence and guard posts were removed throughout the island.

A partial reed fence was also constructed along parts of the coastline while authorities strengthened the country's coastal barrier as well. This secondary fence was even less substantial than along the northern border, and it passed through marshland foot tracks and along river banks making its path somewhat more difficult to identify, but imagery of more than 60 km of coastline south of Ryongampo, passed Tonchang-ri and the Sohae Satellite Launch Center to the small island of Nabi-do appears to show that the secondary coastal fence in that area has also been removed. 

Although the removal of this fence may sound like a positive development, it signifies that the government has finished construction of the primary border fence and all of the new guard posts, garrisons, and other infrastructure built in the last five years to seal off the country from the outside world.

At the height of construction activity ca. 2021-2022, I estimated that a total of 15,000 guard posts were established. Most were temporary wooden structures, and thousands had already been removed by 2024. But around 5,000 of them were part of the secondary fence system. With those guard posts now gone, border guards can be redirected to the permanent facilities that exist. Additionally, any military personnel that were assigned to the construction and defense of the fence while it was being built can also be sent back to their home units, improving the overall manpower readiness of the KPA.

Based on my research of North Korea's border security and twelve years of observations, this will likely be the last major change to the border fence system for several years.

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make AccessDPRK possible: Donald Pearce, David M., Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Joel Parish, John Pike, Jonathan J., Kbechs87, Raymond Ha, Russ Johnson, Squadfan, and Yong H. 

--Jacob Bogle, September 19, 2025

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Farming on the Frontier

North Korea shares 1,369.3 km of border with China and Russia. Predominately demarcated by the Yalu and Tumen rivers, the border regions are mountainous, with the available farmland often squeezed into thin strips or even onto islands that completely flood every few years.

With a few exceptions, such as the plains around Taehongdan and Onsong, farming in this region doesn't contribute significant amounts to the national food supply. However, they are important locally as are the forests which harbor herbs, mushrooms, and other plants used for food and in traditional medicines, and access to these lands provides additional income to local farmers and foragers. 

But, the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has placed that access at risk.

Through the construction of two layers of border fence, the land in between has become subjected to additional checkpoints, and many of the forests have become completely off limits. 

Farmer and ox cart at the Migok Collective Farm (2008). Image source: Stephan (Flickr), CC BY-SA 2.0.

North Korea has attempted to secure the full border in the past but never succeeded in doing so until COVID-19. Using the pandemic as justification, even the most impassable parts of the border are now fenced off with over 1,000 km of new fencing and thousands of additional guard posts having been constructed.

Even in this mountainous region of North Pyongan Province, where the Yalu swells to over two kilometers wide in some spots, electrified fencing has been erected to prevent anyone from fleeing the country.

As seen in the next image, the double row of fencing cuts through not only mountainous regions but also through farmland, disrupting the typical flow of human activity in those areas.

Detail of the border fence. Location: 42.967323° 129.999220°

Sometimes those fences are separated by only a few meters but in other areas it can be as much as a kilometer. In total, over 260 sq. km. of farmland and forest lies between the two fences, cut off from easy access. 

In this area, 17 sq. km. of land (highlighted in green) have been cut off by the two rows of fencing. 

In other areas, the fences run much closer together. At the narrowest point in this image, they are only 60 meters apart.

The land that has always belonged to official farms continues to be cultivated, even in places where the fences are close together, but the secondary fence prevents farmers from easily accessing that land, placing an additional hardship on them. Furthermore, parts of the border are alleged to hold landmines and the placement of those mines could further complicate the farmers' relationship with the lands they're required to work.

Checkpoint example #1 at 42.540183° 130.443553°.

Checkpoint example #2 at 42.544376° 130.477298°.

Positioned along roads that pass through the secondary fence are small checkpoints to verify the identification of everyone that tries to enter the border region. Not all of the existing road network remains open, however, with the fence just cutting across the road, and closing it. By limiting the number of access points, North Korea can funnel activity through a more manageable number of fence crossings, increasing overall security.

However, the fence doesn't only impact official farms. Illegal plots of farmland (sotoji) have been an integral part of North Korea's black market economy for decades, and they play an important role in supporting local economies and supplementing local food supplies, with corn, cabbage, potatoes, and soybeans being common crops.

Although the land in between the fences (and the illegal farms it holds) no longer appear to be openly accessible, entry to the sotoji could still be possible by bribing checkpoint officers as bribery and corruption is already rife in North Korea. If bribes are required, however, that is yet one more slice of income taken away from farmers (who, in the case of sotoji, could be anyone from professional farmers, teachers, and miners, to retired persons). 

If, however, access to the land has been permanently blocked and many or most of the fields are no longer cultivated, then that will have a direct impact on the many small villages and hamlets that can be found along the border region.

Examples of sotoji found within the fenced area. Location: 40.622524° 125.280157° 

In this area (imaged above) northeast of Pyoktong, North Pyongan Province, sotoji comprise roughly half of the land with forests occupying the other half.

Nationwide, an estimated 550,000 hectares are suspected of being sotoji, and DailyNK estimated that some 20% of all grain grown in the country in 2007 came from these irregular farms. Of course, land use patterns evolve over time, but as Andrei Lankov wrote in 2011, "the percentage of land under the cultivation of sotoji owners roughly equals that under cultivation by state-run farms" in some counties that border China. And, indeed, numerous of these illegal plots can be found within the new border fence area.

Crop yields nationwide have struggled in the last few years, but there haven't been any studies yet that focus on the border area that might tell us how the sotoji have fared with the construction of the border fence.

Whether it's a border blockade cutting off cross-border trade and impacting the lives of thousands living in the villages and hamlets of the area, or whether it's the construction of scores of additional checkpoints between towns and counties, and even surrounding Pyongyang, the government has used the pandemic as an excuse to crack down on human movement in ways greater than ever before.

Unfortunately, the difficulties imposed by the dual-layer border fence system on local populations aren't likely to lessen as authorities continue to extend the state's power over the economy and the freedom of movement. 

I would like to thank my current Patreon supporters who help make all of this possible: Alex Kleinman, Amanda Oh, Donald Pierce, Dylan D, Joe Bishop-Henchman, Jonathan J, Joel Parish, John Pike, Kbechs87, Russ Johnson, and Squadfan.

--Jacob Bogle, 12/22/2023

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